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Recommended reading on #MH17
Introduction to the technical investigation
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Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
Venäjän mahdollinen vaatimus Suomen eroamisesta Natosta on herättänyt paljon huomiota. Kyse on kuitenkin paljon suuremmasta asiasta kuin Suomen Nato-jäsenyydestä. Kyse on koko Euroopan turvallisuusjärjestyksestä ja siitä, kuka saa päättää itsenäisten valtioiden turvallisuudesta.
Moskova pyrkii palauttamaan Eurooppaan etupiiriajattelun, jossa suurvallat määrittelevät pienempien valtioiden turvallisuuden ehdot. Jo joulukuussa 2021 Venäjä vaati Naton laajentumisen ja sotilaallisen toiminnan rajoittamista. Sama tavoite näkyy edelleen sen politiikassa.
Venäjän informaatiovaikuttamisen logiikka on ymmärrettävä. Kaikkia vaatimuksia ei tarvitse saada hyväksytyiksi. Jo niiden esittäminen voi synnyttää epävarmuutta, hajottaa lännen yhtenäisyyttä ja siirtää keskustelua Moskovan haluamaan suuntaan. Pahimmillaan länsi alkaa neuvotella asioista, joiden ei pitäisi edes kuulua neuvottelupöytään.
Venäjä ottaa kaiken, minkä se saa irti. Ja jokainen myönnytys voi olla lähtökohta seuraavalle vaatimukselle. Tämä on muistettava erityisesti nyt, kun Ukrainan rauhanneuvotteluihin pyritään kytkemään koko Euroopan turvallisuutta koskevia kysymyksiä.
Ennakoin, että seuraava painostuksen kohde on Naton sotilaallinen toimintavapaus. Vaikka jäsenyyksiä ei saada kyseenalaistettua, Moskova voi pyrkiä rajoittamaan joukkojen sijoittamista, sotaharjoituksia, sotilaallista infrastruktuuria ja vahvistusten vastaanottamista.
Tämä koskee suoraan Suomea. Nato-jäsenyytemme turvallisuusarvo perustuu viidennen artiklan lisäksi yhteiseen puolustussuunnitteluun, sotilaalliseen läsnäoloon ja liittokunnan kykyyn puolustaa meitä käytännössä.
Suomen Nato-jäsenyyttä ei tarvitse purkaa, jotta sen turvallisuusarvoa voitaisiin heikentää. Riittää, että Naton toimintavapautta onnistutaan rajoittamaan.
Seuraavaksi on seurattava, nostetaanko Venäjän laajempia vaatimuksia virallisiin neuvotteluihin ja kytketäänkö niitä Ukrainan mahdolliseen rauhansopimukseen. Samalla Moskova voi pyrkiä hyödyntämään Euroopan ja Yhdysvaltojen näkemyseroja. Euroopan turvallisuudesta ei saa sopia Euroopan ohi eikä Ukrainan tulevaisuudesta Ukrainan ohi.
Suomen on vahvistettava omaa puolustustaan, Naton yhteistä puolustuskykyä ja eurooppalaista yhtenäisyyttä. Meidän on tunnistettava Venäjän tavoitteet ja varauduttava sen seuraaviin siirtoihin.
Suomen Nato-jäsenyys ei ole kauppatavaraa. Ei nyt. Ei koskaan.
Mutta seuraava vaatimus voi koskea sitä, mitä Nato saa tehdä Suomen puolustamiseksi. Siksi meidän on puolustettava paitsi jäsenyyttämme myös sen todellista sisältöä.
Turvallisuudessa johtajuutta on nähdä seuraava siirto ajoissa. Suomen on oltava siihen valmis.
Hvis der stadig er nogle, der ikke har forstået, hvorfor Europa har brug for NATO, så skal de se dette klip fra russisk tv.
Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
Na tym nagraniu widzimy dwa zupełnie różne światy.
