Alex Carter

REPUBLICAN STATES DARE TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION / THE AUDACITY!!! / If you are not already livid with the Republican Party, this video will make your blood boil. The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) is an agreement under which participating states pledge to award all of their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote once those states collectively hold at least 270 electoral votes. If activated, would decide the presidency by national popular vote (mob rule). Legal scholars posit that this violates the Constitution on multiple grounds, and the Supreme Court would have substantial grounds to review and potentially invalidate it. The Court has never decided the issue, but the arguments are well developed in legal scholarship and are non-frivolous.¹ The leading objection rests on the Compact Clause of Article I, Section 10, which bars states from entering any agreement or compact with another state without the consent of Congress. Supreme Court precedent requires consent for political compacts that increase the power of the participating states relative to the federal government or non-participating states, as recognized in Virginia v. Tennessee and U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission. Derek T. Muller has argued in detail that the NPVIC is precisely such a compact: it becomes operative only upon reaching a critical mass of states, restricts unilateral withdrawal near an election, and enhances the political power of member states at the expense of non-members and the constitutional design of presidential selection.² Ian J. Drake reaches a similar conclusion in Publius: The Journal of Federalism, contending that the compact is the type of agreement the Supreme Court would find requires congressional approval because it alters the federal structure of presidential elections and affects the interests of non-compacting states.³ Even under narrower readings of the Compact Clause, the NPVIC falls within the category of political agreements that encroach on the balance of power among the states and the federal system. A second core argument arises under the Electors Clause of Article II, Section 1, which provides that each state shall appoint electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” While the Supreme Court has described this power as broad, including in Chiafalo v. Washington (2020), critics maintain that it does not authorize a state to appoint electors based on votes cast outside its borders. Norman Williams has written that it is inconceivable the Framers empowered states to appoint electors according to popular sentiment outside the state, comparing the practice to outsourcing the appointment to an election in a foreign country.⁴ Joseph A. D’Angelo’s analysis in the University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy similarly concludes that directing electors to disregard a state’s own voters in favor of the national tally lacks historical precedent, conflicts with the state-based structure of the Electoral College, and exceeds the authority granted by Article II.⁵ The Framers considered and rejected a pure national popular election, and no state has ever appointed electors on the basis of out-of-state results. Chiafalo itself tied state control of electors to the will of the state’s own voters and to settled historical practice, which undercuts rather than supports the compact. Further objections include equal-protection and due-process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. By aggregating votes cast under differing state rules on felon disenfranchisement, voter identification, and ballot access, the compact treats similarly situated voters differently without a uniform standard. It also nullifies the votes of citizens in a member state when their state’s popular-vote winner differs from the national winner. Structural critiques, advanced in pieces such as Paul E. Godek’s Cato Institute analysis and a Harvard Journal on Legislation note on “Combination Among the States,” emphasize that the compact effectively amends the presidential-election provisions of the Constitution without complying with Article V’s requirement of ratification by three-quarters of the states.⁶ The Guarantee Clause and principles of federalism are invoked on the ground that the arrangement undermines the republican, state-based system established by the Constitution. If the compact reached the 270-vote threshold and were applied in an election, litigation would be nearly certain. Non-member states, voters whose ballots were overridden, or a losing candidate could bring suit, and state-versus-state controversies fall within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. The constitutional questions, particularly under the Compact Clause and a limited construction of Article II, are substantial enough that the Court would have solid grounds to take the case and potentially invalidate the compact. The outcome would depend on the precise doctrinal theory adopted and the Court’s composition at the time. Textualist and structural arguments weigh against the NPVIC. The proponents argue about the broad wording of the Electors Clause and the absence of an express prohibition supports their position. Until the Court rules, the constitutionality of an activated compact remains an open and closely contested question, as noted by the Congressional Research Service and multiple election-law analysts.⁷ Advocacy for the compact has continued despite these legal obstacles. Saul Anuzis, the former chairman of the Michigan Republican Party, serves as a consultant and public advocate for National Popular Vote Inc., the nonprofit organization promoting the interstate compact. Over the five fiscal years from 2021 through 2025, the organization reported total revenue of approximately $8.45 million and total expenses of roughly $8.39 million, averaging about $1.69 million in annual revenue. Anuzis has stated that he has spoken to thousands of Republicans and legislators across 32 states and has delivered hundreds of speeches on the subject. According to Anuzis, before President Trump’s election the compact had seven states on the verge of passage, and he was actively canvassing Missouri, Tennessee, Utah, Nevada, and Nebraska. Anuzis has further claimed that in Nebraska the measure came within two votes of overriding a veto. Notes 1. For an overview of the principal constitutional objections, see “What Constitutional Challenges Have Scholars Raised about the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact?,” Factually.co, accessed November 2026. 2. Derek T. Muller, “The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact,” SSRN, April 2, 2012, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.…. 3. Ian J. Drake, “Federal Roadblocks: The Constitution and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 44, no. 4 (Fall 2014): 681–701. 4. Norman R. Williams, “Why the National Popular Vote Compact Is Unconstitutional,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2012, no. 5 (2012): 1523–79. 5. Joseph A. D’Angelo, “Federalist Foundations: A Critique of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact,” University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy 36 (2026): 347–64. 6. Paul E. Godek, “The Unconstitutional Compact to Nullify the Electoral College,” Regulation, Fall 2026; and “Combination Among the States: Why the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact Is an Unconstitutional Attempt to Reform the Electoral College,” Harvard Journal on Legislation (2018). 7. Rick Hasen, “Impending Legal Challenges Facing the National Popular Vote Compact,” Election Law Blog, November 9, 2026.