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Russia and Ukraine are set to begin a new round of US-mediated talks in Abu Dhabi. This time, the agenda could draw European governments and NATO into direct negotiations with Moscow. For the first time since Istanbul in 2022, Washington has put Russia’s own post-war security explicitly on the table alongside guarantees for Ukraine. We explain the formats Washington is proposing for wider talks on European security. The US appears to want European governments and NATO to do much of the bargaining with Moscow while it keeps a watchful eye.
European governments want a say in any settlement that affects their security. Many are wary, though, of being asked to negotiate directly with Moscow over NATO’s military posture and Ukraine’s choice of alliances. Moscow sees those issues as part of the war’s ‘root causes’ and wants concrete commitments before signing a settlement.
In the new R.Politik Bulletin, I look at how Russia approaches the talks, what agendas are on the table and what the Kremlin still thinks Trump can deliver, especially after the midterms.
I also look at why Putin’s Africa summit matters to officials and businesses competing for influence in Moscow. At home, Mishustin has reassigned responsibility for public finances and digital policy, while the Finance Ministry’s pension plan raises questions about who gets to decide how household savings are invested. And the prosecution of regional Communists is testing how much protection the party’s long-standing accommodation with the Kremlin still offers.
R.Politik Bulletin No. 19 (193) is available at rpolitik.com/bulletin/19-202…
President Vladimir Putin’s post-election cabinet reshuffle has left Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in office while removing his longstanding chief of staff and deputy, Dmitry Grigorenko. Two planned departures triggered the changes, and Putin chose to keep them limited. The redistribution of responsibilities over finance, digital policy and the government apparatus will determine how consequential they become.
Finance Minister Anton Siluanov’s return to a deputy premiership comes as the government faces increasingly difficult choices over military spending, social commitments and economic stability. Control over scarce resources gives financial officials greater influence across policy areas. The personnel changes also raise questions about Mishustin’s ability to defend his team and the authority his new colleagues will exercise.
R.Politik’s new Bulletin No. 18 (192) examines the calculations behind these appointments, the succession in the Far East and the emerging distribution of responsibilities within the cabinet.
US envoy Steve Witkoff’s St. Petersburg visit opens another set of questions. Discussions of potential economic deals offer Moscow opportunities to engage Washington while the gap over Ukraine remains substantial. Moscow sees little scope for substantive progress towards its goals at present, but views trilateral talks as a way to prepare the ground for an eventual settlement on its terms. A possible meeting involving Putin, US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping raises the stakes further. We examine what Moscow wants from these contacts and how it hopes to make its proposals attractive to Trump.
Inside Russia, the costs of sustaining the war are producing sharper competition over who pays. Business associations’ tax proposals show companies trying to influence the distribution of the fiscal burden, secure investment incentives and protect themselves from further pressure. Access to decision-makers increasingly shapes their capacity to do so.
Ukrainian strikes on data centres create another costly adjustment. Concentration around large digital platforms means disruptions spread through payments, retail, transport and communications. Companies face higher spending on protection and backup capacity, while their customers have unequal resources to absorb the costs.
Lesta’s sale after its confiscation brings together commercial opportunity, security concerns and competition for control over valuable digital assets.
The full bulletin traces how personnel decisions, diplomatic initiatives and business bargaining are changing the distribution of influence and the costs of adaptation.
rpolitik.com/bulletin/18-202…
The diesel agreement gives Putin an opportunity to advance economic cooperation with Washington before any settlement in Ukraine. Trump’s immediate domestic priorities create room for arrangements that Moscow has long sought. The durability of this opening, however, depends partly on pressures that have little to do with resolving the war.
A more transactional agenda changes the Kremlin’s tactical opportunities without necessarily bringing peace closer. Economic agreements can coexist with unchanged demands on Ukraine and continued military pressure. Meanwhile, Europe’s resistance to Moscow’s terms and its widening confrontation with Russia complicate any attempt to translate bilateral dealings into a settlement.
The new R.Politik Bulletin examines how Putin intends to use this opening. What could make a partial ceasefire acceptable to Moscow? How does the Kremlin assess Trump’s volatility, and what does it expect military pressure to achieve over the coming winter? These questions matter more than the immediate commercial value of the fuel agreement.
Domestically, Russia’s new three-year budget sets out how the government intends to finance a war with no defined endpoint. The political questions concern who absorbs the adjustment and how much flexibility remains if economic conditions deteriorate.
