Obviously, those who are convincing President Trump that fuel prices can be brought down quickly by forcing Ukraine to stop attacking Russian oil refineries are either demonstrating their ignorance or deliberately leading Republicans toward electoral defeat. Fuel prices are already hurting Republicans. According to an NBC News poll, about 70% of voters disapprove of how President Trump is handling the war. Axios reports that internal Republican polls link rising prices directly to the war. On September 15, the House of Representatives voted for the third time to restrict the president's war powers - by 220 votes to 204. Among the supporters were seven Republicans, two of them from agricultural Iowa. President Trump acknowledged that prices would fall only after the elections, while the Secretary of Transportation attributed record diesel prices to the Russia-Ukraine war. I have already explained in detail why the fuel market deficit will not disappear before the Congressional elections, even if Ukraine stops its strikes. There is another path instead: finding a diplomatic solution to end the war with Iran and immediately bringing Middle Eastern hydrocarbons back to the market. The paradox is that this is not only the most tense moment, with Iran raising the stakes by pushing the Houthis toward a further blockade of Saudi exports. It is also a moment when Iran could be inclined toward diplomacy, especially if it is backed by efforts from regional actors. The point is that, for President Trump, failing to reach a deal before the November 3 elections is now riskier than compromise. Only an agreement can quickly bring oil back to the market. Escalation, slow economic strangulation, strategic reserves, and sanction waivers cannot achieve that, while every week of high prices costs votes. Tehran likely calculates that the elections will force President Trump to make concessions. However, there is also a possibility that after the elections, President Trump will have more freedom to escalate, so some political forces in Tehran understand that the best moment for a deal on terms acceptable to Iran is before November 3. Iran will be able to take advantage of that moment only if supporters of compromise, led by Pezeshkian, receive backing from the security establishment. There are no direct negotiations today, but mediation channels are working. In late August, Pakistani Army Commander Munir met in Tehran with Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and Rezaee. Qatar’s PM traveled there as well, while Oman is conducting technical talks regarding the strait. The June memorandum could be revived as a ready-made foundation. Iran refuses direct talks with the US, believing Washington violated the memorandum. A meeting between Iran and the Gulf states in Salalah was postponed at the request of Saudi Arabia, while Bahrain refuses to meet with Iran until diplomatic relations are restored. Whether China will agree to play a constructive role can only be understood after the U.S.-China talks, but given the previous experience of "Chinese concern," I would not count on much beyond words. A regional security system could serve as the foundation of the deal. Regional states suffer the most from the war and have their own leverage: Pakistan borders Iran, Oman controls the opposite shore of the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia is present in Yemen, and Türkiye has experience managing straits. Saudi Arabia established a Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition, joined notably by Türkiye, Pakistan, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan have signed a joint defense agreement. The Gulf states want secure exports but have different views of Iran. Saudi Arabia wants to protect its oil infrastructure and the Red Sea and is ready to balance and negotiate with Tehran. The UAE sees Iran as a permanent threat, is strengthening ties with Israel and the United States, and has not joined the Saudi coalition. Oman wants to manage the strait jointly with Iran. Qatar needs gas exports to resume. Türkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt have their own reasons to seek peace. On September 15, Turkish FM Fidan demanded free passage through the Strait of Hormuz and a return to the pre-war order. Ankara also fears the strengthening of Kurds, new refugee flows, and higher energy prices, while paid passage through the strait would set an undesirable precedent for Türkiye. Pakistan wants stability along its border and a role as the main mediator. Egypt is losing revenue from the Suez Canal. The first step could be joint rules for passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian-Omani transit scheme could be recognized as a technical regime without Iranian tolls. Instead of duties, there could be regional navigation and environmental fees administered by Iran and Oman under Gulf oversight. Iran would receive a recognized role, while passage would remain free. It is important that neighboring states not depend on permission from Iran and Oman; concerns over precisely this issue were behind the postponement of the meeting in Salalah. The second step is de-escalation in the Red Sea and Iraq. The Houthis would lift the embargo, while Saudi Arabia would ease restrictions on territories under their control - particularly the port of Hodeidah - which the Houthis cite as the reason for their attacks. Iraqi groups would stop strikes on Saudi infrastructure, and Baghdad would provide guarantees to Riyadh. The third step is restoring the memorandum. The United States would lift the blockade and begin implementing the sanctions-relief schedule agreed in June. Washington will not pay reparations, so part of Iran’s frozen assets could be directed to a reconstruction fund with regional and possibly Chinese co-financing. The agreement needs a clear procedure for handling violations. The parties need to agree on dates, demining, military hotlines, joint investigations of attacks, and consequences for proven violations. The war must not automatically resume after every incident. Iran must be held responsible for supplying weapons to and financing allied groups, while those groups themselves should assume separate obligations. Nuclear issues should be addressed alongside the ceasefire. IAEA inspectors must gain access to stockpiles and damaged facilities. The next step could be dilution of uranium enriched to 60%, something Iran had already agreed to in March, in exchange for subsequent stages of sanctions relief. In the longer term, a regional enrichment consortium could be discussed. Regional guarantees could replace the demand for a U.S. withdrawal from the Gulf. That Iranian demand cannot be met. Instead, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Türkiye, and Qatar could serve as political guarantors of non-aggression and of the agreement as a whole. Several parties could derail the deal. Israel did not sign the memorandum, and the Lebanon front remains separate. The UAE is set on confrontation. Parts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps profit from sanctions and control over the strait. The Houthis have their own goals in Yemen. The Saudi coalition has yet to prove its effectiveness: in September, the Houthis seized parts of the coastline. The region is not yet capable of reopening the Strait of Hormuz without the U.S. fleet. The most serious obstacle is the split between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Without an agreement, the war will either settle into a prolonged stalemate or escalate after the elections. In the first scenario, prices will remain high and Iran will continue to weaken. In the second, President Trump, freed from electoral pressure, may intensify the strikes. The most sustainable option remains a phased regional agreement, but it will require time, political will from Washington, and reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.