Fajasy retweeted
Episode 41 is now live. I built a model tracking 11 signals across the S&P 500, split into two pillars:
Business Momentum (5 signals)
✔️ Revenue Momentum Spread
✔️ Gross Margin Spread
✔️ Operating Margin Spread
✔️ Revenue Growth Persistence
✔️ Rolling CAGR Trend
Expectations Momentum (6 signals)
✔️ Average 4Q Revenue Surprise
✔️ Revenue Beat Rate
✔️ Latest Revenue Surprise
✔️ Average 4Q EPS Surprise
✔️ EPS Beat Rate
✔️ Latest EPS Surprise
The goal is to systematically identify companies gaining fundamental and expectations momentum, uncover potential opportunities and flag changes worth investigating before they become obvious.
Fajasy retweeted
I have what is likely a very hot take around here that index funds/ETFs are not as safe as most investors think. 🤔
Yes, they are probably the best vehicle for most investors to dump their cash and get on with their life.
However, the extreme concentration in the majority of broad market indexes is an aspect I believe too many investors overlook. This is a material risk that should not be swept under the rug, as it is currently.
1. Most broad-market indexes are heavily overweight Tech. Look at an SP500, Total World, MSCI World, Emerging Markets fund. Most have 35-42% exposure to Tech.
2. Most broad-market indexes are heavily overweight US large cap. Again, look at most broad-market funds and the top 10 holdings make up ~35-40% of fund exposure. Almost entirely US large caps, and maybe $TSM. Sometimes $ASML shows up in the top 20. Mid-cap and small-cap exposure is either entirely missing, or a tiny fraction of the weighting.
3. Most broad-market indexes are heavily overweight growth/momentum, with little exposure to value. This is correlated with the above two points, but exposure to value in most of these funds is minimal. Growth has killed value for 15-20 years, but it isn't always the case.
Personally, I have always built my own mini-ETFs worth of equities for different exposures within my broader portfolio. I am definitely not trying to say my approach is superior to anything else. This is just how I do it and might be of interest or spark some discussion.
Let's say that I want to build out my exposure to banks. Banks make up about 8% of the broad-market indexes (e.g. MSCI ACWI). Let's say that I want to equal weight banks - i.e. I like the 8% exposure.
I decide I want 8 equal-weight positions of 1% per position.
I would setup a watch list of 2-3x the number of desired positions across a broad geographic scope, e.g. 16-24 banks on the watchlist.
For reference, my banks watch list looks something like this:
🇺🇸
- JP Morgan
- Goldman Sachs
- Bank of America
🇬🇧
- HSBC (Asia)
- Standard Chartered (Asia)
- Barclay's
- NatWest
🇪🇺
- BNP Paribas
- UBS
- Deutsche
- ING
- Nordea Bank
- Banco Santander
🇿🇦
- FirstRand
- Standard Bank
- Absa
- NedBank
- Capitec
🇦🇺
- Commonwealth Bank
- WestPak
- National Australia Bank
🇯🇵
- Mitsubischi UFJ
- Sumimoto
🇮🇳
- HDFC
- ICICI
🇸🇬
- DBS
🇧🇷
- Itau Unibanco
- NuBank
🇨🇦
- Royal Bank
- Toronto-Dominion
Next, I would decide on a metric to assess and value each bank to determine when is an appropriate time and what an appropriate valuation is to initiate a position. I am a value-focused investor so this my predilection. However, to keep it simple, some investors may just want to skip this step entirely.
I might use an intrinsic valuation method such as a total payout model (I.e. discounted value of dividends and buybacks). It might be easier to only buy when price-to-book is < than its 10-yr median, or even simpler, only buy when share price is below the 200-day or 200-week moving average. Pick something that works for you.
Build the positions out over time if and when the targets from the above are met.
Sell when they exceed some pre-defined threshold.
Adjust sector weightings, as appropriate.
Admittedly, this is a lot more work than buying an index fund.
But, I believe there are significant benefits to those who want to put in the work.
Specifically, this approach allows focused exposure to highly-profitable, high-quality companies, rather than owning hundreds of terrible companies to provide "diversified exposure".
Moreover, the control over geographic and sector exposure is of paramount importance.
Personally, I don't not want to own an index fund with 72% exposure to US markets, or 40% Tech exposure, or 90+% exposure to large cap growth.
Just some food for thought. I would love to hear any thoughts or constructive commentary. 🙌
Fajasy retweeted
I first wrote up an AI data center company that rents out $NVDA GPUs to AI startup companies on April 15, 2026, when it still traded as a SPAC at $10.70/share, just above its ~$10.60 trust value.
The merger was a success, and the stock peaked at $39.20/share on June 1st.
Now it trades below its SPAC price.
That company is Boost Run $BRUN, which has fallen to $8.89/share, down 77.3% from its peak, even after it announced its largest disclosed contract on October 6 (worth $525.6M).
