Blocking by IP does little when each address sends only a request or two. A defender on r/AskNetsec described traffic from huge residential and mobile IP pools, with tactics that changed within hours of a block. They do not know whether AI is involved, and say so.
Behavior and real-browser checks beat blocklists. On a patient portal, put the strongest checks on sign-in, account recovery, proxy access, and record downloads. Turn off endpoints patients do not use, measure how many real patients your controls lock out, and make sure app logs can answer "did they get in, and what did they see?"
CDT Detection Evidence Exercise: cyberdefensetactics.com/dete…
carbene.ai/blog/patient-port…
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A working prompt proves the idea works, not that the workflow is safe. @hubizet put it well: "If you're a doctor building your own AI scribe with ChatGPT, I respect the initiative. But a working prompt is a prototype."
The prototype is safe because its builder reviews every output. That hidden control does not carry over when a colleague copies the prompt.
I wrote a nine-row checklist for the gap (data destination, users, consent, error checks, failure modes, EHR transfer, versioning, ownership, stop criteria). Get storage and retention answers in writing, then ask for the prompt, the failure cases, and the no-use scope.
AI Use Register: carbene.ai/products?utm_sour…
carbene.ai/blog/doctor-built…
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Unit 42 reports that from August to September 2026, a customized Cairn fork ran 25 operations against at least 19 organizations, with unauthorized access or data retrieval at 10. It assesses this with moderate confidence as China-nexus collection (CL-STA-1238).
Operations ran from 20 minutes to more than 50 hours, likely a single operator or a small team. The weaknesses were old ones: auth bypass, IDOR, default credentials, exposed cloud APIs, and dated CVEs. Autonomous AI raises volume, not complexity.
Separately, Gambit Security reported a criminal campaign that used Strix, Cairn, and Hermes against online retailers, with at least 27 companies compromised to varying degrees. That campaign is not linked to the Unit 42 cluster.
NorForge found exposed Cairn consoles, with a little under 23 hours average project time for one cluster.
CDT IR tabletops and the AI Tabletop Kit: kit.cyberdefensetactics.com/…
carbene.ai/blog/cairn-fork-2…
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An outage tracker counts complaints. It does not test whether a 911 call reaches a call-taker. On November 13, Cybernews reported Downdetector reports peaked at 298 around 5:21 a.m. Florida's Clay County Sheriff's Office said the Microsoft outage hit its email but not its 911 center.
I am not claiming 911 was down anywhere. Nothing I found says it was. ABC15 reported Phoenix fire kept dispatching and pointed residents to X because email was down. Phoenix-area police said emergency services were not affected.
The answer has to come from the 911 center, after a written status check, with a public message that has a time, what is affected, what to do, and when the next update comes.
CDT AI Tabletop Exercise Kit: kit.cyberdefensetactics.com/…
carbene.ai/blog/is-911-down-…
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A leak-site listing is a claim by a criminal group, nothing more until someone with the facts confirms it. On November 13, DataBreaches.net wrote about a group calling itself "Curious Worm" that listed 12 incidents, more than half involving U.S. healthcare-related entities. As far as DataBreaches could determine, none had been confirmed or denied.
A Dark Web Intelligence post on X warned that new groups sometimes pad first listings with recycled or fabricated victims. Treat every listing as unverified.
If you are a vendor to a named organization, check your own side first, then answer with what you checked, rotated, and found, without confirming or denying.
CDT AI Incident Readiness Exercise: cyberdefensetactics.com/serv…
carbene.ai/blog/customer-nam…
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A governance approval does not tell you whether an agent can be talked into doing something it should not. That is Neeraj Sabharwal's point (co-founder, Trust3 AI): agent security and AI governance answer different questions.
His invoice-agent example: governance covers bias, audit trail, and vendor compliance. It does not cover a hidden instruction in an invoice that redirects payment. "Neither answers the other."
I wrote a two-column method for one agent. The empty cells are the findings.
AI Use Register: carbene.ai/products?utm_sour…
carbene.ai/blog/agent-securi…
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Josh Mandel: a wellness-visit agent needs message history and the health maintenance list, both outside USCDI through v7, so certified FHIR APIs need not serve them. I wrote a 10-item permission template.
AI Use Register: carbene.ai/products?utm_sour…
carbene.ai/blog/agent-chart-…
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Notion: Insights AI chats were in a Fireworks dataset (fewer than 1% of workspaces, Nov 2 to 12). Zero data retention by default does not tell you where a given feature stores data.
AI Use Register and Ongoing AI Advisory: carbene.ai/products?utm_sour…
carbene.ai/blog/ai-subproces…
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Microsoft: Storm-0940 used ARTEX to attempt sign-in to more than 2,250 Microsoft 365 tenants after one vendor app fell. In some cases, privileged cloud access came in under three hours.
