
Bitcoin minimalist Not the expert at @BitBoxSwiss ⚡ [email protected] 1907c92a96deaca8830b533fe0974e08ffa8e69ce51d8d53268ff9cd2b6c27af
Switzerland
Joined March 2012
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If you care about #Bitcoin you should run your own full node.
There are great plug & play options available, but if you want to learn how your node actually works, and have some geeky fun along the way, the @RaspiBolt guide might be for you!
RaspiBolt.org
Stadicus retweeted
🚨DEFCON 1🚨
In a few hours, a critical vulnerability that affects ~70% of web sites will be disclosed. It allows an attacker to upload and execute arbitrary code.
It's probably best if you stop browsing the internet for the rest of the week.
xitter.cf/ThePHPF/status/2112633…
The PHP security team is giving advance notice: Upcoming security release Wed, Oct 21st 2026, 14:00UTC, two critical vulnerabilities, both rated CVSSv4 9.2.
PHP users are encouraged to prepare to update. Earlier release if details become public or active exploit evidence.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
These are server-side PHP RCE vulnerabilities for which web hosts/admins should prepare to patch per official notice; general users face no direct need to stop browsing. PHP detected on ~69% of sites with known server-side language.
php.net/archive/2026.p…
w3techs.com/technologies/d…
cert.europa.eu/publications/s…
sansec.io/research/php2s…
arstechnica.com/security/2026/…
Stadicus retweeted
Tangem appeals to the lowest common denominator in crypto, that's why it's filled with bagholders from $XRP $KAS and affiliates paid peanuts to shill.
I will make it simple for people to understand today.
In December 2024, @Tangem had a critical vulnerability where its mobile app wrote users' PRIVATE KEYS into logs that got attached to support emails. They deleted early warning posts on Reddit.
Inb4 "muh seedless, muh safe", yes, your keys never touch the app. Your TRANSACTIONS touch it every single time. The attack vector is the APP ITSELF and the OS it runs on. Read on.
Tangem's Nirvana Fallacy is: seatbelts have occasionally failed, therefore remove seatbelts.
Ledger/Trezor clear-signing bug: worst case, the screen lies about transaction parameters.
Tangem's design: the (phone) screen can lie about transactions as the permanent baseline.
>"Hardware Implant"
Physical implants predate Bitcoin. They are device agnostic. The phone on which Tangem's app runs could have an implant too, what then?
"Tangem Genuine Check" was exploited by Ledger already. Counterfeit Tangem Cards are not just theoretical:
ledger.com/tangem-genuine-ch…
>"Clear Signing Bugs"
Clear-signing bugs are a failure of a layer Tangem doesn't have at all. Tangem signs whatever payload the app hands it, every time, by design.
Car airbags have defects, even from Toyota, the most reliable car manufacturer that exists. Tangem's solution is to remove airbags altogether.
Both Ledger and Trezor vulnerabilities are routinely patched.
You can never patch your laser vector:
donjon.ledger.com/blog/bypas…
Or tearing vector:
ledger.com/blog-brute-force-…
...because there's no update channel for users.
Your security page still advertises resistance to "fault injection attempts". Donjon's laser attack IS fault injection. It works and it's unpatchable by you.
[Eureka Moment]
@Ledger and @Trezor clear signing bugs were discoverable BECAUSE the trusted display can be audited against what it signs.
In Tangem's model, there's nothing to audit. Read that back slowly because it's easy to miss. It's evidence the architecture is testable.
Ledger/Trezor is like bank that publishes audited accounts. It will occasionally have an auditor find an error:
1. Construct a transaction.
2. Record what the device displays.
3. Record what the device actually signs (the signature reveals exactly what was signed).
4. Compare the two.
Tangem is a bank that keeps no books. Therefore it will never have an accounting error found:
1. Construct a transaction.
2. Record what the app displays.
3. Record what the card signs.
4. They differ: the app showed one address, the card signed another.
In Tangem's case, there's no vulnerability because Tangem never promised those two things should match. The card signs whatever payload the app hands it. The system is working exactly as designed. It's the default behavior for a compromised OS.
>"And more hardware components can introduce more attack vectors."
So your solution to a purpose-built trusted display driven by minimal firmware (Ledger/Trezor) is a whole ass smartphone, running a full OS, with millions of lines of code and attack vectors.
Genius.
>"muh security hardened app"
You never replied to my original post here because you can't:
xitter.cf/HalesFall/status/20767…
Tangem was also audited by Riscure in 2023, yet you still got smoked by Ledger later:
tangem.com/en/blog/post/tang…
Not even Apple or Google can defend an app from a kernel-level exploit on their own OS, that's why Ledger/Trezor don't try. They verify OUTSIDE the blast radius. Your "hardened app" lives inside it.
[Latest Exploits]
See the videos attached, there's tons more I haven't included. You have neither the money, resources, or expertise to defend from OS exploits. How many of your users are even using Pixel 8 series and later, or iPhone 17 series and later? That matters greatly too.
Your "app" layer is dead-on-arrival. Ledger & Trezor provide mitigation where you cannot.
Tangem is more akin to a software wallet because it implicitly trusts a compromised OS. The secure element is theatre since the card will sign anything passed to it.
A screen makes your hardware wallet safer? Think again.
Recent security incidents tell a different story.
1. Ledger, October 2026 — Hardware Implant
A hidden hardware implant captured recovery phrases directly from the device’s screen and transmitted them over LTE. The Secure Element remained intact.
2. Ledger, August 2026 — Transaction Mismatch
A Clear Signing vulnerability allowed the transaction parameters displayed on the screen to differ from those actually signed.
3. Trezor, May 2026 — Hidden ETH Transfer
A Clear Signing flaw could hide an additional ETH transfer while displaying a routine token transaction.
