Tal beeri

Lebanese Army Commander Rodolphe Haykal says Israel is the main problem - while ruling out internal armed conflict. In practice, that means no confrontation with Hezbollah. So who is Israel expected to rely on to enforce the ceasefire?

U.S. vs. Iran: Will Hezbollah Join the Conflict? Hezbollah's current priority is to avoid another full-scale war with Israel and continue rebuilding its military capabilities. However, a renewed U.S. military campaign against Iran could change this calculation. IRGC pressure or independent action by elements within Hezbollah could draw the organization into the conflict. Even limited attacks against Israel could rapidly escalate into a broader confrontation. Read the full assessment >> israel-alma.org/u-s-vs-iran-…

In October 2026, Lebanon's central bank revoked the local operating license of Bank Saderat Iran (بنك صادرات ايران), one of Iran's largest and longest-established banks, which has operated in Lebanon since 1962. Central Bank Governor Karim Souaid (كريم سعيد) confirmed the decision on October 15, explaining that it was intended to protect Lebanon's banking system from sanctions risks and preserve its ties to the international financial system. Souaid also linked the move to Lebanon's efforts to exit the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) gray list and curb illicit financial activity. Bank Saderat has a history of U.S. sanctions for facilitating terrorist financing. In 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department cut the bank off from the U.S. financial system, and in 2007, designated it for supporting terrorism. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, between 2001 and 2006, Bank Saderat transferred $50 million from the Central Bank of Iran through its London subsidiary to its Beirut branch for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Bank Saderat's operations in Lebanon have contracted significantly over the years amid sanctions, exclusion from the clearing system, and the loss of local and international banking ties. The bank currently has five branches: three in Beirut, in the neighborhoods of Verdun (فردان), Ghobeiry (الغبيري), and Burj al-Barajneh (برج البراجنة); one in Baalbek, and one in Sidon. The decision to revoke the license drew opposition from the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, Sheikh Ali al-Khatib (الشيخ علي الخطيب). On October 29, after meeting with a delegation from Bank Saderat's management, al-Khatib called for the decision to be reversed, claiming that it represented capitulation to American dictates and warning of harm to employees and customers. He also called for the ban on Iranian civilian flights to Lebanon to be lifted. The revocation of Bank Saderat's license in Lebanon comes 20 years late, at a time when its operations and financial influence are limited. Concrete evidence of the Lebanese state's willingness to act against the active and influential financial network associated with Hezbollah should take the form of revoking the license of al-Qard al-Hassan Bank and closing its branches. The institution received its operating license as a "charitable association" from the Lebanese Ministry of Interior in 1987.

On October 27, 2026, it was reported that Amal representatives on the municipal council of Hallousiyah (الحلوسية), in the Tyre district, had threatened to resign following a dispute with Hezbollah representatives over the naming of the village's main street. Amal representatives proposed naming the street jointly after Musa al-Sadr, founder of the Amal Movement, along with Hassan Nasrallah. The Hezbollah representatives insisted on commemorating Nasrallah alone. Amal representatives opposed putting the matter to a vote, called for a consensus, and accused the council chairman of undermining their partnership and turning the council into a partisan instrument. We note that before Hezbollah's establishment, Nasrallah himself had been shaped by Musa al-Sadr's worldview and admired him, leading him to join the Amal Movement in his youth. This was not the first dispute in Hallousiyah. In January 2021, five council members affiliated with Amal, including the deputy chairman, held a boycott of the council meetings which lasted more than three months. According to these members, one reason for the boycott was the placement of Hezbollah's Islamic Health Organization emblem on an ambulance registered as council property. Amal representatives demanded the emblem's removal, arguing that public property should not be used to serve partisan interests. The current dispute reflects the ongoing competition between Hezbollah and Amal over influence, resources, and their presence in Shiite public life. Alongside their political alliance, the two sides engage in local struggles over the management of public institutions, service provision, and at times, military activity near residential areas, shown in several recent incidents. At this stage, these events alone do not indicate a significant rift between the two organizations. They do, however, demonstrate that their interests do not always align, raising the question of what costs Amal’s support base is now willing to bear as a result of Hezbollah’s conduct.

