Es. Sarah🌟

Apparently, Russian imperialism is a myth, American foreign policy is responsible for Putin’s authoritarian consolidation, and the Kremlin bears little responsibility for either. Quite a remarkable rewriting of recent Russian history. Why is it so difficult to acknowledge Russian agency? Putin has spent decades questioning Ukrainian sovereignty, denying the existence of a distinct Ukrainian nation, and asserting Russia’s right to determine its neighbors’ political future. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, launched a full-scale invasion in 2022, and subsequently claimed to annex four more Ukrainian regions. Calling Russian imperial ambitions an “esoteric mythology” requires ignoring not only Putin’s actions, but also his own words. As he wrote in July 2021, seven months before the invasion: “I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia.” Equally astonishing is the suggestion that “American adventurism” explains Putin’s authoritarian consolidation. Even before becoming president in 2000, Putin asserted that Russia had developed from the outset as a “super-centralized state,” a characteristic “embedded in its genetic code, its traditions, and the mentality of its people.” His conception of centralized authority was rooted in his understanding of Russian history and society, not simply in reactions to American foreign policy. Nor can the Kremlin’s perception of the West be understood simply as a response to recent American policies. In March 2014, Putin declared: “The infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today.” When Western hostility is imagined as a centuries-old constant, almost any development can be interpreted as further evidence of it. The Kremlin is not merely reacting to Washington. It has ambitions, interests, ideological convictions, and political responsibilities of its own. It also chooses when to act, often when it perceives the West as vulnerable, as illustrated by Putin’s Munich speech in 2007, the war in Georgia in 2008, and Russia’s ultimatums in 2021. The irony is striking: where the Kremlin sees a deliberate American strategy to undermine Russia, some Western critics see reckless US policies that supposedly provoked an inevitable Russian response. Different interpretations, same underlying logic: Washington acts, Moscow merely reacts, and the countries caught between them are denied agency of their own.

The Kremlin’s obsession is not NATO expansion. It is the loss of control over its neighbors. NATO is a problem for Moscow precisely because it makes that control harder to restore. Confusing these two things has distorted the Western debate on Russia for decades.