The three larger listed GPU clouds have fallen from their 2026 highs as well, through the October 16 close:
→ CoreWeave $CRWV: Down 55.5% to $61.39/share.
→ $IREN: Down 60.2% to $26.99/share.
→ Nebius $NBIS: Down 42.3% to $165.47/share.
So $BRUN fell with the group, but further than all three.
I’d blame the drop from $39.20 on two causes that have nothing to do with $BRUN’s core operations: (1) higher rates and borrowing costs, and (2) $BRUN’s float growing ~3.1x, which was expected once its lockup ended and its warrants were called.
Yet the business carries less risk than it did as a SPAC:
→ Contracts: $1.61B with disclosed terms and TCV over $2.6B, including $1.43B signed since my April write-up.
→ Customers: Thinking Machines Lab (the AI startup founded by former OpenAI CTO Mira Murati) and Cohere make up 61.9% of the $1.61B on three- to five-year terms, after three customers made up 75.9% of 2025 revenue, led by RunPod, a GPU cloud platform, at 44.5%.
→ Year-end target: If Thinking Machines’ GPUs are fully running by December 31 and the June order starts on November 30, the five disclosed contracts running by year-end cover $300.6M (75.1%) of the $400M ARR target.
→ Merger: Closed on May 8, 2026, with zero redemptions.
→ Balance sheet: The merger proceeds paid off its short-term bridge loans, the going-concern language is gone, and pro forma cash is $191.8M, up from the $108M I used in my June 3 update, right after the merger.
But $BRUN still has to get the GPUs bought, financed, and running by December 31:
→ To reach the $1.0-1.2B of GPU spending management expects for 2026, $BRUN has to deploy $663-863M of GPU servers in H2 2026, 2.3-3.0x its cash and contracted prepayments.
→ CFO Erik Guckel said on the Q2 call that $BRUN is working on new ways to finance the build, but I found no new facility, lender, or term sheet in its filings or press releases from August 14 to October 16.
→ $BRUN’s named customers are private AI startups without investment-grade ratings, so its contracts are harder to borrow against.
→ If lessors funded 70% of the H2 2026 build instead of 79.5% (as in H1 2026), $BRUN would need $199-259M of its own cash for the build, more than its $191.8M of pro forma cash.
→ Both 10-Qs came late, after notices of late filing on May 26 and August 14, and $BRUN still reports three material weaknesses, the most serious kind of gap in a company’s financial reporting controls.
→ Founder and CEO Andrew Karos controls 87% of the vote.
At $8.89/share, $BRUN’s EV is $989.7M. That’s 2.5x its $400M target for year-end ARR, down from 5.4x at the $22.93 price in my August 16 update.
At 2.5x, $BRUN trades below all three peers, including $IREN at 3.2x.
So did the thesis break, or just the stock?
That’s what I answer in my new ~5k-word update on $BRUN, including my bear, base, and bull cases (Excel model included).
Fajasy retweeted
One of the biggest mistake I see investors make online is having an anchoring bias impact their decision(s).
A few examples:
-Investor buys a stock at $10. A few years later the stock is at $15, but is in a much better situation yet the investor refuses to average up into the position.
-Investor sells a stock at $10. A few years later the stock is at $20, however the valuation still makes a lot of sense and they made a mistake selling it in the first place. Most investors don’t have the balls to swallow a mistake and jump back into a great opportunity simply because they sold it lower.
-Investor watched a stock climb from $10 to $15 over a short period of time. They tell themselves it will go back down, but they know the stock is incredibly cheap still and in a great state for the coming decade.
-Investor buys a starter position in a new company at $10/share. Stock goes lower and since the investor has money in the position they continue to dig deeper with a blinding positive bias for said company due to their red position. They end up doubling down in a stock that they never should have owned in the first place…
There’s multiple ways that an anchoring bias can destroy our long term returns as investors.
The best way to avoid this is to make decisions INCREDIBLY slow, think in years/decades instead of months/quarters, understand a company deeply by following them for quarters before buying a single share, and treat every day as if it’s day one when allocating your portfolio.
$DGXX and @michelamar3 once again delivering on their promises. Using non-dilutive debt financing is the most shareholder-friendly way to build out the Alabama AI campus.
Debt is debt, but when Goldman Sachs is willing to syndicate $200M behind DigiPower X’s execution, that says a lot.
It’s only a matter of time before the market starts giving this company the attention and respect it deserves.
DigiPower X does not deserve its current valuation.
$200 MILLION DEBT FINANCING COMMITMENT | DIGI POWER X ($DGXX)
We have announced a US$200 million debt financing commitment, with financing syndicated by Goldman Sachs, to support completion of our 40 MW Alabama AI data center campus and advance our AI infrastructure strategy.