What this shows:
A screen doesn’t guarantee you’re seeing everything you’re signing. And more hardware components can introduce more attack vectors.
Why Tangem doesn’t need a screen:
• Your phone displays transaction details through a security-hardened app.
• Multiple protection layers help defend against UI manipulation, malicious overlays, and runtime attacks.
• Private keys remain inside the secure chip.
• No screen, no battery, no unnecessary hardware complexity.
tangem.com/en/blog/post/mobi…
Security is about protecting the entire system, not just adding more components.
Simply Tangem
To be clear: with Tangem, the full security of your wallet depends on your mobile phone. The card is just signing everything blindly.
Shame on them for their dishonest marketing. Don't be fooled.
The last thing we need is competitors dunking on @ledger to score cheap marketing points.
If retirement attacks are possible, this threatens all of self-custody.
Today it's your competitor. Tomorrow it could be you.
Stadicus retweeted
This is toxic and disingenuous. Tangem is misleading so many folks who don’t know better.
Gaslighting the industry for years.
Blind signing has a clear definition. This product is a glorified 2FA hot wallet and doesn’t protect from the most simple type of attack: a compromised phone or computer.
Hey, Chris!
A screen doesn’t solve blind signing. Huge sums have been lost to transactions people approved on screens they couldn’t actually read. Please read it: tangem.com/en/blog/post/blin…
Why the "no screen is bad" narrative fails
By shifting key processes to the secure mobile app, Tangem’s hardware wallet doesn't need a display. The secure app handles all critical interactions and is protected by the robust security layers outlined above. This simplifies the user experience while keeping their digital assets safe.
The app side is hardened separately: integrity checks against modified versions, root and jailbreak detection, tapjacking protection, certificate pinning, DexProtector, and open code on GitHub. Details here: tangem.com/en/blog/post/mobi…
We compared the two approaches and chose the one we believe is safer and simpler for people to use. Ledger Cryptobilis incident shows it was the right choice: with Tangem, a story like this simply couldn’t have happened.
Stadicus retweeted
1/ How does a hardware wallet actually generate a Bitcoin wallet? 🔐
It all starts with entropy: randomness that makes your wallet extremely hard to guess.
Here’s how BitBox generates yours.
Stadicus retweeted
I just tried the @BitBoxSwiss 02 Nova.
This may be the first hardware I've tested that includes a lightning wallet.
So how does it work? Well you can watch here to find out.
youtu.be/dTQNZ4E6xS4
Stadicus retweeted
BitBox02 Nova Schritt für Schritt einrichten!
Wir zeigen euch in unserem neuen Video, wie ihr die #Bitcoin Hardwarewallet von @BitBoxSwiss einrichtet, Sicherungen erstellt und dann Transaktionen sendet sowie empfangt.
👉 youtu.be/5RKMCgpDXmU
2000+ Trustpilot reviews, rated Excellent with 4.9 stars, doesn't come easy. trustpilot.com/review/bitbox…
That's a pretty good summary. 🇨🇭
Stadicus retweeted
Two booths, two countries!
Markus at Finance26 in Frankfurt 🇩🇪, Pako and Laura at BTCHEL in Helsinki 🇫🇮 If you're around, go to say hi!
Stadicus retweeted
We used the opportunity at the @blocktrainer event last weekend to battle test our Lightning integration! All Bitcoin sales at our booth were accepted with the BitBoxApp.
Fast payments, no hickups - everything went smoothly and was sent back to cold storage afterwards
Stadicus retweeted
Spoiler: there were a lot of you today at @blocktrainer event🔥
Stadicus retweeted
BitBox just collapsed the tradeoff.
One seed. One backup. Cold storage and Lightning under the same roof.
Your stack and your coffee money — same app.
Self-custody doesn't have to mean complicated. It just has to mean yours.
Stadicus retweeted
Replying to @BitBoxSwiss
@BitBoxSwiss implementa una wallet de Lightning en la BitBoxApp usando el estándar BIP-85.
Ahorros para el largo plazo y bitcoin para el día a día con un solo respaldo.
¿Cómo funciona?
Usando el BIP-85 puedes crear múltiples llaves privadas hijas a partir de una llave privada padre. Con la llave padre puedes derivar todas las hijas, pero con ninguna de las hijas puedes derivar la padre.
En este caso, la llave padre se mantiene en frío en la BitBox02 mientras la app usa una llave hija para crear tu wallet de Lightning.
Si pierdes tu teléfono puedes restaurar tu wallet de Lightning con la BitBox02, y si por alguna razón tu wallet en la app se compromete tus fondos en la hardware wallet no están en riesgo.
Esto significa que en lugar de hacer dos respaldos para dos wallets solo tienes que preocuparte de uno solo.
¡Trabajando en un tutorial!
Stadicus retweeted
To spend bitcoin you'd open a second app, with a second seed phrase, backed up in a second place, so you could buy a coffee.
That's over. Lightning is in the BitBoxApp.
One backup. Both wallets.
Stadicus retweeted
I really hope you'll like this. I spent a huge amount of time and effort on this, together with some of the best people I've ever worked with.
Stadicus retweeted
Your hardware wallet doesn't need to come with you to pay for a coffee.
Lightning is now in the BitBoxApp. Public beta, for every BitBox user.
One backup. Both wallets.
Stadicus retweeted
RaspiBolt is a free, open-source guide for building your own Bitcoin and Lightning node. Contributors and reader reports have shaped it since 2017.
If it helped you run a node, that is the whole point. Thank you.
Stadicus retweeted
Ready for a day between vintage cars and stock investors. We're the booth talking about Bitcoin.
We're at Anlegertag Düsseldorf with @Bitsurance_ 🚀 if you're around, come to say hi!






























