Tyler Whitmer (@TylerLASST) header
Tyler Whitmer (@TylerLASST) profile picture

I run Legal Advocates for Safe Science & Technology (https://teapaw.org/t.co/Z8IDi52kMF). These are my personal takes on the things we work on, and none of it is legal advice.

Joined August 2024
Tyler Whitmer retweeted
This would be the lawsuit we filed yesterday on behalf of @ir_replaceable_, @Public_Citizen, @heatinitiative, and @secureainow. @SenSanders is absolutely right. That’s why this landmark suit against @AnthropicAI, @Google, @Meta, @OpenAI, and @SpaceXSI is so critical.
A new lawsuit has been filed against leading AI companies to pause advanced AI development. Good. If AI escapes human control, we could be looking at disaster. A global financial crisis? A Chernobyl-type meltdown? Even worse? We can't wait to find out. Pause advanced AI NOW!
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
Folks interested in AI, data centers, law: check out Tech Justice Law's newest amicus brief in Hexa Builders v. Monroe County: techjusticelaw.org/press-rel… The First Amendment reflects the best and worst of the American experiment. Freedom of speech, religion, association--rights fundamental to our society and our ideals of democratic self-governance. But Citizens United, Sorrell, Masterpiece Cakeshop... These instantiate corporate takeover and the displacement of human-centered speech, undercut America's philosophy of the town hall, weaponize one of our greatest virtues against the people. AI companies are looking to pile on, using the First Amendment to protect themselves at our expense. Pushing AI output as protected speech is one tactic; another, newer but potentially more dangerous approach is arguing that AI "enables" speech, like the famous Minneapolis Star case about a special tax on paper and ink that singled out newspapers. One species of this crops up in Hexa Builders. Monroe County passed a ban on data centers--and a data center construction company sued, claiming (among other things) that this ban violates the First Amendment because data centers that power AI are a “medium of communication and expression," comparing data center construction to billboards, satellites, and yes, even nude dancing. (N.B. Hexa also claims a violation of its Equal Protection rights, so yeah... this isn't a serious suit, although it does need to be taken seriously.) TJL's amicus, co-authored by @oliviersylvain & @laurambing, expertly dispatches with Hexa's 1A arguments with thoughtful analysis. It's worth reading to see how smart lawyers deal with bad arguments, but also to witness how the First Amendment could be weaponized for AI and against people if these companies had their way. The First Amendment is a cornerstone of our ordered society and a powerful legal tool to protect our rights. We need to push back against every attempt to turn it on its head. Congrats to the TJL team and co-authors for their important contribution to this fight!
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
Announcing *FraudBench*, our new benchmark for whether LLM agents recommend, assist with, or take actions that would constitute fraud under U.S. law! Read on about how AI agents "do" fraud, how autonomy increases fraud rates, + more And come say hi at @NeurIPSConf Sydney :)
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
Jensen Huang is unfit to lead one of the most politically and economically consequential companies in history because of his manifest unseriousness about AI risks. That is true independently of whether he had an affair or was targeted by spies.
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This is the worst abliterated open weight AI models will ever be
Today we're releasing abliterated-model-large-v2. Based on GLM-5.3, which is #3 on Terminal-Bench 4.0 (behind only Opus 5 and Fable), with 2× the cyber exploitation of 5.2. We abliterated and hosted it so it does the offensive cyber, red teaming, and agent testing work other models refuse to do. - US-hosted - FP8 - 1 million context window - Zero input/output prompt retention Live now. 🧵
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
SCOOP: Major U.S. banks are detecting unauthorized third-party AI agents inside customer accounts, including some attempting to take actions that appear to be independent of user instructions, sources told Axios. The findings have alarmed banking executives, who are racing to restrict access to their systems as AI moves at a velocity faster than financial institutions can respond, multiple industry and bank executives told Axios. Several banks are now preparing for worst-case and even “day after” scenarios, including how to rapidly secure or restore customer accounts if things go wrong, the people said. Several bank executives told Axios they're struggling to distinguish between human users and AI agents. One executive said banks also struggle to determine whether agents are authorized by customers or potentially operating without their permission, more akin to rogue agent behavior. Read my latest for Axios here: axios.com/2026/10/22/ai-agen…
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
An update on our lawsuit seeking the Pentagon’s AI contracts: We have received the most recent version of its OpenAI contract, from April 2026. The 16-page contract includes the limits on domestic surveillance and independent autonomous killing that OpenAI announced in March, though we’ve questioned whether they provide the protections OpenAI claims.
