CEO of https://xitter.cf/t.co/0w1zWitVLu. Dancing with bits
New York, USA
Joined June 2010
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Gil Dabah retweeted
Crazy 72 hours in security. Three major incidents dropped back-to-back: eMudhra, PingCAP (TiDB Cloud), and PHP.
Here is the short version of what happened and who got hit.
1. eMudhra (Trusted CA compromise)
eMudhra generated 8 intermediate CA certificates in April 2025 (cross-signed by Sectigo). A bug in their HSM key-wrapping test script created a second set of P-384 keys where the private keys were single-byte numbers under 256. Operators picked the wrong key labels and signed them into real CA certs.
One of the intermediate CA private keys was literally the number 4.
The other seven: 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.
Three weeks later (May 2025), their CRL signatures started failing because the CRL signer was using the real keys instead of the weak ones. Instead of asking why the keys didn't match, someone switched the CRL signer to the weak keys and closed the ticket.
• Browsers are safe: Chrome, Firefox, Apple, and Microsoft already blocked them, and zero rogue certs hit CT logs.
• Servers are not: curl, Python (certifi), Go binaries, and Docker base images don't check CRLs. Update ca-certificates, certifi, and Go (1.27.3 / 1.26.10).
• 10-second check on any server:
curl dv-g3b-emudhra.we-have-a-pro…
(TLS error = safe. 200 OK = still vulnerable.)
2. PingCAP / TiDB Cloud (10.6 TB breach)
Attackers found GCP and Azure credentials committed inside PingCAP's own repos. They set up a replication feed of TiDB Cloud's production control plane and exported the entire database every 6 hours for 22 straight days. 88 full exports, zero alerts. 200 GB is already out on torrents.
Beyond the 413 private repos and 20.6M customer SQL queries logged from their web SQL Editor, PingCAP engineers were pasting customer secrets into Jira tickets.
Who is affected in the leaked records:
• Live credentials exposed in support tickets:
- Pinterest: AWS keys for their pingcap-logs S3 bucket
- CardX / Silverlake (NPCI-linked env): AWS admin key in a backup log with full access to 258 external S3 buckets
- DeBank: 38 presigned S3 URLs
- An unnamed AI/dev platform: a 314 MB slow-query log attached to a ticket containing 8,027 live customer secrets (an AWS root key, a GitHub admin PAT over 1,701 repos, 7,485 AWS STS tokens, and 192 OpenAI/Anthropic/Gemini keys)
• Tenants with infra metadata, VPC CIDRs, app-server IPs, or contract pricing exposed:
- Tech: Atlassian, Databricks, Airbnb, Baidu, LINE, Nylas, Persona, PatSnap
- E-comm & Travel: Booking.com, Shopee, Flipkart, Mercari, ZOZO, AEON, Delhivery, Klook
- Gaming: Capcom, Square Enix, Konami, Bandai Namco, Cygames, Colopl, DMM
- Finance: PayPay, SoftBank, SBI, SB Payment Service, Fujitsu, TOPPAN, Bank of China, China Life
- Crypto: Bitget (said only public trade logs were on it and they already left), Pionex, DigiPlus, NFTscan, Chainbase
• Developer profiles leaked (from a purchased reo.dev table in PingCAP's BigQuery):
- 24,900 personal emails + GitHub/LinkedIn profiles of engineers at Tencent (3,327), Huawei (2,726), ByteDance (2,475), AIG (2,140), Mastercard, Flipkart, and bKash.
If you use TiDB Cloud: rotate your console API keys, DB passwords, and anything you ever pasted into a support ticket.
3. PHP "PHP2Shell" (CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619)
Two CVSS 9.2 pre-auth RCEs leaked yesterday ahead of today's 14:00 UTC patch.
Public writeups trace it to a heap Use-After-Free in PHP's native C multipart/form-data session upload-progress handler (ext/session/session.c).
Because C-level multipart parsing runs before line 1 of index.php:
• App auth, Laravel/WordPress middleware, and file_uploads = Off do not stop it.
• Only PHP 8.2–8.5 get official patches today (59% of PHP servers on Shodan are on EOL <= 8.1).
• Until you patch php-fpm: lock php_admin_flag[session.upload_progress.enabled] = off and block unexpected multipart requests at Nginx/Apache/Cloudflare.
Gil Dabah retweeted
@Tenzai_Labs finished #1 on @Hacker0x01's VDP business leaderboard again this quarter.