Key updates:
• $200M Commitment: Supporting campus completion while aiming to limit shareholder dilution.
• Alabama AI Campus: Phase 1 targeted for December 2026; Phase 2 expected March 2027.
• Financial Position: Approximately $135M in cash and $153M in year-to-date capital expenditures.
• @Neocloudz : Advancing our AI token factory strategy, including plans for NVIDIA GTC Berlin.
• Expansion: Progressing AI infrastructure opportunities in New York and Silicon Valley.
From power to compute, we're building the foundation for scalable enterprise AI infrastructure.
Financing remains subject to closing conditions.
Read the full release:
digipowerx.com/press-release…
#DGXX #DigiPowerX #AIInfrastructure #NeoCloudz
Just dropped the $BRUN vs $WYFI vs $SHAZ article. I had quite a bit of fun digging into each of the companies and evaluating them.
I scored all three from 1 to 5 across eight sections straight from the filings: leadership, financials and funding, network, power and unit economics, contract quality, execution, governance and valuation.
One rents everything, one owns its power, one raised $2.6B and leans on NVIDIA, and the final scorecard is closer than you’d expect. Full breakdown below. Check it out!
Fajasy retweeted
My new "shorcut" Operating Earnings model thanks to @StableBread.
OE = OCF − Maintenance CapEx
For Maintenance CapEx, I have two spreadsheets - one as a % of total CapEx, the other using the Greenwald method.
His article on Owner Earnings is well worth a read: stablebread.com/warren-buffe…
Fajasy retweeted
Yesterday, I put $INTU through my simple 9-metric screener and it passed with flying colors. ✅
The business fundamentals are strong: the balance sheet is sound, debt is manageable, returns on capital are suitable (and increasing) and dividend and earnings are growing healthily and well supported by a growing business.
$INTU looks like a compelling opportunity based on the financials. Today, I have been working through whether the current valuation is attractive. 👇
I built two free cash flow DCF's (FCFF-based) and two dividend discount models, both under my base case and a conservative case scenario.
My base case DCF assumes that FCFF grows by 12% over the next 5 years and then grows down to 2.5% terminal growth rate by year 10. The 12% CAGR represents 60% of the historical 10-yr FCFF growth rate, which I believe is quite conservative. I assume a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 9.32%. This produces a fair value estimate of $502 per share, and P/FVE of 0.57x.
Similarly, the conservative case DCF assumes that FCFF grows at 8.1% CAGR over the next 5 years (50% of 10-yr historical revenue growth rate). Again, this seems very conservative. This produces a fair value estimate of $405 per share, and P/FVE of 0.71x.
If we flip the calculation to calculate the current market-implied FCFF growth rate over the next 10 years, I estimate an implied 1.5% FCFF CAGR, relative to a 19-20% CAGR over the last 10 years.
We can also value $INTU using a two-stage dividend discount model. This is not a particularly appropriate model for the company as the payout ratio is very low (~30-35%). However, I like to use the DDM as a floor for the valuation.
The base case DDM assumes a year 1-5 dividend CAGR of 12% (80% of the 10-yr historical 15% CAGR), growing down to 8% by year 10, and then a terminal growth rate of 2.5% and a 10.28% cost of equity. The forecast assumes diluted share counts remain flat (277m) and net income payout ratios remain consistent (30-34%). This produces a fair value for the dividend of $140 per share. This implies that approximately 50% of the current share price is backed by the dividend.
Under the conservative case DDM, I assumed that the dividend CAGR in year 1-5 was 9.0% (60% of the 10-yr historical 15% CAGR). This produces a fair value for the dividend of $111 per share. Again, this implies that 39% of the current share price is backed by the dividend.
We can also look at valuation on a relative basis looking at price-earnings. $INTU trades at 17.5x trailing 12-month PE and 12.0x next 12-month PE.
Irrespective of which method I use to value $INTU, I find the valuation very compelling.
The FCFF models indicate that the company is 30-50% undervalued. The dividend accounts for 40-50% of the current share price and the market is currently implying FCFF growth of approximately 1.5% for the next decade (relative to ~20% CAGR over the last decade).
As such, I have decided to initiate a position in $INTU, which is the first position in the Vachellia Equity Dividend Champions Fund. 🏆
I bought $1k (1% position size) @ $269.11 on 30th September = 3.7159 shares.
I am looking to build this position over the next year to ~4% of the portfolio, if the fundamentals and valuation hold up. 🙌
Intuit ( $INTU ) is one of the worst performers in the S&P500 year-to-date, down over 60% in 2026. 📉
$INTU has been an incredible business for many years, so I thought it was time to pass it through my screener to see if this drawdown is worth considering further or not.
1. Balance Sheet Quality
$INTU has a strong balance sheet.