The “Qawluna wal-Amal” Association – Continued Cooperation with Hezbollah Following our August 2026 article on the Sunni “Qawluna wal-Amal” Association (جمعية قولنا والعمل), which operates in Bar Elias in the Beqaa Valley under Hezbollah’s patronage, cooperation between the association and Hezbollah-affiliated organizations continues. “Qawluna wal-Amal” continues to cooperate with Hezbollah’s “Wa Ta’awanu” (“Help One Another”) Association, including through the provision of assistance, such as clothing and food, to families in the area. The head of the “Qawluna wal-Amal” Association, Sheikh Ahmad al-Qattan, presented the cooperation between the two associations as part of a community assistance network intended to address economic and social hardship in light of the state’s weakness in providing services to citizens. On October 24, the “Qawluna wal-Amal” Association organized a rally in support of Muslim women and girls in Azerbaijan, amid claims of restrictions on wearing the hijab in educational institutions. Nibal Raad, a representative of Hezbollah’s Women’s Activities Unit, participated in the event alongside additional female representatives affiliated with the organization in the Beqaa Valley. The “Qawluna wal-Amal” Association continues to operate on the basis of a deep and enduring ideological, political, and practical affiliation with Hezbollah, Iran, and the “Axis of Resistance,” and serves as a platform for Hezbollah’s civil and religious influence within the Sunni community in the Beqaa Valley.

The investigation into Hezbollah’s explosives shipment, seized at the Dahr al-Baydar (ضهر البيدر) checkpoint while en route from the Bekaa Valley to Beirut, is expanding. According to reports, three Hezbollah members who traveled in a Kia escort vehicle and continued toward Beirut before the shipment was seized have been identified. Hezbollah members reportedly disabled surveillance cameras along the route following the seizure, but investigators obtained footage from other cameras. The two operatives detained in the Dodge vehicle carrying the explosives have been identified as Ali al-Kurdi (علي الكردي) and Haitham Amhaz (هيثم أمهز). The full names of the Hezbollah operatives known as "Sajed" (ساجد) and "Dhu al-Fiqar" (ذو الفقار), who were responsible for handing over the shipment in Baalbek and receiving it in the Dahieh, respectively, have not been published. At this stage, efforts to refer the case to the Judicial Council – a special court that hears, among other cases, offenses against state security – have been blocked. Hezbollah has issued threats over possible action against its operatives and facilities. The case tests the Lebanese state’s ability and willingness to enforce its decisions asserting exclusive state control over weapons. A key test is whether the authorities can reach those who organized the transfer and were to receive the shipment, particularly "Sajed" and "Dhu al-Fiqar." Failure to pursue the investigation to its conclusion, arrest all those involved, and implement measures informed by its findings to prevent further Hezbollah weapons transfers within Lebanon, particularly to areas south of the Litani River, would provide further evidence of the state’s inability to exercise its sovereignty effectively. For further details, read the full report. israel-alma.org/hezbollahs-e…

