Alf retweeted
Totally memory holed including by the most pathological force in British politics for a century, the Tory Party.
Moronic NPC Kemi-kasi described the Single Market as 'a free trade area' showing how her laziness and extreme uselessness means the entire Brexit debate for a decade passed her by in entirety. She was programmed by pre-2016 EU software and never got the NPC update patch.
She was a clown minister who Sir Humphry easily tricked on everything they cared about - a perfect representative of the Tories for 30 years.
She says the Boriswave happened because she and other Tory ministers "didn't notice" the numbers - DIRECT QUOTE!!
No wonder 'morale has never been higher' in rancid Tory world and the Idiocracy tells you she's a serious character you shd trust.
And if tempted to think Farage can turn things round... Remember, most voters have NO IDEA HOW MANY MILLIONS THE BORISWAVE WAS.
SW1 has persuaded itself the public OVERestimate immigration but they massively UNDER estimate it. SW1 lives in a parallel world as always (and this is getting worse as the information ecosystem fragments, if you depend on Bluesky you wouldnt know 3rd generation migrants are torching France, youd think 'the real story' is white racism and it's 'smart politics for Burnham to rejoin without a referendum' etc).
I described this in February and said - one simple goal for 'the right' is to communicate the numbers on the Boriswave, if you do this politics will change a lot.
But 'the right' is such a farce the entire ecosystem has failed to do this ONE crucial thing. And you think they could deal with Sir Humphrey???!
For 30 years, 'the right' has been total losers on campaigning and FOCUS. The Right is exactly like MPs generally: 100% inability to FOCUS on anything, 100% toddler attention span on whatever is leading 'the news'.
Farage had one job. He failed.
Escaping our nightmare requires new political leadership + new team + new campaign machine + new story facing the reality of our world and the reality of the electoral dynamics, info ecosystem etc. It is laughable to think Kemi-kasi or Farage could do this, they will both just bounce from studio to studio as pure NPCs...
New blog explains, link below
Alf retweeted
Amazing 70k word substack from Dom: AI and Power
dominiccummings.substack.com…
... it’s useful to take a wide look at the context, to see how many questions connect, before ploughing into lots of detail. Much of the news is extremely hard to make sense of even for tech Insiders — so there’s these people call ‘Sam’ and ‘Dario’ who think they’re close to building super-intelligence then putting it in robots, and they apparently think there’s a 20% chance it kills everyone, and they’re accelerating their plans because they don’t trust each other, and some of their opponents claim this is a marketing campaign, and the governments have mostly ignored it all and have no Actual Plan?!
... I’m one of a tiny number of people who’ve had senior roles in politics AND has followed the AI debate since ~2000, listened to three physicists about AI before 2016 and took it seriously, hired AI experts to do AI on two historic elections (2016 and 2019) when this seemed kooky in politics and in 2019-20 helped create an AI office in No10, as part of a general push to make AI and robotics a central strategic priority for the British state and No10, when this idea seemed ludicrous to ~100% of the ‘sensible mainstream’.
... It’s normal to listen to some bigshot talking about AI and someone from a lab will say, sometimes with a pitying smile, ‘they just don’t feel the AGI’: i.e they don’t really grasp how fast change is happening and will accelerate because it’s exponential.
My friend physicist Steve Hsu has made a documentary, Machine God, coming out soon (check out the trailer, and his blog for details). Steve also was boss of the PRC side in the AI wargame organised by Marc Warner (film here). Steve wanted to capture the feel of the Bay Area in this extraordinary time. Here, the people who feel the AGI talk about ‘the future lightcone’.
This is a good piece overall but I do have a major quibble with the interpretation of this particular chart on "capital efficiency".
1⃣ The nature of capital investment in China vs. the U.S. is completely different (capital-light vs. capital-intensive) which makes direct country-to-country comparisons problematic.
e.g. in my view the U.S. would be in a better strategic position today had it not shifted to such an extreme capital-light model (which helped it maintain those relatively high "productivity" levels): Our antiquated infrastructure and atrophied manufacturing ecosystem / supply chain were casualties of policies that shifted the economy to become "capital-light".
Instead, I would argue the U.S. would be better off today if it had dedicated more resources investing in infrastructure, even if it lowered "capital efficiency" according to this metric.
Said differently, high "capital efficiency" by this metric should not be interpreted as a universal positive, but also as a symptom of deeper structural issues.
2⃣ Meanwhile, I have argued how the downward trajectory on China's "capital efficiency ratio" was mainly a function of the shift from an export-processing intensive capital investment model in the 90s and 2000s to a housing and infrastructure-centric model since the mid/late-2000s and not declining capital efficiency.
While RoIC in annualized % terms was lower on the latter, there is an offsetting effect with housing and infrastructure bearing significantly longer useful lives (meaning that you can spread economic payback over a longer period of time).
Furthermore, infrastructure was comprised of significant "public goods" asset formation that generate significant externalities that are not necessarily captured in near/medium-term GDP.
“China is not the world’s largest command economy. It is a continent-sized Silicon Valley.”
