Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
No psg
No el clasico
No ballon d or
Gerard martin plays for my club
An Israeli is on my team
Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
"I looked at one hell of a beautiful ass before, Nicki Minaj!" - Trump
"That's hard to miss"
Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
The US Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar remains unevacuated, according to satellite images from October 25.
This may indicate that a major US attack is not yet imminent, as these aircraft would be extremely vulnerable to an Iranian attack.
Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
EXCLUSIVE: In a joint investigation by @InsiderGeo × @SONARROW_OSINT , we identified a large-scale Russian military loading operation in Baltiysk. Between October 15 and 16, we observed the Russian cargo vessels ASCALON (IMO 9198226), LADY D (IMO 9349289) and ANASTASIIA (IMO 9349291) loading significant quantities of military equipment at the Kaliningrad naval base, including logistics vehicles, infantry vehicles, MRAPs and troop transports.
A rotation of other cargo vessels also appears to have taken place in the days before and after, although heavy cloud cover over the period makes this difficult to confirm.
One or more large convoys are likely already underway. Their destination(s) remain unknown at this time.
Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
Iranian forces reportedly managed to strike 6 commercial vessels in and near the Strait of Hormuz on Sunday alone -UKMTO
The 6 ships struck on Oct. 11 mark the highest single-day tally since the war began.
Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
If Putin is so eager to make a deal, then things must be going really badly for the Russian military, and Ukraine has absolutely no incentive to actually make a deal if that is the case.
REPORTER: How are you going to make Putin abide by the ceasefire?
US PRESIDENT TRUMP: I think what's happening is that he wants to make a deal, and we have to get Zelensky to want to make a deal.
REPORTER: Where do you see his wilingness to make a deal when he is striking Ukraine, striking ships...
US PRESIDENT TRUMP: I think actually Putin wants to make a deal more than Zelensky.
RSAF strikes on Houthi tunnel networks.
C: 15.536763°N 44.384500°E
S:teapaw.org/CJFCSpox/status/210866…
@GeoConfirmed
Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
NEW | The Houthis have, at least for now, prevented further Yemeni government advances northward on the Red Sea coastal plain.
CTP-ISW is adjusting its previous assessment that Houthi forces on the coastal plain are collapsing in light of evidence in the last 24 hours indicating that the Houthis have stopped Yemeni government-aligned advances.
A temporary pause in the Yemeni government ground advance provides both the Houthis and the Yemeni government with time to consolidate their combat forces and positions.
The Houthis may use the current pause in government advances on the coastal plain to deploy more reinforcements to the operational area and strengthen defensive positions north of the front line.
A successful Yemeni government counteroffensive in the mountains east of the coastal plain could support Yemeni government-aligned forces' advances northward on the coastal plain.
Saudi naval and air forces targeted Houthi military and maritime assets on October 5 that the group could use to attack shipping in the Bab al Mandeb Strait, amid the broader Saudi and Yemeni air campaign to degrade Houthi strike capabilities and support Yemeni government-aligned forces.
The Houthis significantly expanded the scale of their attacks on Saudi military and civilian infrastructure on October 5, likely to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its support for ongoing Yemeni government counteroffensives.
Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
NEW: The Yemeni government, backed by Saudi air power and international coalition military support, launched an offensive to capture Mokha city and secure the coastline along the Bab al Mandeb Strait on October 4. This offensive will likely succeed in capturing Mokha in the short term. Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government likely launched the offensive to accomplish the limited objective of securing the Bab al Mandeb. (1/2)
Other Key Takeaways:
Yemeni government-aligned forces will likely stop offensive operations within the next seven to 14 days to rest, resupply, and consolidate their positions to prevent a Houthi counteroffensive.
The Yemeni government will need to secure its own defensible line before its offensive culminates in order to ensure it can repel Houthi attacks combining drones and ground forces, which the Houthis employed in early September.
Allied air and intelligence support almost certainly made this offensive possible. Over 100 Saudi aircraft provided air support to Yemeni government-aligned forces during the initial assault, and US intelligence is reportedly supporting the air campaign.
Saudi allies in the Mecca Pact are providing military aid to Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia announced on October 5 that Pakistan and Turkey are taking “practical measures” to defend Saudi Arabia pursuant to the Mecca Pact requirements.
The Iranian regime appears increasingly concerned that mounting economic pressure could threaten internal stability and is combining its attempts to manage its wartime economy with expanded efforts to deter and prepare to suppress possible unrest.
Iran is likely reconstituting and enhancing its ability to target distant US regional military targets and commercial shipping through improvements in missile accuracy, range, speed, and targeting capabilities.
Iran is likely aiming to increase its ability to deter US airstrikes targeting Iranian assets, impose costs on the United States, and preserve strategic initiative in the conflict by prioritizing improvements to its missile capabilities.
Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
BREAKING: Russia secretly established a covert missile program to help Iran develop and acquire advanced supersonic cruise missiles. The program, codenamed C430L, was established in 2023 and has continued throughout the U.S. war with Iran according to an investigation conducted by FT.