Last Q we ran on US frontier models; this quarter we used GLM 5.2 & 5.3, open-weight models from z.ai.
We still came out on top, with just 3.5% false positives, and roughly 30% lower cost per report.
For us, it shows the harness matters more than the model underneath it - we built Tenzai to work with a choice of models.
The bigger point is the warning. Open weight models are freely available and highly capable to power offensive AI operations at scale. Attackers can and will build malicious agents with these models.
@nytimes covered it today: nytimes.com/2026/10/01/scien…
If you're defending applications, networks and infrastructure the window to test them continuously, before someone else does, is closing.
Full write-up on how we did it: tenzai.com/blog/an-open-weig…
Gil Dabah retweeted
Yeah, really liked Emergence Capital. Gordon and Santi there are wonderful. But we could never get a deal with them because another partner was skeptical. Years later I ran into him and he said: “You know, I always thought you were completely full of shit, but you proved me wrong. My loss. Congratulations on all your success.” And I totally get it because early on we were full of shit but we figured it out, day after day.
Gil Dabah retweeted
Hackathons are a good excuse to build a slightly unreasonable version of the future.
So we built an entire computer inside the browser, designed for humans and agents to use together through WebMCP.
No access to your local machine. Just send an agent a URL and give it a fresh computer to work with.
Built by our awesome @ilay_alog 🦾🤖👑 !
We just submitted our project to the @OpenAIDevs WebMCP hackathon: The WebMCP Computer.
WebMCP Computer is an operating system that lives inside the browser, with WebMCP as its native control layer.
It is a computer that treats agents as first-class citizens, where files, processes, applications, windows, and the terminal are exposed directly through WebMCP.
You can send anyone one URL that becomes a disposable computer for any agent task.
We created a computer instance in ChatGPT Sites, open it with Codex’s in-app browser and try it here: computer.webmcp.com/
Some examples of what you can do with WebMCP Computer:
1/ Give a coding agent a fresh computer to clone a repository, edit code, run tests, and preview the result.
2/ Let an agent inspect logs, manage processes, change configurations, and repair a broken system.
3/ Give a research agent its own workspace to browse, download files, analyze data, and create a report.
4/ Create reproducible environments for evaluating and comparing different agents.
5/ Let humans and agents work together in the same environment, with the agent using WebMCP and the human using the GUI.
The list of applications is endless, with more examples in our GitHub. The project is fully open source under the MIT license.
github.com/nekuda-ai/webmcp-…
devpost.com/software/webmcp-…
Created by our awesome founding engineer @ilay_alog.
Gil Dabah retweeted
Big NEWS: Today we're launching Catch AI, an admin-assistant for busy executives.
We started Catch with a simple idea:
AI should actually do the administrative work executives hate doing themselves.
Not suggest. Not summarize. Do.
>>
Gil Dabah retweeted
Great time to share all the WebMCP tooling we’ve built lately:
1/ the first WebMCP directory
webmcp.com
2/ WebMCP extension for developers (batteries included)
chromewebstore.google.com/de…
3/ codex plugin to build WebMCP tools on your site
github.com/nekuda-ai/webmcp-…
The WebMCP Challenge is here.
We’ve teamed up with @ChromiumDev, @CloudflareDev, @ShopifyDevs, @vercel, @render, and @Netlify for a 10-day hackathon.
Up for grabs: $35,000 in cash prizes, Codex Micros, ChatGPT Pro subscriptions, and more prizes from our supporters.
Gil Dabah retweeted
Autonomous Security - EDT for AI Agents. Think CrowdStrike for Claude Code and Cursor.
a16y.ai
Gil Dabah retweeted
What a rotten deal we made with Iran. We get nothing (except laughter at our stupidity). They get everything, including delay and big cash!
Gil Dabah retweeted
FULL REMOTE CODE EXECUTION on default nginx 1.30.0 no config changes needed. 🫠
Verichains a deadly exploit chain combining Nginx-Rift (CVE-2026-42945) + Nginx-PoolSlip (CVE-2026-9256).
2-byte heap pointer overwrite & heap over-read then ASLR bypass to arbitrary command execution via system() on connection teardown.
Over the next few months, we'll be gradually publishing some of our internal security research.
Starting with a bug chain that turns Nginx-Rift + Nginx-PoolSlip into full RCE.
More to come.
#Nginx #1day #RCE
blog.verichains.io/p/two-byt…
Gil Dabah retweeted
Joining the agentic vuln research hype, @EyalKraft and I did something. Unfortunately, it worked better than we hoped.
