"A Chinese Communist Party agent impersonated a Stanford University student. Under the alias Charles Chen, he approached several students through social media. Anna, a Stanford student conducting sensitive research on China, began receiving unexpected messages from Charles Chen. At first, Charles's outreach seemed benign: he asked about networking opportunities. But soon, his messages took a strange turn. Charles inquired whether Anna spoke Mandarin, then grew increasingly persistent and personal. He sent videos of Americans who had gained fame in China, encouraged Anna to visit Beijing, and offered to cover her travel expenses. He would send screenshots of a bank account balance to prove he could buy the plane tickets. Alarmingly, he referenced details about her that Anna had never disclosed to him. He advised her to enter China for only 24 to 144 hours, short enough, he said, to avoid visa scrutiny by authorities, and urged her to communicate exclusively via the Chinese version of WeChat, a platform heavily monitored by the CCP. When Charles commented on one of her social media posts, asking her to delete screenshots of their conversations, she knew this was serious. Under the guidance of experts familiar with espionage tactics, Anna contacted authorities. Their investigation revealed that Charles Chen had no affiliation with Stanford. Instead, he had posed as a Stanford student for years, slightly altering his name and persona online, targeting multiple students, nearly all of them women researching China-related topics. According to the experts on China who assisted Anna, Charles Chen was likely an agent of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), tasked with identifying sympathetic Stanford students and gathering intelligence...For years, concerns about Chinese espionage have quietly persisted at Stanford. Throughout our investigation, professors, students, and researchers readily recounted their experiences of Chinese spying, yet they declined to speak publicly. One student who experienced espionage firsthand was too fearful to recount their story, even via encrypted messaging. 'The risk is too high', they explained. Transnational repression, $64 million in Chinese funding, and allegations of racial profiling have contributed to a pervasive culture of silence at Stanford and beyond. It is this pervasive silence that has compelled us to write. After interviewing multiple anonymous Stanford faculty, students, and China experts, we can confirm that the CCP is orchestrating a widespread intelligence-gathering campaign at Stanford. In short, 'there are Chinese spies at Stanford'...Students engaged in sensitive scientific research, especially in fields like AI and robotics, are those most often targeted. One Chinese national at Stanford spoke to us on this very issue under conditions of anonymity: 'Many Chinese [nationals] have handlers; they [CCP] want to know everything that's going on at Stanford. This is a very normal thing. They just relay the information they have'. Another Stanford student shared an incident involving their professor's encounter with suspected Chinese espionage. According to the student, the professor recounted needing to schedule a meeting with a Chinese student. When the student declined, citing a mysterious reason, the Professor asked why. The student replied, 'You know why'. The professor continued to inquire, only to receive the cryptic response, 'I cannot tell you that'. Finally, the professor revealed that the student admitted to meeting a CCP handler. This issue has been under discussion at Stanford since 2019...The Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC), which funds an estimated 15% of Chinese students at American universities, is regarded as a primary avenue of information gathering. China experts speaking anonymously confirmed that it requires students to regularly submit 'Situation Reports' to Chinese diplomatic missions about their research.