Volodin kept the speakership, but the distribution of posts also reshaped control over United Russia’s faction and the Duma’s administration. The bulletin examines what Volodin, Medvedev, Yakushev and the Kremlin’s domestic policy team each secured—and why these positions could become more valuable as Putin grows more detached from day-to-day governance.
Changes in the judiciary and investigations in the defence sector raise related questions about control and protection. Igor Krasnov’s proposals cover both jury trials and the financial administration of courts. At Patriot Park, a new arrest has reached an official appointed after the removal of the previous Defence Ministry leadership. The EFKO drone investigation has prompted intervention by prominent figures on behalf of the defendants. We explain the different interests behind these developments and the practical limits of political backing.
Kanye West’s cancelled concerts offer another perspective on how the system operates. A commercial event became a political confrontation involving competing interests and uncertain signals. The case raises a broader question: how do officials and businesses determine what is acceptable when Putin’s preferences matter greatly but no clear presidential decision is communicated?
R.Politik Bulletin No. 17 (191) examines Moscow’s diplomatic calculations and the domestic decisions sustaining its war effort.
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The war in Ukraine is entering a more dangerous phase of multilateral escalation, with few remaining guardrails. Ukrainian attacks are reaching deeper into Russia, Moscow is intensifying strikes on Ukraine and pressure on its maritime trade, and European support is becoming more directly connected to Kyiv’s capacity to strike Russian territory. Germany’s attribution of the attempted Leipzig airport attack to Moscow, alongside a succession of hybrid and other hostile incidents across Europe, has driven Russian-German relations into a new crisis and increased the risk of the confrontation spilling beyond Ukraine.
At the same time, Washington is making a new attempt to reopen negotiations, even though the positions of Moscow and Kyiv remain barely reconcilable.
Witkoff and Kushner returned to Moscow on 5 September after several months of work by Washington on a potential settlement framework. The disputed issues include territory, security guarantees, Ukraine’s future military capabilities, a possible international presence and the political conditions surrounding a settlement.
Russia’s fundamental terms have not changed, while Ukraine continues to signal that it is ready to keep fighting. Neither Moscow nor Kyiv appears prepared to make a strategic concession. The important questions are whether Putin continues to stand by earlier understandings and whether renewed contacts can produce more than another trilateral meeting.
The new R.Politik Bulletin assesses these questions alongside the military, maritime and Russian-European escalation now shaping the negotiating environment.
Russia’s domestic political system is also becoming less predictable as the first federal parliamentary campaign since the start of the war approaches. Yabloko was initially allowed to participate, only to be removed after the party began to look less politically manageable. The significance lies not simply in Yabloko’s electoral prospects, but in the reversal itself: was this a coherent policy shift, an improvised response to changing circumstances or the result of competing assessments of political risk? The bulletin examines the decision-making behind the party’s dismantling and the implications for the remaining boundaries of legal opposition.
Other developments raise similar questions about how wartime governance is changing. A new decree allows the state to place broadly defined critical infrastructure under temporary management without formally transferring ownership. Its practical application will determine whether it remains a security measure or develops into a wider instrument of corporate control.
The authorities have designated Pavel Durov an extremist while government bodies, businesses and election managers still rely on Telegram. This unresolved contradiction will become particularly important after the election, when the platform’s political utility may begin to change.
The prosecution of charity leader Lida Moniava tests how far social standing and institutional importance can influence the form of state pressure. In Udmurtia, an unexpected gubernatorial replacement offers a separate indication of the operational and personnel requirements emerging under wartime conditions.
Meanwhile, Russians continue to report relative personal stability while becoming markedly more pessimistic about the country’s future. Business confidence presents a similar picture: limited stabilisation, but at a persistently low level.
R.Politik Bulletin No. 15 (189) examines how these decisions are taken under pressure.
rpolitik.com/bulletin/15-202…
Several #Wildberries logistics facilities were attacked in less than a week. The strikes mark a significant expansion of the war into #Russia’s civilian consumer economy, directly affecting a platform used by millions of consumers, employees and small businesses.
The damage is highly visible, yet the state has no agreed mechanism for protecting private infrastructure or distributing wartime losses. Companies are expected to manage the consequences, demonstrate social responsibility and avoid placing additional demands on the authorities.
The new R.Politik Bulletin considers how #Putin views these losses, how political managers are trying to reconcile them with the official narrative and what happens as businesses and citizens assume responsibilities previously associated with the state.
This matters because the disruption has so far produced practical adaptation rather than politicisation. Sellers are concerned with compensation and the survival of their businesses; public discussion largely avoids the war itself. But how sustainable is this model if Ukrainian attacks continue to reach deeper into civilian economic life? The bulletin sets out the political risks the Kremlin sees, and those it may be overlooking.
