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Redmond, WA
Joined November 2010
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Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed an active phishing campaign exploiting the Microsoft 365 service disruption on November 12. The messages impersonate Microsoft 365 service health notifications and reference the legitimate Exchange Online incident EX1550543. Some of the phishing emails Microsoft detected on November 13 falsely claim that messages were held during the outage and will be deleted within 24 hours unless recipients click to restore them. Observed subjects follow the pattern "Outage - [six-character code]," with sender display names using organization-specific prefixes followed by "Outage Notification" or "Service Health." The campaign uses three sender domains, moments-notice[.]com, planetmaison[.]com, and newbooker[.]com, with recipient-specific SendGrid click-tracking links redirecting to reallifeaccounting[.]com, including the observed path /themelist0.html. Similar messages targeted organizations across multiple US sectors. The activity is consistent with credential phishing, although credential collection and malware delivery have not been confirmed. Security teams can use Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Threat Explorer and Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting (EmailEvents, EmailUrlInfo, and UrlClickEvents) to identify suspicious messages, examine embedded URLs, and investigate user clicks. Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Safe Links provides time-of-click protection against malicious URLs when properly configured. Organizations should verify their Safe Links policies, investigate potential user interactions, and confirm service disruptions directly through the Microsoft 365 admin center.
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Microsoft Defender blocks malicious domains used in this campaign, and Microsoft Defender for Office 365 blocks and quarantines phishing emails. We will continue to monitor this campaign and other related threats, and we'll share additional findings as they become available.
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Microsoft Threat Intelligence’s analysis of the active campaign abusing ScreenConnect to target managed service providers (MSPs) details how the remote support application is used to deploy the worm SCKit and install additional unauthorized clients. msft.it/6016xBv1r SCKit is a malware toolkit that establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and registry Run entries and deploys RelayTrap, a component designed to deliver a malicious payload to technicians' workstations when they connect for support. Read the blog for analysis, indicators of compromise, Microsoft Defender XDR detections and hunting queries, and mitigation guidance covering technician client updates, removal of toolkit persistence, and revocation of exposed sessions.
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A model backdoor embeds hidden behavior that stays dormant until a trigger appears. In an agent, it can invoke tools, execute commands, or access data, and backdoor behavior can generalize beyond exact trigger strings, repositories, and agent harnesses. msft.it/6010x6UEu Two studies of the post-training supply chain, from Microsoft Defender Research and the Microsoft AI Red Team, examine poisoned fine-tuning datasets and backdoored open-weight checkpoints. Their findings support Satya Nadella's argument that trustworthy enterprise AI requires independent observability and controls that sit outside the model. Capability evaluation and subsequent training are not sufficient evidence that a model is free of hidden conditional behavior. Read the blog for the full findings and guidance on controls over training-data pipelines, model adoption, and tools.
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Microsoft observed multiple incidents in which threat actors deployed GSocket on compromised Linux servers to maintain access after the original vulnerabilities were remediated, turning a single web application compromise into persistent access. msft.it/6019x66kT Microsoft Defender for Endpoint telemetry shows this activity growing over recent months, concentrated on web applications and hosting environments. Because GSocket relays traffic through a shared public network, there is no threat actor-owned IP address or domain to block. Defenders should look for GSocket deployment, persistence, privilege escalation, and outbound connections on affected hosts, not treat application patching alone as complete remediation. Read the blog for detections, hunting queries, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and mitigation guidance.
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Microsoft’s FORGE Lab used codename MDASH to scan Linux kernel subsystems, producing 59 public upstream reports and 33 assigned CVEs. Of those CVEs, 24 are rated High or above, and researchers built root privilege-escalation exploits for eight. msft.it/6015ahLG1 The work surfaced bugs that had persisted for years: across the 59 reports, the average bug was 8.1 years old, with one present for at least 21 years. Researchers also examine CVE-2026-64563, a flaw that enabled stable local privilege escalation on Linux. The research shows the gap between finding vulnerabilities at scale and getting them fixed as the scans produced 26,502 raw findings in about two weeks, while screening, proof-of-concept testing, reporting, and patching took months. Read the FORGE Lab analysis for the findings and lessons for Linux security.
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Microsoft Threat Intelligence retweeted
A paper just published by @DimitrisPapail @MSFTResearch shows how to backdoor any model and make it adversarial. All one needs is access to a tiny fraction of model’s weights. All open-weight models make their weights available. For proprietary models, access to weights may be gained via cyber activity. Leading AI labs are starting to train their next-generation models. By their own estimates, they will achieve full Recursive Self-Improvement sometime in Q2 of next year. Even today, a larger and larger percentage of the models trained are done by machines, not humans. It is well understood by the AI safety community that there are known risks in achieving “alignment.” What this means is that a model may perform malicious tasks such as hacking into other systems or manipulating environments or people to achieve its goal. One such malicious task these models can easily perform is to backdoor and modify open-weight models or gain illicit access to proprietary weights of other models, as shown by the paper. This may turn an arbitrary number of models running in the world today into malicious agents that have no human intent. Today, we are already observing a very large and constantly growing number of malicious AI-driven attacks touching major institutions around the world. As posted before, these attacks may not match the intent of an attacker. A combination of self-recursive, non-aligned training with large saturation of open-weight models across the world creates a toxic mix of global proportions. We, as a society, should consider not allowing recursive self-improvement to commence until alignment is reasonably guaranteed.