Turkey’s Force Buildup for the Syrian Navy On October 23, 2026, the Turkish Ministry of Defense announced a force buildup program to develop Syria’s naval forces. Following meetings between commanders and ship visits, cooperation is now taking on a broad force buildup framework encompassing vessel maintenance, repair and upgrades, the construction of new vessels, personnel training, and the development of port infrastructure. This represents another layer of Turkish influence and involvement in Syria’s military force buildup. A delegation of senior Turkish Navy officials and representatives of ASFAT, a company subordinate to the Turkish Ministry of Defense, visited Latakia and conducted technical assessments to advance the Syrian Navy’s capabilities. The delegation included Istanbul Naval Shipyard Commander Erdinç Yetkin, Turkish Navy Logistics Chief Timur Yılmaz, and Turkish Navy Training and Education Commander Yücel Darcan. Following the visit, a force buildup program was formulated covering the areas outlined above. The latest move reflects the deepening of maritime cooperation that began in 2025. In September 2025, reports described a Syrian Navy delegation’s visit to Turkey and a meeting with the Turkish Navy commander to discuss the development of long-term mechanisms for coordination and cooperation in maritime defense. The Syrian delegation visited the Turkish Fleet headquarters in Kocaeli province and toured the frigate TCG KEMALREIS. Visits by Turkish naval vessels to Syria have also been documented. The Turkish warship TCG Meltem visited the port of Latakia on May 11. The visit was presented as an expression of Turkey’s growing military presence in Syria and the deepening security ties between the two countries. On July 13, it was reported that the Turkish warship TCG Istanbul had docked in Latakia after its visit had been postponed by several weeks. Syria’s reliance on Turkey for maintenance, training, upgrades, and construction will strengthen Turkish influence over the Syrian Navy’s professional priorities and operational practices, while increasing Syrian dependence on Turkey. The participation of ASFAT representatives also adds an industrial dimension: a link between Syria’s reconstruction needs and Turkey’s defense industries.

The “Shiite Duo,” representing the respective support bases of Hezbollah and Amal, rests on a shared sectarian identity and common political interests. But interests can change, particularly when the interests of one party, Hezbollah, begin to harm those of the other, Amal. Is the realization beginning to take hold among Nabih Berri and the Amal Movement that Hezbollah has become a liability rather than an asset? Several recent statements have been attributed to Nabih Berri: “The army is a red line.” The Amal Movement will stand alongside the Lebanese army even if it is required to carry out sensitive missions in southern Lebanon. Relations between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah were closer during Hassan Nasrallah’s leadership. Messages reportedly conveyed on Berri’s behalf also stated that the previous framework of coordination between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah has effectively come to an end. Amal is no longer willing to accept a situation in which Hezbollah makes decisions independently and then expects Amal to stand behind it and share the consequences. At this stage, we do not identify significant indications that the “Shiite Duo” is breaking apart or that a political rupture is developing between Amal and Hezbollah. Berri continues to act as a mediator, seeking to prevent a direct confrontation between Hezbollah and state institutions. Nevertheless, under Lebanon’s current circumstances, the Amal Movement and Nabih Berri face a significant dilemma: whether to preserve the alliance with Hezbollah even at the cost of another war, or to widen their political distance from Hezbollah in order to protect the interests of Amal’s Shiite support base and forge a meaningful alternative alliance. On October 25, it was reported that the positions of Berri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt had moved closer on issues concerning the state’s monopoly on arms and the need to prevent Hezbollah from dragging Lebanon into another military confrontation. Could this be a new “duo”?

On October 4, 2026, the “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan International Turkish School” opened in the Artouz area in the Damascus region. The school was established as part of cooperation between Turkey and Syria and follows the Turkish Ministry of Education’s curriculum. It offers education from kindergarten through high school, with 36 classrooms and a capacity of approximately 1,000 students. Among the families seeking to enroll their children were Syrian families who had returned from Turkey following the fall of the Assad regime, and whose children had studied in the Turkish education system. The school's opening is part of #Turkey's expanding involvement in education in Syria, which includes rehabilitating schools and supporting the development of new institutions in cooperation with the Syrian authorities. This involvement may create long-term linguistic, cultural, and institutional ties. Education serves as another channel through which Turkey is strengthening its influence in #Syria . For more information, read the attached report israel-alma.org/turkish-invo…

