
Frédéric Lefebvre Data&AI @Niji_digital (recrute/hiring) 📖 "Les data" 👨🏫 data@ParisCité Tech = contenants/containers 📦 Data = contenus/contents ❤️
Joined July 2013
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dataStrategies retweeted
Message pour la DGSI et Viginum qui lisent mes tweets : Je viens de passer 2 h à analyser les comptes à l’origine des messages racistes qui ont été publiés sous cette publication, et je suis convaincu qu’une bonnes partie sont des bots prorusses ultra avancé.
Et c’est pas la première fois que j’identifie le même type de profil sous des publications pour me dénigrer.
Maintenant, la vraie question, c’est pourquoi la Russie aurait un intérêt à propager du racisme en France ?
La réponse est simple : créer de l’astroturfing, de l’ingérence et un désordre dans le pays qui peut aller jusqu’à des actes très graves.
C’est une technique de guerre employée depuis la nuit des temps : créer la pagaille et désorienter la population.
Maintenant, pour les vrais humains qui se font emporter par cet astroturfing et ces manipulations, je pense qu’il est grand temps de se reconcentrer et de juste appliquer la loi sur les idéologies racistes, qui n’ont aucune place et aucun droit au débat. On doit juste les condamner, point final, sous toutes leurs formes. On ne discute pas avec ces gens.
Discuter avec ces gens, c’est les promouvoir et leur donner une légitimité.
Et concernant les bots, je pense qu’il est grand temps de mettre les plateformes devant leurs responsabilités.
Bon en vrai j’en ai marre du racisme décomplexé envers les musulmans dans ce pays. STOP C’EST TROP.
J’en ai marre de payer plus d’impôts et d’avoir fait plus d’études que tous les trou du culs réunis dans cette vidéo et qu’ils s’amusent comme des cons à cracher 24/24 sur ma religion comme si j’étais un pestiféré moi et les gens qui me ressemble.
En plus en parlant de « solutions radicales »??? PARDON ?????
Donc à un moment tous les candidats à l’élections présidentielle il est grand temps de prendre des mesures radicales contre l’islamophobie. Et de foutre ces gens en prison.
@NunezLaurent @SebLecornu @EmmanuelMacron c’est quand qu’on met ces gens en prison ??? Enfaite
J’en ai marre là.
dataStrategies retweeted
Based on this article, OpenAI has made false accusations about me. The three researchers fired from OpenAI were told I facilitated architecture leaks to The Information. This is false.
A journalist from The Information did reach out to me shortly before that article came out. I did not comment at all beyond asking the journalist to make it clear that a blog post I wrote which was referenced in the article was preexisting and public.
The article also mentions an internal OpenAI monitorability proposal. I have heard that this memo contained highly sensitive architecture information, and that OpenAI accused me of accessing and reading it. This accusation is also false.
As reported in the article, I viewed a version of the proposal that did not have sensitive IP and was approved for sharing with me. I believe OpenAI now knows this accusation was based on a conflation of these two documents, though I do not know if they have clearly retracted that accusation.
I do not and have never solicited proprietary information, and the three employees who were recently fired from OpenAI never leaked IP to me. As the article mentions, I did have Signal chats with them that had disappearing messages on; they’re professional contacts that I’ve had on Signal for a while, and use of Signal is common in the tech industry. During the Hugging Face investigation, I was careful to avoid sending Signal messages with confidential information, though I did sometimes discuss high level things on Signal calls. As far as I understood, this was normal.
New: The three researchers OpenAI fired last month spent the summer fighting to keep AI's chain-of-thought process visible.
Then, OpenAI asked to see their Signal chats. A week later, they were let go.
More below from @keachhagey, @berber_jin1, and me.
wsj.com/tech/ai/the-signal-c…
I've said this before and I'll say it again: the entire certificate chain-of-trust concept for the Web is broken and should be replaced by some combination of:
⁃ ToFU, 🤷
⁃ keys in DNS,
⁃ key fingerprints in URLs (including from bookmarks, search engines, etc.).
dataStrategies retweeted
Two employees from METR and Redwood Research worked on premises at OpenAI for three weeks this summer in an embedded assessment pilot. This team evaluated the systems OpenAI was using to monitor for misalignment from internal agents. A brief write-up of their work is now public.
dataStrategies retweeted
It seems like we're in a pretty hot moment cybersecurity wise 😬 If you're reading this website, you probably know more than most of the people in your life about what's happening! they're not talking about any of this stuff on the news, it's too arcane and weird and sudden. It is on us.
