Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi) header
Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi) profile picture

Founder of Projeto CTF-BR (@ctfbr), ELT (@eltctfbr), TecLand Group (@teclandgroup) and @Pwn2Win CTF

Brazil
Joined February 2012
Photo by Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi)Photo by Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi)Photo by Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi)Photo by Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi)Photo by Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi)Photo by Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi)Photo by Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi)Photo by Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi)Photo by Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi)Photo by Álisson Bertochi (@AlissonBertochi)
The RCE for nginx needs 128GB of HTTP/2 traffic to trigger and specific CPU instructions to be exploitable I hope I saved you some time.
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Apparently tweeting “I have a working PoC” creates a small obligation to explain how the thing works 😅 So here it is: both PHP bugs, the memory leaks, the ASLR bypass, worker pinning, and how I eventually got to execution andrewmohawk.com/2026/10/26/…
Its me, I have a working PoC with the infoleaks to bypass ASLR. It took a lot of prompting and re-iterating to find those, tested against PHP 8.5.11 x86_64 with with all defaults and tested over the Internet
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Álisson Bertochi retweeted
New on our Frontier Red Team blog: using Claude to formally verify software at large scale. Formal verification can prove that code is free of certain bugs, but historically it has only been feasible for small codebases (or required a lot of expert time). With AI models, however, this is beginning to change. In collaboration with @theoremlabs, we used Claude to prove security properties in over one hundred real-world open-source libraries over the span of a few weeks. Read our research in full here: anthropic.com/research/forma…
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Álisson Bertochi retweeted
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 4 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
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en.gamegpu.com/news/zhelezo/… The AnyPS5 compatibility layer project has achieved 88.12% implementation of PlayStation 5 system libraries. Over the course of a single day, the developers successfully integrated 206 new functions, increasing the total count from 3,005 to 3,211 out of 3,644 tracked system calls. Key modules show major progress, with the libc library now reaching 99%, libkernel standing at 94%, libSceNet climbing to 96%, and libSceAgc hitting 90%. In addition, GPU shader instructions maintain a full 100% completion rate across all 1,166 instructions. With 567 functions delivered in just a few days, the project continues to expand rapidly. #anyps5 #ps5 #emulation #gaming #tech #software #playstation
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Álisson Bertochi retweeted
I am done with this shit. It is over. The state of engineering right now is horrible. It has been half a month since I started a new role at a big company. Nobody knows anything here. The specs, code, tests, PRDs, tickets, resolution of those tickets, reports, etc., everything is made by Claude Code. Nobody on my team likes this. They are being forced to ship as much as they can. I have heard multiple times from higher management that pushing code is not a bottleneck, so why are we slow? People are working 12 to 13 hours a day just to press enter. Nobody is reading anything. Humans in corporate are doing nothing on their own. Everyone, literally everyone, from an L1 to an L7 engineer here is doing the same thing. Talk to Claude. There is no sense of victory. Nobody is resolving bugs. In reality, nobody is thinking anymore. Everything is done by LLMs. It is so soul-sucking. I would not mind it, to be honest, if we were at least given the time to check out the code and see what is going where. But no, the goal is to just ship. No matter what happens.
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I found a Linux 0day vuln with @rqda_A, and $80,000+ rewarded for it by Google kernelCTF! The vuln has been surprisingly hidden for about 19 years. We've published an English version of the blog post! gmo-cybersecurity.com/blog/1…
Linux kernelで19年以上見過ごされていた0-day脆弱性を報告しました 悪用されると一般ユーザーからの権限昇格が可能になる脆弱性です 詳しくはこちら gmo-cybersecurity.com/blog/1…
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Álisson Bertochi retweeted
the real winners of DEFCON quals
Replying to @NotDeGhost
claudio and gepetto
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had way too much fun golfing copy.fail , so I made a website to compete with other people copy.golf holding the WR at 492 bytes, please beat it (or pwn the website host for extra points)
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A 2005 state-designed worm designed to corrupt physics simulations sat undetected on VirusTotal for nearly a decade. Fast16, intercepted executable files at the kernel level and silently rewrote floating-point calculations to make them produce slightly wrong answers. Targets: high-precision engineering suites used for structural analysis, crash simulations, and physical process modeling, including LS-DYNA, a tool cited in reports on Iran's nuclear weapons research. The sabotage vector relied on deployment of the driver across a network via worm, corrupting calculations on every machine, and eliminating the possibility of cross-checking results against a clean system. Stuxnet got the documentary. Fast16 got twenty years of nothing. sentinelone.com/labs/fast16-…
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Álisson Bertochi retweeted
Very cool Linux bug found by @xint_official 100% reliable, instant LPE from a portable python script that works on all platforms and distros. Root cause is a subtle logic bug at the intersection of several subsystems. I highly recommend patching and checking out the details!