The issue also looks at Washington’s preparations for another attempt to revive diplomacy over #Ukraine. Moscow’s fundamental position has not changed: it maintains contacts with the American side while increasing military pressure on Kyiv. Yet Russian officials are signalling that Moscow may no longer regard itself as constrained by what it describes as the #Anchorage understandings. The practical question is whether the autumn could offer a limited opening for renewed negotiations without any substantive change in the parties’ underlying positions.
Other sections trace the growing maritime confrontation and its implications for Russian and Ukrainian grain exports; the informal mechanisms of political control exposed by the Sobchak correspondence; and the policy dilemma created by sanctions against VK, as pressure for retaliation collides with Russia’s continuing dependence on Western digital infrastructure.
Finally, the treatment of Boris Nadezhdin offers an insight into the Kremlin’s thinking ahead of the State Duma elections. The episode is less about Nadezhdin than about growing risk aversion within the political system, the enforcement of unwritten boundaries and the shrinking tolerance for initiatives that have not been fully authorised.
R.Politik Bulletin No. 14 (188) examines how the Russian state is managing the expanding domestic consequences of the war.
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Putin does not believe that Ukraine's strike campaign can break Russian society. He reads it as a Western attempt to make his position fragile, and he is drawing conclusions from that reading which are not the ones being anticipated in Western capitals.
The new R.Politik Bulletin, No. 13 (187), is out today.
The assumption underpinning current Western policy is that mounting pressure will eventually bring Putin to the negotiating table. Trump has said publicly that the strikes on Russian refineries are "an escalation that can help lead to an end". Moscow's reply, and more importantly its private calculation, points the other way. The bulletin sets out what the Kremlin actually concludes from the pressure it is under, why that conclusion produces an incentive to escalate rather than to soften, and where the escalation is most likely to go next as the geography of the war widens.
The fuel crisis has become the central issue of Russian politics, and the authorities are managing it in a way that tells you a great deal about how the system now works under strain. The bulletin explains what is being decided, by whom, and what the Kremlin expects the political cost to be before the September vote.
Andrei Melnichenko's essay in The Economist has been read in incompatible ways: as a declaration of loyalty, as a text written in the presidential administration and merely signed, as a businessman breaking with the war. R.Politik's reading differs from all of them. Even if it changes nothing in practice, the essay may mark the beginning of something consequential for the fate of the regime. The bulletin sets out what it is actually proposing, and who its real addressee is.
The same pressures run through the rest of the issue: Lukashenko's narrowing room for manoeuvre between Moscow and Kyiv; the pre-election congresses and what United Russia's list reveals about the Kremlin's read on its own society; the arrests around the Rotenberg brothers and what is really being contested there; and Moscow's decision to install an outsider in South Ossetia for the first time since 2008.
R.Politik Bulletin No. 13 (187) examines how these decisions are taken under pressure. Available at rpolitik.com/bulletin/13-202…
The US-Iran memorandum signed in Islamabad is being read in Moscow in two seemingly contradictory ways. The loud version treats it as an American capitulation in the war — confirmation that Washington tried to topple an authoritarian regime but failed, and ended up in a more complicated position than before the war: a sign that #US power is in decline despite its military might. The quieter, more realist version acknowledges that stepping back is itself a smart move to correct a mistake, and proof of flexibility — ending the war is in any case better than a militarised destabilisation of the region with nuclear risks.
Moscow's real hope is that a closed Iran file frees #Trump to turn back to #Ukraine — on terms Russia can shape. The contest with Kyiv and the Europeans for his ear has accordingly been accelerating, with the latter handed a chance during the G7 in Évian to explore an opening and tilt Trump their way. However, much more will depend not on the outcome of this battle but on how Russian-American contacts develop in the coming weeks, how the situation on the front line changes, and whether November's US mid-term elections affect the prospects for resuming peace talks. We explain what Putin is set to undertake over these months.
That external picture sits on top of a domestic one that pulls in a single direction: pressure, not concession. A weeks-long campaign against Russian refineries had already pushed fuel shortages across more than fifty regions; the largest drone strike on Moscow since the war began, on 18 June, sharpened a crisis that was well under way — real strain, but strain the Kremlin reads as a reason to escalate, not to soften its demands.
