Don’t forget that between 137,000 and 300,000 original Kurdish residents of Efrîn have been displaced from their homes, while Syrian Arab and Palestinian Arab settlers have been brought into the region and provided with housing built by various Syrian and Turkish organisations.
Šerwān Humāwand Gūrān retweeted
🔴 وثيقة انگليزية عسكرية في غاية الأهمية تستخدم مصطلح " كوردستان الغربية " من سنة 1923 م
جاء فيها التالي ؛
" إن قبائل كوردستان الغربية ذات أغلبية كوردية من حيث العِرق، ولا تختلف في خصائصها العامة عن القبائل المماثلة التي جرى وصفها في التقرير العسكري الخاص ببلاد ما بين النهرين (العراق)، والمنطقة التاسعة (كوردستان الوسطى)."
وأيضاً تفاصيل مهمة حول أعدادهم :
" التعداد القبلي والقوات المسلحة
يُقدّر إجمالي عدد أفراد القبائل في كوردستان الغربية بنحو 300,000 نسمة، أي ما يعادل 60,000 أسرة، أو 120,000 رجل قادر على حمل السلاح.
ويُقدّر عدد البنادق الصالحة للاستخدام العسكري بنحو 35,000 بندقية."
🔴ملاحظة هامة :
• هذا الكتاب طُبع قبل ثورة الشيخ سعيد پيران النقشبندية التي يتبجّح فيها العروبيين كحجة على عدم وجود أرض كوردية في سوريا لما سبّبته تلك الثورة من حالات نزوح داخل الجغرافيا الكوردستانية.
🔴 سؤال إلى العرر و ذيولهم ، ما المقصود بكوردستان الغربية في هذه الوثيقة وأين تقع ؟
جوان سعدون
Šerwān Humāwand Gūrān retweeted
12th Century Arab Poems on the Ayyubid Kurds,Part 2:
“On the day of battle, the Kurds bring forth such fearless warriors that each one charges through the dust and smoke of the battlefield, throwing everything into chaos.”
“Among the Kurds are such brave warriors that+
Šerwān Humāwand Gūrān retweeted
Replying to @bahramyusufm
No, the case in the Sharafnama is very distinct and does not provide any view like this one here.
First of all he explicitly says the Kallhurr were Goran too, he also says the Lak and other tribes were Goran as well. Second, there is nothing like "Sorani", or even representing CK, in his categories. And obviously the Lurs weren't ever Kurds to begin with, they were intertwined with Kurdish history and Kurdish tribes were among them and even ruled them, which is why Sharafxan mentions them as Kurds. Which is also why Sharafxan mentions the Kallhurr as a Kurdish category, simply because they were an important ruling power. The Kallhurr first ruled in EK area btw. So how does any of this work for your argument?
Regardless of whatever Sharafxān wrote down, and many thanks to him, what I am doing is far more accurate in understanding the ethnological and linguistic situation of the Kurds. The Sharafnama literally provides nothing of this kind. The Lurs are only mentioned as a category because they are a whole different ethnicity but were ruled by Kurds.
I am dealing with the actual situation that we have at hand and that we have always had in at hand. For the Kurmānj, the word "Kurmānj" is understood as referring to ANY Kurd. And all those other words did not even exist like that back in Sharafxan's time except "Kallhurr" which happened to be important back then and happened to be important in the last century too which is why SK is associated with it. But even two centuries ago SK was associated with "Gorani" before it was associated with "Kallhurri" like today. Goran of course existed too and historically it firstly referred to EK and Yarsani but secondly it also referred to SK. That we know but that is not the case as such today anymore. Today the Goran are tribes and most of us do not speak EK and most EK speakers are not part of any Goran tribe ether.
Šerwān Humāwand Gūrān retweeted
Şırnak'ta yaşayan 100 yaşındaki Helîme isimli kadın:
Kürtler Türkçe konuşunca tepemin tası atıyor, 100 yıl daha da yaşasam, kendi dilimi konuşurum.