Z jednej strony Zełenski – prezydent państwa, które od lat walczy o przetrwanie, niepodległość i prawo do samodzielnego decydowania o własnej przyszłości. Człowiek reprezentujący naród, który każdego dnia płaci najwyższą cenę za rosyjską agresję. Nie jest bez wad, nie jest politykiem bezbłędnym i historia z pewnością rozliczy go z wielu decyzji. Ale dziś ponosi odpowiedzialność za los swojego państwa i milionów obywateli.
Z drugiej strony Jared Kushner – zięć Donalda Trumpa, człowiek bez demokratycznego mandatu, bez wyborczego umocowania do reprezentowania jakiegokolwiek narodu, a mimo to uczestniczący w rozmowach dotyczących przyszłości Ukrainy i bezpieczeństwa Europy. Człowiek ze świata biznesu i politycznych układów, którego pozycja w tej dyplomatycznej rozgrywce wynika przede wszystkim z osobistej relacji z amerykańskim prezydentem.
Trudno nie dostrzec symboliki tego spotkania. Prezydent kraju, który walczy o życie, niepodległość i terytorium, musi prowadzić negocjacje z ludźmi wyznaczonymi przez Trumpa, którzy zaledwie chwilę wcześniej rozmawiali z Putinem i liczą tylko i wyłącznie na udział w kontraktach energetycznych z Rosją.
To obraz niezwykle wymowny. I niestety pokazujący, jak bardzo osobiste ambicje, rodzinne powiązania i polityczne interesy zaczęły przenikać do amerykańskiej dyplomacji za Trumpa. Tej dyplomacji filara demokracji już nie ma. Nikomu nie powinno życzyć się źle, ale może śmierć kilkudziesięciu tysięcy obywateli USA na amerykańskiej ziemi w rosyjskim ataku byłaby "rekompensatą" za to co robi Biały Dom z Ukraińcami. Ukraina straciła prawdopodobnie tysiące zabitych z winy Trumpa.
Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
Og mere om de krav, Rusland kommer med.
Uanset hvad må man sige, at det er højt spil.
Enten prøver Rusland at få det optimale ud af Trumps resterende regeringstid - eller også er Rusland til at sætte magt bag ordene og se, hvilken reaktion, det afføder.
🇷🇺🇺🇦 W czwartek na Kremlu, jak relacjonował wieczorem Uszakow, Putin przypomniał Witkoffowi i Kushnerowi projekty umów z USA i NATO z grudnia 2021 r.: żadnego dalszego rozszerzenia Sojuszu, żadnego „zagrażającego” uzbrojenia przy granicach Rosji i powrót sił NATO do konfiguracji z 27 maja 1997 r., gdy podpisano Akt Stanowiący NATO–Rosja.
To stan sprzed 12 marca 1999 r., kiedy do Sojuszu weszły Polska, Czechy i Węgry. Moskwa chce do tego „dokleić świeże przemyślenia”, bo „zbiorowy Zachód zwrócił się przeciwko nam”. Plany europejskich wojsk w Ukrainie po wojnie Uszakow nazwał „receptą na nieskończoną wojnę”. Żądanie jest to samo. Zmienił się stół: Kreml składa je teraz Amerykanom jako punkt wyjścia do rozmów.
🇪🇺🇺🇸 „Echo” napisało 12 listopada, powołując się na źródła w różnych grupach negocjacyjnych, że jedna z nich przekazała europejskim partnerom listę możliwych warunków. Czyja to pozycja, źródła pisma nie mówią. Od flanki wschodniej są:
• rezygnacja z baz wojskowych na Litwie, Łotwie, Estonii i w Finlandii;
• powrót Finlandii do statusu sprzed wstąpienia do NATO 4 kwietnia 2023 r.;
• oraz przekształcenie Mołdawii w „republikę federacyjną” złożoną z Mołdawii, Naddniestrza i Gagauzji, a w razie jej wejścia do UE — referendum o niepodległości Naddniestrza i Gagauzji.
