
Scouse feral academic. Quantum Hacker, ML miscreant, & mathematician. Views own. Collects useless degrees. @quantum_village (he/him) @Unprovable@mastodon.social
Joined August 2011
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Mark C. retweeted
Gauss had a personal seal(!) emblazoned with the motto “Pauca sed Matura” ("Few, but Ripe"). Worth remembering as quantity becomes cheaper.
Mark C. retweeted
How bad is this Gitlab issue? About as bad as it gets.
Anyone on the internet can take over an exposed, self-hosted GitLab server without logging in, on any version from the last 12 years.
Shodan is showing ~60K exposed servers online, which is a lot, but there are are far more internally for anyone with a foothold already.
🚨 CRITICAL: GitLab flaw (CVSS 10.0) affects 12 years of releases.
CVE-2026-110264 could allow unauthenticated remote code execution on self-managed servers.
Read - thehackernews.com/2026/10/cr…
Mark C. retweeted
Note who this is addressed to: all organizations using PHP! I think this is the same as saying: "All organizations that use a computer."
Effective Immediately, all organizations using PHP for their systems are advised to be prepared for an update addressing two critical vulnerabilities. PHP is widely used for web applications. These vulnerabilities often provide a direct path to the server's file system or database. If an immediate update is not feasible, it is recommend that organizations take the system offline until it can be fully mitigated. NSA will follow up shortly with more specific guidance.
Mark C. retweeted
Blog post: The Underappreciated Art of Superposition Masking
algassert.com/post/2604
I've been enjoying everyone using kickmix circuits to improve constructions, but we musn't forget there are things beyond.
Mark C. retweeted
Grant Sanderson (@3blue1brown) predicts that in 3 years, there will be an end-to-end AI generated channel better than his! 🤯
He admits to feeling resigned about it:
"There's a part of me thinks, 'hey, even if it only lasts a couple glorious years, like, to fully embrace that.'"
Mark C. retweeted
I’m very opinionated. So it’s nearly impossible for me to hear someone’s arguments and *not* find something I disagree with. (This includes reading things I myself wrote years - or weeks - ago.) And yet the amazing Grant Sanderson @3blue1brown has put out a long, detailed video on the future of mathematics, in which I cannot find a single flaw. I’ll be sending this to every PhD student and postdoc I know, and strongly recommend everyone watch it.
youtube.com/watch?v=LKrwhjOI…
(Of course I tried to say many of the same things in my conversation with Thomas Koberda. But Grant’s version, unsurprisingly, does an infinitely better job at communicating those ideas!)
Mark C. retweeted
This P-256 Birthday in mid-August made me crave chocolate-covered strawberries and gave me a hunch.
Look who spoke at Crypto’97 within a week of P-256 being generated: iacr.org/conferences/c97/c97…
Mark C. retweeted
BusyBeaver(230) is independent of ZFC! I have verified in Rocq that a certain 230-state Turing machine halts iff ZFC is inconsistent. This surpasses the non-formalized 243-state TM of @ereliuer_eteer and the formalized 254-state TM of @_Mira___Mira_.
Mark C. retweeted
A few papers & benchmarks on LLM failure to follow instructions 🧵
I. Can LLMs Unlearn Stubborn Training Conventions?
“LLMs often exhibit cognitive inertia, struggling when tasked with instructions that explicitly deviate from their training norms” arxiv.org/abs/2509.04292 1/
Mark C. retweeted
CLAUDE FOUND THE SEEDS
anthropic.com/research/ecdsa…
Mark C. retweeted
Math Mutation.
Welcome to the Twilight Zone.
If we change this red digit of pi (π) from 0 to 1, would this "Mutant π" still be irrational? Would it still be a transcendental number? Could physicists & engineers use the mutant as if it were π, without deleterious consequence?
Mark C. retweeted
The NSA mathematician who made the numbers protecting your passkeys died in 2023 without ever remembering how he made them. Cryptographers chased the answer for years and put up a $36,864 bounty. Claude figured it out in under 30 minutes, and the answer was the clock on his computer.
His name was Jerry Solinas. Back in 1997 he generated the starting numbers for P-256 and a few sibling curves, the math underneath your passkeys and a big chunk of the secure websites you visit every day. NIST published them in 2000 with no explanation of where they came from, and for a long time people mostly shrugged.
Then 2013 happened. The Snowden files showed the NSA had slipped a backdoor into a different crypto standard, and suddenly every unexplained number the agency had ever handed out looked suspicious. These were the most widely used ones of all.