Awesome piece by @RobinRivaton on China’s local governments and industrial clusters: worksinprogress.co/issue/chi…
Alf retweeted
When explaining China's industrial success, Westerners often conclude that it's about central control: the Chinese government picking winners.
In fact, it's about local governments being incentivised to care about the growth of their region, forming so-called "growth machines." These compete ruthlessly with each other. China hasn't shown central planning works, but rather that the force of capitalism is more aligned with public benefits when incentives are right and local rulers directly benefit from the health of their constituency.
The heavy state involvement correctly perceived by observers belongs not to Beijing but to those local governments, of which China has thousands, and which compete with one another for investment and prestige. These local growth machines and the competition between them are what drives China’s stunning economic success, and what the Western world must embrace to keep up.
Read this new fascinating piece for @WorksInProgMag!
China has become the most important manufacturing economy in the world because it is a continent-sized Silicon Valley.
worksinprogress.co/issue/chi…
Every Chinese city govt acts as a VC firm trying to create clusters in its region, because it has both the means and incentive to do so.
Local govts generate their revenues, nearly all of which they keep, from selling leases on land and from stakes they have taken in local companies, which together allow them to capture economic spillovers.
Chinese officials have their entire careers graded and determined by how much growth they have been able to create in the areas they run. Career progression is determined according to a great tournament that pits official against official and gives promotions to whoever has grown their region the most. If they don’t reach a certain stage by a certain age they are blocked from promotion forever.
This is why so many economic clusters have centred on Chinese cities, for high- and low-tech products alike. Shaodong makes 70% of the entire world's cigarette lighters; Danyang makes half of the world's spectacle lenses; Zheng'an makes 1/7 of the world's guitars; Datang a third of its socks.
Whereas many of the West’s most important city governments capture only a small amount of the spillovers from successful clusters, and thus have very little reason to foster them, in China, they get a huge amount of the upside and can re-invest it in further growth. This also gives them a great incentive to solve problems for companies, like when Shanghai's govt got Tesla's factory there built even faster than Elon himself had expected (and twice as fast as his Fremont, CA factory).
But this is not some exotic 'oriental' innovation – this is how America used to do things when it grew fastest, in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. Catching up with China on advanced manufacturing does not require a wise and strategic approach, let alone authoritarianism or the end of democracy. It may just mean fixing city government.
This is why I care so much about local in Britain and America: if we give our own local governments the same incentives and means to grow, the crazily dysfunctional entities we have become used to may be transformed into corporation-like bodies that are ruthlessly focused on making their cities rich, safe and prosperous.
Read more in Works in Progress worksinprogress.co/issue/chi…
It was discussed intensely from 2022 to 2024, when foreign commentariat hoped it would lead to a broad economic crisis. Which didn't happen. So it is a background activity now. People like me wrote that:
- Actually a low proportion of China owned secondary homes for investment
- Lending for investment houses had been frugal
- Real estate and construction didn't in fact make 30% of the Chinese economy (It was about 13%, infrastructure and commercial construction included)
- Chinese lending wasn't tied to the financial markets
So no recession
Alf retweeted
In my first opinion piece for The Wall Street Journal, I argue that our political conversation is locked in the 19th century.
Capitalism, communism, racism, feminism, liberalism, conservatism—they’re all 19th-century words.
Is their descriptive power more illusory than real?
Out today @WSJFreeEx.
Alf retweeted
Great podcast on the Chinese perspective on recent events. Western coverage of these issues is so poor it’s left to “geopolitical entrepreneurs” like @alf_stff to pick up the gauntlet. 🫡
Replying to @alf_stff
Podcast -seekingtruthfromfacts.substa…
Follow Zichen: @ZichenWanghere
Keep up with Harvey's work: chinausfocus.com/author/2088…
Podcast -seekingtruthfromfacts.substa…
Follow Zichen: @ZichenWanghere
Keep up with Harvey's work: chinausfocus.com/author/2088…
Alf retweeted
Vietnam grew its economy nearly 10% in the face of soaring energy prices, geopolitical uncertainty, and trade war headwinds.
What’s your excuse?
Vietnam's economy grows 9.95% in Q3, fastest pace this year s.nikkei.com/4hpspO1
Alf retweeted
AI boom or bubble? ~$trillion capex, but only ~tens of $billions in organic revenue.
Financial bubble, unless revenue doubles every year for next ~4 years.
stevehsu.substack.com/p/ai-r…
Replying to @hsu_steve
@hsu_steve explaining why rapid recursive self-improvement means nothing for AI valuations until real-economy businesses -- not VC-backed startups -- start organically spending trillions on the tech.
Alf retweeted
In the bucket of very useful heuristics (eg stupidity not malice), we need some pithy expression that says “sure, it could be a carefully coordinated disinformation conspiracy to hype an IPO, but it’s probably just people telling you what they think (but they might be wrong)”
Truly shocking to see public funds being shaken down like this. Something has gone very badly wrong to allow this to happen.
New - Sir Keir Starmer signed off a record payoff for sacked cabinet sec Sir Chris Wormald of nearly £860,000, more than three times higher than initial estimates
ft.com/content/dd6af02e-9328…
