They hold $1.1 billion in net debt ($8.3 billion in total debt; short-term debt + long-term debt + long-term operating leases) against $5.2 billion in free cash flow to firm (FCFF). This represents a 0.2x net debt / FCFF ratio (MRQ), or 0.5x over the last 3 years, both of which are well below my threshold of 5x.
Similarly, both on an earnings (17.8x) and FCFF basis (20.4x), $INTU has high interest coverage ratios, well above the typical 8-12x ratio typically used to determine well-covered debt servicing capacity.
Approximately, 88% ($6.75 billion) of total debt is fixed-rate, with the remaining 12% ($0.92 billion) being variable-rate debt. In a a possible rising rates environment, $INTU clearly has room to service their variable-rate debt.
More importantly, $INTU has about 54% of their debt maturing in the next 5 years, with FY2027 notably seeing $1.2 billion (15.6% of total debt) mature.
As such, the high interest coverage ratios are really important as interest expense will increase significantly when this debt matures and gets rolled over into higher interest rate debt.
For example, their current weighted-average cost of debt is approximately 3.6% - 4.3%, while recent senior notes issued in June 2026 were offered with 4.950% and 5.50% coupon rates.
I think $INTU has a balance sheet that is well placed to endure what I expect to be a tough few years ahead of higher interest rates.
2. Return on Capital
$INTU's mean return on invested capital (ROIC) over the last 5 years is approximately 14.2%, and 19.6% over the TTM. While these numbers are depressed compared to their pre-2021 MailChimp acquisition (30-50% ROIC), they still generate returns on capital in excess of their weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 9.30%. This indicates that capital deployed back into the business is value accretive.
A positive trend is seeing ROIC increase incrementally year-over-year since 2021, increasing from a low of 11.0% in 2023 to 19.6% (TTM), as they integrate their acquisitions into the business.
3. Cash Generation
$INTU is generating substantial cash flows. In FY26, they generated $8.8 billion in cash from operating activities and $8.6 billion in free cash flow, representing 41% increases year-over-year.
However, they also paid just over $2.0 billion in stock-based compensation in FY2026. Once we net this out, and adjust to FCFF, the generated approximately $6.8 billion.
These cash flows were generated on an adjusted FCFF margin of 14.8% in FY2026, their highest margin post-2021 integration, and trending upwards like ROIC.
I expect to see FCFF margins return to the 18-20% levels over the next few years as the business streamlines operations further.
4. Dividend Growth
$INTU currently pays a $4.26 per share dividend, with an indicated dividend yield of ~ 1.73%.
Over both the last 5-yr and 10-yr periods, the dividend per share (DPS) has growth by an average of 15% per annum. This is well above my threshold of 7% per annum, and represents an excellent, consistent and growing dividend.
5. Dividend Safety
The dividend appears to be very safe, with a net income payout ratio of 29.5% (TTM) and an adjusted FCFF payout ratio of 42.5% (TTM). Similarly, over the past 5 years, the two payout ratios have averaged 34% and 58%, respectively.
Notably, the net income payout ratio has remained relatively flat and consistent over the last 10 years in the 30-35% range. On the other hand, the FCFF payout ratio has increased slightly, albeit this is largely due to two irregular spikes of 78% and 80% in 2022 and 2024. These spikes were primarily due to significant increases in stock-based compensation in FY22 and FY24, relative to the preceding FY21 and FY23.
Irrespective, $INTU's dividend appears to be relatively safe and well-covered by both earnings and FCFF. The consistency of the payout ratio over time, in my opinion, is a very good sign of dividend safety and consistency, which is a priority.
6. Earnings
Much like their dividend, $INTU has grown diluted earnings per share (EPS) at an incredible rate of 16-17% over the last 5-yr and 10-yr period.
Notably, this is largely due to net income growth (17% CAGR per annum over the last 10 years), not due to significant reduction of their diluted share count through buybacks. In fact, diluted shares outstanding are currently higher TTM at 277 million than 10 years ago at 265 million, albeit over FY2026 they did retire ~ 6 million rates.
EPS is one of the best predictors of business growth, all else being equal, and the fact that $INTU have growth EPS at such a high and consistent rate over the last 10 years is testament to their business model.
Ideally, I would like to see EPS growth > DPS growth, otherwise the payout ratio starts to increase over time. Thankfully, $INTU's EPS growth per annum is about 1% > than DPS growth, so I would expect to see them continue to grow their dividend significantly over the next few years.
7. Summary
$INTU passes 9/9 of the quality screening criteria. ✅ It is important to acknowledge that these criteria are largely backwards-looking. However, despite the current 60% drawdown, the fundamentals of the business still look very strong.
The fundamentals are largely the product of high efficiency and consistency. Earnings and dividend growth has been consistently high (>15% per annum) for a decade, which produces a high-quality dividend with lots of room for further growth.
