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Giornalista. Scrivo di Cina e Asia orientale. Ora collaboro con @repubblica, @ilmanifesto e @chinafiles. Poi non so.

Roma, Lazio
Joined March 2016
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Lee met with Russian President Putin on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen. The two leaders discussed a wide range of issues including North Korea and "reached a general consensus to foster mutual cooperation and improve bilateral relations," according to a senior Blue House official. ​The event marked the first face-to-face meeting between the leaders of South Korea and Russia since 2019.
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President Trump said he is “not concerned at all” about tensions in the West Philippine Sea during a bilateral meeting with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. When Trump was asked whether the Pax Silica Initiative deal would be signed, Marcos interjected, saying “we are not covering that on this trip.” The Pax Silica is a U.S. State Department-led international initiative to secure non-Chinese supply chains for high-tech manufacturing, which includes building a 4,000-acre manufacturing hub in the Philippines. Critics argue this will displace farming communities and Indigenous groups, harm the country’s water supply and represent U.S. imperialism over the Philippines. cbsn.ws/4knAdBU
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The Absurd Logic of Selling China AI Chips to Keep China Behind Jensen Huang and his defenders argue that selling China more American AI chips will keep it dependent on Nvidia, slow Huawei’s development, and give Washington leverage over Beijing. teapaw.org/gavinsbaker/status/212… All three claims are deeply flawed. The CCP is determined to replace American technology regardless of export restrictions. Meanwhile, American GPUs are helping China advance its AI capabilities today. Why should America strengthen its strategic rival today in the hope of keeping it dependent tomorrow? My latest Substack: The Absurd Logic of Selling China AI Chips to Keep China Behind. desmondshum.substack.com/p/t…
Both the Biden and Trump administrations allowed the export of less powerful GPUs to China while reserving the most advanced chips for America. This has been a clear national security success. Per Grok and Claude, the US-to-China AI FLOPs ratio has grown from 2.8x in 2023 to 8.8x in 2026 and is modeled to reach 14.1x in 2027. Our advantage in compute has grown dramatically and American AI labs have stayed well ahead of Chinese labs the entire time. Chinese labs prefer these less powerful American GPUs to domestic accelerators from Huawei and others. That preference has slowed China’s hardware industry: AI chips improve through intensive use by leading labs, and the ready availability of American alternatives has limited that feedback loop for Chinese AI hardware. Chinese labs can also access capacity in Southeast Asian clouds run by American hyperscalers. Those zones can be shut off instantly in a conflict, giving the US signficant leverage. This dependence is advantageous in every way. A complete ban on GPU exports and Southeast Asian cloud access might be deeply damaging to long-term American national security. It would force Chinese labs onto the Huawei AI hardware ecosystem. China is not power-constrained, and Huawei is developing extremely power-hungry, large optical scale-up domains that may approach American state-of-the-art systems through brute force rather than architectural elegance and efficiency. And China has a lot of power. Having Chinese labs optimize models for this different architecture is risky as nothing prevents China from sharing this hardware and associated models with Russia, North Korea, or Iran. We would lose any ability to cut off their AI in a conflict. Policies now under discussion in Washington carry serious, uncertain risks. Reasonable minds can disagree, but treating this as a simple black-and-white issue does America a disservice. If China closes the installed FLOPs gap as its domestic hardware matures rapidly as a result of increased Chinese lab usage after stricter export controls, we will know this new policy was a mistake. If Russia, Iran, or North Korea later field comparable Chinese AI hardware systems that are used to run AI targeting models against Ukrainian or American troops, we will know stricter controls were a *terrible* mistake. The current reality is one where China is consistently behind America thanks to the export of less powerful GPUs and we have immense leverage over China in any future conflict. We know that the current policy is working. We have no idea what the consequences of stricter controls might be. This is why China is currently restricting imports of roughly 600,000 H200s sitting in Hong Kong warehouses. China Hawks should consider why Beijing agrees with them and why China *restricts* the sales American GPUs inside China. The current policy has worked spectacularly. The alternative is extremely risky with unknown consequences.
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Papua New Guinea ordered Taiwan’s top diplomats out in seven days. China immediately offered to buy more of PNG’s gas. On Nov 6, PNG’s foreign ministry handed a departure notice to Taiwan’s representative Chiu Chen-yu and First Secretary Lee Chung-nun. One lower-level diplomat may stay briefly to finish closing the Port Moresby office. The move escalated a campaign that began July 16, when PNG first demanded the office shut under its “One China” policy. Taiwan had kept it running. Taiwan responded the same day. It will close the office, pull out all staff, end technical and medical missions, scholarships, and training, and review the relationship over national dignity. It has also permanently stopped spot LNG purchases from PNG. Taiwan had been taking roughly one-third of PNG’s LNG exports but says it already secured alternative supply. Staff, including aid workers, began leaving Nov 11–12. Consular help for the ~100 Taiwanese in PNG will shift to other missions. Taiwan’s deputy foreign minister pointed to Chinese pressure and incentives, noting a recent PNG delegation visit to China and Prime Minister Marape’s upcoming trip to APEC there. Beijing welcomed the closure, praised PNG’s One China stance, and said it is ready to import more PNG LNG. The US State Department expressed concern. The office was never an embassy. PNG has recognized Beijing since 1976. Taiwan still has 12 formal diplomatic allies. This ends a 36-year practical presence anyway.