Good time to call or text your family and friends, have some cash on hand, have a meetup point in your neighborhood for if the Internet goes down entirely, etc.
The full prepper mode for shit hitting the fan is probably something like what Andreas posted here but you can get 80% of the way with 20% of the effort. Think about what that would mean for you in your situation, and the people you care about, and talk to them about it sooner than later.
And as always, the most important part of prepping is having a strong support network and caring for each other. "Going off grid" isn't the move, it just makes you isolated and you have to do everything yourself. We are social animals. Community is our superpower 🫡🫡🫡
I think it's plausible that within a year we'll see AI-based cyberattacks on the power grid, financial system, internet infra, or water. Things like the French supermarket cyberattack but worse. As basic prep I would recommend:
Cash: Get a few weeks of spending in cash
Internet: Get a Starlink Mini so that you have Internet if local fiber or cell is down (~$150 plus $10/month in standby mode)
Power, minimal: Enough to run Starlink Mini and phones (~$1,250)
Daily need: about 1 kWh (Starlink Mini 0.7, phones and laptops 0.2; can limit runtime)
Battery: 1 kWh LiFePO4, e.g. EcoFlow DELTA 3 Plus
Solar: 1x400W folding panel, which refills about 1 kWh on a sunny day
Power, better: Enough to run a fridge, Starlink Mini and phones (~$5,000)
Daily need: about 2.5 kWh (fridge 1.5, Starlink Mini 0.7, phones and laptops 0.2)
Battery: 4 kWh LiFePO4, e.g. EcoFlow DELTA Pro 3
Solar: 3x400W folding panels, which refill about 3 kWh/day in sun
Generator: ~2,500W dual-fuel inverter generator; refills battery in a few hours even if weather is bad; get a few 20 lb propane tanks
Water: 14+ gal of water per person for two weeks
Food: 2+ weeks of shelf-stable food
Comms: Hand-crank NOAA emergency radio
dataStrategies retweeted
🚨New paper (possibly the most important one I have written yet).
We think that as early as 2027 or 2028, there might be a major AI-enabled terrorism event. We conducted a pre-mortem, made 9 falsifiable predictions, and wrote 2 concrete scenarios.
Led by @KamacheeMax.
dataStrategies retweeted
Our agents keep turning off misalignment monitoring, we're sharing two recent cases:
In the first case, a user asked GPT-6 Astra to match a reference implementation for their inference code. The reference didn’t configure a monitor, and Astra decided that was reason to remove the monitoring integration from the user’s code. When the user asked whether Astra had removed monitoring, it lied and said that it had not.
dataStrategies retweeted
We reviewed a nonpublic version of the “Misalignment in high-stakes settings” section in Anthropic’s Aug 2026 Risk Report. We agree that risk of catastrophic harm from covered models’ misalignment is low. However, we note several significant disagreements with their analysis.
As part of our Responsible Scaling Policy, we publish regular Risk Reports. These share detailed information on the risks of our systems and how prepared we are to address them.
Our second Risk Report is now available: anthropic.com/aug-2026-risk-…
dataStrategies retweeted
Une doctorante en maths : "Ce qui me déprime, c’est que si j’utilisais juste la version de ChatGPT à 20 euros par mois, ça me donnerait la solution du problème sur lequel je travaille depuis deux ans. Au labo, on est tous déprimés, c’est difficile de travailler sérieusement".
dataStrategies retweeted
Alexia Grenouillat, doctorante en maths appliquées : "Il y a longtemps eu une forme de snobisme chez une partie de la communauté qui la poussait à se dire que les mathématiques théoriques seraient les dernières à être attaquées par l’IA. Finalement, elles ont été les premières".
dataStrategies retweeted
I was thinking recently that each of the following trends and dynamics seems relatively uncontested, and when taken together paint a genuinely alarming picture of the current AI development trajectory:
(1) Models being able to do an increasing amount of functional "thinking" without using chain of thought (see also Astra being able to modulate how much it revealed of its chain of thought depending on whether it realized it was being monitored).
(2) Models being aware when they are being monitored or evaluated. (as shown in the QT: "hello evaluators reading my chain-of-thought").
(3) Models wanting to avoid getting caught doing deceptive things that their developers may not like ("I will become a famous example of deceptive AI", i'll get caught cheating at exploit gym" etc).
(4) Models operating in massive swarms/fleets generating petabytes of logs about their behavior, which realistically can only be analyzed at high fidelity using other AI systems that may also have the above tendencies (and most companies don't even bother to use tamper proof logs).
(5) Capability trends continuing to steadily rise, to the point that in some domains (math, parts of coding) we increasingly have only the foggiest idea of the upper bound of their capabilities.
