Taylor presses THORChain cofounder Chad Barraford on why the protocol wasn't shut down when stolen funds were nearly 100% of one route Taylor: "Okay, so what happened in this case?So the admin key was used as an interim stop. And then the protocol was upgraded to take the actions. In reaction to a situation that was deemed to be bad by the protocol. Chad: "By a 2/3 majority." Taylor: "Okay. So why couldn't you do that in any case where, let's say, the majority of funds on a certain route are known to be directly stolen funds? What you did for THORFi, right? You take an interim action and then you do whatever you want to do." Chad: "Right. So the action you're referring to is, like, turn off trading, for example, right? To be clear, the admin key that we're talking about doesn't even exist in the code base today. It did a while back, but it no longer exists. It was removed, I don't know, a year ago, a year and a half, I don't remember how long ago it was." "But even if it still was around, you want the protocol to turn off its entire system and all the trading that it does, and the source of revenue and income, for 1 to 2 weeks every time some external exchange or external thing gets hacked." Taylor: "I'm advocating for it if that's the only functionality you have, right? And the vast majority of funds. So, like, for example, the XRP to ETH route, right? We can look at the numbers, but it was not 20%. It was not 50%. It was nearly 100% of assets on that route for that period of time that were directly stolen funds." "If you turned it off, I'm not saying a time limit. I'm saying any amount of time, right? That would have cut them off somewhere else, right? And then you wouldn't have laundered stolen funds for DPRK." Chad: "No, that's not right. That's not correct."