Moreover, the balance sheet is strong, with approximately 1 years worth of cash from operating activity / FCF in gross debt ($8 billion), and just over $1 billion in net debt. Interest expense is well covered by earnings and cash flow, with a substantial buffer to handle a possible higher interest rate going forward and a significant roll-over of 54% of existing debt into more expensive debt over the next 5 years.
Personally, I think $INTU looks like a compelling opportunity based on the above. Follow to make sure you don't miss a follow-up post where I will share my thoughts on the current valuation for $INTU under my base case and conservative case assumptions using both a (1) two-stage dividend discount model (DDM) and (2) a FCFF discounted cash flow model (DCF). 👍
Let me know your thoughts on $INTU? Does the company look like a good investment at these levels? 🤔
BREAKING: Boost Run Announces Five-Year, $525.6 Million AI Cloud Services Compute Agreement
NORTHBROOK, Ill.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Oct. 6, 2026--Boost Run, Inc. (Nasdaq: BRUN) (“Boost Run” or the “Company”), an NVIDIA Preferred Cloud Partneroperating in adherence with NVIDIA Reference Architecture standards, today announced it has signed a five-year AI cloud services agreement with a leading sovereign AI company. The agreement carries a total contract value (TCV) of $525.6 million along with acceptance of the initial infrastructure expected to begin in early Q2 2027. Under the agreement, Boost Run will deliver compute capacity powered by NVIDIA GB300 NVL72 GPUs, along with network storage and CPU node services.
To date, this contract brings Boost Run’s TCV to over $2.6 billion. This figure represents the total revenue customers have committed to pay over the life of all agreements, where the Company’s signed contracts have upfront payments. Boost Run's non-dilutive financing structure and deep relationships across the AI infrastructure ecosystem position it to scale quickly and provide flexibility to grow.
“This agreement marks an important step in efficiently deploying our financing into contracted revenue. Our ability to deliver NVIDIA GB300 systems to leading AI companies demonstrates the strength and diversification of both our customer base and our GPU fleet, ” said Andrew Karos, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Boost Run.
Boost Run plans on continuing to convert its strong pipeline into signed contracts, deploying capacity against contracted demand as the AI compute market continues to expand.
Haters, where you at now?
Fajasy retweeted
this article by mauboussin, I think may be 20 of the best pages, pound for pound, written on markets
"Thoughts on Valuation" (1997)
in it he destroys some of the most common myths of how markets work, and lays down what are really several "LAWS" of what drives stock prices...like ironclad, bulletproof, indestructible, 'do not argue with anyone who disagrees' type law
and a lot of people don't get it and refuse to get it
12mv2.com/wp-content/uploads…
--
1. "markets are short term oriented" -- no they are sure as hell arent...most stocks have 70-80% of their equity value tied up in cash flows 10+ years out, and in terminal value
2. "markets are inefficient" -- no, they really aren't...they move around a lot, but most of the time its based on data/newsflow which actually has an effect on valuation.
the daily data deluge, does not make it onto twtr...funds pay billions of dollars for this data, what appears as "random fluctuation" on twtr, is probably "data provider out with a call on the qtr"...none of which is ever posted on twtr
a lot of times when u hear "markets are short term oriented and inefficient," you can assume its from a guy who is down 40% from his cost basis
you ever notice how markets are never "inefficient" for a guy with green P&L? strange isnt it
3. "eps is everything" -- no, stocks trade off FCF, not eps. EPS doesn't capture capex, fcf does, so value-destructive capex can create EPS while destroying FCF (so the stock goes down)
I wrote a longer version of this in the quoted tweet, but there are several points he makes in the article which are
1. paramount to understanding how markets work
2. not understood by 99% of people
between the myth-busting, and replacing the myths with what is basically law...these 20 pages are "screw your head on straight" in making sense of markets
you have to ignore twtr and get used to saying "I'm not going back and forth with you." people will legitimately argue with you for 8 straight hours based on some theory of how markets work that they just invented
literally "source? I made it up"
they'll argue with me, over something I post from mauboussin or buffett..."no, stocks arent valued via dcf, those guys are both wrong"
like dog, you can take it up with those guys lol
and thats just my default response to a lot of shit... between mauboussin, buffett, and munger, you prob can get to 99.9% of what needs to be known / "LAWS OF MARKETS."
flush out any other opinions and install those
between these 20 pages and "expectations investing" you are in real good shape
12mv2.com/wp-content/uploads…
"Thoughts on Valuation" (1997, Mauboussin)
this one is straight to the point, and busts several market myths...stuff u see people get wrong every day
1. the market is short-term oriented, or "unsophisticated" or "irrational"...this is a myth.