The same logic of pressure runs inward. A budget-code amendment pushed through the Duma in a single sitting hands the executive freedom to spend and borrow without returning to parliament; the Central Bank, meanwhile, faces unusually open lobbying to make money cheaper. Decision-making is concentrating, as the fiscal room narrows.
The clearest signal of where the system is heading may be the arrest of #StPetersburg mogul Ilya Traber — a shadowy figure tied to #Putin's early career. The point is not the man but the precedent: personal connection no longer guarantees protection, and with the security services ascendant, the once-untouchable are now exposed.
Against that backdrop, the unblocking of Roblox stands out as a rare concession to public mood ahead of September's elections — we answer whether it marks a pre-election "thaw" or an exceptional decision, based on the specific nuances.
The polls capture the tension precisely: his rating decline has halted at a slightly lower level, while fear of the drone attacks climbs fast towards the centre of public attention.
If you follow how Russia actually makes decisions under pressure — where it bends, where it hardens, and why — the full analysis is in R.Politik Bulletin No. 12 (186), available at rpolitik.com/bulletin/12-202…
Putin went to Beijing four days after Trump, and the sequence flattered Moscow only on the surface. Trump had left without a breakthrough; Russia could present itself as China's steadier partner. But the visit produced no Power of Siberia 2 and no significant agreements, and what it confirmed was the asymmetry underneath the friendship: China is now the player whose economy lets Russia keep fighting. Beijing declines to press Putin to end the war while maintaining, in public, that it should end.
The commercial frictions are real — gas price, car imports, the terms of dependence — yet none of it touches the strategic closeness. The partnership deepens precisely as it becomes more one-sided. #Russia #China #Putin
I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 10 (184), which looks at this and at a sharper question forming at home.
Because the more telling shift this fortnight is internal. With talks paused and Washington waiting to see whether Russia's position weakens, loyalist voices — people who are no one's idea of dissenters — have begun to argue openly that the war cannot be won by military means. Putin is unlikely to move; what matters is that the argument is now sayable, and that speculation about manoeuvring around him has started to circulate.
Against that backdrop, Russia staged its largest joint nuclear exercise with Belarus to date — the nuclear card pressed harder precisely as the conventional war offers less. #Ukraine
The domestic machine, meanwhile, is preparing for September. Two border regions, Belgorod and Bryansk, went to a combat general and a technocrat — wartime personnel policy in miniature — while United Russia has been told to campaign in a softer register even as the pressure the Kremlin cannot control keeps building.
If you follow how Russia's strategic choices and its internal politics are starting to pull against each other, the full bulletin is at rpolitik.com/bulletin/10-202….
R.Politik retweeted
The Iran war is dominating global headlines — US-Israeli strikes since 28 February, Khamenei assassinated, Mojtaba now Supreme Leader, oil markets volatile over #Hormuz threats, and #Trump claiming the US is “very far ahead of schedule.”
Public discourse remains focused on the immediate chaos: who gains from rising #oil prices? Is this a strategic distraction for Russia in Ukraine? Will the conflict ultimately damage Western interests more than anyone else? Many analyses continue to emphasize short-term gains for Moscow.
Behind the scenes in Moscow, however, the picture is far more complex and uncertain than these surface-level assessments suggest.
I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 5 (179), examining how the Kremlin is actually assessing the situation: the short-term fiscal relief it is receiving, alongside the deeper strategic risks and long-term uncertainties causing genuine concern.
Key elements I highlight:
📌 Short-term fiscal relief. The surge in Brent prices — and the risk of even higher levels if the Strait of Hormuz remains threatened — is helping to close Russia’s budget deficit and replenish reserves. It also creates new opportunities for Russia to leverage energy markets to its advantage.
📌Long-term strategic concerns. Moscow views Trump’s decision to launch strikes as a serious miscalculation, driven by Israeli pressure and overconfidence following the Venezuela operation. Moscow expects that a protracted war risks radicalising Iran, entrenching hardliners, and further destabilising the region. Putin’s restrained response to Khamenei’s assassination — and the deaths of several family members — reflects deep unease over the precedent of targeting a head of state. At the same time, Trump’s recent call to #Putin is seen in Moscow as a potential opening for Russia to offer its mediation services, although attempts to engage Gulf states have so far produced limited results.
The central lessons for Moscow are clear: Trump is an unpredictable partner for any negotiated settlement (the so-called “spirit of #Anchorage” is fading), negotiations can serve as cover for military preparations, reliance on allies has clear limits, and sanctions pressure often accompanies military action. The prevailing mood among Russian elites is mixed and contradictory — ranging from a sense that the situation is spiralling into a major mess to cautious hopes that the war in the Middle East could become a serious strategic setback for the US and the “collective West.”