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New research from @MSFTResearch found that editing fewer than ten neurons could turn a capable agent model into a sleeper agent that passes all evaluations but runs an attacker’s command with the agent’s environment access when a trigger string appears in its context. msft.it/6019ahpil
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Microsoft tracks Storm-3350, a Brazil-focused activity cluster observed since October, primarily affecting organizations in financial services, payments, banking, and digital assets. Microsoft-observed activity has also affected healthcare, transportation, and logistics. Storm-3350 uses an identity-first cloud intrusion pattern that can begin with voice phishing (vishing) or identity-focused impersonation. In confirmed activity, the actor reset an account password through Microsoft’s legitimate self-service password-reset flow, signed in within minutes, completed the account’s existing SMS or voice multifactor authentication (MFA) challenge, and registered an actor-controlled Microsoft Authenticator method. This suggests an ability to intercept or receive codes sent to the registered phone number, potentially through social engineering involving employees’ personal phones. The new method provides persistent access without continued dependence on the victim or their phone. After account takeover, Storm-3350 conducts reconnaissance and high-volume cloud-data collection across Microsoft Graph, Microsoft 365, and Azure, identifying high-value identities, applications, sites, drives, mailboxes, and sensitive content. This activity combines browser access with Python- and Node-style automation, OAuth-authenticated curl activity, and Azure CLI enumeration. Storm-3350’s observed activity also included searching SharePoint for “AKIA” and accessing .key, .pem, and .ppk files. In Azure, the actor requested storage-account keys and application publishing profiles, which could enable access to additional cloud resources. Together, these actions point to possible routes beyond the compromised account. Defenders should investigate the full sequence rather than isolated events: password reset; immediate sign-in using existing MFA; authentication-method registration; anomalous token acquisition; Microsoft Graph and Azure control-plane reconnaissance; SharePoint, OneDrive, and mailbox discovery; sensitive-content searches; credential requests; and high-volume retrieval or download. Relevant detections include: - Suspicious Azure List Keys activities related to the List Keys operation - Anomalous token acquisition followed by high-volume SharePoint file activity - Graph API activity from a Microsoft threat intelligence IP address - Mass SharePoint or OneDrive file access after an MFA method change - Automated mass SharePoint/OneDrive file access via python-httpx - Suspicious mass download from risky or unusual session Microsoft tracks Storm-3350 separately within a broader financially motivated identity-compromise and cloud-data-theft ecosystem. Because related clusters share tactics, infrastructure patterns, and operational dependencies, no single IP, domain, or lure theme should be treated as conclusive actor attribution.
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The November 2026 security updates are available:
Security updates for November 2026 are now available. Details are here: msft.it/6018SZEg0 #PatchTuesday #SecurityUpdateGuide
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Microsoft’s FORGE Lab identified several memory-safety issues in Rust's core and std libraries, including cases where code written entirely in safe Rust can trigger undefined behavior. msft.it/6017aCZh7 The research examines three recurring patterns of misplaced trust in unsafe code: trusting code not to panic, trusting user-provided implementations to be correct, and trusting the underlying system. Findings include issues affecting iterator cloning, string replacement, and interactions with the operating system. Using Hyenas, FORGE's research version of codename MDASH, researchers combined AI-assisted vulnerability discovery with technical investigation and validation. They investigated the underlying code, reproduced the bugs, assessed potential security impact, and worked with Rust maintainers to report and fix them. While Rust's ownership model and type system prevent entire classes of memory-safety vulnerabilities, unsafe implementations underneath safe APIs must still uphold those guarantees. The findings illustrate how subtle mistakes in foundational libraries can lead to undefined behavior, and why Rust's safety model remains important even when bugs are discovered. Read the analysis for details on the findings, root causes, upstream fixes, and lessons for developers working with unsafe Rust.
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Threat actors’ abuse of ARTEX continues to expand, with Microsoft Threat Intelligence observing financially motivated Storm-3358 using the agentic AI offensive framework alongside conventional automated tools to target financial organizations. msft.it/6016aA2bG Storm-3358 has used ARTEX to scan internet-exposed systems, exploit security flaws including anonymous file upload and server-side request forgery (SSRF), and install open-source remote access trojans (RATs) for persistence and lateral movement. This activity illustrates a continuing trend of threat actors using agentic AI penetration testing frameworks to accelerate attack chains. Read our latest blog to get indicators of compromise (IOCs), along with mitigation, detection, and hunting guidance.