🇲🇩 To niemal memorandum Kozaka z listopada 2003 r., kiedy Putin chciał wpisać Mołdawii federację z Naddniestrzem i Gagauzją. Voronin odrzucił je w ostatniej chwili, 25 listopada, a Putin odwołał zapowiedziany przylot do Kiszyniowa. Inne słowo, ten sam mechanizm, którego Mińsk z 12 lutego 2015 r. oczekiwał od Ukrainy pod nazwą „decentralizacji” i „specjalnego statusu” dla Doniecka i Ługańska. W niedzielę Gagauzja i tak wybiera nowego baszkana.
Dalej na liście „Echa” są:
• demilitaryzacja portów Odessy i Mikołajowa;
• szczególny status języka rosyjskiego w Ukrainie; pozablokowy status Ukrainy, który nie wykluczałby wejścia do UE;
• oraz porozumienia o swobodzie żeglugi na Morzu Czarnym i na Bałtyku.
🇧🇾 Jako możliwe kroki ze strony Rosji pismo wymienia wycofanie broni jądrowej z Białorusi, rezygnację z rozmieszczenia rakiet średniego zasięgu na jej terytorium oraz wycofanie wojsk rosyjskich z Naddniestrza w zamian za pozablokowy status Mołdawii.
W innej grupie, pisze „Echo”, omawiano rosyjską propozycję „klubu” pięciu–sześciu państw NATO, które mogłyby wetować przyjęcie nowych członków, na przykład Ukrainy, Mołdawii, Gruzji czy Armenii. Pismo przypomina też publiczną zapowiedź Drobinina o dwustronnych paktach o nieagresji z kluczowymi państwami NATO. Rano 13 listopada podobny katalog, z dodatkiem żądania całego Donbasu, opisał niemiecki „Bild” jako materiał z nieoficjalnych rozmów.
Witkoff i Kushner po wyjściu z Kremla zapowiedzieli miejsce dla Europy w kolejnej rundzie. Kushner mówił w czwartek o wielostronnych rozmowach w tygodniu od 16 listopada, ale po wieczornym spotkaniu z Zełenskim w Dublinie nie podano ani daty, ani miejsca. W komentarzu Uszakowa z czwartkowego wieczoru tego miejsca nie było: Europejczycy mają się najpierw zdecydować, czy chcą pokoju, czy wojny. Resztę, według Uszakowa, ma zająć planowane spotkanie Putina z Trumpem na marginesie szczytu APEC w Shenzhen 18–19 listopada.
#KierunekWschodni
Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
Når nu det tegner til, at Europa bliver del af forhandlingerne om Europas fremtid må man håbe, at Europa, dvs EU-lande og ikke-EU-lande, er klar til at blive konfronteret med Ruslands krav om ny europæisk sikkerhedsorden.
Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
Moscow has now spelled it out. Alexey Drobinin, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry official, said that Russia could conclude nonaggression pacts with individual NATO member states and offer them “additional individual security guarantees.” At the same time, Russia’s chief negotiator Vladimir Medinsky called a new European security framework the central topic of the talks in Abu Dhabi.
Moscow put its December 2021 demands back on the table.
Europe opened this door itself. By agreeing to discuss a new “security architecture” with Moscow, it agreed to negotiate the non-negotiable: its own collective defence. The Kremlin’s answer is to deal with each European country alone, face to face with Russia.
Every European country that faces Russia one-on-one will lose. Inevitably. This applies to the nuclear powers too: neither Britain nor France can stand alone against Russia’s pressure. Europe can stand only united, only together. Countries that pursue individual pacts with Moscow will end up as Russian satellites.
Time to Win the War describes where this leads:
“Collective defence would give way to individual attempts at survival. Every government that tried to secure itself separately would make Article 5 less credible for everyone else, which in turn would push more governments towards separate arrangements with Moscow or Beijing. European defence could collapse politically without Russia having to defeat NATO forces on the battlefield.”
An “individual security guarantee” from Moscow is worth exactly as much as the one Russia gave Ukraine in Budapest in 1994. Any European government tempted by such an offer should remember how that ended.
Link in the first comment.
Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
I rarely find myself at a loss for words. Yet the assumptions underpinning the peace talks in Abu Dhabi test the limits of diplomatic language.
For too long, President Trump has reversed cause and effect in his account of Russia’s war against Ukraine. He has also presented the conflict as though the aggressor and the country defending itself bore equal responsibility. A peace process built on these premises begins by obscuring the very facts it must address.