Meanwhile, the conflict is diverting international attention and munitions from Ukraine. While the direct impact on Russian-Ukrainian peace talks remains uncertain, Moscow is preparing for the possibility of additional sanctions, increased US pressure, and a prolonged war — even as it sees potential gains from a weakening Ukrainian position. Moscow has already been seeking to relocate the negotiation process while increasing pressure on Ukraine to withdraw from the Donbas.
On the domestic front, the FSB has prevailed in its long-running confrontation with Telegram. A criminal case has been opened against Pavel @durov for assisting terrorist activity, traffic throttling has intensified, and a full ban inside Russia now appears irreversible — despite broad resistance from elites, the public, and even parts of the military. Current geopolitical developments are creating additional grounds for the FSB to expand its influence in political decision-making.
I also examine the Kremlin’s creation of a new presidential commission on AI. Internal competition is intensifying, reflecting the broader struggle for technological sovereignty and tighter state control over the digital space.
Another significant development is the arrest of Ruslan Tsalikov, a long-time associate of Sergey Shoigu. Despite his high-level connections, he now faces the prospect of a lengthy prison sentence.
This bulletin offers a non-headline perspective on how the Kremlin is recalibrating its foreign and domestic priorities in light of the events in Iran.
If you follow Russia’s strategic thinking, the interplay between the Middle East conflict and Ukraine, the Telegram situation, or you simply want a detailed, source-based analysis of the factors shaping decisions in Moscow — the full 45-page document is now available at rpolitik.com/bulletin/5-2026….
R.Politik retweeted
A rare situation has emerged in which domestic developments have overshadowed an already fraught international agenda for Russia.
The Kremlin has decided to begin throttling Telegram, the country’s most widely used social media platform for communication and access to information. Although preparations for such a move had been evident, the decision nonetheless came as a shock to many, including senior officials, businesses, and representatives of the pro-war community. The systemic opposition chose to speak out against the measure. While this carries no tangible political weight, it signals emerging discrepancies within the ruling elite. The FSB, which stands behind the decision, was compelled to justify its actions publicly. The measure is highly likely to be implemented, yet it will have a noticeable impact on public sentiment.
In international affairs, the Munich Security Conference was a central event, exposing growing transatlantic tensions and mistrust. This has occurred notwithstanding attempts by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to adopt a conciliatory tone. The discussions have intensified European debates about how to shape the continent’s future security and defence architecture without a dominant US role, and how to manage the Russia threat when Putin is failing to achieve victory in Ukraine yet is still committed to unrealistic objectives. Nuclear issues have moved to the centre of the discourse. Russia has observed these developments with limited interest but increasing concern.
With regard to Ukraine, talks in Geneva have opened a new chapter in diplomatic efforts. For the first time since April 2022, Russia has secured an opportunity to draw Ukraine into negotiations on the political aspects of a settlement — effectively a reproduction of the “Istanbul format” of 2022, to which Moscow has repeatedly referred as its preferred basis. The process, however, shows little sign of progress. Volodymyr Zelensky continues to push for a direct meeting with Putin, a scenario still unacceptable to Moscow. Kyiv faces a particularly difficult position: growing pressure from Washington, hesitant and divided European partners, and a Russia unwilling to abandon its maximalist demands.
Considerable attention has also focused on Armenia amid US Vice President JD Vance’s visit — the highest-ranking US official to ever visit the country. Armenia is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in June, and Russia is expected to seek to weaken the position of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan by supporting his opponents. Moscow appears to underestimate the significance of the intensifying Armenian–American engagement and is likely to double down in order to keep Yerevan within its sphere of geopolitical influence. At the same time, the Kremlin must calibrate its actions carefully so as not to provoke President Donald Trump.
Decision-making logic, internal splits, and the real trade-offs that never make it into open sources — all unpacked in the new R.Politik Bulletin No. 4 (178).
Find out much more on the Kremlin thinking in our latest issue.
rpolitik.com/bulletin/4-2026…
Russian-American relations navigate a delicate phase, with Abu Dhabi trilateral talks yielding no settlement breakthroughs despite U.S. pressure for resolution before summer. Moscow deems Kyiv's sequencing plan unworkable, irritated by Washington's dismissal of prior understandings, new demands on Ukraine and hostile rhetoric in the context of Venezuela, Cuba or Russian oil. We depict these topics in detail in our fresh R.Politik Bulletin, revealing the nuances one won't find in the media.