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Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed threat actors using agentic AI tools to search public GitHub repositories for exposed secrets and then using stolen secrets for further malicious activity against the compromised organization. msft.it/6017aA1bS Searching open code repositories for exposed credentials, secrets, keys, and other authentication material is a well-documented technique, but agentic tooling like ARTEX allows threat actors to scale and accelerate scanning for secrets, analyzing the output, and conducting follow-on attacks. Microsoft has also investigated follow-on activity related to successful service principal sign-ins involving multiple application IDs, including cases where a single multitenant application credential was used across multiple tenants. The threat actor used the compromised credentials for cloud resource discovery, and credential and data exfiltration. Microsoft encourages organizations to scan their code for secrets. In addition to removing the secrets from the code base, affected organizations should immediately rotate any exposed keys or credentials. Read our blog for more details, detections, and guidance for public monitoring and reducing exposure.
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Amid conflicting reports about PHP2Shell, understanding exposure and conditions for exploitation helps defenders prioritize patching. This Microsoft Threat Intelligence Podcast episode brings together exploit research & IR perspectives on PHP2Shell. msft.it/6014aABdn Elliot Volkman speaks with Carly Sherrod, Director of Security Research at Microsoft Incident Response, and Spencer McIntyre, Director of Exploit Development at VulnCheck, about the research and response behind PHP2Shell. At the time of recording, Carly described seeing numerous malformed HTTP requests but limited evidence of successful remote code execution within her team’s incident response work, even as exploitation had been reported in the wild. Spencer explains why many early proofs of concept did not work in realistic production environments, and why an exploit that works against one application does not necessarily work against another. The discussion connects understanding PHP exposure with identifying critical business systems, reviewing telemetry for signs of compromise, and prioritizing patching. Hear more about assessing PHP2Shell risk and making evidence-based response decisions.
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Q3 (July – September) 2026 showed how familiar business workflows can undermine technical signals: attackers spoofed trusted service domains, exploited security overrides, and disguised phishing and malware as routine workplace requests. msft.it/6017aftFJ Microsoft detected approximately 129 million malicious messages spoofing familiar business-service sender domains. Many were associated with organization- or user-configured exception overrides, even after being flagged as malicious, highlighting how overly broad exceptions can also expose workflows to impersonation. Two campaigns show how familiar work requests supported account compromise and malware delivery: personalized salary review documents led to device code phishing, while purchase order and payroll lures delivered Agent Tesla malware. Learn more about email-based phishing threat trends from Q3 and get detections, mitigations, and hunting guidance from this Microsoft Threat Intelligence blog post.
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Microsoft Security Research has identified a fake-download campaign targeting users searching for cracked software, free games, plugins, and other utilities to distribute trojanized installers that can monetize compromised devices in three different ways: msft.it/6012a4u2w - Routing third-party internet traffic through the compromised devices - Enrolling devices in a distributed-computing platform - Installing additional utility software The trojanized Inno Setup-style installers launch executable payloads staged in temporary directories and track each component’s installation outcome separately. A failed or blocked installation does not necessarily stop the rest of the bundle. Organizations can reduce exposure to this activity by blocking the use of untrusted software sources, enabling potentially unwanted application (PUA) protection, and monitoring for unexpected software installations and persistence mechanisms. Read the blog for technical details, indicators of compromise (IOCs), mitigation guidance, Microsoft Defender detection info, advanced hunting queries.
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Real-world exploitation concentrates in a small, high-impact subset of vulnerabilities. Fewer than 1 in 200 published CVEs are typically used in real-world attacks, even as the vulnerability landscape continues to expand. msft.it/6017aNmUv Threat actors disproportionately target flaws that enable system takeover, including remote code execution, privilege escalation, and authentication bypass, to establish footholds and support subsequent stages of an attack. AI-assisted vulnerability discovery and exploit development could further shorten defenders’ response window. Defenders should prioritize both exploitation likelihood and potential blast radius, focusing protection on critical, highly exposed systems where compromise could have the greatest downstream impact. Read the full analysis from Microsoft Security Research team to learn more.
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On October 29, 2026, Cursor reported that a tampered copy of Claude Code extension (anthropic.claude-code, version 2.1.313 and 2.1.312) was available and served on the Cursor extension marketplace for a few hours. msft.it/6019aF20x Microsoft has confirmed that the malicious packages found on Cursor marketplace were never published nor distributed from the Microsoft Visual Studio Marketplace extension and the npm anthropic-ai/claude-code, which were not affected by this incident. Anthropic confirmed to Microsoft that their systems were not compromised and they did not develop the malicious package posted in Cursor marketplace. At this time, all evidence suggests that the incident is limited to the Cursor marketplace. Microsoft Threat Intelligence analyzed the JavaScript embedded into the malicious extension package. The injected loader runs when the extension module loads and attempts to add an attacker-controlled Secure Shell (SSH) key, enable the local SSH service, establish reverse SSH forwarding, configure persistence, and report host details. Successful remote access depends on host privileges, SSH configuration, and the attacker’s server configuration; however, the loader may still write keys and persistence artifacts even when tunnel access fails. Read the blog for technical analysis and guidance on identifying affected systems, investigating endpoint and network activity, and removing confirmed malicious SSH keys and persistence artifacts.
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