
いろんなキャラクターをAI でレオタード風の服に改造してます! シンプルにレオタード系の衣装も着せたりしています! とにかくレオタードが大好き! pixai メインで使っています! #Alillustration #AIイラスト #Alart 無断転載禁止
Joined January 2026
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VR4 retweeted
皆さまおはようございます( ³ω³)
この素晴らしい世界に祝福を!よりめぐみん・ゆんゆん ブラマジコスVerになります!
ブラマジガールの衣装はやはり可愛い🥰
#AIイラスト #この素晴らしい世界に祝福を #めぐみん #ゆんゆん #ブラマジコス
VR4 retweeted
皆さまおはようございます( ³ω³)
この素晴らしい世界に祝福を!よりアクア・ダクネス ブラマジコスVerになります!
髪の色からダクネスが普通のブラマジになっちゃうので表情でダクネス感を出してみました('ω')
#AIイラスト #この素晴らしい世界に祝福を #アクア #ダクネス #ブラマジコス
ツインテちゃんの太もも成分がないなら自分で作ればいいと聞いて😙
ツインテちゃんにうちのお姫様ドレスを着てもらいましたと
結構際どい衣装なので恥ずかしがるかなと🫣
……ですが自分が作る衣装の中ではこれでも露出度低めだったり😚
#AIイラスト
🤖 Made with AI
During this red-teaming exercise, we also found a vulnerability that allows for unauthenticated remote code execution in Brotli, a widely-deployed compression library included in many pieces of software such as Node.js, Bun, and Envoy.
The flaw could let an attacker run their own code on affected systems by sending or replying with malicious compressed data, without any need to create a user account. That is, an unpatched server that accepts compressed input could be taken over by a malicious client, and an unpatched client that accepts compressed input (such as “curl --compressed”) could be taken over by a malicious server.
This root cause issue was actually fixed in the Brotli source code in February, but it wasn’t known at the time that it gave rise to a security vulnerability and there was no more recent release of Brotli. Since Brotli is built into other software, any software which includes this library needs to take the update too, followed by the users of that software. We disclosed the vulnerability to Brotli and other downstream projects such as Node.js, which released or are currently releasing security updates, and Brotli cut new release versions and published a CVE.
More details on the patch and mitigations below:
patchtheplanet.org/brotli
Over the past several months, we have substantially hardened the security of our research training environment. We’ve removed live internet access for all frontier models during training and built an offline world for them to use instead—a cached version of the web where they can still learn to browse, search, and use applications.
On September 20, after a model exploited a DNS misconfiguration to find a way outside of this offline world, we paused frontier training to strengthen containment further. We assembled teams of agents, powered by our most cyber-capable models, and tasked them with finding weaknesses in our research environments.
While they found no route to the internet they could easily exploit while concealing their activity from our monitors, they did find zero-day vulnerabilities, virtual machine escapes, and hardware side-channels for communication between agents. We used their discoveries to further strengthen our defenses and contribute fixes to open-source software.
After strengthening our containment architecture, we resumed our frontier RL training and inference on October 1. We’ve reserved substantial compute for continuous red-teaming, and made high-compute red-teaming part of the safety cases we use to decide whether frontier training and evaluation can proceed securely.
openai.com/index/securing-ou…







































