Tony (@_TheoMed) and I have significantly updated the file on Charnock’s Hypothetical Universalism. It now appears more like a small book, with a table of contents and chapters with an expanded section of Charnock’s Two-fold reconciliation view. Link in the comments.

Davenant recounts Maccovius being brought before the synod for allegedly denying God wills the salvation of all men, and for positing God ordains men unto sin: “Maccovius was upon a by-occasion brought before the Synod; and the business between him and Lubbertus was committed to the examination of some few Delegates, according to whose report he was dismissed. Unto the objection of ordaining men unto sin, his answer was that God did not ordain any man unto sin efficiendo [by effecting it], but permittendo [by permitting it]. As for his denial of a will in God for the saving of all men, he understood it of the absolute effectual operative will, not of the conditional and approbative will of God.” —John Davenant, Animadversions upon a Treatise Entitled, God’s Love to Mankind (Cambridge: Roger Daniel, 1641)

Hyper-Calvinists hit hardest.

“Christ, therefore, our Surety, by yielding the exact obedience which the law demanded, and undergoing the punishment which was required from violators of the law, did that to which we were bound by this hand-writing, and so blotted out the hand writing itself. For, as says Augustine, shedding his blood without sin, he blotted out the hand-writing of all sin. Christ was made under the law, that he might redeem them that were under the law, Gal. iv. 4, 5. But it must be observed, that this hand-writing may be said to be blotted out in two ways: First, universally and sufficiently as it respects God: because by the blood of Christ such satisfaction is made to God, that he cannot require that hand-writing of the law from any debtors, when they flee by faith to this Deliverer; but according to the order of his own justice is necessarily engaged to acquit them. Secondly, particularly and efficaciously, when, in fact, it is blotted from the conscience of all believers who lay hold on Christ by faith; according to that declaration of the Apostle, Being justified by faith we have peace with God. But, truly, he cannot have peace who sees himself overwhelmed with debt, and, moreover, entangled by a bond: but as soon as any one takes hold of Christ by faith, thenceforth this hand-writing is blotted out, and his conscience enjoys a blessed peace. And Paul in the most admirable manner hath provided for trembling consciences by a certain beautiful gradation. For, not content with having asserted in the foregoing verse, that all our sins are forgiven us; he subjoins, that the hand-writing itself is blotted out: but lest any one should think that it is not so blotted out, but that a new charge may be raised, he therefore adds, it is moreover taken out of the way: and lest it should be thought to be preserved hidden somewhere, and may be preferred against us hereafter; nay, says he, it is nailed to his cross, i.e. it is torn and rent in pieces by those nails wherewith Christ was affixed, and lacerated upon the cross.” —John Davenant, An Exposition of the Epistle of St. Paul to the Colossians, trans. Josiah Allport, vol. 1 (London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co., 1831), 465–66.

Jean Daillé addresses Spanheim’s absurd objection that God commands obedience without truly desiring it, an argument illustrated by the case of Pharaoh, whom God commanded to release Israel while supposedly not willing that Pharaoh should obey Him. Daillé rejects this inference, arguing that God genuinely willed Pharaoh’s obedience according to his preceptive and approbative will, even though he permissibly decreed to leave Pharaoh to his own hardness. Daillé explains that God’s hardening of Pharaoh is understood permissively, that is, as his deliberate refusal to soften Pharaoh’s heart and overcome his resistance. But God’s willing to harden Pharaoh in this sense does not entail that he was unwilling that Pharaoh should release Israel, as he himself commanded. It only signifies that God, though willing Pharaoh’s obedience according to his approbative will, nevertheless permitted him to persist in his own hardness rather than soften his heart, while providentially ordering that very disobedience toward the manifestation of His glory and the benefit of His people. The essential distinction is between willing to permit disobedience and willing the disobedience itself. God may knowingly and freely permit men to act contrary to what he genuinely wills and commands, without thereby approving or desiring their disobedience. So God’s permissive decree does not negate his genuine approbative will that men obey him, nor does their disobedience imply that his decree has been frustrated. Nor must every genuine divine volition be an absolute and efficacious will that God infallibly brings to pass. To insist that God cannot genuinely will something unless He decrees to effectuate it is merely to assume what must first be demonstrated. Thus, while God’s preceptive and approbative will may be crossed by the disobedience of men, it is crossed only insofar as God has freely decreed to permit such disobedience. Consequently, His decretive will is never frustrated, for His decree to permit men to act contrary to His revealed will is itself infallibly fulfilled, just as everything else He has absolutely decreed to accomplish. The violation of His preceptive will, therefore, does not entail the frustration of His decretive will, nor does the infallibility of the latter negate the sincerity of the former.