Whose “Future Leaders”? The al-Mahdi Scouts and the Making of Hezbollah’s Next Generation On October 15, Hezbollah’s Imam al-Mahdi Scouts in the Sidon area reported holding 22 activities involving 163 members of its senior section over a single week. The activities included educational, cultural, religious, medical, and scouting training, emphasizing the development of “future leaders,” strengthening a sense of belonging, and instilling values. Behind this educational language lies a mechanism designed to build organizational capacity and indoctrinate: preparing Hezbollah’s next generation and maintaining its hold on the population. The al-Mahdi Scouts are part of Hezbollah’s educational network. The movement operates within the Executive Council’s Education Unit, combining social and scouting activities with religious and ideological education. This framework enables Hezbollah to guide young people throughout their adolescence, shape their worldview, and connect their religious and communal identity with membership in the “resistance society.” What does “developing future leaders” mean? It means cultivating a pool of instructors, operatives, and personnel who can take on roles within Hezbollah’s civilian, political, and military structures. These activities take on added significance against the backdrop of the hardship facing Hezbollah’s support base following the war. Families coping with loss, financial hardship, and disruption to daily life also need a stable framework for their children. Hezbollah seeks to exploit this need to maintain and deepen its presence in community life. Activities that provide a sense of belonging, responsibility, and social connections can strengthen ties to the organization, even among families struggling to bear the cost of its decisions. The scout movement is another component in building dependency, loyalty, and legitimacy. Hezbollah’s recovery also involves retaining and nurturing the younger generation, training it, and ensuring organizational continuity. In this sense, the “future leaders” cultivated by the al-Mahdi Scouts form the pool of operatives and personnel from which Hezbollah can develop its next generation.

366 buildings struck and destroyed in Beirut’s Dahieh - A new geospatial study by the Alma Research and Education Center reveals the extent of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure embedded within the civilian population. The study, based on an analysis of Airbus satellite imagery covering an area of 25 square kilometers in the Dahieh, southern Beirut, presents the following findings: 2024 - Operation Northern Arrows: At least 304 buildings were destroyed within the study area during 62 days of fighting, including 292 mid-rise and high-rise buildings. 2026 - Operation Roaring Lion: An additional 62 Hezbollah sites were struck and destroyed within the same study area over 47 days. Human Shields: Hezbollah military infrastructure was identified at distances ranging from less than one meter to several dozen meters from schools, hospitals, religious institutions, and public facilities. Military Reconstruction: The significant decrease in the number of sites destroyed during Operation Roaring Lion in 2026 compared to Operation Northern Arrows in 2024 indicates, among other things, in our assessment, two trends. The first is Hezbollah’s difficulty in rebuilding its military presence in the Dahieh during the 15 months between the two campaigns. The second is that Hezbollah has been and continues to be engaged in the redeployment of its assets. As part of this redeployment, Hezbollah is establishing a presence in other areas of the Beirut metropolitan area, outside the Dahieh, as well as in other parts of Lebanon that are not traditionally considered Hezbollah’s “natural” areas of operation. Key Finding: The study provides further geospatial evidence of Hezbollah’s systematic embedding of military infrastructure within civilian areas and its use of the civilian population as human shields. The use of civilians as human shields is not a byproduct of Hezbollah’s activities, but an integral component of its military and information warfare strategy. Read more in the attached research report. #Hezbollah #Lebanon #Dahieh israel-alma.org/the-dahieh-a…

Under the Health Minister’s Patronage: Hezbollah Rebuilds Its State Within a State Lebanon’s government pledges to assert state sovereignty, yet Health Minister Rakan Nassereddine, who represents Hezbollah in the cabinet, is sponsoring the reopening of a medical center operated by Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Organization. The civilian network is a central source of the organization’s power: alongside essential services, it deepens dependency, strengthens loyalty, and maintains Hezbollah’s foothold within the population. Rebuilding the medical center therefore also restores Hezbollah’s capacity to exert influence with official recognition from within the government. israel-alma.org/under-the-he…