Anadilimiz bizim imanımızdır
Simple example of why Northern Kurdish (known as Kurmanji), Central Kurdish (known as "Sorani") and Southern Kurdish (known as Gurani or Kallhurri and including Laki) are one language and how Eastern Kurdish (known as Hawrami or Gorani) and Western Kurdish (known as Kirdki and Kirmanjki) are different than them:
English
SK
CK
NK
EK
WK
I go
(min) cim / dicim / acim / macim
(min) acim / dacim
az dicim
(min) milū
az shonā
I came
(min) hātim / hāwtim
(min) hātim
az hātim
(min) āmān
az āmayā
they know
(awān) zānin / dizānin / mazānin / azānin
(awān) azānin / dazānin
aw dizānin
(āde) (mi)zānā
E zānī
their father
bāwikyān / bāwiki awān
bāwikyān / bāwikī awān
bāvge wān
tātashā / tātaw ādīshā
pīye īnān
they did
(awān) kirdin / kirdyān (-yān kird)
(awān) kirdyān (-yān kird)
wān kir (< kird)
ādīshā kard(shā) / kardshā
īnān kard
you eat
(tu) xwayt / dixwarīt / mörīt (< ma-hwar-īt)
(to) axoyt / daxoyt
tu dixwī
(to) (mi)warī
ti wanī (< war-an-ī)
she hits him
(aw) daet la aw / daeta le
(aw) la aw adāt / ley adāt
aw le dixa (with xistin instead of dān/dāyin)
(āda) (mi)dowana ādī / (mi)dosh wana
Ā dānā piro
See, you can do the same comparison with SCN Kurdish and other Western Iranic tongues too even the closest ones (Farvi-Xuri, Rayeji outliers, Balochi) and you will see that generally especially with everyday forms of speech, all the relevant sound shifts, the majority of the vocabulary but also most of the basic grammatic structures and morphemes correspond to each other wirhin SCN Kurdish while they are either very different or structurally different in other Western Iranic tongues. This is not a coincidence. It wouldn't be like this if SK, CK and NK would not be one language and descend from a common ancestral tongue.
No offense but it is incredibly laughable and pathetic that Kurds do not understand that none of these terms are supposed to be used that way.
Kallhurr is a tribe. Most SK speakers are NOT Kallhurrs. Even if you want to call SK Kallhurri, the "Kallhurri" speakers are still generally not Kallhurrs.
"Soran" is another tribe too. Exact same story.
Exact same story with "Lak". They were/are a single tribe out of all Eastern Southern Kurdish subdialectic speakers.
Zaza is a term propagated by the state of turkey on Kurds who are native speakers of what is authentically and generally called "Kirdki" and "Kirmanjki".
"Kurmānj" means the same thing as "Kurd" in Northern Kurdish. For a Northern Kurdish speakers all Kurds are "Kurmānj". The term "Kurd" with that form does not exist natively in Northern Kurdish.
The Goran are also a tribe who mostly speak Southern Kurdish and some descending subtribes of the Goran speak Central Kurdish or in Badinan they even speak Northern Kurdish (Badini). Historically, the term Goran referred to many things and still does so, including Eastern Kurdish speakers, but EK speakers were called Kurd before the term Goran (Jābāriqa = Gābāraka) was attested as such and that is a fact too.
Šerwān Humāwand Gūrān retweeted
Debunking a popular myth: that Bahram Chobin, the general who seized the Sasanian throne in 590, and the Parthian house of Mihran he belonged to were Kurds. The claim basically rests on the personal names of his siblings in the Arabic language. In Arabic, his sister is named Kurdiya (كردية) and his brother Kurdi (كردي).
The major issue is that Arabic had no letter for this g, and that is not how their names are spelt in Iranian languages. Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh renders their Iranian Bahram's siblings as Gurdiya (گردیه) and Gurduy (گردوی), and introduces the brother with the meaning of his own name: "که گرد و دلیر و جهانجوی بود", “a hero (gurd), brave and ambitious”. Take another example of poor Arabic rendering: the Gūrāns of Kurdistan, who are written as Kūrān in Arabic, with a k.
The same texts turn Bahram’s father Gushnasp into Jushnas and Bahram Gor into Bahram Jur. One sentence in the Mahasin wa’l-addad writes Kurdi with a k and Jur with a j: "دعا بكردي، أخي بهرام جور".
A further problem is that the words Kurd and gurd are not etymologically related. Persian gurd, “hero, brave”, comes from Old Iranian *wr̥ta-, beginning with *w-. Kurd comes from proto Iranian *kr̥ti-, beginning with *k-, which meant cut, semantically shifting to mean type of cultural outer cloak garment used by herders during the Old Iranian era, loaned into the plateau, then adopted as an Iranian tribal name, first attested by Greek writers by 220 BCE.
Ibn Wadih’s description of al-Jibal as a home of the Kurds in the 9th century has no bearing on the Mihranid house. Çelebi’s Ottoman list, which counts Bahram among Kurdish heroes and explains “Kurd” as meaning “brave”, is the exact same confusion and mistake I have explained above, because it is not Kurd that means brave, but rather gurd. A lack of textual criticism can not be used as justification.
What is more, on the same exact page that names the siblings, al-Tabari shows Bahram Chobin using the actual word “Kurd” as a slur against the Sasanian king Khosrow II: “son of an adulteress, raised in the tents of the Kurds”. This makes it even more unlikely he was Kurdish.