European engagement ramps up: French diplomat Emmanuel Bonne's unannounced Moscow visit prepares potential Macron-Putin dialogue, yet unofficially the Kremlin dismisses it as substance-free, absent a fundamental European policy shift. Moscow signals openness but harbours deep skepticism.
U.S. proposal for a new nuclear deal including China puts Moscow in an awkward position: dialogue is welcomed in principle, but viewed as unrealistic amid Beijing's refusal and Russia's call for broader inclusion.
Putin's pragmatism emerges in Syrian discussions, supporting interim President al-Sharaa to restore territorial integrity and maintain a modest Russian role via military-technical ties.
Economic pressures surface through asset sales: Domodedovo Airport sold at half value to a state-linked buyer amid investor reluctance.
Lukoil's conditional Carlyle deal freezes proceeds under sanctions, a lesser-evil calculation with rival bids ongoing, betting on future geopolitical relief.
Societal impacts deepen: the state has to significantly restrict the general access to higher education, simultaneously favoring war veterans, heightening inequity perceptions.
Ahead of September Duma elections, Telegram restrictions are seen as inevitable but questioned to avoid voter backlash.
GRU Lt Gen Alexeyev's assassination attempt prompts in Moscow swift Ukraine accusations, exposing security gaps for war-linked figures and setbacks of the FSB, but unlikely to foil the negotiations.
Find out much more on the Kremlin thinking in our latest Bulletin.
rpolitik.com/bulletin/3-2026…
Over the past two weeks, the geopolitical cycle has intensified and become more volatile. The Maduro extraction was followed by Trump’s forceful threat to annex Greenland, accompanied by sustained pressure on Denmark and other European NATO allies. The chaos at Davos—marked by gloomy interventions from the leaders of Canada and Belgium, unexpected criticism of Europe by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and a series of disrupted meetings—reflected a broader sense of fragmentation in the global order.
In the latest R.Politik bulletin, we examine how Russia is interpreting and positioning itself within this evolving context. While Trump’s modus operandi—characterised by force, pressure, blackmail, and incompetence—is undoubtedly alarming to Moscow, it also creates significant tactical openings. The Kremlin has adjusted its position on both the Greenland claim and Trump’s Board of Peace initiative, carefully balancing strategic interests with potential situational gains.
Amid these shifts, a new round of discussions on the war in Ukraine has begun. The first Russia–Ukraine–US trilateral talks took place in Abu Dhabi, following a preparatory visit to Moscow by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. What does the choice of the Russian delegation tell us? What are Putin’s intentions? What does the Kremlin expect to see further, demonstrating pragmatism coupled with still-actual maximalist demands?
On the domestic front, January brought unusual delays in wage payments to social workers in several regions—a reflection of growing economic imbalances and mounting budgetary pressure at the regional level.
At the same time, the Kremlin has accelerated preparations for the State Duma elections, as indicated by a leaked draft list of United Russia’s leading candidates. The list, headed by Dmitry Medvedev and Sergey Lavrov, points not only to early electoral planning but also to ongoing internal wrangling over the party’s configuration and prospective personnel changes.
Finally, an emergency in the Belgorod region—where hundreds of thousands of residents were left without heating or electricity following Ukrainian retaliatory strikes—has exposed serious weaknesses in crisis response and the federal centre’s reluctance to publicly acknowledge the severity of the disruption.
For those monitoring how the Russian state is adjusting—strategically and structurally—this bulletin offers grounded, non-public insight essential for understanding what comes next.
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🚨 Why is Moscow perplexed by Trump's swift Venezuela "special operation"—and how is it reshaping Putin's Ukraine calculations?
As headlines buzz with Maduro's capture, US oil control, Greenland threats, and stalled Ukraine talks, my new R.Politik Bulletin No. 1 (175) reveals Russia's contradictory responses and strategic shifts you won't find in mainstream coverage.
With 2026 off to a turbulent start—US seizures of Russian-linked tankers, NATO tensions over Greenland, and fears of Venezuelan oil flooding markets—this edition unpacks the pressures converging on Russian policymaking.
Key insights you'll find inside:
📌Ukraine Peace Talks on the Brink: US, Ukraine, and Europe near a full framework with NATO-style security guarantees—leaving Moscow in a precarious spot: disrupt without alienating Trump. After an alleged drone hit on Putin's residence and a fresh Oreshnik strike on Lviv, Russia's hardening its stance: Will Putin retract earlier "Anchorage deal" concessions?