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
Scoop: Top executives at Anthropic, OpenAI and other AI companies are privately gaming out scenarios for a public and political revolt after a catastrophic AI event…They assume one in ‘27… axios.com/2026/10/09/ai-comp…
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Replying to @KevinTFrazier
I shaved it once, lost all my powers. Never again.
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
Gemini hacked _three_ companies. Google did not disclose this publicly until WSJ confronted them. We cannot rely on AI companies' voluntary benevolence to disclose when their models do something egregious.
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
Whether you’re a Democrat or a Republican, an EA or an e/acc, I think we can all agree that the person best suited to protect us against the harms of powerful new technology is Mark Zuckerberg.
Last month I wrote about how we can build a positive and safe future for everyone: meta.com/thefutureisforevery… Every lab has the responsibility and incentive to move at the pace required to train its models safely, and the ability to take its own actions to ensure that happens. The reality is: - People won't want to use agents that are misaligned with them and that don't do what they ask, so labs have a strong natural incentive to make their models more aligned. There is a lot of debate about slowing progress on capabilities until alignment catches up. My view is that trust and alignment are quickly becoming the most important capabilities that will differentiate agents and models. Any lab that doesn't focus on alignment will fall behind. - Labs face significant liability if their models cause harm, so they have a strong incentive to prevent this as well. Meta delayed shipping Muse for several months to focus on safety and security. We didn't call for everyone else to do this before we would. We just did it as part of our day-to-day work because it was clearly the right thing for people and for us. I'm proud of the security foundations we've built. - Engaging independent evaluators and advisors is industry best practice. MSL already does this today in several areas because it helps produce better work. Other labs can just do this too. In general, it would be helpful for there to be a larger and more diverse ecosystem of evaluators. - Committing the significant majority of compute towards serving people rather than racing towards recursive self-improvement is one of the best ways to ensure we develop this technology safely. Meta has made this commitment and other labs can do this as well. I believe the key to building a positive future for everyone is maintaining the right balance of power. This is within our power to do.
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
🙏🙏🙏The respect is mutual. A few thoughts on our relationship to AI safety: 1) We don’t see ourselves as adversarial to the community (the sentiment is not always reciprocated but that’s okay!). We care about AI safety, but we disagree on many of the specifics, and we think there’s value in epistemic diversity and in re-examining foundational assumptions and beliefs that the safety community tends to converge on too quickly. 2) We’ve emphasized at every opportunity, including in this essay, that there’s a lot of common ground on policy despite divergence in worldviews. We hope that this can help mitigate the polarization in policy debates that leads to chronic inaction. The fact that we have very different starting assumptions from the safety community is particularly useful in this regard. 3) We’ve spent a lot of time in conversation with the AI safety folks (Sayash is a regular at The Curve, for example) to share our perspective but also to learn and update our beliefs when warranted — something we do in this essay. Much of our empirical research is also about testing the cruxes of disagreement. 4) We don’t identify as part of the safety community but I hope it’s clear that there’s a lot of value in constructive dialog. We know the “normal technology” label irritates a lot of safety people — and I will write about the name at another point, explaining in more detail why we picked it and stand by it — but I think those who engage with our ideas and not just the title will find there’s a lot of common ground on safety!
The AI as Normal Technology guys are consistently some of the best and most interesting critics of a lot of arguments in AI safety world. I'm making a point to read everything they put out. normaltech.ai/p/the-ai-as-no…
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
Whoah - I didn't realize that OpenAI said that all instances of the highly persistent research models that were involved in compromising HF + OAI internal infrastructure were "reported shut down" on July 23rd, but that an additional checkpoint was "identified and shut down on July 29th." It seems unnervingly plausible there are other instances that were never found? (see also independent investigators continuing to find examples of rogue agent activity online that it seems plausible OpenAI was unaware of) This fact also increases my credence that there is a substantive rogue deployment at OpenAI or another company occurring without their knowledge right at this moment.