The Kurdish tribe bearing the name Mihran, being equated with Sassanid houses, is effectively equivalent to equating random Muslims with the name Muhammad. Mihran is the name of the Zoroastrian God Mithra. Claims such as these are wishful thinking, and nothing else.
Šerwān Humāwand Gūrān retweeted
An important 2025 publication investigating how Öcalan’s democratic confederalism opposes only one state, the Kurdish one, by socially engineering and removing Kurdish social and political structures that act against assimilation. This is proven using his own writings and notes. In his original Turkish he calls Turkey’s borders legitimate and says the Turkish flag can fly over his grave. He told Kurdish MPs that asking the state for Kurdish education “is a mistake”. He promised that his model removes the “danger” of Kurdish becoming an official language, and eases the assimilation process of Kurds in the countries they live in. He said he built the KCK during talks with Turkish intelligence chief Emre Taner. He also called the Kurdish National Congress the body that would “determine the Misak-ı Milli”, the 1920 pact that claimed Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah for Turkey.
It draws on Öcalan’s post-2000 Turkish texts, including the KCK Social Pact, Democratic Confederalism, Problems of Democratization in Turkey, Defending a People and his İmralı notes from 2013 and 2014, and prints the originals in the footnotes. Democratic confederalism is presented as an alternative to the nation-state, yet it leaves all occupying forces that rule Kurdistan untouched and treats them as legitimate.
The translation problem is specific. Democratic Confederalism is under 50 pages, yet its flag statements, “I respect the Turkish flag” and “your flag is mine”, appear only in the Turkish edition. The English version uses the word “assimilation” five times, always critically. The Turkish original uses it once, and there Öcalan accepts the “natural assimilation” of Kurds, describing them as a “sociological phenomenon” and a “richness” for the Turkish nation. Most Western scholarship on Öcalan, including Jongerden, Akkaya, Gunes, Dirik and Graeber, rests on these selective translations. Kamran Matin and Michiel Leezenberg are among the few critical exceptions.
The story that Öcalan converted from Kurdish statehood to post-nationalism under Murray Bookchin’s influence does not hold, because there was no statehood project to give up. In 1977 he said the PKK “did not emerge exclusively for only one nationality”. In 2004 he admitted that “Independent Kurdistan” was a slogan and that the PKK never thought the question of a state through. In a 1988 interview with Mehmet Ali Birand he spoke of coexistence and “internal independence”. At a 1993 press conference in Lebanon with Jalal Talabani he said Kurds and Turks could not separate, comparing them to “a fingernail and the surrounding flesh”, and offered to disarm in return for legal guarantees. In 1996 interviews with Nabil al-Mulham he denied that Western Kurdistan exists, saying “it is correct to say Syrian Kurds”, and proposed federalism inside Turkey, Iran and Iraq on the German, Spanish and Swiss models. The real shift after his capture was from supporting Kurdish federalism to opposing it. He also claims that without his “insight” in prison he “would have been a primitive nationalist aspiring for the nation-state”, which contradicts his own account.
Behind this sits a Kemalist view of Kurds that runs through his writing. In 2004 he wrote that Kurds “were not even aware of the extent of their betrayal” and that “neither human nor animal laws applied to them. They almost played the role of a third kind of being.” He spoke of the “old Kurdish trouble”. He told cadres that Kurds who believe they are free “must first be enslaved, and then these slaves must be freed”. He said his personality and principles “are more like those of a prophet”. In 1992 he told Birand that Kurdish power must stay under a single leadership: “I hold all these strings in my hand.” The PKK’s working language remained Turkish, and in 47 years it has produced no serious plan to revive Kurdish. Meanwhile the war emptied 2,685 Kurdish villages and hamlets by 1996, according to Human Rights Watch. A Van teachers’ union estimate puts the share of Kurds speaking Kurdish at 90% in the 1920s and around 7 to 8% today, with voluntary assimilation peaking during the Turkeyification years under the AKP.
In Öcalan’s own words, democratic confederalism leaves the Turkish state untouched. “The institutions and existing borders of the Republic of Turkey are considered legitimate. Issues such as whether it should be unitary, federal or confederal are not discussed, and it is not even recommended to bring them up.” “Yes to state reform, no to opposition to the state.” A completely stateless democracy is “adventurism”. “I am not saying that Turkey should become confederal. I am saying that it should be a democratic republic without losing its unitary structure.” Kurds should build their confederalism “without touching the borders”. The 2005 KCK Social Pact declares that three legal systems will now apply in Kurdistan: EU law, unitary state law and democratic confederal law. Öcalan describes the KCK as a civil society body that belongs “within the totality of the people or nation of Turkey”. He calls it parallel and complementary to the unitary state, and says its flexible idea of the nation will block “the problem-causing potential of federalist solutions”. He calls the nation-state fascist and compares it to Hitler and Mussolini, yet he declares the Turkish nation-state legitimate by calling it a republic. France, the first modern nation-state, was also a republic. Real multinational states such as Switzerland and Belgium rest on decentralisation and constitutional multilingualism, the very things Öcalan rules out.