The conduct of his two principal envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, raises serious questions about their competence and integrity. Too often, they appear to lend the authority of the United States to the Kremlin’s account of the conflict: Russian talking points on American government letterhead. Witkoff’s description of Putin as a “humanitarian” does little to inspire confidence in the judgement informing this diplomacy.
The proposals themselves raise equally fundamental questions. Why should Russia be rewarded for launching a war? Why should European countries accept changes to their security architecture that they have neither sought nor endorsed? These questions go to the heart of Europe’s security and the terms on which peace could endure. They deserve convincing answers before any settlement can command confidence.
Then there is the assumption that Vladimir Putin can be trusted. Given his record, this is perhaps the least defensible premise of all. A durable peace requires considerably more than confidence in his assurances.
Taken together, these assumptions make it difficult to discern a coherent American strategy for a lasting peace. Yet considerations of power and security leave European governments little choice but to engage with the process.
This is the uncomfortable dilemma in which European policymakers find themselves.
Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
Venäjä ei tullut Abu Dhabiin lopettamaan sotaa. Se tuli hakemaan sodassaan voitoa. Olisi strateginen virhe lupautua siihen, mihin osattiin sanoa ”ei” ennen sotaa.
Venäjän pääneuvottelija Medinski sanoi tänään, että Euroopan turvallisuusjärjestelmä on sairas ja Ukrainassa on vain puhjennut märkäpaise. Laastari ei hänen mukaansa riitä. Koko elimistö on hoidettava. Diagnoosin tekee se, joka taudin tartutti.
Linja on vanha. Vuonna 2008 Moskova esitti haasteen ja vaati Euroopan turvallisuusjärjestystä kirjoitettavaksi uusiksi. Vuonna 2021 haasteesta tuli uhkavaade. Nato takaisin vuoden 1997 asemiin, ovi kiinni Ukrainalta. Eurooppa sanoi ei, ja Venäjä vimmassaan hyökkäsi. Tänään Medinski veti itse viivan näiden vuosien välille.
Nyt sama uhkavaade on nostettu neuvottelupöydän keskelle. Alueista ei sovittu mitään. "Jokainen tuuma" palautetaan Venäjälle tavalla tai toisella. Paikalla olleita eurooppalaisia Venäjän valtuuskunta ei suostunut edes tapaamaan. Euroopan turvallisuudesta puhutaan ilman Eurooppaa. Se on Jaltan asetelma.
Vankienvaihto on hyvä uutinen jokaiselle kotiin palaavalle. Rauhaa se ei vielä ole.
Suomi muistaa, mitä etupiiri tarkoittaa. Jos hyökkääjän sotaa edeltävä uhkavaade kelpaa neuvottelujen pohjaksi, pienten maiden turvallisuudesta tulee vääjäämättä suurten kauppatavaraa.
Siksi järjestys pidetään. Ensin tulitauko ja Ukrainan turvatakuut. Vasta sitten puhutaan laajemmasta, ja silloin Eurooppa istuu pöydässä.
Paniikkiin ei ole syytä. Rintama on tänä vuonna tuskin liikkunut, ja Venäjän sotatalous on kovilla. Moskova hakee pöydästä sitä, mitä se ei saa rintamalta.
Eurooppa sanoi ei vuonna 2021. Vastaus ei ole vanhentunut, ei vaikka Teumpin USA on Venäjälle nyt myötämielinen.
Venäjän pitää itse tehdä selkeitä myönnytyksiä aloittamansa sodan lopettamiseksi.
Ukraine oplever igen begrænsninger i Starshield, der forhindrer effektivt forsvar mod droner. Det kunne være amerikansk pression ifm fredsforhandlingerne, da Trump har travlt med at hjælpe Rusland inden den nye kongres træder sammen i januar.
Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
🇷🇺 NOT ENOUGH BRAINS...
Retired Russian Colonel General Leonid Ivashov has publicly told Vladimir Putin that he has already lost the war against Ukraine.
