My new book, The Swiss Democracy Dictionary, asks a deceptively simple question: do we need better politicians, or do we need a better way of organising political power? This 365-page guide contains 72 entries explaining, in clear and accessible language, the institutions, ideas, history and mechanisms that make Swiss democracy so different. Each entry runs across several pages, making the book equally accessible to the curious layperson, while also providing a useful reference for academics, constitutionalists, politicians and anyone interested in how democracy can work differently. And Switzerland 🇨🇭provides a rather remarkable case study. It is not simply that Switzerland 🇨🇭is wealthy. It repeatedly performs exceptionally well across an extraordinary range of measures. It has one of the world's highest life expectancies. It remains the world's number one country for innovation, topping the Global Innovation Index for the 16th consecutive year in 2026. It was ranked the world's most competitive economy by IMD in 2025 and, even after falling to third in 2026, remained number one for government efficiency and infrastructure. It is also consistently among the world's most peaceful countries, with low levels of violent crime, and ranks highly for political stability and institutional quality. Switzerland 🇨🇭was ranked 5th in the 2025 Global Peace Index and 8th in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index. So we have a country that combines remarkable economic performance with innovation, infrastructure, stability, security, high institutional quality and an exceptionally high quality of life. Is that simply coincidence? Or is there something about the way Switzerland 🇨🇭organises and distributes political power that helps explain the result? That is one of the questions this dictionary explores. It looks beyond the familiar idea of referendums to examine the much bigger picture: subsidiarity, federalism, decentralisation, local government, civic participation, accountability, political compromise and, above all, the principle that citizens should retain meaningful political power between elections. I have lived under the Swiss system for two decades. It is certainly not perfect. No country is. Switzerland 🇨🇭has its own problems, disagreements and political failures. But there has to be a reason why the same country keeps appearing near the top of so many completely different international measures. And once you start looking closely at how its political system actually works, some uncomfortable questions begin to emerge. Why can Swiss citizens challenge laws directly? Why can they propose constitutional change themselves? Why is so much political power held at cantonal and communal level? Why does Parliament not sit all year? Why do citizens have so many opportunities to intervene between elections? And perhaps the most uncomfortable question of all: If citizens can be trusted to choose their politicians, why shouldn't they also be trusted to decide some of the things politicians decide for them? This dictionary follows my two non-fiction books and four novels exploring direct democracy. It is intended as an easy guide to a system that gives citizens something many representative democracies largely reserve for politicians: the power to decide. I make no claim that Switzerland 🇨🇭has discovered a perfect political formula, or that direct democracy alone explains its success. But I do believe there is an inconvenient truth worth examining. When citizens are given meaningful democratic tools, something rather interesting can happen. They do not necessarily become more extreme, more chaotic or less responsible. They can become more engaged. They can challenge those in power. They can reject proposals they dislike. They can demand change when politicians refuse to act. And, importantly, they can also reject attractive-sounding proposals when they believe the consequences are wrong. That is the Swiss experiment. The Swiss have been practising it for more than a century. Now political movements and newly formed parties around the world are increasingly looking towards Switzerland 🇨🇭and asking whether direct democracy might represent the next stage in the evolution of democratic government. Perhaps they are discovering something Switzerland 🇨🇭has known for generations. This book is an invitation to look closely. Not just at Switzerland. 🇨🇭 At your own system. Because after 72 entries and 365 pages, I suspect many readers will find themselves asking a rather uncomfortable question: “What on earth is the system I have been living under?” There is no perfect democracy. But perhaps there is such a thing as a better one. And perhaps Switzerland 🇨🇭gives us a rather compelling place to start looking. #DirectDemocracy

🤔 How?

Yep

🇨🇭 The Fiscal Shield 🛡️ In Switzerland they installed a debt break, a constitutional rule introduced in 2003, following approval by approximately 85% of Swiss voters in a 2001 referendum. Its purpose was and is to prevent the federal government from continually spending more than it can sustainably afford, passing the burden of debt to future generations. The principle is straightforward: government spending must be aligned with revenue over the economic cycle. This allows flexibility during recessions and exceptional emergencies, while requiring financial discipline in normal economic conditions. Rather than relying on politicians to restrain borrowing voluntarily, the debt brake establishes a binding framework for managing public money responsibly. The results have been significant. Between 2003 and 2019, Switzerland reduced its federal debt by approximately CHF 27 billion. Lower debt also helped limit interest costs, leaving more public money available for other priorities. Academic research has found evidence that the debt brake contributed to improved fiscal outcomes, although economic growth and other policy decisions have also played a part. The Swiss model demonstrates how constitutional safeguards and democratic accountability can work together to protect public finances. Its central lesson is that governments should retain the flexibility to respond to genuine crises, but should not routinely finance today’s spending by leaving tomorrow’s taxpayers with the bill. If the UK had more #DirectDemocracy maybe it wouldn’t have 3 trillion of debt. Something to learn here from the Swiss. The Fiscal Shield 🛡️ A Sure Protection

“Digital Finance’s Achilles’ Heel: When the Cloud Goes Down, Your Money Goes With It”

Yep - I agree with that