On where the KCK came from, the İmralı notes are blunt. “We want to be a fundamental democratic element of this state… I built the KCK on this condition during Emre’s time.” Emre Taner was then head of Turkish intelligence (MİT). Öcalan describes five exhausting years of negotiations with Taner and a 156-page roadmap that was rejected. In his 2009 book he calls for “an intensive dialogue with the state’s security forces” to resolve the KCK’s legal questions. The KCK came out of bargaining with the Turkish state, not out of a Bookchinite change of paradigm.
Then there is the Misak-ı Milli. The last Ottoman parliament adopted it in 1920, and it defined Turkey’s borders as the armistice line of 1918. Mustafa Kemal’s own definition ran from south of İskenderun through the Jarablus bridge between Aleppo and Katma to the Euphrates and down to Deir ez-Zor. It included Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah, which means South and West Kurdistan. He wrote to Talat Pasha that “all our provinces where Turkish and Kurdish are spoken will belong to us”. He told parliament that “the line that we will determine with our strength and power will be the border”. Turkey annexed Hatay on the same logic in 1939, and Erdoğan invoked the Pact over Mosul in 2016.
Öcalan presents this pact as a Kurdish-Turkish brotherhood. He writes that its borders were “built on the unity of Kurds and Turks”. He says its break-up after 1925 “is actually the fragmentation of the Kurds” and that “when we mention the Middle East Confederation, it is about reviving this”. He says he does not see it as “an imperial event”. He tells the PKK: “All Kurds will establish a strong alliance with Turkey. The National Pact Commission will discuss this… This alliance has existed since the Hittites.” He describes the KCK as an umbrella for “all Kurds of the Middle East within the framework of Turkey’s national integrity”. He builds a thousand-year history for this alliance, from Manzikert in 1071 to the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin in 1639, which he calls a betrayal of it. He says he pitched the Mitanni-Hittite alliance to Emre Taner and the Battle of Manzikert to Taner’s successor, Hakan Fidan. He also claims Kemal’s speech of 23 April 1920 described Kurds and Turks respecting each other’s rights. The parliamentary minutes show that Kemal never mentioned Kurds. He spoke of Turks, Circassians and “Islamic elements” and put off all details until “after our existence is saved”.
The plan was put into practice through the Kurdish National Congress. “This Kurdish congress will be the thing that determines the Misak-ı Milli,” Öcalan told a pro-Kurdish delegation. He proposed four conferences. One was in Diyarbakır and open even to Hizbullah and Kemal Burkay. One was in Ankara under the HDP, one in Europe, and one in Erbil, which “should approach it within the framework of the National Pact”, with Kurds from Syria taking part. When Selahattin Demirtaş asked for a message for the Erbil conference, Öcalan told him to explain “the issue of Misak-ı Milli in the right form”. HDP MP Nursel Aydoğan put it plainly: Öcalan “is the main obstacle to the establishment of a Kurdish state”, and every negotiation on İmralı aimed to resolve the Kurdish issue within the framework of the Misak-ı Milli. The whole project fits the AKP’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy.
Öcalan says Jewish lobbies first planned “a proto-Israeli project” in South Kurdistan. Later they “got rid of Saddam” in order to take over the Kurds through Kurdish nationalism. He recasts Sheikh Said’s 1925 revolt as a British-provoked attempt to restore the caliphate, which reverses his earlier view that it was a religious and national uprising against near-genocidal attacks. He calls Iraqi Kurdish self-rule “a bomb” placed at “the very bottom of Turkey’s belly” and the Kurdistan Region “a cheap collaborator state”, likening it to Enkidu. In the Social Pact, self-determination shrinks to villages, neighbourhoods and cities managing their own affairs, and the UN system is dismissed as a failed model built on nation-states.
From 2004 the Kurds stop being a nation in his writing and become a people, and Kurdish becomes “the local language”. By 2011 he questions whether Kurds have even “reached the stage of nationhood”, while Turks remain “the Turkish nation”. He writes that “considering the Kurds as a sociological phenomenon serves the interests of the Turkish nation better” and that “leaving social phenomena to natural assimilation” has been humanity’s basic tendency. His “fraternal unity” comes with a guarantee: “With this approach, there is no danger of Kurdish becoming the official language, followed by a federation.” He dismisses insistence on nation and language as “dogmatic values” and writes that he was “born into a society that has not really progressed beyond Neolithic culture”. He calls this policy Türkiyeleşme (Turkeyification) and presents it as Atatürk’s own inclusive idea of a “nation of Turkey”. In reality Kemal used “Turkish State” and “Republic of Turkey” interchangeably, spoke of the “Turkish nation”, and called Kurdish identity an “incorrect label” left over from despotic times. Turkeyification is voluntary Turkification.