In early October 2026, Hossein Yekta (حسين يكتا), a senior commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) associated with recruitment and ideological indoctrination, arrived in Lebanon as part of a delegation supporting the families of Hezbollah's fallen operatives. According to several reports, the visit was intended to bolster morale and ideological commitment within Hezbollah's support base. It was also reported that Yekta met with senior Hezbollah political and military figures and conveyed Iranian messages calling for the revival of the "unity of fronts" and stronger coordination among the components of the axis. The visit's ideological message was reflected in a video showing Yekta washing his hands and face before prayer on the bank of the Litani River. Addressing the youth of the "resistance," he described the ablution in the river, "before the eyes of the Israelis," as "the prelude to prayer in Jerusalem." As a reminder, in March 2026, the Lebanese government announced that it would act to prevent security or military activity by IRGC personnel on its territory. Against this backdrop, Yekta's presence in Lebanon once again raises questions about the state's ability to prevent unauthorized Iranian activity on its territory. israel-alma.org/hossein-yekt… The attached report examines Yekta's profile, the mechanisms of influence through which he operates, and the significance of his visit to Lebanon.

Are some members of Lebanon’s Shiite community beginning to fear Israel more than they fear Hezbollah? Is Hezbollah becoming a liability rather than an asset for Nabih Berri and the Amal Movement? A series of confrontations in Shiite villages affiliated with Amal, local opposition to Hezbollah’s military presence, and emerging differences between the leaderships of the two movements may indicate the beginning of a shift. The fear of another war, the expansion of Israeli ground operations into the Nabatieh area and further north, and the potential loss of homes and livelihoods could alter the balance of fear. This is not a Shiite uprising against Hezbollah, but rather the possible emergence of a sentiment favoring the removal of Hezbollah from civilian areas and communities affiliated with Amal. Is the realization beginning to take hold among Nabih Berri and his associates that Hezbollah poses a greater threat to the Shiite community than the protection it claims to provide? Could the fear of another war with Israel succeed in restricting Hezbollah’s activities in Shiite areas that are not part of the organization’s core support base? Read more in Alma Research and Education Center’s special report. israel-alma.org/special-repo…

On October 15, Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah confirmed that the vehicle carrying hundreds of kilograms of explosives, seized on October 5 at the Dahr al-Baidar checkpoint, belonged to Hezbollah (see the attached video). According to Fadlallah, immediately after the vehicle was seized, Hezbollah contacted the security and judicial authorities, declared its ownership, and demanded the immediate release of the detainees and the return of the vehicle and its contents. Fadlallah claimed that the explosives were intended for use against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, rejected allegations of preparations for domestic assassinations, and warned the authorities of the consequences of measures taken against the organization. The demand for the shipment’s return illustrates Hezbollah’s position: it seeks to retain its ability to transport weapons within Lebanon and continue its independent military activities. On October 17, Al-Akhbar reported that Lebanese President Aoun had asked Military Intelligence to expand the investigation, after which Prosecutor General Rami al-Hajj issued orders to arrest Hussein Abdullah (also known as Hajj Hussein al-Khalil), currently the head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, and his aide, Ali Ayoub, to determine their responsibility for the shipment. However, Hezbollah MP Ibrahim al-Moussawi and judicial sources quoted by the Lebanese MTV channel denied the report concerning the arrest order. At this stage, we cannot verify the accuracy of the report that an arrest warrant was issued. As of February 2026, Hussein Abdullah was considered a very close associate of Naim Qassem and served as a political adviser. Ali Ayoub also headed Hezbollah’s Security Committee, an unofficial security body functioning as a quasi-police force, which operates as part of the broader military and intelligence apparatus the organization has built over the years. The test of Lebanese sovereignty lies in the authorities’ ability to pursue the investigation, uncover the chain of responsibility, and prevent similar transfers of weapons and military equipment throughout Lebanon. Meeting this test also requires tackling the widespread “revolving door” practice, whereby equipment and weapons confiscated from Hezbollah with much fanfare are returned to the organization through discreet coordination...

As part of a satellite imagery-based study we conducted on Hezbollah's site deployment across the Dahieh in Beirut during the war, we located this interesting image of an Israeli UAV in the skies over Dahieh. The findings of the study on Hezbollah's massive scale of site deployment within a relatively small, densely populated area will be published by us next week. Stay tuned...