2. EPS and EPS growth are what drive stock prices...also a myth.
theres other topics in here, he goes into CAP which is a good term/framework u can use forever...I will pull a few highlights
capatcolumbia.com/Articles/R…
1. how you can grow EPS and destroy growth (like Bezos' example)
"Let’s pretend I am an unlimited source of capital. Everyone in this room can come to me and I will give you all the money you want. There is just one catch: the expected return on the capital I give you, not the explicit return, but the implicit return, is 10%. Now, let’s say you can go out and reinvest the money I give you at 8%. I give you capital with a 10% “cost” and you reinvest it at an 8% return. Now here is the question. What is your earnings per share growth going to be for this venture? The answer is, It is going to be anything you want it to be! All you have to do is keep coming back to me for more money, reinvest it, and you will generate earnings growth at whatever rate you choose. Clearly, the more rapidly you grow earnings the worse off you are, because you are investing below the required rate of return.
That may make sense, but how does it apply to the real world? The answer is that the primary source of capital for most companies is retained earnings. (Roughly 75% of investments are funded internally.) Retained earnings have an implied opportunity cost—that is what shareholders could earn on that capital if they invested it in other ventures of similar risk—but most managers think of retained earnings as “free” money. Hence, managers who take cash generated by the business and reinvest it at below appropriate rates of return in order to drive earnings per share are doing their shareholders injustice. Mind you, investing in projects that do not earn the costs of capital may drive earnings per share growth, but will clearly destroy value. This type of investing goes on every day in corporations around the world."
2. the market sells off "EPS accretive" M&A
Here are some other illustrations in the last few months that demonstrate the earnings/value dichotomy. Tyco International—which has been a very good performing stock, by the way—announced in March it was acquiring a company called ADT. Tyco is in the building supply business, ADT is a leading home security company. It came in as a white knight. The acquisition is structured as stock-for-stock—formally called a pooling of interest. It is a mathematical truism when a high P/E company buys a low P/E company, EPS for the acquiring company go up. This point is axiomatic. This was also the case for Tyco and ADT. The day of the announcement, ADT stock was up 18%—no big surprise. Tyco suggested that the deal should result in EPS accretion of about 8%. The stock, however, declined 3% in a flat overall stock market. So earnings per share went up, the stock went down, and the company witnessed a 4 P/E point multiple contraction.
This underscores the important point that P/E multiples are not a determinant of value, but rather a function of value.
3. what's in a multiple? a lot
On Wall Street, the typical valuation formula is EPS x P/E = value. We just talked about earnings and how they can be misleading. Now we go to this thing called the P/E multiple. We are asking the P/E multiple to reflect growth, capital intensity, risk, quality of management, and competitive advantage. We are heaping a lot of responsibility on one number and we argue that it is practically impossible to know what that right number is.
--that bolded sentence is very important...very common question/pushback from new investors "why can't I just do a 2027 multiple, or 2030 multiple" etc
because u are obscuring all that shit, plus terminal value assumptions, into one number.
like you may as well just throw a dart. u arent doing real valuation work, ur just pretending these assumptions don't exit.
in a DCF, all those assumptions are made explicit - capex, roic, fcf, everything that moves stock prices...u model those and add confidence intervals/scenarios/probabilities where ur uncertain.
as opposed to just saying, "15x 2027 EPS." like closing ur eyes and saying, poof, doesn't exist
the only shortcut (which everyone uses) is thinking directionally...a stock price = cash flows and multiple.
so if u say a stock at $100, is worth $50, u have to explain...are cash flows going down 50%? or is the multiple going down 50%? or some combo? and why? (keeping in mind that the multiple captures all those variables laid out above)
ask LLMs if any of this isnt clear (multiple vs DCF) -- I'm not going to argue with you on how you think the sky is orange instead of blue, and LLMs will get this right.
4. short-termism myth
"The next myth is that the market is very short-term orientated. This one is a favorite of the business press, and is a theory in which many CEOs indulge. What is the evidence for “short-termism?” First, stocks react to quarterly earnings per share. Next, money mangers are evaluated every 90 days so they have to run fast to make sure their portfolio is well positioned for the short term. Finally, there is a disproportionate focus on next quarter’s earnings per share. This is particularly endemic to the sell side."
--someone is going to push back and say, "the market can be irrational"
yes, it can, its not perfect - "the market has predicted 9 of the last 5 recessions"
its still far more right than it is wrong. and the degree to which u understand this, tends to be linear to ur years of experience
mauboussin goes into examples of how the market is long term focused, but u can see that regardless - why is spacex worth a trillion dollars despite that theres no FCF for 5+ years?
because the market plays the long game. maybe its worth $2T, or $1T, or $500B, we'll see...but there's clearly a lot of value in there.
and on the flip side, u can see how AI/Claude has lopped off the terminal value of software stocks - those are long-term considerations, its not about next qtr being at risk, its 5-10 years out.
again, I'm not gonna argue with u here, go hit LLMs with ur opinions and views.
buffett 101: a stock is worth all the cash flow it will produce from now until kingdom come, discounted back at some rate appropriate to the business, risk, opportunity cost, 10-yr (he has many answers re: disc rate...but the point stands)
go argue w buffett, dont argue w me
5. cont - time horizon
"The next canard is that the market is “unsophisticated” or in some instances “irrational.” Allen Greenspan and Warren Buffett have recently contributed to this myth. Sumner Redstone, the CEO of Viacom, recently said that his stock price is depressed because the stock market is irrational; people don’t get it. All these portfolio managers, who are out to make money in a competitive setting, are collectively irrational. That is a difficult one to buy.