In an interview with Russian blogger Pavel Ivanov, the 83-year-old general addressed the Russian president directly: “You've lost. You failed to foresee absolutely anything. You didn't have a single brain cell.”
Ivashov ridiculed the Kremlin's expectations of a lightning-fast victory: fly in, strike, and conquer. In his view, continuing the war is driving Russia toward economic, educational, and cultural degradation, destroying the country's future.
Ivashov is neither a liberal nor a supporter of the West. A former head of the Russian Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation (1996–2001), and one of the organizers of the famous Russian paratroopers' dash to Pristina in 1999, he spent decades among Russia's hardline nationalist patriots.
He headed the Union of the Russian People, participated in the activities of the Izborsk Club, opposed NATO, and supported Russian territorial claims against Ukraine.
Yet back in January 2022, Ivashov became one of the first senior Russian military figures to publicly warn Putin about the catastrophic consequences of the impending invasion.
In an appeal titled “On the Eve of War,” issued on behalf of the All-Russian Officers' Assembly, he described preparations for the attack as a criminal policy, declared that Ukraine had the right to defend itself, and demanded the president's resignation.
The general warned that the war would turn Russia into an international pariah, cause enormous human losses, and make Russians and Ukrainians enemies for generations.
At the time, less than a month remained before the full-scale invasion.
Almost five years later, Ivashov is reminding Putin that all of this could have been foreseen.
P.S. I'm moving from Twitter/X to Substack. Join me there, subscribe, and follow my work on my new platform.
mykhailorohoza.substack.com
Glimrende beskrivelse af Ruslands forhandlingstaktik.⬇️
Russia is returning to the playbook it used in Minsk before the full-scale invasion: using war to force the adversary to make concessions, and negotiations to lock those concessions in. Back then, Moscow sought to gain permanent leverage over Ukrainian politics through the Russian-occupied parts of Donbas. Now, Russia is striving to influence the security decisions of the whole of Europe.
The first common feature is the war continuing during negotiations. Following the signing of Minsk-2, Russian-backed forces continued the battle for Debaltseve. The OSCE recorded Russia's outright refusal of a ceasefire. Today, Moscow is conducting negotiations in a similar way while simultaneously launching strikes at Ukraine.
The second is the demand to change political rules in exchange for ending the violence. The Minsk agreements envisaged amendments to Ukraine's Constitution, a special status for certain areas of Donbas, and coordinating election issues with their representatives. Moscow wanted to return its controlled structures into Ukrainian politics while maintaining leverage over them. Russia counted on using these structures to limit Kyiv's independence. Now, it is trying to negotiate a veto power over European security policy.
The third is the imposition of a sequence of steps advantageous to Moscow. Under Minsk-2, Ukraine was to begin regaining control over the border only after local elections. Russia demanded political concessions while retaining levers of pressure. Today, Lavrov speaks even more directly: first we agree on a new security system, then we deal with the war. He even pushes a ceasefire off to the future.
The fourth is shifting the responsibility for the war. In the Minsk process, Russia called itself a mediator and denied being a party to the conflict. Now, hiding its involvement is impossible, so the explanation is different: the problem allegedly lies within the European security system itself, which failed to account for Russian interests. When Kushner talks about decades of mutual distrust and competing security interests, he is helping Moscow shift the conversation away from its aggression and onto grievances against the West.
The fifth is an attempt to force Western negotiators to pressure their own partners. During the Minsk process, Putin demanded that Berlin and Paris influence Kyiv. In August 2021, he asked Angela Merkel for this directly. Now, Moscow is trying to use Washington so that Americans persuade Ukrainians and Europeans to accept a framework advantageous to Russia.
The sixth is opposition to independent monitoring and strong guarantees. During the Minsk process, armed formations blocked access for OSCE observers. In 2021, Russia refused to extend the mandate of a separate mission at two Russian border checkpoints. Now, Lavrov rejects European stabilization forces in Ukraine after a truce. Moscow's shared interest is to retain the ability to threaten new violence and limit the presence of those who could prevent it.