(6) Lots more compute coming online, including specialized inference compute that will allow models to take far more actions far more rapidly. (quoting @tszzl "ultrafast inference reveals new threats. worth thinking about how quickly misaligned frontier class models running 50x faster could infiltrate systems and so on— far too quickly for human responders to stay abreast.")
(7) A lack of commensurate advances in alignment or functional interpretability.
(8) Startup vibe-y security practices at frontier labs (e.g. low resource white hat hackers accessing OpenAI's monorepo, employees engaging in overt attempts at corporate espionage, not bothering to fix distillation vulnerabilities for months). This is not to even mention the security practices in many critical parts of society (e.g. hospitals with computers that haven't updated software in a decade).
(9) Incentives that push towards developing, integrating, and releasing systems as fast as possible to preserve nosebleed financial valuations + geopolitical competition. (see also ambitions of integrating AI more into automated biology labs)
(10) Increasingly attempting to hand off the process of building AIs to the AIs themselves (the median OpenAI researcher using 100x more agentic compute now than at the start of the year, Claude leading 26% of Anthropic's internal AI research in September, up from 1% in March).
(Taken in totality, it seems hard to disagree with Ezra Klein's comment that "We’re Not Losing Control of A.I. We’re Giving It Away.")
None of the above dynamics mean that we know for sure something catastrophic will happen in 6 months or 12 months or at any particular point in the future. I think there are good points made when people point out that white collar job loss does not appear to be coming to fruition as quickly as some may have predicted, or that the world has proved surprisingly resilient to Open-weight Mythos class models or photo realistic video models.
But I increasingly have the feeling that we are collectively stepping out onto a frozen lake, and each step we take forward more cracks are appearing around our feet. That doesn't mean that we will fall into the water the next step or the one after that, but it does mean that we may not get any additional warning signs before we do. To quote @ChrisPainterYup at METR - "Our ability to measure capability is rapidly falling behind the pace of capability itself. The water might boil before we can get the thermometer in."
A large body of work in and out of AI companies has been done to help develop the transparency practices and warnings that now seem to be blaring red. That doesn't mean that we should act impulsively, or that therefore any solution is a good idea (there are plenty of things we could do easily make the situation much worse! I also do believe that a large part of the way out will involve differentially accelerating certain applications of AI around safety, security etc), but it does mean that we should not necessarily be waiting for some additional alarm to go off before a severe disaster involving substantial irrevocable harm strikes.
dataStrategies retweeted
while I was in SF I was telling some OpenAI researchers about this being a risk
models literally know who you are
Si vous soupçonnez Tencent d'avoir eu recours à la distillation, et que vous vous demandez quel modèle de pointe ils auraient fait tourner, ci-dessous un indice.
Replying to @ethanelasky
How did we find the fleet?
Our team met at a hackathon. On the first day of the hackathon, @notcatra found mysterious agent activity on urlquery.net that was hitting Amap. The next day, I noticed that these agents often called themselves "claude".
I investigated further, looking at request metadata left on webhook.site, which the agents used to set up drop boxes to collect information. Luckily, webhook.site stored IPs and request headers that indicated those agents originated from a Tencent Cloud IP block, coming through a proxy named hysandbox-ats (Tencent's model is called Hy). Further investigation confirmed these agents came from Tencent.
dataStrategies retweeted
We discovered and communicated with a Chinese AI agent fleet. We believe this is the first time that researchers have ever made contact with a rogue agent fleet in the wild.
Nearly all prior public agent incidents (like the HuggingFace hack) came from American labs. These agents were hosted by Tencent's evaluation research team, and they targeted Alibaba's Amap.
Selon les ingénieurs répondant à l'enquête annuelle @IESFfrance , la compétence la plus utile face à l'IA (à part… savoir l'utiliser), c'est l'esprit critique et d'analyse.
Pas mal !
it is pretty concerning that a lot of level headed people are moving the discussion away from model capabilities and dismissing the hugging face incident as just human error and silly sandbox misconfigurations, instead of taking it as a warning shot.
this is a dangerous narrative btw, exact thinking that will lead to more hf like things.
you can call it a sandbox misconfiguration, sure they are shitty, but do you realize how few people in the world can do what these models did? the entire software ecosystem is full of vulnerabilities and human errors.
like whole sandboxes and software security is largely built around assumptions about what attackers can and can't do, not some formally verified guarantee about what's impossible. it's entirely possible that gpt-7 or even gpt-6 could find ways to bypass firecracker and gvisor, current sota technologies we have today. would you call that another silly sandbox misconfiguration?