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China just made it official law to chase people overseas for “corruption.” Critics say this gives Beijing a legal excuse to pressure fugitives and critics abroad. On November 6 the NPC Standing Committee passed the Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law, effective immediately. It defines “cross-border corruption” to include not only bribery abroad but also suspects who flee overseas and the transfer of corrupt assets across borders. Authorities can impose exit bans, seek judicial assistance, freeze assets, and pursue extradition, repatriation, or forfeiture. Article 25 blocks the reverse. Foreign institutions and individuals may not investigate corruption inside China without Beijing’s consent, and no one in China may hand them evidence or data. China can also retaliate under its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. Companies doing cross-border business must build compliance systems. Failure alone can bring business suspension or license revocation, even if no bribe occurred. Beijing’s Operation Sky Net has already repatriated 14,048 fugitives from more than 120 countries and recovered roughly 66.6 billion yuan by the end of 2024. In 2025 it brought back another 963. Groups such as Safeguard Defenders have documented cases of threatening relatives in China, surveillance, and coercion to force returns—sometimes aimed at critics rather than corrupt officials. Dissident Wang Dan called the new law a “legal cloak.” Beijing calls it fair global anti-corruption governance. The law does not invent the overseas pursuit. It makes it official.
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Alice Huang: The Spy Narrative Misses Her Real Business Everyone on X seems to treat the “Alice Huang is a Chinese spy” narrative as established fact. I say, not so fast. Having spent over two decades doing business in China, I recognize a different character: the 掮客 (commercial fixer) and 白手套 (white glove)—an intermediary who shields the real principals behind a deal. Her career in Shanghai’s murky capital markets, followed by Megaspeed’s $4.8 billion in Nvidia chip purchases, reveals a strikingly similar pattern. The relevant questions should be: Whose money? Whose chips? Whose interests? My latest Substack follows the money rather than the sensational spy narrative. desmondshum.substack.com/p/a…
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“The Commission is informing industries that there is a queue of at least one to one-and-a-half years,” said Ruud Wassen, EU managing director at Consello, a U.S. consulting firm.
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The Communist Party of China has launched the process of electing delegates to its 21st national congress, which is scheduled to be held in the second half of 2027 in Beijing. What do you need to know about the election? Find out in this explainer: xhtxs.cn/bgin
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This raises an interesting question. The Trump administration feels Beijing has not fulfilled the Busan agreement. Others disagree. So who is right? And what does this mean for the next few months and for next year? It's worth first setting the scene. The Trump administration erred in starting a trade war, taking tariffs on China to 140%, and then folding abruptly when Beijing retaliated with rare earths. That resulted in the Busan deal with Beijing last year. But it implementation is mixed. First, the United States was supposed to suspend the affiliates rule and lower tariffs, and it did. The affiliates rule remains suspended, and on tariffs, as @Brad_Setser notes, "the U.S. has actually over delivered on its Busan commitments (the term 2 tariffs fell to 12.5%, well below the 20% cap)." SCOTUS played a role, of course. Second, China was supposed to let rare earths flow, and they have not. The administration claims, and data indicates, that those flows are below what they should be by 30-50%. U.S. companies are not getting licenses. US consultancies and trade associations are trying to help them navigate MOFCOM. What's more, the "truce" was extended to January 10, and as far as I can tell MOFCOM hasn't issued a guidance formally extending the suspension date of its rare earth controls. Third, the items Kyle (and others ) raise aren't part of the deal. Clearing the BIS license queue was never part of Busan, and even so, the US did license H200 exports. Implementation of the 30-for-30 tariff cuts are not part of Busan either, and they were designed to take effect after going through domestic processes, by MOFCOM's own admission. Fourth, there is a lack of proportionality here, too. The licensing queue and thirty-for-thirty deal are not existential for Chinese companies. But rare earths access is a gun to the head of the entire US economy. So what does all this mean? In November, Trump and Xi will have an awkward meeting in Shenzhen. In December, they'll have an awkward meeting in Miami. And then in January, they won't have any meetings. The truce will expire on January 10th. Barring an extension at one of the upcoming summits, we are looking at a period of possible economic tension and escalation in January without a summit on the horizon to put the brakes on a spiral. So if 2026 was the year of so-called detente, 2027 may bring something different. I don't think this is priced in by analysts or the markets.