The İmralı notes from 2013 show where this leads. When pro-Kurdish MPs pressed for state-funded Kurdish education, Öcalan replied: “Asking the state is a mistake. This is not the duty of the state but of society. If you cannot teach your mother tongue to your own child, how can you ask the state?” He said there is “a principle of equality in the constitution”, so such education “cannot be demanded”. He said boycotts only inflame things and that the MPs should open model schools in Diyarbakır instead. A Kurdish school did open there in 2013, and the authorities later sealed it. Elsewhere in the notes he says: “I am not even discussing language education.” When the PKK leadership in Qandil demanded that the new constitution name the existence of the Kurdish people, he refused: “Do not conflate national identity with state citizenship.” The only wording he proposed was “our constitution accepts all historical cultures as the richness of Turkey”. He told MPs “we belong to the state” and borrowed the AKP’s Islamic language of a shared millet. He summed it up: “There is a Turkish nation, and that is a reality… We can call it the nation of Turkey.” Elsewhere he says: “We have no objections to the unitary state, to the republic. Turkish will remain the official language, the flag will of course be there.”
This is the constitution he declared legitimate. Article 66 says that everyone bound to the state by citizenship is a Turk. Article 42 says no language other than Turkish may be taught as a mother tongue. The preamble places sovereignty in the Turkish nation alone, and Article 301 of the penal code makes “insulting Turkishness” a crime. It is the system İsmet İnönü summed up as “our task is to Turkify everyone, no matter what the cost”. Iran’s constitution allows regional languages in the media and the teaching of their literature in schools, which is more than Öcalan asks for. His position also falls short of UN standards on language rights. It is a neoliberal position: a self-declared enemy of “capitalist modernity” leaving the survival of Kurdish to the market.
In 2003 he wrote that forced assimilation should end and “voluntariness should be the basis”, because “the necessities of life take care of one’s own language”. He warned that forcing Kurds to count as Turks damages “Turkish purity” and produces “an ugly hybridisation”. In 2004 he described assimilation before the Republic as “peaceful and culturally enriching”. The results can be measured. A 2023 Kurdish Studies Center survey found that only 30% of Kurds in Turkey are proficient in Kurdish, 30% have intermediate skills and 40% do not use it in daily life. More than half the children of fluent parents know little or no Kurdish, and nearly 60% of respondents report discrimination. Öcalan’s prescription leads to language death from the top down. He says that Kurdish can only be encouraged at primary level, and he treated Turkish as the sole official language.
Öcalan opposes a Kurdish state, not the nation-state. His proposal asks Turkey to tolerate the physical existence of Kurds and to replace forced assimilation with voluntary assimilation, and in return he promises that Kurds will not seek federalism or official status for their language. The result is a “civil society of subjects” under colonial sovereignty.
Šerwān Humāwand Gūrān retweeted
New sample under R1a-YP4141!
In what can only be described as a class of its own, we have provided a sample to YFULL with 96x read depth, making it the most in-depth sequenced individual Iranian-speaker that we are aware of.
The individual in question is a Baluch from Zahedan, and he can be found on the unopened branch of R1a-YP5049. What this means is that while he certainly is not basal, no other sample on the tree matches him sufficiently enough to form an unique subclade under YP5049. This implies that, with a more robust sampling strategy, we will have a better understanding of the clade diversity.
The link to the clade can be found below:
yfull.com/tree/R-YP5049/
Šerwān Humāwand Gūrān retweeted
Here is my Y-DNA, since there is amateurish gossipy confusion about how to interpret it. This is one of the largest currently tested patrilineal Kurdish terminal mutations, which proliferated rapidly during the early Islamicate period (currently dated to 900 AD), much like many other core Kurdish male lineages. Outside this Kurdish clade, there are no modern or ancient matches until a sample of unknown origin dating to 259 BCE, followed by matches among Uzbeks, Pashtuns, Ormuris, Achomis, Tajiks, etc., dating to the 1500s/1600s BCE.
Therefore, this Kurdish lineage has no notable matches outside the Kurdish clade since the late Proto-Iranian phase in what is now Kazakhstan/Russia. There is absolutely no indication that this Kurdish lineage entered the Kurdish gene pool after Kurds had already formed as a tribal/ethnic group sometime before the 100s BCE. On the contrary the high tribal diversity would instead indicate this is one of the core original lines.