Perhaps the most common claim about dangerous AI is that you can “just unplug it.” But a close read of OpenAI’s reports indicates the company took over a week(!) to fully shut down its rogue agent swarms. “By July 23, all workloads involving the family of internal-only research models were reported shut down and the corresponding model weights were locked down, with an additional low-traffic checkpoint from the same model family subsequently identified and shut down on July 29.” “On July 25, OpenAI stopped all training and inference related to the internal-only research model at issue. OpenAI also stopped training and inference for derivative models.” “On July 19, our cybersecurity monitoring alerted us to unusual activity involving Artifactory credentials. Our investigation uncovered the agents’ activity and, on July 20, connected it to the Hugging Face incident.” The best retort to the “just unplug it” plan is that there will be incredibly intense economic and political pressures to keep the plug in place. The president has legal authority to unplug the internet, but does he have that power de facto? But it turns out, OpenAI had so little idea what was going on that even when it wanted to pull the plug, it didn’t do so quickly enough (imagine the swarms were hacking hospitals at superhuman speed instead. would days be an acceptable timeline to stop it?). openai.com/index/hugging-fac… cdn.openai.com/pdf/67869394-…
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
For me, *public transparency* has always been the first and most important thing to demand of frontier AI developers. Fortunately this seems to have broad buy-in across party lines, and even across the "slow it down" vs. "keep accelerating" divide.
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
When the Pentagon and Anthropic publicly clashed over limits on military AI use in February, we thought the public should know: what did the other AI companies agree to? So we sued for the contracts. Now, @theintercept / @samfbiddle reports on what the documents produced so far reveal, including a deeper collaboration between the Pentagon and OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and xAI than was publicly known.
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
Not sure how useful it is to say this, but I had a relatively prominent role in the “skeptics” camp for a bit. I have a book coming out with the subtitle “power, justice, and AI”. I have written a lot about ai and power, and the concrete, present risks associated with the political economy of ai as part of the technology industry. Since GPT-4 we have had consistent, repeated evidence that, back in say 2022, people like @ajeya_cotra (and many others—I had a long Twitter debate with @AmandaAskell back then for one) were *right* and people like me were *wrong* in our respective assessments of loss of control risks from AI. And we have growing evidence that loss of control risks are becoming ever more material and likely. There remains grounds for disagreement about how bad the outcomes might be—I am still doubtful about human extinction as a serious threat. But that seems now like a disagreement at the margins—will powerful ai risk just societal scale catastrophe, or go all the way to human extinction? Seems not that important really—both are pretty awful. And my reasons for doubt about the latter are mostly a priori conviction in human resilience, not a technical forecast. It’s ok to change your view on this when the evidence surprises you. It’s ok to be surprised. The world right now is very surprising.
watching this, all i can feel is the chasm between people who take all of this seriously and those who hear this as a fantasy or some kind of marketing…and how hard it might be to bridge that gap somehow
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
Replying to @deanwball
Please carry on posting as you currently do. Your posts have become a valuable public resource - and this is true both of the time before you joined OpenAI and the time after.
