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Everyone saying excel modeling skills will no longer be valuable but it’s ok because I never had them anyway
“What are neoclouds”
“Does cost of capital include revenue”
“Are GPUs waterproof”
“Can data centers go bankrupt”
FCF Freddy retweeted
As someone with a portfolio of energized land assets here is what I am seeing:
1. Neoclouds are disorganized and poorly capitalized. Some are definitely better than others however.
2. Hyperscalers are intractable, bureaucratic organizations that take 3 months to do an NDA and want 18mo escrow periods. We built our portfolio by competing against these terms because of our speed and simplicity. The more future assets orgs like ours win, the bigger the problem for the hyperscalers downstream (see 3).
3. There are delays in the existing pipeline that will catch people off guard in 2027. Hyperacalers will (obviously) react by focusing on their own internal compute needs over any third party. If the third party is a model company, they will tell them to go through their model router where they will also take a non-trivial vig. Them telling Ant they have no compute for them (rumored in Ant’s S-1) if true is a huge tell that this is already happening.
All of this is to say that it does look like there will be a lot of partially stranded compute and compute sitting in inventory in 2027 than is currently forecasted. This is bought and paid for but effectively underearning (below total cost of capital) or collecting dust. We see this as true for everyone - model companies, hyperscalers, neoclouds except ONE (you can guess which one).
This dislocation will benefit two kinds of orgs: the non-bureaucratic big scalers who can build industrial scale quickly and the nimble, well capitalized players feeding them.
2027 will be a turbulent year because it will clear out a bunch of wrong/bad bets. It will also be a consolidation year for a few.
Magic Johnson’s credit team realizing the borrower’s org chart also includes their boss
So let me get this straight. Walters' own insurance companies stopped lending to his other businesses once they got subpoenaed back in Feb
In just weeks, insurers owned by Amistad, a holdco where Magic is a board member, lent ~$2.3bn to Walter companies/intermediaries (BBG)
Amistad isn’t technically a Walter affiliate. But they share his office address, his firm (Guggenheim) manages its insurers’ money, and his brother-in-law runs one of them.
Kind of related, right?
Me asking management to clarify why they’ve gone through four external auditors in the last six years



