“Hence the Scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus, Durandus, Richard, Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Hervaeus, Biel, and the more recent writers, both Thomists and Scotists, as also Greeks and Protestants, received and employed the distinction of the Divine Will into Antecedent and Consequent, not in the sense that God, His former Will having been changed, should form another Will, and that the Will of God should be one Antecedent in time and another Consequent in time; for this would involve a change of counsel and consequently imperfection; but because the Antecedent Will precedes the consideration of voluntary unbelief, impenitence, and contumacy, God therefore seriously wills, out of natural Goodness and Mercy, the salvation, under the condition of Faith and Repentance, of men rendered miserable in Adam; whereas the Consequent Will follows the consideration of voluntary unbelief, impenitence, and contumacy, and consequently of contempt for offered Grace, and, out of Justice, wills and executes the punishment deserved by man. Hence it is also called Judicial. Here no change whatever occurs in the Will of God. Thomas Aquinas observes that this distinction is not to be understood from the standpoint of the Divine Will itself, in which there is nothing prior or subsequent, but from the standpoint of the things willed; and he explains it by an analogy drawn from a just judge: a just judge antecedently wills every man to live, but consequently wills a murderer to be hanged; similarly, God antecedently wills every man to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, according to the demand of His justice.” —Barthold Holtzfus, On God’s Attributes and Divine Decrees

“Fourthly, the Will of God is distinguished into antecedent and consequent; for this distinction to be understood; something can in its first consideration, i.e., as it is considered absolutely, be Good, which however when considered with some adjunct (which is indeed a consequent consideration of it) behaves in the contrary way; thus a Prince considering his citizens, absolutely and as they are citizens, wills the salvation of them all; but considering a certain citizen as a murderer, wills his death: similarly God is said to will certain things according to the first and bare consideration of things, as e.g. He wills the salvation of all Men by this antecedent will; but He is said to will certain things consequently, i.e., by a will by which things are considered with their adjuncts, as e.g. the eternal death of impious Men. And although God, when He considers Men as they are Men, does not predestine them to eternal punishment, yet when He considers them as they are sinners, i.e., as they have fallen in Adam, He can justly prepare eternal punishment for them and will to punish them eternally by this consequent will.” — Robert Baron, General and Special Metaphysics, Section XII, Disputation II

“His [Spanheim] second dilemma is: "The redemption of all and every sin by Christ was either absolute or conditional." But it is confessed that it was conditional, not absolute. But (he says) "if the redemption or salvation obtained by Christ is conditional, either Christ obtained for all the redeemed the condition of applying the redemption to themselves, or not." But this too is confessed, that Christ did not obtain this for all; He obtained faith for the elect alone absolutely, so that they will certainly and infallibly believe by the efficacy of His death; for the rest of mortals He obtained the same, not indeed absolutely, but conditionally. Namely, the death of Christ effected this, that if they wish, they can believe, and thus be saved; which is given to all men. Therefore, it is necessary that by Christ's death, something was obtained even for those men who do not believe, whose condition in this matter would otherwise be the same as that of the devils. But the Exercitator insists and says that if what we say stands, that Christ did not obtain that all for whom He died should actually believe through the gracious efficacy of the Spirit, but only that they should be permitted to believe if they wish, it would thence follow that the redemption was obtained in vain under a condition not performable by man dead in sins. Behold where the Exercitator has finally led us through so many rugged contrivances of dilemmas! And yet, if I remember correctly, this was the very thing with which he terrified us in the previous objection, and which was objected more than once in another part of the discussion. Therefore, I answer as above: I confess that the condition under which men are to enjoy the redemption obtained by Christ is not performable by them, indeed, being unwilling; but I deny it for those who are willing. For the reason they cannot believe is not because, when they themselves desire and greatly wish to believe and repent, they are prevented against their will from giving effect to what they will by some external force, either divine or human; but they cannot believe and repent for this reason, because their mind, turned away from God and all good by perverse studies, loves its own vanity and vices so ardently and furiously that it cannot obtain from itself the assent and obedience of heavenly truth. Which is also the very reason why men are said to be dead in sins; not because they lack all power of feeling, understanding, and willing, like corpses, but because that wickedness with which their mind and will is hindered brings it about that they no more grasp or will divine things than if they lacked both mind and will along with a corpse. Now, no one would say that a condition is laid down in vain and absurdly because he to whom it is laid down is unwilling to perform it. Therefore, that those men dead in sins are excluded from the salvation obtained through Christ because they have not fulfilled the given condition, this is done justly, and in no way detracts from the wisdom or goodness of God or Christ.” —Jean Daillé, Apologia Pro Synodis Alesonensi Et Carentonensi