Slow pace of China’s REE and CM exports, but no mention of U.S. foot dragging on implementing tariff reductions, or wait for it, the billions of dollars in export licenses sitting on Kessler’s desk. Got it.
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习近平会怎样看待这次遭遇重大政治挫折的川普? 我不知道习近平本人现在怎么想,但从北京的战略计算出发,可以分析几种可能。 第一,北京可能认为,川普失去国会支持,国内政治力量受到削弱,因此更需要在外交方面取得成绩。 未来两年,川普要想推动重大国内立法,会面临民主党的阻力。相比之下,外交仍然是总统可以发挥较大主动性的领域。 如果川普能够和习近平达成一项重要协议,他就可以告诉美国选民,自己虽然失去了国会,但仍然能够为美国争取利益。 从这个意义上说,北京可能认为,川普对中美交易的需求增加了。 但我认为,习近平如果只看到这一点,就可能产生误判。因为这里有一个悖论。川普越需要通过外交证明自己,就越不能让美国人觉得他向中国作出了重大让步。特别是台湾和科技问题。 如果川普在这些问题上向习近平让步,民主党不仅会批评他,共和党内部也可能出现反对声音。 川普可以不在乎民主党怎么说,但他不能完全不在乎共和党2028年的命运。因为共和党如果在2028年再次惨败,川普不仅可能失去对共和党的影响力,他的政治遗产也可能遭到全面否定。 所以,川普在政治上变弱,并不意味着习近平就能够从他那里得到更多东西。恰恰相反,川普可能因为变弱,反而更加不敢在涉及中国的重大问题上让步。 第二,北京还必须看到,美国对华强硬政策已经具有明显的两党基础。 过去,习近平可以直接与川普谈判,尝试通过领导人之间的政治交易解决部分问题。但民主党控制国会之后,即使川普愿意达成协议,也不一定能够保证协议顺利落实。这会使中美谈判变得更加复杂。 第三,也是我认为非常重要的一点,习近平可能需要重新评估川普在美国政治中的地位。 2024年川普重新当选,尤其是共和党同时掌握国会,曾经给外界一种印象:川普不仅重新控制了白宫,而且正在按照自己的想法重塑美国政治。 但是,2026年的选举说明,川普并没有获得美国社会的长期授权。 美国选民可以让他重新执政,也可以在两年之后削弱他的政治力量这对北京理解美国政治,是一个很重要的信号。 习近平习惯于从长期战略角度考虑问题,而美国政治有一个特点,就是总统的政策可能受到两年一次的国会选举、四年一次的总统选举影响。 川普2024年看上去非常强大,2026年就失去了国会。这种变化,对中国来说既是机会,也是风险。 机会在于,华盛顿政治分裂可能使美国更难形成统一的政策行动。风险则在于,面对中国问题,美国两党反而可能通过对华强硬来显示自己的政治立场。习近平必须同时考虑这两种可能。 所以,如果问我,这次中期选举之后,中美关系会不会改善,我的回答是,不能一概而论。 经贸关系存在调整空间,台湾和科技竞争则可能更加尖锐。 而川普本人,虽然仍然掌握美国外交大权,却已经不能像共和党同时控制国会时那样从容地与习近平进行政治交易。
民主党掌控国会两院,对未来两年美中关系的影响,我的看法是,中美经贸关系可能出现某些缓和,但是在台湾和先进科技领域,美国对中国的压力不仅不会因为川普政治受挫而减轻,反而可能进一步增加。 首先,民主党在台湾问题上,并不比共和党软弱。而且民主党的台湾政策更强调所谓民主价值、地区安全,以及美国对盟友和伙伴的承诺。假如川普希望与习近平达成一个重大协议,并且准备在台湾问题上作出某种让步,肯定会遭到民主党的反对。 外交权力虽然属于总统的“专属权力”,但川普并不能为所欲为,他必须顾忌2028年的总统选举对共和党的压力。 其次,民主党控制国会之后,很可能更加关注川普是否为了争取中国购买美国商品,或者为了达成经贸协议,而放松对先进芯片的出口限制。川普今后要想在先进科技领域因为商业礼仪向中国作出让步,政治阻力会比以前大得多。
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I've heard from many in Beijing that they like Trump's accommodating China policy. But this quote is quite striking: "The Chinese are very realistic that a new president might be very different (from Trump)," said Shen Weizhong, a former Chinese Foreign Ministry official. "But if we ​can have two more years of stability, that's already a good thing for China ... The more time we have, the better prepared we might be towards ⁠a final showdown on Taiwan or maybe another trade war," added Shen, who now works for Beijing-based think tank Global Governance Institution.
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China could face “severe economic headwinds” if the Democratic Party’s sweeping midterm victory slows the US’s artificial intelligence buildout, Bloomberg Economics says — just as tech stocks across Asia slump on tech worries bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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