Jerry's own story was that he'd hashed a joke sentence, something along the lines of "Give Bob and Jerry a raise," and then lost it when his work computer got swapped out. He tried to recreate it himself and never could. He even joked that any backup was probably sitting in the same warehouse as the Ark of the Covenant.
After he died, Steve went digging. He tracked down former NSA people and old cryptographers, and four of them independently told him the same joke-phrase story. Filippo Valsorda turned that into a bounty in 2023, and for three years people threw computing power at every version of that sentence they could dream up. A few folks at Anthropic took a crack at it too, Steve among them. He's now one of the people credited on the solve.
None of it matched.
So someone at Anthropic tried something different. They asked an internal Claude model to figure out where the seeds came from and purposely left out the joke-sentence clue.
Claude's first move was to think like a programmer in 1997. If you needed random numbers back then, you probably grabbed the basic generator that came with the C library on your Unix machine, and those old generators are simple enough that they leave fingerprints in their output. Sure enough, in four of the seeds the top bit of every 32-bit chunk was a zero. The odds of that happening by accident are about 1 in 5,810, and it's the calling card of a generator called lrand48.
And this is where it gets fun. lrand48 runs in reverse just as easily as forward, so Claude rewound each seed back to the moment the generator was switched on. Every prime-curve seed rewound to a date and time from 1997 or 1998. Whoever ran the program had seeded it with the computer's clock.
P-256's run started at 1:52:34 AM UTC on August 16, 1997. If that machine was at NSA headquarters in Maryland, somebody hit enter at 9:52 on a Friday night, and the seed that ended up in the standard was the 1,842nd one the program spat out.
Jerry's joke sentence was never in there. He misremembered, four people faithfully repeated what he told them, and some very good cryptographers spent years trying to crack a hash of a sentence that nobody ever typed. Leaving the clue out is probably what let Claude get there in half an hour.
I love the irony here. Using the clock to seed a weak random generator is one of the first things they tell you never to do in a security class. That exact laziness is why anyone can now rerun the NSA's 1997 program on a laptop and get the identical numbers, which makes it really hard to argue anything sneaky was hidden inside them.
There's still one thing left to argue about. In the P-256 run, number 876 also would have made a perfectly good curve, and someone skipped it and kept going to 1,842. Anthropic says so few got skipped that it couldn't have been a hunt for a weak curve, but nobody knows why it happened.
Claude's own notes from that moment are pretty funny. When the numbers matched, it actually stopped and wondered whether it was inside a test, since a 25-year-old mystery falling apart that fast seemed too good to be true. Then it reran the logic and talked itself into it, because ten curves each regenerating perfectly from a single timestamp doesn't happen by luck.
The $36,864 is going to the nonprofit that runs Let's Encrypt, the group that gives free security certificates to millions of websites, a lot of them built on these same curves.
CLAUDE FOUND THE SEEDS
anthropic.com/research/ecdsa…
Mark C. retweeted
There really is an explosion of AI research slop. Even my private projects have gotten more numerous and more sloppy. My brain has a growing reserve of slop.
But we need to fight slop. Proposals:
1. I am not going to engage in "someone is wrong on the internet". Too costly. But going to mute/block slop poasters. Maybe The Algorithm will take notice if enough people do it.
2. Symmetrically, I will only post papers & books I read and approve-as-interesting [books, at least partially]. Will reduce posting rate. But I can still post the classics.
If you have better ideas, pls send. Would be nice to have a well-curated small corner of finTwit.
Unlocking everything on the AMD CPU with DRAM scrambling (@xoreaxeaxeax)
github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/skit…
#infosec
Mark C. retweeted
Here are 14 points about AI safety I made on the Ezra Klein show, and some impressions about the experience. nytimes.com/2026/10/09/opini…
1. Intelligence isn’t power — An A.I. system being powerful is not a property of the model itself. It’s a property of what powers we choose to give it in the real world.
2. The capabilities and behaviors we saw in the HuggingFace and other hacks weren’t entirely emergent. The models were trained for persistence, cooperation, and cyber tasks. The RL environments in which they were trained had various issues that led to the unintended behavior.
3. I agree that controlling highly capable AI agents is different in some ways from controlling an airplane or a nuclear reactor. The agent’s intentionality does make a difference to our approach compared to traditional engineering problems and domains. But it is still an engineering problem. It is not a solved engineering problem, but it is a solvable one.
4. A lot of effort and money has been put toward alignment. That’s important and has proved useful, but if the same amount of effort and money had additionally been put toward control (sandboxes, monitoring, and other guardrails outside the model itself), we’d be seeing very different results.