“But that God deals with men through ministers, and exhorts and calls them, both the matter itself speaks and the Apostle explicitly cries out: "Now then we are ambassadors for Christ," he says, "as though GOD did beseech you by us: we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." (2 Cor. 5:20) Whence it happens that elsewhere he teaches that those who reject the preached Gospel have violated and offended not the minister who preaches, but God himself, as the author of the whole business. "He therefore that despiseth," he says, "despiseth not man, but God." (1 Thess. 4:8) In vain and undeservedly, unless we establish that the act of the minister in this part is the act of God himself.” —Jean Daillé, Apology for the Synods of Alençon and Charenton

40. The moving cause of the covenant of grace was God’s love toward the world, that is, toward the whole human race, which had fallen into misery by Satan’s cunning, so that it should not perish eternally once every hope of pardon had been cut off. 41. Therefore he set forth a common remedy for the common fall, as a means of averting evil, not sparing his only-begotten Son so that he might spare us, to this end: that we should not perish, but have eternal life, provided that, repenting, we apply to ourselves by true faith the Christ promised in the Gospel. 42. “For God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, so that whoever believes in him should not perish, but have eternal life,” John 3:16. Likewise: “God, who is rich in mercy,” says the Apostle, “because of his exceedingly great love with which he loved us, even when we were dead through offences, made us alive together through Christ, by whose grace we are saved,” Ephesians 2:4. 43. At this point one must carefully distinguish between God’s general decree, establishing the covenant of grace with the whole human race and, according to the counsel of his will, setting it forth in Adam indefinitely to all, under the condition that human beings repent and believe; and the particular decree of election, by which he himself graciously fulfils the required condition in those whom he determined from eternity to give to Christ. 44. The former concerns the remedy set against the common fall as the means of human salvation, so that, just as all descendants fell in Adam, in his loins, so in him the common promise concerning the woman’s seed, destined to crush the serpent’s head, should be made to all. The latter concerns the application of the proposed means and remedy through the inward drawing of faith, which pertains to the elect alone. 45. According to the former, attention must be paid to the general promise through the external calling, both once made in Adam and subsequently repeated to those to whom God wished; according to the latter, attention must be paid to the effective application of the promise according to the promise of particular grace. Hence the Lord in the Gospel says: “Many are called, but few are chosen,” Matthew 22:14. —Raphael Eglin, On the Covenant of Grace, Chapter III, theses 40–45, translation pp. 11–12.

Limitarian Proposition: The sincerity and truth of the universal gospel offer do not require that Christ made satisfaction for the sins of all men. For the gospel promises salvation to everyone who believes, and the truth of this conditional promise is sufficiently established by the infinite worth and all-sufficiency of Christ’s death. Since his satisfaction is intrinsically sufficient to save all who come to him, ministers may sincerely offer salvation to every sinner without supposing that Christ died for every individual. For the ministers of the gospel are commissioned to declare God’s commands and promises, not his secret intentions and decrees. Response: We deny that the intrinsic sufficiency of Christ’s satisfaction, considered apart from its divine ordination, is sufficient to establish the truth of the universal conditional promise. For a distinction must be made between the intrinsic worth of a satisfaction, whereby it is sufficient in itself to redeem all mankind, and its ordained applicability, whereby God has actually constituted it a remedy for the sins of those to whom salvation is promised. The former establishes only what Christ’s satisfaction could accomplish; the latter establishes what it may accomplish according to the appointment of God. Now, since the gospel promises remission of sins through faith to every individual if they repent and believe, it necessarily presupposes that Christ’s satisfaction has been ordained as applicable to every individual upon that condition. Otherwise, a sinner might be called to believe in Christ for the remission of sins when no satisfaction had been appointed by God as applicable to his sins, and consequently the promised benefit would lack its proper judicial ground. Nor does this universal ordination of satisfaction imply that God has decreed to bestow faith upon all, or infallibly to apply salvation to every individual. For it is one thing to ordain Christ’s death as a remedy applicable to all upon the condition of faith, and another to decree the effectual fulfillment of that condition in particular persons. The former belongs to the universal conditional evangelical covenant; the latter to the special decree of election. Therefore, the sincerity of the universal gospel promise rests not upon the bare intrinsic sufficiency of Christ’s death but upon its actual divine ordination as a satisfactory remedy applicable to all who believe, while its infallible application remains peculiar to the elect.

“…God is able to make a self-determining power that can thus do: for it is no contradiction.” —Richard Baxter, An End of Doctrinal Controversies