We spent a few weeks building an agentic loop that reverse-engineers and exploits kernel drivers. We already found 100+ exploitable drivers.
(link below)
Gil Dabah retweeted
I’ve been digging into HTTP Trailers and found some new smuggling techniques:
sebsrt.xyz/blog/trailing-dan…
Gil Dabah retweeted
נכון שהתמונה נראית תלת-ממדית למרות שהמסך שטוח?
רובכם רואים את הטבעות האדומות בולטות החוצה ואת החלק הכחול מאחור. אם זה הפוך, זה גם בסדר (למרות שאתם במיעוט).
אז מה קורה כאן?
איך הפיזיקה מצליחה לעבוד על המוח שלנו?
הסבר קצר על תופעה אופטית מגניבה עם שם מפוצץ.
כרומוסטריאופסיס🧵⬇️
Gil Dabah retweeted
Very thoughtful (and terrifying) article.
My favorite is the email prompt injection if you gave your @openclaw access to gog (Google CLI)
Gil Dabah retweeted
The @trailofbits security auditing skills! Teach Claude to be an expert bug hunter: github.com/trailofbits/skill…
Gil Dabah retweeted
We hacked the AWS JavaScript SDK, a core library powering the entire @AWScloud ecosystem - including the AWS Console itself 🤯
How did we do it? Just two missing characters was all it took.
This is the story of #CodeBreach 🧵👇
Gil Dabah retweeted
🇺🇸 INTERVIEW: THE MAN WHO SHOT BIN LADEN SPEAKS ON THE CAPTURE OF MADURO
There’s two elite forces in the world: Delta Force and Seal Team Six.
Seal Team Six was behind the operation to take out bin Laden, and Delta Force is the one that captured Maduro.
I spoke to the man who shot bin Laden to get his take and analysis on the capture of Maduro
What went into planning? How did they take out the air defense systems? How could such an operation have no casualties? Did someone betray Maduro? Was there a stand down order?
I also asked him broader questions on the capabilities of Delta Force/Seal Team 6. How do they compare to other special forces? What makes them so capable?
And how difficult would it be to capture or kill other leaders, including Iran’s Supreme Leader.
I hope you enjoy the conversation.
🇺🇸🇮🇷🇻🇪 PEPE ESCOBAR ON VENEZUELA, IRAN, & UKRAINE - A NEW WORLD ORDER?
I’ve said on multiple occasions that after Maduro’s capture, and with the severe weakening of Iran and their proxies, it’s become very difficult to criticize the capabilities of the U.S military and their intelligence.
Well, Pepe Escobar disagrees, and he disagrees with many of my stances, including whether the Iranian regime will survive the current protests.
In this conversation we discuss:
• Who betrayed Maduro within his inner circle
• What the future of Venezuela looks like
• Is Iran next
• Will the Iranian regime survive
• And what all this means for the ongoing war in Ukraine
@realPepeEscobar regularly visits China, Russia, Iran, Lebanon, Venezuela, and even Yemen, and has deep knowledge on those regions, so I hope you enjoy his insights as much as I have.
03:02 - Venezuela intervention framed as reckless move tied to petrodollar collapse
06:11 - Venezuelan security chief demoted amid suspicions of internal betrayal
08:50 - Regime change vs U.S. interests: democracy not the real objective
11:22 - Trump’s unpredictability debated as a negotiating weapon in geopolitics
12:25 - Iran, Russia, and China unimpressed by Trump’s “madman” strategy
15:59 - NATO attacks on Russia’s nuclear command centers shift war dynamics
18:23 - U.S. dominance narrative challenged: geopolitics not about winning or losing
20:32 - Hezbollah described as ideological movement, not just an Iranian proxy
22:44 - Yemen and Iran framed as long-term resistance societies shaped by sanctions
26:04 - Iranian protests: economic pain mixed with foreign regime-change playbook
29:12 - Iran’s internal weaknesses acknowledged amid sanctions and generational divide
33:55 - Russia and China quietly backing Iran through infrastructure and logistics
36:20 - Beijing and Moscow operate on long-term strategic timelines, not fear
39:09 - BRICS payment systems and de-dollarization efforts explained
41:56 - Sanctions identified as main obstacle to Venezuela’s economic recovery
50:05 - Russia-Ukraine war outlook turns bleak after attack on Putin’s residence