To unpack the three scenarios a bit more: 1/ Rely solely on NATO Since 1952, Turkey has relied on NATO and especially the US for extended nuclear deterrence. But repeated crises in US-Turkey ties have eroded Ankara’s confidence in American security guarantees. The F-35 saga added an operational dimension to those doubts. Turkey is now the only NATO nuclear-sharing country not transitioning to the F-35. Without another nuclear-certified aircraft, it risks shifting from an active participant in nuclear sharing to essentially a host for US nuclear weapons. That makes exclusive reliance on NATO increasingly less attractive. 2/ Make a run for the bomb Still unlikely. Turkey learned from its post-Arab Spring regional isolation and tensions with the West, including over the S400, that prolonged estrangement from both is costly. A nuclear weapons program, overt or covert, could jeopardize the relationships Ankara has worked hard to rebuild. The costs remain too high. 3/ Hedge This is the most plausible path. A hedging state develops the technological and institutional capabilities that could make weaponization faster if circumstances change. Its answer to the bomb is essentially: maybe, not now, but perhaps later. For Turkey, the appeal is even advanced hedging toward nuclear-threshold status can remain compatible with the NPT. But widespread hedging carries its own dangers. It can trigger reciprocal hedging, shorten breakout timelines, fuel arms-race dynamics and incentives for preventive strikes, and blur the line between nuclear and non-nuclear states, which weakens the nonproliferation regime even without producing new nuclear-armed states.