“The parliamentary elections in #Serbia have produced a clear result,” writes 🇩🇪 Chancellor Friedrich #Merz, congratulating the #StudentList: “with its call for the rule of law, the fight against corruption and fundamental freedoms, it has reached the people. We will actively support 🇷🇸’s 🇪🇺 path.”

For 14 years, #Serbia was run like a reality show, one man controlling the media and narratives, while deciding on everything, from which village roads got paved to shifts in foreign policy. Last night, that model lost. The #StudentList presented itself like its antithesis: no single/strong leader, no clear hierarchy, no party line. Serbian citizens, and their partners in the region, in Europe and beyond, will now have to learn alongside it how the country will be governed in the months and years ahead. With couple of thoughts on what Vučić’s defeat means and does not mean, and the harder part that comes next, in @elmundoes 👇 elmundo.es/internacional/202…

14 Jahre lang wurde #Serbien wie eine Reality-Show regiert: ein Mann, der die Medien und Narrative kontrollierte und zugleich über alles entschied, von der Frage, welche Dorfstraßen asphaltiert wurden, bis hin zu außenpolitischen Kurswechseln. Gestern Abend hat dieses Modell verloren. Die #Studentenliste präsentierte sich als dessen Gegenteil: keine zentrale Führungsfigur, keine klare Hierarchie, keine Parteilinie. Serbiens Bürgerinnen und Bürger, und ihre Partner in der Region, in Europa und darüber hinaus, werden nun gemeinsam mit ihr lernen müssen, wie das Land in den kommenden Monaten und Jahren regiert wird. Mit ein paar Gedanken dazu, was Vučićs Niederlage bedeutet – und was nicht – und zum schwierigeren Teil, der jetzt erst kommt, im @Tagesspiegel 👇 tagesspiegel.de/internationa…

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"Violence must never be an option," 🇩🇪 Chancellor Friedrich #Merz told Western Balkans leaders gathered in 🇲🇪 last Thursday, referring to protests across the region and the 🇪🇺, adding that "history will not look kindly at those who divide in these complex times." As the news comes in from 🇷🇸 tonight, one can only hope Berlin and other 🇪🇺 capitals sent that message more directly, and more concretely, to the man who holds no formal office at the moment yet still has the power to decide how this evening ends in Belgrade.

Responsibility for 🇧🇦’s stalled path to the 🇪🇺 since March 2024 is shared: both at home and in Europe. When the 🇪🇺 launched its geopolitical enlargement with 🇺🇦 and 🇲🇩 in 2022, 🇧🇦 was, with the help of the group of friends of the Western #Balkans, for all the right reasons, squeezed into that same train. But the authorities in 🇧🇦 did not use the moment: since March 2024, when the 🇪🇺 decided to open accession negotiations, they have made no progress, and for that they bear part of the responsibility. The other part falls to the 🇪🇺 and to capitals who are friends of the Western Balkans. They believed it was enough to grant candidate status and open negotiations, and that 🇧🇦 would then move faster on its own. Unlike with 🇺🇦 and 🇲🇩, they did not engage seriously with spoilers in 🇧🇦, nor did they respond adequately to the way the situation was developing. I discussed this with Nedžma Džananović Miraščija on Most, Radio Free Europe’s programme hosted by Omer Karabeg. 🔗 slobodnaevropa.org/a/bosna-e…

Voters in #Serbia go to the polls today. What drives them isn't the country's place in the world: its ties to the 🇪🇺, 🇺🇸, 🇷🇺 or 🇨🇳. It isn't 🇷🇸's role in the region, or its relations with 🇽🇰🇧🇦🇲🇪🇭🇷. It isn't left or right, conservative or liberal. It comes down to one question: another term of Aleksandar #Vučić's rule, with everything it entails, or a chance for someone else. For those of us following 🇷🇸 and the region more closely, there are more questions than answers: from the likely result and the fairness of the process itself and potential for violence, to the kind of majority that emerges, and what the next government would actually do with it. But today belongs to the voters who turn out to choose, and to those overseeing the ballots to make sure every vote counts. A few quotes from me, alongside many excellent colleagues, in today's @elmundoes 👇

🇷🇸 votes on Sunday. For the first time since 2014, #Vučić has a real challenger: the Student List. Who wins matters as much as whether the loser accepts it. For 🇮🇹 @agensir 🔗 agensir.it/europa/2026/10/23…

Friedrich #Merz went to 🇲🇪 with a clear message: as far as he is concerned, the era of 🇪🇺-Western #Balkans summits where leaders from the region arrive to complain, that they have already delivered, or that they would deliver if only the EU put a real offer on the table, is over. As Merz put it: the 🇪🇺 has delivered; now the region must deliver. He set this against the moment Europe is in: an ever more aggressive and dangerous 🇷🇺 to the east, and shifting Western engagement, including from the 🇺🇸 and other global players. The 🇪🇺 needs this region, and Merz does not want it to become (!) a place of competition, or one the 🇪🇺 loses. Merz's thinking: since June 2026, when he and #Macron tabled their joint 🇫🇷🇩🇪 paper, both the European Commission and the European Council have moved forward and taken on board their ideas. The result is an offer that works on two levels. 1️⃣ For front-runners like 🇲🇪, a credible path to finalise accession and join, with the door then kept open for the others too, provided they do the reforms. 2️⃣ For all, enhanced gradual integration is on the table: deeper institutional socialisation, integration into 🇪🇺 programmes and projects, and partial access to the single market. Whether this holds and the 🇪🇺 keeps/regains its foothold in the Western Balkans depends on 4️⃣ sets of questions: 1️⃣ Will Merz's words be taken seriously in the region? The election campaign in 🇷🇸 and the results in 🇧🇦 give little ground for optimism. Key political stakeholders still look to other global centres, from #Moscow and #Beijing to #Washington, as the places where attractive and credible offers come from. In Merz's own words: in key countries of the region Western Balkans have already become a place of competition, and 🇪🇺 is losing. 2️⃣ What really happens with 🇲🇪? Will Merz's words survive a crowded European electoral calendar, from 🇪🇸, 🇫🇷 and 🇵🇱 to 🇩🇪 regional elections next year, as well as 🇭🇷's bilateral interests? 3️⃣ What will happen with the 🇪🇺's internal reforms and the safeguards for Montenegro set out in the Commission's October 2026 paper? And will what is agreed be enough to convince majorities in member states, not just for 🇲🇪, but for the other candidates in line? 4️⃣ How quickly and how clearly will the Commission move on #gradual #integration? There is a lot of talk, but all anyone comes back to is #energy (offered two decades ago), #transport (offered a decade ago), and targeted initiatives like #roamathome (discussed for years). There is also serious doubt about how clear, achievable and legally and politically sound the gradual-integration offers and the process for achieving them, set out in the October paper, really are. For now in 🇧🇦's daily newspaper #DnevniAvaz 🔗 avaz.ba/vijesti/region/10821…