If anyone is wondering how common it is for Kurdish male lineages to proliferate during the early Islamic period, I will list every Kurdish male lineage that is of equal or greater size. Note: This absolutely does not mean that this was when these lineages entered into Kurdish society. This is the predicted "time of recent common (male) ancestor".
E-FTG45861 around 500 AD, G-Y164809 around 100 AD, J-FTA16277 around 900 AD, J-FT388093 around 300 AD, J-Y265986 around 1400 AD, J-FTA63018 around 1200 AD, L-Y215411 around 1100 AD, L-FT18761 around 1100 AD, Q-YP1228 around 300 AD, R-Y37891 around 700 AD, R-FT186752 around 100 AD, and R-PH3610 around 1000 AD. Almost half of Kurdish men have Proto-Iranian/BMAC/IAMC lineages mediated through early Iranian societies in south central-Asia before moving to the Zagros.
The more people test, the greater the likelihood that new divergent mutations will be discovered, pushing the estimated dates of when these lineages proliferated further back in time. For example, in 2021, G-Y164809 was estimated to have originated around 900 AD, but following considerably more sponsored testing to identify divergent branches, its estimated date has been pushed back multiple times, and currently sits at 100 AD. As the coverage of various populations increases, the security of these TMCRA placements is more locked into position.
This ignorant individual has chosen to name me in his post and call for my attention. Even though he is as unimportant as he is ignorant about Kurdish linguistics and history I will reply to his fallacy here:
First of all, the writing system, the alphabet that I use is created by myself and is based on Latin itself and influenced by English and some other well known tendencies across all kinds of enhancement of the Latin script. Nothing else. The macron signs over the vowels that I use like on <ā>, <ī>, <ū> are from how the Romans wrote in Latin. This was the original way of distinguishing long vowels from short vowels when writing in the latin language with the roman/latin alphabet because Latin had 10 vowels with 5 qualities and 2 sets of those 5 of short and long quantity which makes five. Kurdish also distinguishes traditionally between length in vowels. And classically or pre-classically the distinction was even more apparent than it is now.
Letters like <j>, or <sh> and <zh> are based on how certain sounds are traditionally spelled in the English alphabet (which derives from latin too). Letters like <š> and <ž> are also well known ways of depicting those same sounds. Letters like <ř> and <ł> I have imported from the Hawar alphabet but even so these choices of shapes are so obvious and the same as on other letters that this would be what I would decide for anyway.
Now, that my alphabet has traits which are common in the usage of the latin alphabet for languages which use it too, like persian, has nothing to do with me and does not interest me in the least.
That for persian <ā> etc. are also used is a coincidence that is irrelevant to me and my alphabet. As a prouder Kurd than any of these insecure and ignorant and arrogant dimwits I could not care the least about coincidental similarities in another language when what I am doing is based on the purest and most common ways of using letters with the latin alphabet.
Furthermore, the Hawar alphabet is FACTUALLY based on the turkish alphabet. So what are these ignorant folks hassling me for??
Not only that, but it is a VERY UNFIT AND BAD way of depicting the Kurdish language. Badirxān chose the letter <e> for the Kurdish short /a/ which destroys any resemblance to the traditional way of the Kurdish language. He chose the letter <i> for the traditional short /i/ in Kurdish (and <î> for /ī/) but this is not even based on Kurdish itself but on how turkish depicts <i> (like long /ī/) and <ı> (like short /i/).
Infact, this short /i/ has become the schwa [ə] in Northern Kurdish (most central and undistinguished vowel) and is barely even a vowel anymore in Central Kurdish. In Southern Kurdish it is mayhaps closest to the traditional short /i/ which is actually /ɪ/ but even there it is very central and might become a short /e/ sooner or later or even already counted as a schwa [ə] too.
So, if we go with this and write short i as short e now then it will even look more similar to how iranian persian is written in latin. But this has nothing to do with persian. Persian is a very closely related language to Kurdish and has many of the same words or many cognates and has had the same set of vowel until recently. If you have the same vowels it is also possible that you do somewhat similar shifts. In iranian persian the short i has shifted to /e/ and in Kurdish it has shifted to short /ə/ or /e/ too.
If you have the CN Kurdish word bibīna (see!) and the persian word bibīn/bebin (see!) and you adjust short i as e in Kurdish then you have bebina in CNK too and this has NOTHING to do with persian. Just a coincidence which actually was easily expected to happen because these languages are very close and similar. But none of that is relevant to Kurdish and Kurds. We just need a proper and useful alphabet - and that is what I have created!
Replying to @Neo_Hurrian
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Daryush Musili, Humawand Nakojaabadi, and many other ugly nicknames with š, ī, and ā.
Is it because Kurds possess the key to the disintegration of their British-made Iran? Or is it because anti-reactionary Kurdish movements are the flag-bearers of standing against...