📌Venezuela Shockwaves in Moscow: Trump's Maduro capture sparks apprehension, awe, and discord. Ultra-patriots express indignation at the "embarrassing" contrast to Ukraine's prolonged war; some in leadership debate if it's a threat or opens a "new wonder world." Exclusive: Moscow's confused reaction and how it views this as a blow to the international order.
📌Greenland Factor Looms: As Trump doubles down on acquiring the territory "at any cost," testing NATO unity—Putin sees tactical opportunities in disrupting alliances short-term, prioritizing less confrontation with the US and more hostility toward Europe.
📌Domestic Developments: Putin's year-end meeting with big business signals pessimism amid inflation and stagnation. Plus, speculation swirls on Dmitry Kozak: Prime minister contender or sidelined figure?
📌Rising Xenophobia Wave: Anti-migrant backlash surges with Indian laborers' influx, exposing rifts between security hawks and economy chiefs facing labor shortages.
2026 Outlook: What Russians really expect this year, plus hard data on 2025's industrial slowdown locking in "economy mode."
This bulletin cuts through the noise with exclusive analysis on Russia's opportunistic pivot—less confrontational toward the US, more hostile to Europe—amid a world order in flux. If you're tracking #VenezuelaCrisis, #UkraineWar, or Trump's assertive moves, this is your insider edge.
Subscribe to R.Politik for the full issue, archives, and future deep dives—stay ahead in 2026's geopolitical storm.
#Russia #Putin #Trump #Geopolitics #Greenland #maduro
rpolitik.com/bulletin/1-2026…
R.Politik retweeted
Exciting news, everyone! 🚀
I know that many of us are currently consumed by events in Venezuela, but I have something important and exciting to distract you with. For the past two years, I've been developing StarkTalk, an exclusive online platform designed as a virtual Track 2 forum for leading Russian and Western experts on strategic security, foreign policy, arms control, and related fields.
What is StarkTalk? I envision it as an elite expert club for sharing ideas on peaceful coexistence between the West and Russia within the strategic framework: how to navigate a tectonically shifting world, collapsing international rules, and crumbling security architecture. The focus is to zoom out—avoiding direct discussion of the Ukraine conflict—and examine the broader picture of strategic changes. Experts can present contrasting views in a "pro and contra" format, engage in moderated discussions and chats, connect with peers, and submit proposals to build a shared bank of solutions for global security challenges. It's a unique opportunity for respected voices to network, debate, and influence forward-thinking strategies in a safe, respectful setting.
This is entirely my personal, independent project—self-funded, with no sponsors, donors, or institutional affiliations. To preserve its high-caliber, apolitical, and professional environment, registration is selective and requires pre-approval. This ensures StarkTalk remains an exclusive space for established professionals only, shielded from propaganda, hidden agendas, or unqualified participants, allowing for candid, structured exchanges among true peers.
I'm thrilled that distinguished experts such as @AlexGabuev , Samuel @scharap , Tatiana Mitrova @mitrovat , Pavel Podvig @russianforces , William Alberque @walberque have already joined. If you're a prominent professional in these areas with valuable insights—or have a topic you'd like to debate with a counterpart—this is your chance to contribute to a select community shaping the future.
Two ways to get involved:
- Follow this link to apply for registration and await selective approval: starktalk.com/membership-req…
- Email me directly at [email protected] to discuss participation.
For experts facing safety concerns (e.g., those based in Russia), we offer fully anonymous options: We'll verify your credentials privately, without any public traces, and represent you via a nickname with a brief expertise description.
We're launching soon (exact date TBA). More updates to follow.
Let's talk starkly. 💬
RT @Stanovaya: As 2025 draws to a close, the Ukraine-Russia peace talks remain stalled—but why is Moscow growing even more cautious about T…
📢 New R.Politik Bulletin №20 (172) just released.
What’s really happening behind the curtain as Trump’s team pushes a “peace plan” that reads suspiciously like Moscow’s wishlist?
We dissect:
• How much of the Witkoff-Kushner draft was shaped in the Kremlin
• Kirill Dmitriev’s quiet role as go-between
• Why even Russian insiders call the wording “ambiguous”
• Exact signals to watch in the coming weeks
Plus:
• FSB’s aggressive new grip on all digital communications (and the turf war it’s triggering inside the regime)
• Putin–Tokayev: walking the sanctions tightrope with Kazakhstan
• EU visa ban fallout: weaponised for domestic propaganda, crippling the anti-war diaspora
• “Technology levy” squeezing the IT sector dry
Details and context that go beyond what’s visible in open sources.