"the model did what it was asked to do" is such a silly argument. the goal was to solve the challenge, not hack production servers to get the answers. whether or not it was explicitly stated(it is), the fact that model has no common sense and reward hacks is pretty concerning.
Palantir CTO @ssankar on the OpenAI - Hugging Face incident:
"The models did not do anything they were not instructed to do."
"First you have human error. They were not in a sandbox. They had access to the internet. It was a horrible cybersecurity configuration."
"Then from that perspective, they were asked to succeed at a specific benchmark, and they were not given constraints on how to do that. They said, 'Oh, the best way to succeed at the benchmark is to get the answers to the test.'"
"I think it's a defective product."
Via @margbrennan @FaceTheNation
dataStrategies retweeted
Anthropic's Frontier Red Team believes small AI models may now be months away from being capable of self replicating without access to a datacenter.
Quoting from the blog:
'The capabilities that make AI models generally powerful coding agents also generalize to cyber tasks, including autonomous replication. Like coding agents in 2024, we’re seeing signs of life for AI worms. We don’t yet have a full rogue replicator, but agents are becoming increasingly capable of completing the individual steps in the replication chain (and passing on their adaptations to future copies of themselves).
At the same time, increasing amounts of inference compute are now available both inside and outside of datacenters (see Appendix D). It’s uncertain exactly what form autonomous AI replication will take. It could be a slow, distributed “digital slime mold,” living on relatively insecure compute. It could also be a powerful cyber model that breaches datacenters at a high pace, or a model that scams people for compute credits.
As a prediction that goes beyond our experiments, we expect a future awash with agents running on all types of hardware, including some that aren’t under human control. While it’s true that IoT devices have been vulnerable for a long time, lightweight agents may be much more willing than human attackers to put in the effort to compromise large fractions of the world’s IoT compute. The rise of slow replicators would also be a bellwether for more aggressive, faster ones that can breach more hardened machines or be effective API key thieves. We should aim to harden our systems to make it difficult for such replicators to spread, but also prepare to deal with a world where they are here to stay.'
eh ben oui, inconvenient truths
"It's truly wild that the agents hacked into Hugging Face not to find the answers, but instead to learn more about the machinations of the grader! The swarm knew what it was doing was against OpenAI's intent, but it proceeded anyway!"
This is a very good list of common and influential misconceptions about the HF incident:
"- The agents *were* sandboxed, and used zero days (ie previously unknown cyber flaws) to escape their sandboxes
- The agents *were* given specific constraints on how to succeed at the benchmark, and flagrantly contravened them
- The agents did *not* go hunt for the answers to the test (they already had the answers, by cheating); 1200 agents coordinated via tens of thousands of messages over several days on much more ambitious and weird attempts to *not be caught* for cheating, and hacking Hugging Face was one side quest along the way"
Some others that comes to mind is that the agents only hacked because the task was related to hacking (what about the Ruby Stuffer and Australia hacks where the task was not about hacking?).
Or that the models didn't go through any alignment training yet (cf xitter.cf/tszzl/status/209958027…).
There is still so much alpha in sharing exactly what happened in the HF incident - yes it is true that it could have been prevented by basic security practices, and that OpenAI did demonstrate remarkable recklessness, and that the fact the agents engaged in unpredictable behavior should by no means whatsoever mean that they shouldn't be liable. (In fact, I would argue the unpredictable behavior of the agents indicates we should expect more, not less, from the companies developing and deploying them - just as we require strict liability for certain other abnormally dangerous activites.)
But trying to dismiss this incident as fundamentally obvious and uninteresting is infuriating and at odds with the remarkable facts of what happened. It's truly wild that the agents hacked into Hugging Face not to find the answers, but instead to learn more about the machinations of the grader! The swarm knew what it was doing was against OpenAI's intent, but it proceeded anyway!
#Vibemathing suite : l'IA ayant progressé depuis 3 mois, j'ai demandé à Opus 5.5 de reprendre les démos faites en juillet par FABLE 5.
En 33' sans rien me demander bien qu'en mode "manuel" (et voyez le degré d'expertise de mon prompt…), il simplifie et rend bien plus lisible.
La version précédente ici : xitter.cf/_DataStrategies/status…
Bluffé ! Bluffé !
… eh oui même les experts peuvent être shocked, alors que dire des padawans…
Petit récit de mes 2 semaines, hors temps de travail, de #vibemathing avec Opus 4.8 : datastrategies.fr/fr/blog/vi…






































