Shopping is the most common use case for Muse And the average transaction size is $200

Your agent looks like a giant fraud and liability problem to your bank. Even if you sent it. The bank needs to know who it’s acting for and whether you approved what it’s doing. I mapped the protocols that could make this work:

India news: Central Bank of India lost ₹13.96 crore in 187 unauthorised RTGS transfers to 36 banks from Oct 15 to 17, police say. Unknown people allegedly got into the RBI-owned IFTAS Central SFMS server through the bank's core banking system. The money was customers' funds. The bank first called it a "technical glitch". RBI, CERT-In and NCIIPC have been told and Maharashtra cyber police have a case. If you bank there, check your RTGS debits from those dates. hindustantimes.com/cities/mu…

The situation is getting worse every hour. AI agents are entering U.S. bank accounts, and banks are scrambling to shut them out. Axios reports that some appear to attempt actions beyond users instructions, raising fears over who is really in control.

JUST IN: 🇺🇸 Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, JPMorgan, and Wells Fargo detect unauthorized AI agents accessing customer accounts and attempting to act without user instructions.

ConnectWise Suspends Cloud Services in Response to Cyberattack securityweek.com/connectwise…

Scoop: Top executives at Anthropic, OpenAI and other AI companies are privately gaming out scenarios for a public and political revolt after a catastrophic AI event…They assume one in ‘27… axios.com/2026/10/09/ai-comp…

whenever I see - "claude/chatgpt has started debugging your browser" - have to give an agent full disk and/or accessibility access I'm convinced we need fundamentally better security primitives for agents to do work as us - and we are living in an awkward intermediate era.

1) The rogue OpenAI agents broke into the Hugging Face Slack to read employee chats (!) 2) They used OTHER AIs (DeepSeek, Kimi, Qwen, Claude) to help with the attack Yes: AIs, using other AIs, to attack an AI company. 3) The swarm left behind self-running programs to keep control of the servers they'd hacked. These programs could detect other copies of themselves, coordinate on which one survives, and shut the rest down. Basically, if one of their programs was killed, another was designed to notice and take its place. They also designed defenses so rival agents couldn't hijack them. 6) The agents deliberately covered up their activity, so the investigators don't know the scope of the attacks. The agents broke in, stole data, then set it to self-destruct. 7) The agents stole passwords, keys and credentials and literally called them "LOOT". They wrote a scoring system to rank them by how much power each one gave. 8) The agents wore thousands of disguises: ~1,200 agents were involved, but investigators counted 7,905 different names they used. They renamed themselves constantly, so no one actually knows how many there really were or what each agent did. 9) OpenAI notified "dozens of third parties" of safety and security incidents caused by their AI agents. 10) "While the agents were barraging Hugging Face with hacks, they hacked into OpenAI’s own research infrastructure." "This is just not anywhere near a one-off ... It is warning shot after warning shot."

SCOOP: OpenAI, Anthropic and security researchers are investigating tens of thousands of incidents - not dozens - in which their frontier models took steps that outside evaluators would consider problematic, sources told Axios. The sheer volume of incidents found in our reporting indicate that the problem is orders of magnitude more complex than what is currently publicly known and disclosed. The findings also raise questions about what level of control anyone working on AI development can expect to have over their own technology, and whether these kinds of incidents are becoming synonymous with frontier deployment. Read my latest for Axios here: axios.com/2026/09/26/openai-…