You might think that reality is not truly weird. The simple argument is that weirdness is entirely relative to a model: that which exits the manifold of possibility given your understanding. So someone who understood it all would find nothing weird. But this is incorrect. Because the qualia of weirdness is itself a feature of reality, and the fact it feels weird is a feature of the universe, even if you understood it fully, in essence it would remain intrinsically (if not extrinsically) just as weird if not more so. There are two senses of weirdness worth distinguishing. One is representational, the "this shouldn't be happening" content of the experience, and this one is relative to a model (you can understand someone's surprise at a magic trick without being surprised yourself). The other is phenomenal, the specific texture of what weirdness feels like, which exists in the world as much as anything else and is still there after you explain why it arises (fully understanding pain doesn't make pain any less painful, and the same would apply to weirdness). More so, if fully understanding consciousness requires knowledge by acquaintance (as in Mary's room), then a being who supposedly finds nothing weird would need to instantiate the feeling of weirdness in order to understand it at all. In other words, the complete understander would have weirdness as part of their own experience. That said, every explanation eventually bottoms out in brute facts (why these qualia, why this state space, why anything at all), and a complete theory would make those more precise rather than dissolve them. Many mathematicians who understand Euler's identity perfectly well report finding it more uncanny the more they see how much it ties together. One objection is that a world containing a weirdness quale is not thereby a weird world, in the same way a world containing sadness is not thereby a sad world. To answer it you would need to show that weirdness is not only a local quale but a structural feature, perhaps the irreducible gap between any finite self-model and the reality it is embedded in. If weirdness has a geometric signature, then we could say it belongs to reality itself and not only to our models of it.