When a Private Equity took over my company froze wages and canceled every single employee benefit and were overheard telling the VP's to create an atmosphere for folks to want to leave -> - I stopped working for my company and started working for my customers. That was my motivation to come to work each day. I literally had no boss I was the GM of my high dollar cutting edge product that I created from scratch and commercialized with constant internal resistance. As a result after the first 50 million in orders - Siemens had let me run it bumper to bumper before the spin out. When PE demanded I betray my semiconductor customers with poor quality, over priced components that their other company made... Which would have me working overtime to support in 7 day a week task force meetings- I left. Went and developed new products for a company in SW Florida. The PE went through 3 other employees that came in to take my place in a little over a year before losing a customer that was 40% of their bottom line with 60% margins. I had two people I didn't know and my old customer calling me at all hours of the day nearly suicidal. I calmly explained what Kobayashi Maru was. There was simply no solution. The PE didn't care they spun the company off and got rich for it. We aren't talking about thousands here we are talking billions. Meanwhile, I am the one with the bad reputation. They didn't do a single illegal thing either. This is Private Equity explained in a single post

**Medical Tuesday.** Why does AI and Google report fewer malpractice claims against foreign doctors? Easy...they settle, they have to or risk exposing the whole scam. Reports that foreign-trained physicians generate no more malpractice claims than American graduates, and sometimes fewer, require a look at how those claims are resolved before the count can be treated as proof of equal care. The majority of medical malpractice cases are settled over 90% are. The cases most likely to be settled are those in which the evidence of injury is strongest and an award is most probable. A settlement removes the case from the public record of trials. It also removes the risk that a pattern of claims against physicians hired through a particular pathway will become visible. If there were data to show a deviation in care - it would likely result in fewer trials, not more... and that is exactly what we see. Hospitals and staffing groups that rely on foreign-trained physicians are protecting a large and continuous source of labor. A single claim can be managed. A series of claims that draws attention to the training pathway itself threatens the model. The institution therefore has a reason to resolve those claims early, before discovery, before a trial, and before the origin of the degree becomes part of the story. An insurer facing a physician with a complete American record of undergraduate study, medical school, and residency has a credential that can be defended in court. The same insurer facing a physician whose medical training began at eighteen in another country, under a different standard of passage, has a weaker public narrative. The rational course in the second case is settlement- no institution wants to admit this and open the floodgates to more claims. The published rate of claims therefore measures the cases that were allowed to proceed far enough to be counted. It does not measure the cases that were closed before they could be counted, nor the institutional interest in keeping the foreign staffing arrangement intact. A number that is equal, or lower, is consistent with equal performance. It is also consistent with faster settlement of the claims that would have been most damaging to the pipeline. Here is how the insurance side works... Most hospital-employed physicians do not buy their own malpractice policy. The hospital or health system provides it, and large systems increasingly self-insure through a captive. **How the coverage is structured** Independent physicians and small groups still purchase commercial medical professional liability policies. They pay the premium, choose the carrier, and retain more control over settlement. Employed physicians, now the majority, are covered under the employer’s policy. The hospital selects the carrier or the captive, sets the limits, pays the premium, and controls the defense. The physician usually has no consent-to-settle right. The institution can settle without the physician’s agreement. **Self-insurance and captives** Large hospital systems rarely rely solely on the commercial market. They form captive insurance companies, licensed insurers they own, domiciled in places such as Vermont, Bermuda, or the Cayman Islands. The system pays premium to its own captive, which holds reserves and pays claims. Excess layers above a retention are often reinsured. The captive keeps underwriting profit and investment income inside the system and prices risk according to its own loss history rather than the open market. Healthcare captives are a substantial and long-standing part of the market. **Why this matters to the settlement point** When the hospital owns the captive, or carries a large self-insured retention, the first dollars of any claim come out of the institution’s own reserves. A claim that proceeds to trial risks publicity, discovery into staffing practices, and a public record that the degree was earned abroad under a different curriculum. A quiet settlement keeps the money inside the system’s control and keeps the origin of the training off the record. The commercial insurer defending an independent American graduate has a credential it can take to a jury. The captive defending an employed foreign-trained physician has both a weaker narrative and a direct financial interest in avoiding the trial that would test it. This is the basis for the post. The claim counts reflect the cases that were allowed to become claims. They do not reflect the cases the institution’s own insurance vehicle closed early in order to protect the staffing model that generates the revenue. Bookmark if you see the pattern. Quote or repost your observation. Comment below.