It is important that the diplomatic process continues and remains constructive. Ukraine, more than anyone else, desires this horrific and unjust war to end as soon as possible. A very important achievement is the humanitarian agreement on preparing a new prisoner exchange - the humanitarian track. We will be able to bring some of our people home. I am grateful to the UAE for their help in organizing the negotiations. Thank you to everyone helping Ukraine achieve peace.
Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
I can at least understand why, back in December 2021, when Russia issued the West an ultimatum so blatantly absurd and impossible to meet as demanding that NATO “roll back to its 1997 borders,” everyone was clutching their pearls and gasping in horror.
But come on. In 2022, Putin suffers a crushing defeat at Kyiv, retreats, and abandons the #1 objective of his blitzkrieg. And then, as if nothing had happened, he shows up at the “peace negotiations” in Istanbul demanding outrageously absurd and impossible conditions, including Ukraine's near-total disarmament and a Russian veto over any Western assistance in the event of another invasion.
As if his troops were feasting in Uzhhorod and Lviv instead of having been turned to ashes outside Hostomel and Chernihiv.
Fast-forward almost five years.
He's suffered defeats outside Kharkiv, in Kherson, in Kupiansk, and near Lyman. He's seen Ukrainian troops invade and occupy Russian territory. He's practically lost his Black Sea Fleet. He's lost some 500,000 soldiers killed alone. He's barely managed to change a front line that has remained largely frozen since 2022.
His oil refineries, ports, airfields, and military factories are burning across a vast stretch of Russia, from St. Petersburg to Omsk. He still can't defeat Ukraine even in Donbas, even with the president of the United States in his pocket.
And yet he keeps demanding Ukraine's complete capitulation, the surrender of territory without a fight, the dismantling of Ukraine's defenses. And again and again, he effectively demands that NATO be rolled back and that the entire former Warsaw Pact territory in Europe be handed over to him.
As if he were Stalin in 1952.
And the reason isn't just that Putin is an insane gambler who doesn't know when to stop or recognize the limits of what he can realistically demand.
It's also that, year after year, the free world has repeatedly and spectacularly demonstrated what Putin clearly interprets as weakness, fear, and an unwillingness to stand up for itself.
And therefore, as an invitation to escalate even further, to make ever more outrageous demands, and to engage in ever more brazen blackmail, despite the obvious mismatch between his megalomaniac ambitions, his rhetoric, and his actual results on the ground.
Hvis NATO trækker sig, vil det naturligvis føre til mere krig i Europa - en krig, der let kan sprede sig vestpå.
Var det mon det Jacob Harris og andre ønskede?
Cc @JParti91252
Den vaklende støtte til Ukraine bliver direkte omsat til voksende russiske krav. Nu forlanger Rusland at NATO trækker sig tilbage fra det østlige Europa, dvs de lande, der tidligere var underlagt Kreml.
ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/1…
Den vaklende støtte til Ukraine bliver direkte omsat til voksende russiske krav. Nu forlanger Rusland at NATO trækker sig tilbage fra det østlige Europa, dvs de lande, der tidligere var underlagt Kreml.
ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/1…
Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
Russian Z-propagandist Simonyan called Ukraine a "cancerous tumor" and said "nothing can be preserved, you just have to pound away until nothing is left."
Russia's desire for genocide aginst Ukrainians is well-known.
I'm sharing this to show it still persists.
Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
Happy Kherson Liberation Day! 🇺🇦
Yes, on this very day in 2022, a major Ukrainian military operation culminated in the withdrawal of Russian forces from Kherson, as they sought to avoid having their entire force in and around the city completely cut off. Russia's only captured foothold on the western bank of the Dnipro fell, never to be retaken.
And Ukrainian soldiers entered a half-empty city, where jubilant crowds waving Ukrainian flags greeted them in the central square.
Yes, it was a very, very happy day for all of us. Another spectacular Ukrainian victory, the greatest success since the Battle of Kyiv, in that very same year of war when, just months earlier, people had been writing Ukraine off as dead and buried, giving us 48 or perhaps 72 hours.
