我國國防部@MoNDefense 10月8日至11月8日公布之共機艦襲擾動態,套疊我國國安會吳秘書長@josephwutw 所公布之船艦動態(估繪)。
可發現相比2024與2025年之同樣時段,2026年10/8~11/8的公務船每日通報艘數累計則為最高、共艦每日通報艘數累計為次高、共機通報總架次則為最低。
The #PRC is such a big bully. In addition to the high number of air sorties indicated earlier, the #PLAN & #CCG have also deployed 100+ vessels in the #WesternPacific as of now. #Taiwan is staying vigilant. We won’t provoke, but we won’t bow to any pressure.
Joseph Wen 溫約瑟 retweeted
Too suspicious to ignore! @NavalWarCollege/@ChinaMaritime Note 26—“Easy Infiltration: The Rise of PRC Small Boat Landings on Taiwan”
digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cm…
From CMSI Director CAPT @ChrisHSharman, @USNavy (Ret.)—
#China-#Taiwan Watchers:
Could seemingly isolated small-boat landings on Taiwan be something more than cases of illegal entry?
Beginning in 2021, at least 8 PRC nationals have been arrested after making small-boat crossings of the Taiwan Strait & landing on Taiwan.
Each reported landing occurred at a sensitive location. 5/8 occurred on known invasion beaches; the other 3 were at ports & river deltas believed to be of high interest to PLA war planners.
In CMSI Note #26, “Easy Infiltration: The Rise of PRC Small Boat Landings on Taiwan,” CMSI’s Professor @Ian_M_Easton meticulously documents these incidents & examines their potential security implications.
Professor Easton begins by exploring what PLA textbooks say about infiltrating undercover operatives into Taiwan to conduct reconnaissance & special missions, placing these activities in the context of PLA amphibious invasion planning.
Professor Easton is careful to note that there is no public evidence establishing that the individuals involved were PLA operatives.
There are, however, reasons to question whether these incidents are entirely unrelated or innocuous.
He examines several possible explanations, including smuggling, espionage, & reconnaissance, ultimately arguing that PLA involvement cannot be ruled out.
This CMSI Note also offers practical recommendations for strengthening Taiwan’s defenses against potential infiltration, including improved coastal surveillance, coast-watcher communities, & the fortification of vulnerable beaches & coastal garrisons.
Richly illustrated with photographs, maps, & media accounts documenting the individual incidents, this note provides a fascinating look at an emerging & potentially consequential dimension of Taiwan’s coastal security challenges.
該旅:
吳世義、劉勇 大校
龔仕仙、陳峰韜 上校
宋瑛野、張國棟 中校
陳曉輝、蕭明 少校
報導連結:
tv.cctv.com/2026/11/04/VIDEN…
關於該旅之過往貼文:
1.
teapaw.org/JosephWen___/status/20…
2.
teapaw.org/JosephWen___/status/19…
3. teapaw.org/JosephWen___/status/19…
4. teapaw.org/JosephWen___/status/16…
兵役結訓。
感謝照顧過我的每位長官、幹部與同袍弟兄。
許多人說,兵役蹉跎時光、耽誤生涯。但我想感謝中華民國台灣的兵役制度,使我得進入軍中,學習紀律、學習當一個二兵和被管理者;亦看見許多官兵所不能言的辛勞與克己奉公,國人應予國軍更多支持。
我會很懷念在龍虎部隊與前鋒部隊的日子。
73集團軍陸航旅於紅嶼遂行海島起降訓練科目。
今早,央視發布“直击演训场 多型直升机飞行训练 锻炼飞行员作战能力”軍事報導。
報導顯示,73集團軍陸航旅(73159部隊)近日於福建省漳州市紅嶼遂行海島起降訓練科目。
自該旅之漳浦場站啟用以來,由紅嶼、蔡嶼、橫嶼等島嶼組成的萊嶼列島便開始作為其海島起降、炸射等科目之訓場至今。
Joseph Wen 溫約瑟 retweeted
二十届五中全会座次图(中央委员座席区)
四中全会后,中央委员共有205人。五中全会,162名中央委员出席。43名中央委员缺席。
这43人包括:
五中全会确认开除党籍的24人(包括9名文官、15名军队中央委员);
其他缺席的军队中央委员14人;
已经“官宣”落马,但因为审查还没有结束,因此没有在这次全会上确认开除党籍的3人(易炼红、胡衡华、叶建春);
其他缺席的文官中央委员2人(韩俊、邹加怡)。
其中,韩俊在今年4月被免去农业农村部部长职务之后,就没有任何公开活动,尤其是没有按惯例增补为全国人大某专委会的副主任委员或全国政协某专门委员会的副主任(这是对于退居二线的正部级干部的惯常安排)。
邹加怡最后一次出席中央全会,是2024年7月的二十届三中全会。2025年3月,她获提名为亚投行下任行长。2025年10月的二十届四中全会,是她首次缺席中央全会,并且在全会召开的时候,邹加怡没有其他公开活动,因此无法明确是否是因为日程冲突而缺席全会。
2026年1月,她正式上任亚投行行长。此次中央全会再度缺席,一种解释是她作为现任国际组织负责人,被刻意安排缺席了这次中央全会;另一种解释是日程冲突,因为邹加怡在10月28日(全会会期之内)出席了在北京举行的“全球战略对话(2026)——团结全球南方 推进全球治理”。
不过,即使缺席了两次中央全会,邹加怡也没有辞去中央委员职务;到目前为止,她仍然在名义上是中央委员,只不过可能已经不在履行中央委员的部分或全部职责。
今日,央視發布“南部战区空军某部多兵种联合对抗演练”軍事報導。
報導顯示,南部戰區空軍 地空導彈第19旅(95169部隊)於近日在廣東省湛江市遂溪縣南地之訓場與南部戰區 空6旅(95380部隊)開展多兵種聯合對抗演練。















