What does happen is a company makes an acquisition, tells the world it’s a great strategic deal, and is shocked when the stock is down 2% or 3%. Now in some cases the market doesn’t get it because the market doesn’t have the appropriate information. In that case, it is incumbent on the company to provide the relevant information so as to allow investors to make the right decision. Collectively, the market gets it a lot more times than it doesn’t get it."
6. CAP 🧢
"Now we come to the last component of the value-based model and it is a critical one. This idea is what takes the DCF from the classroom into the real world. It takes it from theory to practice. Most MBAs have not been subjected to anything like this before, yet it is really the key to securities analysis. It’s something we call competitive advantage period (CAP). CAP is defined as the period of time a company can generate excess returns on its incremental investments. It is based on the idea that competitive forces ultimately drive your excess returns down to zero, meaning the business earns the cost of capital. The ability to extend excess returns for as long as possible is the basic concept of competitive advantage. This is how competitive advantage is tied into this framework.
Generally, when companies or investors run a cash flow model they go out five or ten years. Why is that? Because that’s how many fingers you have. Literally, we live in a decimal world because that is how many fingers we have! What you really want to do is link the competitive position of your business and/or industry to an economically sound competitive advantage period.
CAP can be defined by three major variables. The first is the current return on capital—the higher the better. The second is the rate of industry change—if you are in a fairly dynamic industry where things are changing quickly, investors tend to shorten the competitive advantage period. And third, which is related to the first two, is the barriers to entry; the higher the barriers to entry, the longer the competitive advantage period tends to be."
--
Summary
there's more in there, but u will notice that like everyone u know, everyone u follow, is doing all this shit wrong.
mauboussin and buffett have it right, u do not have to question anything they've written, nor argue with someone who says "buffett has it wrong"
ok pal
here is the best path though. independently consult LLMs, make sure you understand all of this front to back, get all ur q's answered...develop your own understanding of this
and then after that, u can either tune the crowd out entirely (since u have confirmation ur logic is sound), or u can try and correct people when u see them doing it wrong.
the latter will have u laughing, people will spend hours arguing in defense of some point of view which they literally just made up
and where an LLM within 2 seconds wouldve said "dude lol. no."
so idk, arguing with strangers on the internet is like Caligula declaring war on the ocean....u are never gonna win, its a neverending battle.
do your own homework and trust in LLMs, they are laser-sharp on topics like this -- fundamental equity analysis and basic market theory -- and will have u operating with some semblance of confidence.
"don't follow the crowd, they're lost."
buena suerte 🫡
I just published an easy-to-digest $BRUN infographic on my website
lekiresearch.com/n/BRUN/BRUN…
It covers 4 main sections which I think are central to understanding the $BRUN thesis.
1. Leadership
2. Financials
3. Commercial Map / Customers
4. Valuations
I hope this helps everyone to have a better understanding on why this is the company I am willing to put majority of my portfolio in. Sentiment is horrible now but that is where the opportunity lies! I am mega long $BRUN.
Fajasy retweeted
Seen a lot of crap DD and takes on $CCXI so I've just removed the paywall on my 7.8k word deep dive.
Enjoy: newsletter.stablebread.com/p…
Agility Robotics $CCXI will be the only listed U.S. pure-play humanoid maker, and the SPAC bringing it public went from $10.42 to a $19.10 peak in the eight days after the deal was announced.
Unitree, its Chinese rival, listed in Shanghai on August 19 and closed its first day up 460% at a ~$48B market cap on ~$240M of 2025 revenue.
I just finished a 7.8k-word deep dive on $CCXI. It's thorough and possibly the only one that includes the S-4 filing info (filed September 4).
Here's where the bull case comes from:
→ Digit (Agility's humanoid robot) already does paid work at $AMZN, $GXO, Schaeffler, $TM, and $MELI, with 65,000 hours of operation across nine committed facility deployments.
→ Management cites $300M+ of Digit v5 orders, and the S-4 leaves enough clues to work out who the unnamed buyer most likely is.
→ $NVDA named Agility the first partner for Halos, its new safety package for robots, and the ISO safety standard Digit needs is being drafted by a working group led by Agility's own safety engineer.
→ ~75% of Digit's parts are U.S.-sourced, which clears the FCC's new bar, while the GUARD Act and the FCC's Covered List are fencing Unitree and Agibot out of the U.S. market. Agility is lobbying for both.