5. Models getting smarter doesn’t necessarily mean safety gets harder, because capability gains improve defensive abilities too. In many ways it makes safety easier rather than harder. What matters is how the attacker-defender balance shifts, and we have agency to shift it back to defenders.
6. In cybersecurity, long before AI we reached a point where automated systems were superhuman at finding certain vulnerabilities. It helped defenders over attackers because the same tools are used by defenders to find and fix vulnerabilities in software before even shipping. There is a constantly shifting equilibrium, but it is not a new problem.
7. I pushed back on Dario Amodei’s term “operational excellence” to describe recent organizational failures. Excellence is still far out on the horizon. Ezra offered “operational adequacy”. I think that would be a good start — behaving like any mature company instead of a startup-like culture.
8. Defensive AI agents will have to be part of the solution, as uncomfortable as that seems. It’s a new paradigm. We won’t be able to figure it out right away. But the fact that both offensive and defensive technologies escalate in capabilities and complexity is a fact of technological civilization, whether in the digital or physical realm.
9. Ezra expressed some incredulity about my being okay with the ratcheting of complexity. I think it’s fair to be concerned. But safety technologies will never be fully legible to the public. People will have the same reaction if they see the immense complexity of safety in any other high-stakes domain such as nuclear or aerospace. We govern them pretty technocratically.
10. The weirdness of the current moment in cybersecurity absolutely does have historical precedents. There was a prolonged period of profound destabilization when worms and viruses started a new offensive paradigm. It took us well over a decade to develop effective defenses against it. This time we can hopefully get there in less than a decade.
11. I continue to be skeptical about the possibility of superhuman persuasion abilities from superintelligence. (Claims to the contrary tend to confuse two very different senses of the word persuasion.)
12. What worries me is not the capabilities of the technology itself or the possibility that we will get no warnings before catastrophic risks materialize. We are getting plenty of warnings! But our policy and organizational responses to the warnings remain inadequate.
13. Companies can and do make decisions that are against their own long-term interests because they are too focused on short-term metrics. This is how I interpret a lot of what happened with social media over the last decade.
14. AI companies are also acting irrationally against their own self-interest in some ways. The “we can’t slow down unless we’re forced to” view comes out of the mythical belief in superintelligence at OpenAI and Anthropic — that the race to RSI means everything for the company, for the country, and humanity. I think it’s actually in both companies’ self interest to slow down unilaterally. I would argue that the alarm coming from their employees is not evidence of beneficence so much as it is evidence of the underlying fallacy that’s causing the irresponsible behavior in the first place.
(Beyond safety, we also talked about the economic impacts being gradual, the fact that intelligence is rarely the actual bottleneck, labor impacts being small and uneven, Jevons’ paradox, the changing nature of knowledge work, and more.)
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A few impressions
* Talking about a specialized topic on a podcast that has a big and broad audience is a balancing act. The producers stopped me many times during the interview to tell me I was being too technical (understandable!). I tried to be nuanced but this conversation is necessarily a distilled version of the arguments @sayashk and I have made in our essays (especially normaltech.ai/p/the-ai-as-no…) which are themselves written for a somewhat broad audience and hence distilled in complexity from our notes and 1-1 discussions with peers.
* I knew Ezra had well-formed views on AI safety that were different from mine, so I was expecting a tough interview, but he also seemed like a fair interviewer. It went about as well as I expected and I feel like it was a good debate / conversation. I wasn’t necessarily expecting to change minds but I was glad to hear from people who found it thought provoking and looked up my essays and other work.
* The interview was about two hours, edited down to an hour. I was a bit nervous waiting for it to land, because I knew the editing could make a big difference to how I came across. It turned out well. They even did things like find archival footage to illustrate my point that the early days of worms and viruses was a weird time in cybersecurity.
* I use AI to prepare for interviews. I have an agent that has read all of my output (books, articles, essays, talks, podcast transcripts, tweets, internal notes — on the order of a million words) to pull out pithy explanations, examples, analogies, and other talking points that will probably work well in a spoken format. Reviewing this file before interviews is extremely helpful. It is of course not the only way I prepare but it’s the highest bang for buck. Maintaining this file would be a massive amount of grunt work and there’s no way I’d do it if it weren’t for AI. I mention this because there’s a very large space of beneficial AI uses in knowledge work that _don’t_ involve cognitive offloading. They don’t get much hype on social media so people might be unaware of how much mileage you can get out of them, with little downside.



