CDT IR tabletops and the AI Tabletop Kit: kit.cyberdefensetactics.com/…
carbene.ai/blog/storm-0940-a…
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APCO and the Public Safety Threat Alliance (766 responses) documented 262 instances where call-takers ran into AI-generated voice tactics. The fix is written procedure and pre-arranged verification, not a better ear.
CDT kit: kit.cyberdefensetactics.com/…
carbene.ai/blog/ai-voice-swa…
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In spring 2026 covert tests, GAO got four major AI platforms to produce information it later verified as feasible for an attack, each in under 12 hours. Every platform's safeguards fired, and every one was bypassed.
That is from report GAO-27-108814, released Nov 18 and requested by Sen. Maggie Hassan. Vendors pushed back on the method and on which model versions were tested.
A vendor's guardrails are one control you rent, not your whole AI program. Test them yourself after every model change, and map the program to NIST AI RMF and its Generative AI Profile.
CarbeneAI Ongoing AI Advisory: carbene.ai/products
carbene.ai/blog/gao-ai-guard…
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Idle cross-account IAM roles still trusted a forgotten vendor, and that was enough for the attacker to get in.
Between Oct 14 and Oct 26, a threat actor used IAM credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole to assume roles customers had created to trust that account, per Wiz (with Sentra and Mandiant). In a majority of environments Wiz observed, those were the only role assumptions from the vendor account that month.
SecurityWeek reports over a dozen organizations had data stolen. Sentra, quoted by SecurityWeek, said the roles stayed in place long after companies stopped using Qubole. Wiz: "In this activity, a source IP condition alone would have blocked every role assumption we observed."
I wrote up what a one-page trust inventory should catch, and how CDT's AI Security Use-Case Audit looks at integrations still trusted in the environment: cyberdefensetactics.com/serv…
carbene.ai/blog/vendor-integ…
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On Nov 11, Windows Update swapped the Intel Ethernet driver on every system I run. All dropped offline, and I had to go to each console. My recovery path depended on the same network the patch broke. The cause is not confirmed.
carbene.ai/blog/patch-tuesda…
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Mittwald says an attacker came in through its MCP server and reached 56 customer projects. That figure is Mittwald's (Nov 7). The Record says it ran eight days before detection (exploited Oct 27, detected Nov 4).
Connectors act with user credentials and need their own review. Ten questions for a hospital considering one, plus controls: off by default, scoped, logs ingested separately. CDT's AI Security Use-Case Audit reviews the detections around that telemetry.
carbene.ai/blog/mcp-connecto…
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FBI's ARTEX FLASH: some intrusions went from first contact to privileged access in under 3 hours. The advisory asks victims for their detection-to-containment time. That's the number to measure in a tabletop, before an incident.
carbene.ai/blog/fbi-flash-ar…
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Two employee Microsoft cloud accounts were enough to put files that may have included names, Social Security numbers, and health information in scope for about 129,000 people. UCHealth found the access on July 27. The EHR was not accessed. The notice is dated November 13.
The PHI that leaks is often the copy that lives outside the EHR. "The EHR wasn't accessed" is not the reassurance it sounds like.
#CISO #HealthIT
carbene.ai/blog/phi-outside-…
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A board can act on three answers about one AI feature, and a prompt-injection briefing gives it none of them.
Mike Miller (@mikemillercyber): What could go wrong? What would it cost? Do you have it handled?
I borrowed his frame for one page per feature.
carbene.ai/blog/ai-feature-b…
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If the only second factor on your DR platform is a code sent by email, it fails exactly when you need it.
Microsoft's preliminary post-incident report, as reported by The Register on Nov 16, describes a July 2026 defect that sat dormant in M365 network gateway servers. After Teams failed over onto the gateway that also serves Exchange Online, "more than 80 percent of servers were unresponsive" at the low point.
Recovery tooling shouldn't depend on the system it recovers. I wrote up a non-email factor, a break-glass account outside SSO, and a tabletop inject you can run with the CDT AI Tabletop Exercise Kit: kit.cyberdefensetactics.com
carbene.ai/blog/m365-down-ca…
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Daniel Lozovsky, Nov 8: if the developer who configured a coding agent leaves, "the agent continues running under that developer's personal token."
I'd ask: "How many active access tokens belong to tools whose sponsors left the company six months ago?"
carbene.ai/blog/coding-agent…
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A health system cannot govern a clinical AI tool it cannot see into after go-live.
Dr. Bhargav Patel listed five duties, including detecting unexpected harm and stopping use when necessary. I wrote the second page of vendor evidence for that.
carbene.ai/blog/vendor-ai-po…
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