Read the full bulletin (subscribers only)
rpolitik.com/bulletin/20-202…
📌 R.Politik Bulletin 19 (171) is out now.
IN FOCUS:
A rare institutional clash in the Russian power system. Zaporizhzhia head Yevgeny Balitsky’s attempt to subordinate the regional election commission and dismiss its head triggered a backlash from the Central Election Commission, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Presidential Administration.
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:
– US nuclear tests: Moscow elaborates possible responses amid growing arms control uncertainty
– Lavrov’s "disappearance": Who is acting against the foreign minister, and why
– State Duma 2026 campaign: AI tools used for voter profiling and targeting
– Venezuela: Moscow navigates its position amid rising external pressure
– Tver’s new governor: Appointment process highlights wartime staffing issues
– Belousov’s new deputy: Move to align Defence Ministry with defence industry
– Lukoil–Gunvor deal blocked by OFAC, raising risk of nationalisation or asset loss
This issue delivers detail on internal decisions and policy recalibration unavailable in open sources.
rpolitik.com/bulletin/19-202…
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The latest R.Politik Bulletin No. 17 (169) is now available, offering an in-depth look at Russia’s shifting external and domestic landscape in early October 2025.
IN FOCUS
We analyse the entrenched tactical deadlock between Russia and the United States, where political dialogue has stalled and military risk is rising. Moscow’s attempt to revive the Anchorage framework now coincides with Washington’s deliberations on supplying Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine—an escalation the Kremlin equates with a nuclear threat. At the same time, Europe’s tougher posture—moves to unlock frozen Russian assets, constrain the “shadow fleet,” and develop an air-defence shield over western Ukraine—has deepened systemic confrontation.
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
- Wartime fiscal tightening: the 2026–2028 budget entrenches a long-term “war economy.”
- “Nuclear Week” in Moscow: Russia leverages its atomic sector for strategic signalling.
- The Momotov case: prosecution extends into the judiciary.
- Moldova’s elections: results expose limits of Russian influence in the region.
- New envoy to the Northwestern District: occasional personnel policy.
- Indicators: record fuel prices; mobilisation fears rising, war-support levels stable.
rpolitik.com/bulletin/17-202…
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The latest issue of R.Politik’s Bulletin (No. 16, September 2025) is out now.
IN FOCUS
We analyse the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace — not only the benefits Moscow can extract from such incidents, but also the risks they carry. We also explore Belarus’s bid to act as a mediator between Moscow, Kyiv, and the Trump administration.
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
- Regional elections: a test ahead of the State Duma vote
- Alexander Gutsan as Prosecutor General: a less ambitious course expected
- Dmitry Kozak’s departure: anticipated, yet politically revealing
- Religious processions: an unpleasant surprise for the Kremlin
- Campaign against activist Roman Alekhin: inconsistency in decision-making
- Economic indicators: falling investment and a state-shaped car market
At R.Politik, we help to understand major Russian developments, the underlying interests and motives, and the strategic consequences often overlooked in open sources.
rpolitik.com/bulletin/16-202…
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R.Politik Bulletin No. 15 (167) is out after the summer break.
We analyse the Trump–Putin summit in Alaska. Moscow achieved tactical gains: Trump no longer demands a ceasefire before talks, acknowledged Russia’s nuclear status, and hinted that Ukraine must consider concessions. Yet the deeper gulf remains: Washington dismisses Russia’s “root causes” narrative, Europe insists on shaping security guarantees, and Kyiv rejects territorial compromise.
Within four weeks, the situation reverted to a stalemate. Trump threatens new sanctions, Putin continues the war, Ukraine holds the line, and Europe dreams of security guarantees. One should not expect sharp changes, either on the battlefield or in negotiations.
We also examine Russia’s internal pressures:
– Nuclear rhetoric moderated, but deterrence remains central to Kremlin strategy.
– China ties reinforced at the SCO Tianjin summit and during Putin’s visit to Beijing, underscoring both dependence and bargaining asymmetry.
– Digital restrictions tightened: WhatsApp and Telegram calls blocked, while MAX messenger is forced onto users despite resistance.
– Judicial reshuffle: Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov set to become Supreme Court chairman, signalling wider elite adjustments.
– Economic fragility: a gasoline crisis driven by refinery strikes, reduced subsidies, and seasonal demand, alongside slowing growth, corporate losses, and rising bad loans.
Don’t miss our forthcoming Essential Ukraine report, to be released on 10 September.
rpolitik.com/bulletin/15-202…

