TWAP Clapper retweeted
love my followers cause i can be talking about some niche protocol and someone called "twap clapper" will appear and provide an accurate timeline of it llamao
Radiant Capital lending market has been hacked on BSC and ARB. It appears as if their multisig has been compromised which allowed attackers to upgrade the proxy implementation and steal funds!
@spreekaway
It has been hacked on Arbitrum as well! arbiscan.io/tx/0x7856552db40…
Is there any reason defillama meta dex aggregator does not support uniswap x? @0xngmi
uniBTC by @Bedrock_DeFi was exploited today. The vulnerability allowed for you to mint uniBTC with eth! This function was likely leftover from the uniETH implementation 😅
@spreekaway
Gala seems to have been hacked. Looks like private key compromise on the minter address
@peckshield @spreekaway
lot of high quality teams on blast. the fiver dev they hired mixed up Liquidation Threshold (LT) with Loan to Value (LTV) and caused 8 figures of liquidations. happens to the best of us
Replying to @wilburforce_
Thank you for letting us know Will. We are aware of the issue and are in contact with the impacted users, actively developing a plan with them to mitigate the issue.
In our effort to adjust the LTV, we tasked a smart contract engineer to make the necessary changes. However, it was discovered that the liquidation threshold was altered unexpectedly without prior notification to our team, leading to the current issue.
Going forward, we will set up a governance contract/timelock and forum for all future upgrades to ensure that discussions are planned ahead of time.
wait... it turns out the munchables hacker tried to take 7,349 eth but accidentally only took 73.49 then the contract got paused
This is the culmination of a lot of ideas that have been going around for a while.
- Pool Managers bid for the right to set swap fee AND capture swap fees (the latter notably distinct from past version of this design)
- Auction proceeds go to LP's
[...]
Introducing the auction-managed AMM!
A new AMM design that:
⚖️ Reduces LVR
⚙️ Optimizes swap fees
📈 Smooths LP returns
🌊 Should attract higher liquidity than any fixed-fee AMM
New paper with @ciamac (@paradigm / @Columbia_Biz) and @aadams @saraareynolds (@Uniswap)
- Auction winners can be overridden by someone willing to pay more
Results in swap fees being set by sophisticated actors specialized in earning max revenue which gets internalized to LP's through the auction
Beautiful post in response to the "why does everyone care about LVR" question
Replying to @guil_lambert
Hi Guillaume :)
You are right LVR is only a means, not an end, what matters is AMM LP profitability, and LVR is just a metric that can (maybe) help to unravel AMM LP protif-and-loss in a systematic way. This LVR metric is indeed opinionated as it seeks to separate out market risk by analyzing LP PnL _assuming a perfectly hedged LP position_. Very likely, the legitimate discrepancy of "whats the right way to look at things" stems from this specific framing for analyzing LP PnL (assuming the perfect hedge).
Note that market risk can still be analyzed, it is another important risk, but being able to separate out the different risk axes is likely good/useful, and the paper is considered a breakthrough precisely because of this separation and the (potential) clarity that it brings. Moreover since market risk can in theory be hedged perfectly, it is quite useful to know that unhedge-able costs remain for CFMM LPs (on the ethereum blockchain) and what they are. Before the paper, this was not as clear or well understood.
The two unhedegable costs of LPing: gas fees you pay to do transactions, and this last interesting term that appears, the infamous "LVR" term, which is essentially the running value leak to arbitrageurs that comes from your pocket as an LP thanks ONLY to how CFMMs and ethereum currently work.
LVR is important bc it's a cost that AMM LPs are paying and it is NOT due to your LPing abilities (constructing and adjusting hedge, picking liquidity distributions), it is completely a function of how the AMM mechanism is designed (and the block production mechanisms are designed).
If you can solve this structural disadvantage for DEX LPs with innovative DEX application design, it will be important. LPs won't notice "wow LVR disappeared!" they will just notice "I turn a profit much easier/more often as an LP on this DEX!" It's because you plugged the leaky hole in the system that made LPs job an even larger uphill battle (turning a profit as an LP will still be tricky but you won't have to overcome this extra burden anymore).
AFAICT the only legit objection to LVR framing is that LPs don't perfectly hedge their positions, and hedging can also come with high costs or just be plain impossible in real (not idealized) markets, so the market risk shouldn't be left so easily by the wayside. Here I could agree! Though I would still see the LVR framework as useful as we can try to quantify the risks of not hedging at all and/or the cost of maintaining your hedge, to get a more complete picture (LVR doesn't go away, just these additional aspects appear).
I also agree that profitability is what matters. Whether you "reduce LVR" (aka reduce running costs of LPing) or "increase swap fees" (aka increase revenues you collect from LPing) these both amount to the same thing for your PnL. However naively increasing swap fees doesn't seem to work that great because you disincentivize the flow you want just as much as you disincentivize the flow you don't want (arbs). Other methods seek to tax arbitrageur-trades more than non-arbitrageur-trades, which should be strictly better than just raising swap fees indiscriminately to better compensate LPs overall (because unifrom fee hikes will supress all-around volume EVEN MORE than the more interesting arbitrage-identifying solutions)
TWAP Clapper retweeted
It's not that difficult. The vast majority of toxicity occurs at O(10 second horizon). You can statistically discriminate toxic addresses with O(50) transactions.
This went under the radar but this is a wacky situation lol
Replying to @pcaversaccio
🚨🚨 WARNING 🚨🚨
The author (@Gas404Official) of the medium post linked to in the above tweet is connected to the butterfly-effect.eth wallet which was responsible for the original exploit.
Writeup in the document linked below:
drive.google.com/file/d/179w…
There are also non-auction based mechanisms that can mitigate value leakage. @0x94305 has shared some clever ways to manipulate an amm's swap fee (which is effectively the "spread") to minimize LVR. You should definitely keep an eye on his work.
