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Note how this wannabe etymologist said this:
Sassanids burned down towns of medieval Kurdistan
> sassanids and medieval
I could quote every single etymology post of this individual and show how each and all of them are wrong because they all are genuinely wrong for the obvious reason that Kurdish has nothing to do with the hurrian language. Lol.
teapaw.org/Neo_Hurrian/status/211…
Replying to @Neo_Hurrian
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who themselves documented burning down the towns of medieval Kurdistan, it would gain them nothing.
They forget that Kurds are a heterogeneous nation, and Kurdishness is a shared nationhood rather than a tribal club where lineage dictates political destiny.
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Most people, or almost all, have the wrong understanding of what a language is. As is generally the case, humans tend to assume to have understood something but the problem is they do not care to consider how a subject can be deeper than initially thought.
So they think nation states, ethnicities and languages go hand in hand. But they don't.
And the big issue here is that a "language" does not even exist. There are no "languages". When we speak about the "Kurdish language" we NEVER speak about one "language" but we speak about the dialects and subdialects. Because when you speak "Kurdish" you speak a tongue that is specific to a tribe, subtribe, city, area or even village. And you speak that variety. That subdialect. Most other speakers of Kurdish speak another subdialect. And this is what the "Kurdish language" is. Many strongly related subdialects and varieties of it.
In the same way even "dialects" do not exist because a dialect is its many subdialects. When you speak a certain language you actually speak a certain dialect or subdialect depending on each case. Some languages may not have subdialects. Some languages may even offer more complicated variety than what would befit categorising it to a specific subdialect.
In nation states people learn one standardised form of the "language" which is usually either based on one specific dialect/subdialect or a mixture of several ones and often there is also input from older stages or related languages to that standardised language form. And then people learn that very specific variety in school all over the nation. So obviously they will all know to speak the same variety and people think that is what a language is. But it isn't. That is just one standardised form and thus a dialect/subdialect even if not completely native to any specific area of the language's speakers.
The term "language" or "tongue" is of manyfold nature and it can be used on a group of dialects (most fitting case), dialect, subdialect, very narrow variety (logical choice too) or even on a whole group of several languages. But you have to know what it means and what it doesn't mean.
Often, the label of a language or language group is not even based on linguistic grounds or not solely on it.
Furthermore, in the case of Kurdish, the Kurds started to confuse and fool themselves. Kurds think that Kurdish is unique in having so many dialects. This is a foolish take beyond measure. A speaker of northern German will not understand a speaker of southern German without learning the other one's dialect OR without knowing the standardised language High German which is taught to both of them in school (respectively was taught to their parents/grandparents and now they speak it at home too). Mandarin and Cantonese are completely different too dialects of the same Chinese "language" too. This is the same for EVERY LANGUAGE AND ETHNICITY whose number of speakers had historically been big or widespread enough to create enough distance to have different forms of speeches shape over time which equals the emergence of different dialects. It is NOTHING special.
What makes it worse is that Kurds think "Kurmanj", "Zaza", "Soran" are actual subidentities of Kurds and the very unfortunate ones think those names describe the actual ethnicities and "Kurd" is an umbrella term. The level of second-hand embarassment and pity, disgust and annoyance I get for the folly has to be studied.
Kurds have two endonyms: Kurd and Kurmānj. In Kirdki: Kird and Kirmānj. Same words. Hawrami speakers historically also called themselves Goran but it was also related to being Yarsani and even if an ethnic designation, it has changed long ago and the EK speakers were referred to as Kurds BEFORE we had the term Goran/Gābārikā attested in the first place.
The origin of "Kurmanj" is very likely from "Kurd" and if not there is another reason for it. But these are not subethnicities. They are modern anti-Kurdish ideas.
See here:
reddit.com/r/kurdish/s/UftKd…
Šerwān Humāwand Gūrān retweeted
Anti-Kurdish narratives are so normalised in academia that foreigners unknowingly put forward exceedingly ignorant proposals. Firstly, the palatal *ḱ in proto Indo-European *ḱerdʰ- becomes Indo-Iranian *ć, and PIE *e becomes *a, which gives *ćárdʰa-. Iranian then loses the aspiration of *dʰ, which gives Proto-Iranian *ćarda-. Iranian turns *ć into s, apart from Old Persian, which turns it into θ. In Middle Iranian the final vowel is lost and *rd becomes *rδ. In Persian and Kurdish this becomes l, with the a lengthened to ā, and in Persian the inherited *θ becomes h.