We were absolutely over the moon. It seemed that the war had finally reached its decisive turning point. That our Western friends would now put aside their fears of Putin, stop wasting time and energy on “escalation management,” and finally unleash the full might of Western military assistance to a victorious Ukraine, bringing Russia's invasion and occupation to a final, crushing collapse.
Alas, it was not to be. For many reasons, some subjective, others objective.
The struggle goes on, and Ukraine continues to fight heroically against one of the world's largest and most brutal dictatorships and military powers, which has proved incapable of crushing Ukraine in 24 hours, in 10 days, in a year, or even in nearly five years.
Glory to the heroes!
Niels Ockelmann 🇩🇰🇺🇦 retweeted
Russia appears to be using the Trump team’s initiatives to win an important round in the negotiations. The discussion about how to stop its aggression is turning into a bargaining process over how Europe should defend itself. The Russian delegation explicitly describes the Ukraine issue as part of a broader agreement covering the entire continent. By agreeing to link these issues, Kushner is legitimising the Kremlin’s demands.
Until now, Washington has mainly pressured Kyiv to make concessions for the sake of a quick deal. Kushner is now bringing the Europeans into this bargaining process too. He has not yet published a specific list of concessions, but he is already proposing negotiations with Russia over their security. Europeans are having to defend their own military capabilities in talks that should be aimed at making Moscow end its aggression. According to the FT, the broader American proposal was not agreed with European capitals in advance.
**Meanwhile, Moscow wants the war to continue.** On 10 November, Lavrov explicitly stated that Russia would not agree to an immediate ceasefire. He insists on the following sequence: first define the parameters of the future security system, then address a settlement of the war. He also rejected the deployment of European stabilisation forces after a ceasefire. Russia’s demand is clear: the West must first accept new rules, and only then will Moscow consider ending hostilities—with no certainty that it will agree to do so.
For the Kremlin, negotiations and continued warfare complement each other. Russian strikes are intended to convince Ukraine and its partners that rejecting Moscow’s demands will become increasingly costly. Moscow demands concessions in exchange for the prospect of stopping those attacks. FT sources involved in back-channel contacts reported that Putin expects to weaken Ukraine through winter bombardments, while broadening the negotiations to encompass European security allows Moscow to drag out the process. According to those sources, he regards even Ukraine’s withdrawal from the remaining parts of Donbas merely as a precondition for a ceasefire. Further demands may follow.
Russia’s objectives have long extended beyond Ukraine. As early as 14 June 2024, Putin called for the gradual withdrawal of the military presence of “external powers” from Eurasia and described dependence on the US as Europe’s main threat. Ryabkov now says that a future European security system can exist only as part of a Eurasian one, while Lavrov refers to a Russian position paper, mentioning the CSTO, CIS and SCO. Europe is being offered a place in an order in which Moscow will have a decisive say.
Russia laid out its maximalist demands long ago. In December 2021, Moscow demanded that force and weapons deployments return to their May 1997 configuration, that NATO stop expanding, and that military activities in Ukraine and other countries in the region be restricted. Separate demands included returning American nuclear weapons to the US, dismantling the infrastructure used to deploy them abroad, and restricting military deployments, missiles, bomber flights and naval operations.
A new structure modelled on the NATO–Russia Council could become a permanent forum for such pressure. The old council did not give Moscow the right to block Alliance decisions: Russia’s consent was required for joint activities, while NATO remained free to act independently. In any future arrangement, everything will depend on the new obligations. If strengthening defences requires every participant’s approval, or if Russia can demand that such measures be suspended as a threat to its own security, consultations will become a means of obstruction. In its 2021 draft, Moscow already proposed allowing exceptional deployments beyond the established limits only with the consent of all parties. Such a rule would effectively give it the power to decide whether allies can reinforce their defences.
Washington has its own reasons to accept some of these demands. The 2026 US National Defense Strategy describes Russia as a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members and assumes that Moscow cannot establish dominance over Europe. Europeans are expected to take primary responsibility for conventional defence, while the US concentrates on defending its own territory and deterring China. This creates a temptation to strike a deal with Moscow to reduce American involvement.