The program was established to help Iran develop supersonic cruise missiles capable of striking U.S. ships and other naval assets which have largely been unscathed in the last 6 months of war.
According to experts, such a program would “require political clearance from the very top in Russia.”
Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
“They [Palestinians] are not even human beings”- Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s Minister of National Security.
Israel's Ben-Gvir suggests killing '30 to 40' people in Gaza nightly on podcast with ex-hostage
itv.com/news/2026-08-16/isra…
Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
What happens now after Turkey's PKK framework law has been approved?
The PKK-related framework law that passed in the Turkish parliament is historic because it is the first law to emerge from direct negotiations conducted with the PKK and with Abdullah Ocalan, the organisation's imprisoned founding leader, and the first to translate those talks into substantive legal provisions.
Also significant: a supermajority of 467 votes to 87 approved the framework, including pro-Kurdish deputies, giving it very broad cross-party backing.
1. Following presidential promulgation and publication in the Official Gazette, the law takes effect, triggering the establishment of a powerful executive board and a much weaker parliamentary Monitoring Commission.
The executive board does far more than oversee disarmament. Under Article 7 it can establish subcommittees; invite officials and other persons; assign subcommittees specifically to advance the process "with the organisation"; periodically assess whether the organisation has actually been completely dismantled; request judicial, administrative and legislative measures; and initiate the eventual restoration of rights. An especially notable power sits in Article 3(3): if an investigation is opened after the National Security Council decision for a covered offence committed before that decision, the investigation itself requires the board's permission. That gives the board a significant gatekeeping role over prosecutorial discretion during the transition.
By contrast, the parliamentary Monitoring Commission monitors and may make recommendations. It does not operate the scheme or make the key implementation decisions.
2. Practically, the law will not trigger anything substantive until formal state verification that the PKK/KCK and the formations covered by the legislation have ended their de facto organisational existence and surrendered all weapons and ammunition under their control. This will be especially important to watch because the law refers not just to the PKK or KCK but to "all types of formations connected to it," raising the question of how compliance is measured and which affiliated structures are expected to disarm. Two cases stand out: the SDF in northeast Syria, which is undergoing integration into the Syrian army but has not yet surrendered its heavy weapons to the state, and the Iran-focused PJAK, the PKK's affiliate in Iranian Kurdistan, which has become significantly more active in recent months.
3. Once verification is complete, a six-month window opens for eligible PKK-affiliated individuals. The law covers membership of the PKK/KCK, establishing or managing the organisation, knowingly assisting it, propaganda offences, other crimes committed within the organisation's activities, and terrorism financing under Law No. 6415. It applies to the PKK/KCK only; personal crimes unconnected to the organisation's activities fall outside its scope. Confiscation is unaffected: assets under confiscation orders can still be liquidated and the proceeds transferred to the Treasury.
Pro-Kurdish MPs are already naming the Penal Code itself as one of the laws they want changed in a second legislative package. Gulistan Kilic Kocyigit, DEM Party group deputy chair, has argued that political participation and the right of return should be codified rather than left to case-by-case decisions, and the party has opposed permanent bans on political activity in favour of short, time-limited restrictions. Amending the Penal Code would be the route to removing or loosening these deprivations at source, rather than lifting them individually through the board and the courts. No such amendment has been agreed.
How people physically return is still unresolved. Kurdish movement representatives are asking where returnees from the mountains and from Europe will first be received, what administrative procedures they will face, and how military-service obligations will be handled. Remzi Kartal, a senior figure in the PKK-linked Kurdistan National Congress, set out these questions in a post-vote interview with ANF, the pro-PKK news agency.
4. The five- and ten-year suspension periods can permanently close old cases.
The suspension periods are not simply temporary pauses. If the individual completes the five- or ten-year period without committing another terrorism offence, the underlying case is effectively brought to an end. For an investigation, prosecutors issue a decision not to prosecute. For a pending trial, the proceedings are dismissed. For a final conviction, the sentence is legally regarded as having been served. The law therefore creates a structured mechanism through which eligible PKK-related criminal files can ultimately be extinguished, provided the individual complies with the conditions of the process. This is one of the most consequential provisions in the framework.
More details: thenationalcontext.com/what-…
Ezzi🇮🇶 retweeted
NEW | The Iranian armed forces are undergoing an extensive reorganization that reflects lessons that the regime learned from the June 2025 and Spring 2026 wars.
Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei instructed Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi on August 10 to “complete the process” of merging the AFGS and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters.
The regime likely calculates that merging the AFGS and KOACH will help streamline coordination between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), reduce institutional redundancies, and enable military leaders to make wartime decisions more quickly and effectively.
Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed several Iranian officials to senior military positions on August 10. These appointments largely formalize the structure of the armed forces that has existed for several months and consolidate both Mojtaba and his inner circle’s authority.







