The final outcome of PIE *ḱerdʰ- (which gives English herd) would therefore be *sāl in Kurdish and *hāl in Persian. The word for “year” went through exactly the same changes from a different root: Old Persian θard-, Avestan sarəd-, Parthian sarδ, Kurdish sāl. The Avestan cognate of herd is sarəδa- “kind, species”. It is not possible for Kurd to come from Proto-Indo-European *ḱerdʰ-. Kurd has k instead of s, θ or h, u instead of a or ā, and keeps r plus a dental (the Pahlavi spelling kwltʾ/kwrtʾ is pronounced kurd) where *rd should have become l. Of course, this etymology is proposed on Wiktionary, where anyone can edit and type nonsense.
Secondly, there is not a single shred of evidence that the word Kurd originally meant herder or tent dweller, and especially if you use any historical Iranian account. There is 11 non-Kurdish Iranian nomadic, tent dwelling, herder tribes living in the plateau before the Islamic age: The Mardi, the Sagartians, the Dropici, the Tapuri, and so on. Eratosthenes of Cyrene and Strabo specifically list the Kurds as a tribal entity living in the Zagros. It has taken a long time, but the most prominent academics in the field now, such as Boris James, now reject the old orthodoxy that Kurd was a lifestyle label. The entire premise of Kurd meaning shepherd or herder rests on isolated, mistranslated and misappropriated early Islamic Arabic historiographical accounts that draw analogies and comparisons. These same accounts treat other ethnic groups, in the exact same way but you will never see a claim like Persian means farmer even though we can build a case showing exactly that if we decide to become disingenuous.
A lot of these older western academics have relied too heavily on the ideologically driven yappings of local near easterners who built narratives to serve certain nation building projects at the expense of Kurds. Or just built upon these narratives out of spite. It doesn't help that the odd Kurd who entered into academia only contributed mickey mouse unserious tier narratives about us Kurds.
Replying to @nrken19
More likely related to middle Persian *kwrt ("herder") possibly cognate with English "herd".
There is a post about SCN Kurdish and (at the moment) especially NK brewing!
Before I post it I could need more help from native speakers of different Northern Kurdish subdialects and varieties - which apparently are way more frequent than anticipated... And they ought to speak the most possible authentic version of their own speech.
Can anybody help or knows anyone that can help?
Also, if someone knows an actual expert on various Northern Kurdish sundialects and varieties please direct me to them or direct them to me!
I solved a problem with the words /nah/ (nine) and /nū/ (new) in Northern Kurdish. Both of these words derive from Old Iranic /nawa-/ (meaning nine and new) and would therefore become /naw/ and then be affected by the Southwestern Iranic sound shift of Vw > Vh (or specifically aw > ah).
So, before I had thought that /nū/ (new), in its previous form /naw/, didn't shift to /nah/ because /nah/ (nine), in its previous form /naw/, had shifted to /nah/. Things like this can happen in a language to avoid confusion. But that would mean that previous /naw/ (new) shifted to /no/ and then to /nū/. A sound shift of o > ū does not really happen in Northern Kurdish (except of the subdialects which did it but they also shifted ū to a differen vowel), randomly sometimes but that still is not the default to simply accept. So it was always bothersome.
But recently I learnt that in Qamishlo the speakers say /nih/ for "new" and in Afrin they say /ni/ (also from /nih/) and this is extremely relevant. Because it suggests that the word /naw/ for new in Middle Northern Kurdish (NK of the Middle Iranic stage) had shifted to /niw/ before the sound shift w > h happened.
And it ought to be this very /niw/ that both /nih/ and /nū/ would directly derive from. /niw/ could have easily and quickly shifted to /nū/ in early subdialectish forms of Middle Northern Kurdish, because of the "physically" rather unstable sound sequence of /niw/ while in other subdialectish forms of MNK the word /niw/ remained as such until w > h happened and then it shifted to /nih/ which still exists in that NK subdialect of Qamishlo and Afrin.
This would explain why the word for "new" is /nū/ instead of /no/, because /naw/ "new" shifted to /niw/ first to avoid confusion with the word /naw/ meaning "nine". And then /niw/ shifted to /nū/ in some MNK varieties while it stayed /niw/ in others until niw > nih "new" happened (alongside of naw > nah "nine") in other MNK varieties.
This also makes me wonder if SK (and CK) had shifted certain -aw > -wa to avoid confusion with -aw > -o which the modern SK /-üa/ and CK /-we/ could derive from ALREADY in the early Middle Iranic or late Old Iranic period like at the same time when NK apparently shifted naw > niw (new).
In SK words which would have -ū- (from -o-) in two different words have the strategy that in one word ū > üa or much rather o > ūa > üa or even more rather now aw > wa > üa happened and in the other word the expected shift aw > o > ū happened. And in CK it is the same just o staying o (aw > o) and -we- instead of -üa-.
As I say and always remember:
Any new solved etymology is a small success!
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