Kushner has political backing to advance this approach. Trump himself announced a broad agreement concerning Europe, while Rubio supports the negotiating team and discussions about the post-war order. There is no confirmation that a specific package of concessions has been agreed within the administration. There is also bipartisan opposition in Congress to easing pressure on Russia. But presidential support is enough to conduct negotiations, propose options and gradually get allies used to the idea that their defence, too, is negotiable.
The most dangerous scenario is taking shape: weak guarantees for Ukraine are being negotiated alongside restrictions on European defence. Rubio is already saying that these guarantees must be acceptable to Russia; meanwhile, American officials are discussing shifting the financial burden onto Europe and gradually easing sanctions, with the option of reimposing them. In this arrangement, the West pays with concrete concessions in exchange for a promise to end the aggression, while Moscow strengthens its position and gains the ability to bargain over how its opponents defend themselves. The Trump administration’s effort to save money on its military presence weakens alliances—one of the main sources of American power. Declining trust in the US pushes European governments towards separate deals and undermines a common policy towards Russia. The Russian threat remains, while Washington loses the ability to confront it together with its allies.
Lavrov commented on the Abu Dhabi talks. He says all the EU and Ukraine want to talk about are an immediate ceasefire. He confirmed that Russia would not agree to this.
Then, confirming that the USA want to discuss the European security architecture, Lavrov mocks the EU participation: "let them sit in the hotel there."
No real readiness for negotiations is visible from Russia.
Trump/Musks pres på Ukraine ved at begrænse brugen af Starlink har resulteret i at ukrainerne nu bruger det israelske HiSKY system, der også kan bruges over Rusland. Det har betydet, at Ukraines angreb på Rusland er blevet *meget* mere effektive, og at USA har mistet indflydelse.
🔥Russians are panicking over Ukraine’s new refinery strike tactics. Drones reportedly switch targets mid-flight, and Trump can no longer simply pull the plug.
The Russian Telegram channel *Дневник Разведчика* (Intelligence Officer’s Diary, 147,800 subscribers) describes a major shift in Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign following the strikes on Kstovo, Samara and Yaroslavl.
Previously, Ukrainian drones were sent toward predetermined targets. If the first drones successfully hit a refinery unit, the rest continued toward the same target.
Now, according to the Russian channel, Ukrainian operators can monitor strikes in real time and redirect incoming drones while they are still in flight.
Once a primary distillation unit is hit, subsequent drones can be redirected toward storage tanks, cracking units, electrical substations or other critical equipment.
Instead of concentrating an entire wave on one target, Ukraine can distribute the damage across multiple parts of the refinery.
The Russians are describing something far more dangerous for their oil industry than simply larger drone attacks: the ability to adapt an entire strike while it is happening.
The channel attributes this capability to Israeli HiSKY SmartLight satellite communications terminals, which it says Ukraine is using as an alternative to Starlink.
It claims the terminals allow two-way communication over Russian territory, making it possible to adjust flight paths, identify air-defence positions and redirect drones around interception zones.
And then comes the most revealing part.
The Russian channel argues that American restrictions on Starlink have backfired spectacularly.
Its conclusion:
"Trump has simply lost his leverage over Kyiv’s long-range strikes."
And:
"Ukraine has slipped off the American leash and found a commercial alternative that the White House cannot switch off with a phone call."
That is coming from a Russian military channel, not Ukrainian propaganda.
Moscow is now discussing a scenario in which Ukraine can strike multiple critical refinery units in a single operation, adapt to Russian air defences in real time and continue its campaign without depending on American-controlled communications.
Putin has been trying to get Trump to restrain Ukraine’s refinery strikes. Now Russian military commentators are warning that even American pressure may no longer be enough.
The irony is extraordinary. Washington reportedly tried to limit Ukraine’s options. The Russians are now complaining that Ukraine has found a way around those limits.
The HiSKY deployment, electronic-warfare resistance and real-time retargeting capabilities are claims made by the Russian channel, not independently established technical facts. The attribution in the draft matters, especially for the claims about Trump’s leverage.