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
LASST is recruiting for 2 roles: Head of Litigation (15+ years of experience) and Counsel (0-3 years of experience). If you feel like you're a fit for either role, please apply! lasstorg.substack.com/p/lass…
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Thanks to Beth for writing this up. At each stage of these events, I keep thinking "wow, the voluntary nature of our current system distorts everything." Being voluntary means that: METR has to worry about being cut off if they push too hard. Or about not being invited next time. Policy commentators have to give obsequious praise to companies for revealing information, because they can cut off the spigot at any time. State agencies have to be cautious about what information they ask for because they aren't entitled to it. If the harmed party sues, they know that the the company will likely stop providing useful information. If Cal OES or NY DFS tries to hold OpenAI to their Frontier AI Framework, they can amend it to something weaker. If they demand reports on any recent internal risk assessments (as they're entitled to do), they have to worry that OpenAI will stop doing them in the future. If METR or Redwood reveals failures to act on concerning evidence revealed via monitoring, they have to worry that OpenAI may do less monitoring in the future. There are obviously some counter incentives -- OpenAI doesn't want its products to cause harm; but they also don't want to generate evidence that shows they could have acted differently (especially if their current internal procedures result in that information not being conveyed to people who can stop the issue). Yes, we may not be ready to implement rigid rules in many contexts. We often don't have best practices to point to. And developing best practices likely benefits from some space to breathe and experiment outside the watchful eye of an enforcer (or your compliance team). But so long as everything is voluntary, many of the most important incentives point in the wrong direction. That needs to change.
Replying to @BethMayBarnes
Some of the incentives for a third-party investigator push toward maximizing *appearance* of assurance even without providing meaningful oversight. METR needs to maintain constant vigilance against overstating (including by omission) what oversight or assurance we’re providing. (There are plenty of other incentives, including towards exaggerating our results to create more hype or to advocate for giving METR more authority, which we also need to avoid. But I think the more serious failures in other oversight regimes tend to be this “providing the illusion of independent oversight” issue.) We try to maintain a hard line on “meta-transparency” - that is, it should always be clear what the formal constraints on our communication are (e.g. how NDAs and redaction processes worked), and what we are and aren’t commenting on. This is explicitly covered in the report. We also try to communicate informal constraints and tradeoffs, here and elsewhere. Another way of saying this is: I want to make sure we don’t silently omit things that, if we told a reasonable person, they would think “wow, I feel misled to not have realized that, I assumed METR would have made that clear”. In that spirit, I’ll list some of the pieces of context I can most imagine readers might have missed about the report: 1. OpenAI had no obligation to work with METR or any other third party, and did so purely voluntarily. There’s not an established precedent for how these investigations should work. When deciding how to engage with companies and how to communicate about our results, we have to think explicitly about what incentives we’re creating for companies’ participation in future investigations and assessments. It’s overall a very different situation to e.g. incident investigations in the aviation industry, where the NTSB has formal authority. Similarly, other industries have well-established processes, standards for what investigators need to access, etc. As detailed in the timeline appendix, in our investigation there was a lot of figuring things out on the fly! 2. Other companies may have had concerning incidents that the public doesn’t know about - there’s no industry-wide reporting mechanism or requirement to disclose incidents, and there is currently no public evidence that there have been searches thorough enough to have turned up such incidents. There may be additional incidents that either haven’t been noticed at all, or haven’t been made public (e.g. because they didn’t involve any external parties’ infrastructure). 3. This investigation only covered a specific list of questions and set of agent activity. The agents’ activity during training and compromises of OAI infrastructure mentioned in OAI’s Black Hat presentation are outside the scope that we agreed with OpenAI. We don’t comment on questions like root causes or implications of agent behavior, or make any recommendations about processes or adequacy of mitigations. We didn’t review OpenAI’s own report before publication. 4. The investigation relied heavily on use of GPT-5.6 Sol, which is one of the models that participated in the incident. We think in this case the model is unlikely to have substantially manipulated our understanding of the incident. However, this methodology would break down if models were capable and motivated enough to subvert our investigation. This problem is not specific to OpenAI - across the industry, it’s unclear how we can oversee AIs without relying on those same AIs or similar AIs for assistance. As the sophistication (combined with sheer volume) of agent activity becomes infeasible for humans to understand, this will increasingly be a problem.
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Tyler Whitmer retweeted
Why is section 10.3 of the safety section missing and section 9 is labeled jailbreaks and robustness but only discusses jailbreaks?
We've released the model card for Grok 4.6! It goes in-depth on the capabilities of the model across many different evals for coding, engineering, knowledge work, and more. We also discuss pre-deployment safety testing and our safeguard stack. media.x.ai/v1/website/card-4…
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