→ RoboFab, its 70,000 square-foot factory in Salem, Oregon, is rated for 10,000 robots a year, and the deal brings $576M of new cash at close if there are no redemptions.
Here's the bear case, or what investors may be overlooking:
→ Only $1.78M of FY2025 revenue and a $138.1M net loss, per the S-4.
→ The "$300M+ of orders" is a single three-year RaaS contract with a single unnamed customer, paid partly in Agility's own warrants.
→ The factory rated for 10,000 a year is "currently producing fewer than 100 a year," per the co-founder, the "hundreds" promised for 2025 slipped two years, and the S-4's own risk factors say Agility doesn't "currently have the facility capacity, employees, or equipment needed to manufacture its products in high volume."
→ Digit v5 doesn't reach early customers until December 2026, has no FCC authorization yet, and no third-party safety certification.
→ The deck's "2.0x customer ROI" assumes a worker on two 10-hour shifts, six days a week. So a customer that can't fill two shifts of tote work has no reason to rent one (a single-shift worker costs ~$61K/year against the $100K RaaS fee).
At $13.40/share you're paying a 30.7% premium to the ~$10.25 trust floor, arbitrage funds own most of the float, the sponsor's founder shares carry no vesting, forfeiture, or earnout, and 216M locked-up shares come loose 180 days after close.
Here's the full deep dive: newsletter.stablebread.com/p…
Fajasy retweeted
This is sure to become the standard reference for long-term investment returns.
rpc.cfainstitute.org/sites/d…
Fajasy retweeted
The Nigerian equity market has surged 62% year-to-date. While developed markets are largely driven by AI-focused tech valuations, Nigeria’s momentum is anchored in a much more structural catalyst: explosive demographic growth.
The country’s population is projected to expand by 50 million over the next decade, aligning with the government's strategic goal of becoming a $1 trillion economy by 2035.
Although approximately 60% of Nigerians currently live below the poverty line, the national Agenda 2050 framework outlines a roadmap to lift over 100 million citizens out of poverty.
Zooming out to the broader continent, up to 1.4 billion Africans are projected to enter the middle class by 2050.
This macroeconomic shift is already catalyzing historic capital market activity. This year, Nigeria hosted Africa’s largest-ever IPO with the Dangote Refinery. Launching with an implied market valuation of $47.5 billion, the offering generated such unprecedented retail interest that management considered hosting the annual shareholder meeting in a football stadium to accommodate the volume of investors.
Ultimately, Africa possesses the world's most compelling demographic tailwinds. As economic mobility increases, behavioral economics dictates that this newly minted middle class will exhibit a strong home bias, heavily deploying their wealth into domestic capital markets.
For global investors looking beyond saturated indexes, front-running this incoming domestic liquidity offers a highly attractive long-term strategic allocation.
Everyone talking about how cheap $LMND is getting, but $ROOT has already been cheap...
But not to mention:
- profitable and consistently generating net income
- significantly more revenue, $1.57 bil TTM
- $725 mil market cap, which is less than half of annual revenue, trading at 0.46x TTM PS
- EV/revenue of only 0.26x
- 13x trailing PE
- stacking cash / building capital
- 92.1% net combined ratio and improving
- 7.9% net underwriting margin
- improving loss ratios
- highly disciplined underwriting leading to industry leading loss ratios
- not chasing uneconomic growth
- 37 states and 80%+ of the US population
- on track for contiguous US coverage by 2027
- 51% of new writings coming through partnership and independent-agent channels
- rapidly expanding independent-agent distribution
- huge OEM relationships
- growing embedded insurance distribution
- proprietary telematics technology
- 37 billion+ miles of driving data
- over a decade of data and insurance experience
- highly focused on AI, machine learning and data science
- next-generation pricing model coming in Q4
- growing and renewed Carvana relationship
- 200,000+ Carvana policies sold
- expanding Hyundai/Kia relationships
- expanding distribution through digital marketplaces
- returning capital through share repurchases with more than $55 mil remaining on its $75 mil repurchase authorization after Q2
- annualized ROE of ~31%
- lower interest expense after refinancing
- ~$4.5M expected annual interest savings from the refinancing
- shrinking operating expenses
- generating meaningful earnings while still investing heavily in growth
- positioned for the autonomous-vehicle insurance future
And last, but certainly not least - building an insurance platform specifically designed for the AI era.
Bullish yet?
Fajasy retweeted
There’s an unusual amount of uncertainty around investment in pure-play AI, but the fact that it’s present doesn’t mean you don’t do something. I discussed how to think about AI investing with Bloomberg's David Gura and Christina Ruffini at the QEF. Watch the full interview: bloomberg.com/news/videos/20…

