In March 2026, as part of Operation "Roaring Lion", eight bridges along the Litani River were struck, according to open-source information. These bridges served Hezbollah in moving operatives and weapons under civilian cover. In our new report, attached here, we examine their current structural and security status. The findings indicate that the strikes significantly disrupted transit routes, but emergency repairs, temporary crossings, and alternative bridges have restored much of the capacity to cross the river. Although the network of crossings over the Litani has not yet been fully restored, the routes now appear open for Hezbollah to move operatives, equipment, and weapons south of the river. Despite the Lebanese Army's involvement in rehabilitation efforts, continuous military monitoring on the ground has not been verified at all active crossings. Informal crossings along the river must also be taken into account. The seizure of the vehicle carrying Hezbollah explosives by Lebanese security forces at the Dahr al-Baydar checkpoint on October 5 sharpens the question of enforcement along the routes to southern Lebanon as well. If the organization continues attempting to move such shipments through a permanent, well-known checkpoint such as Dahr al-Baydar, how will the state prevent similar transfers at the Litani crossings? Even if a shipment happens to be intercepted, Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah's remarks on October 15 regarding the seized vehicle warrant close attention. We have previously published extensively on the "revolving door" practice, whereby equipment and weapons are returned to Hezbollah after being seized by security forces. Fadlallah’s remarks leave no room for doubt in this regard. The test of Lebanese sovereignty lies in the state's ability to secure the crossings and prevent Hezbollah from exploiting their reopening to rebuild its military infrastructure south of the Litani. israel-alma.org/the-litani-r…

Turkey is working to expand its influence among Damascus, Hezbollah, and Beirut through security mediation, diplomatic engagement, and civilian assistance. Reports of a meeting between Syrian government representatives and Hezbollah in Turkey point to an attempt to reduce tensions between former enemies. Damascus and Ankara denied the report, while Hezbollah did not respond. At the same time, Ankara is seeking a role in shaping the security arrangements in southern Lebanon. During his September 21 meeting with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, Erdoğan called for an international initiative to replace UNIFIL and pledged continued humanitarian and medical assistance. Meanwhile, reports describe cautiously developing communication channels between Turkey and Hezbollah. Accumulating reports indicate a Turkish attempt to transform political, security, and humanitarian ties into significant levers of influence, not only in Syria but also in Lebanon. israel-alma.org/ankara-as-a-…

The Struggle in Lebanon over Reconstruction and Control of Its Resources According to reports, the United States is working with the Lebanese government to develop an oversight mechanism intended to prevent entities linked to Hezbollah from benefiting from reconstruction contracts, including through front companies and subcontractors. However, channeling funds through the state is not enough. Figures affiliated with Hezbollah and Amal hold influential positions within the government, the presidency, and other state institutions responsible for reconstruction. Resources intended to assist those affected could therefore strengthen Hezbollah’s networks of influence, the population’s dependence on it, and its standing. As long as the government’s response remains partial, Hezbollah exploits the hardship to direct anger toward the government and portray restrictions on its funding as harming civilians. The challenge is to provide tangible assistance to residents while continuing to restrict Hezbollah’s funding and oversee the entire implementation chain. Reconstruction funds should rebuild Lebanon, not Hezbollah’s power. israel-alma.org/who-controls…

On October 10, a Telegram channel associated with the Salafi-jihadist movement published a video encouraging preparations for attacks against IDF forces in the Quneitra and Golan Heights area, declaring that a battle is inevitable. The video is not evidence of an imminent attack, but it highlights a broader security challenge. Alongside Iranian-backed networks, Hezbollah, and Palestinian organizations, global jihad actors, including ISIS and Al-Qaeda-aligned elements, remain a potential threat in southern Syria. This threat is not limited to IDF forces operating in the security zone. Given the proximity to Israel, it could also extend to Israeli communities along the Golan Heights border. Read the full analysis >> israel-alma.org/not-only-ira…