Patch your Linux boxes! Copy.Fail is a trivially exploitable logic bug in Linux, reachable on all major distros released in the last 9 years. A small, portable python script gets root on all platforms. Found by the teams at @theori_io and @xint_official More details below xint.io/blog/copy-fail-linux…
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Álisson Bertochi retweeted
i went to clickup.com. opened the page source. found a hardcoded API key in the javascript. copied it. sent one GET request. got back 959 email addresses and 3,165 internal feature flags. employees from Home Depot. Fortinet. Autodesk. Tenable. Rakuten. Mayo Clinic. Permira. Akin Gump. government workers from Wyoming, Arkansas, North Carolina, Montana, Queensland Australia, and New Zealand. a Microsoft contractor. 71 clickup employees. fortinet sells enterprise firewalls. tenable makes Nessus, the vulnerability scanner half the industry runs. their employees emails are exposed because clickup hardcoded a third party API key in a javascript file that loads before you even log in. this was first reported to clickup through hackerone on January 17, 2025. its now April 2026. the key has not been rotated. i just pulled the response five minutes ago. every email is still there. clickup raised $535 million at a $4 billion valuation. claims 85% of the Fortune 500 use their platform. looks like the proof is in the page source.
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CTF in 2026
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> be north korean hackers > spend 6 months cosplaying as a quant fund. hitting conferences, shaking hands, dropping $1M of real money into the protocol > all so one dev would clone a repo > make $270M from the $1M initial investmet patience is the scariest exploit
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Álisson Bertochi retweeted
GLM-5 is a 744-billion-parameter open-weight model from that performs comparably to the best proprietary models (Claude Opus 4.5, GPT-5.2). The paper documents how they got there. They use reinforcement learning in an "agentic" setting where each trial might involve the model writing code, running it, reading error messages, and trying again over dozens of steps. Training on these long interaction sequences is slow because you have to wait for the slowest one to finish before updating the model, so they built an asynchronous system where the model keeps generating new attempts while simultaneously learning from completed ones. They also describe a sparse attention mechanism that lets the model skip irrelevant parts of its input when processing very long contexts, cutting computation roughly in half without losing accuracy. The paper explains what worked, what didn't, and why, including details like reward hacking during slide-generation training where the model learned to hide overflowing content with CSS tricks instead of actually improving layouts. Read with an AI tutor: chapterpal.com/s/aafb0d2c/gl… PDF: arxiv.org/pdf/2602.15763
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Álisson Bertochi retweeted
North Korea is targeting npm maintainers -- not for crypto, but for write access to packages downloaded trillions of times a year. Several Socket engineers were targeted in this campaign -- myself, @ljharb, @jdalton, and others. None of us fell for the bait. Unfortunately, the axios maintainer did. No shame in that -- these aren't phishing emails. They're weeks-long ops with fake companies, fake Slack workspaces, and spoofed meeting platforms built with realistic Zoom/Teams interfaces using the official SDKs for realism. Other confirmed targets: @matteocollina (Fastify, Pino, Undici, Node.js TSC Chair), @wesleytodd (Express TC), @voxpelli (mocha, neostandard). The common thread? High-trust maintainers with publish access to packages that sit deep in everyone's dependency tree. The attack chain: build rapport over weeks, schedule a video call, fake an audio error, prompt the target to install a "fix." That fix is a RAT. Once it's on your machine, they have your .npmrc tokens, browser sessions, AWS creds, keychain. 2FA doesn't matter. OIDC publishing doesn't matter. Game over. Security researcher @tayvano_ linked this to UNC1069, a DPRK-nexus group Mandiant has tracked since 2018. Why social engineer one rich person when you can compromise one maintainer and reach millions of machines? This is the threat model now. If you maintain popular packages, act accordingly. If you use open source (and you certainly do), act accordingly. Full writeup: socket.dev/blog/attackers-hu…
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Álisson Bertochi retweeted
Naturally, the first thing we did was run it through Xint Code. Unsurprisingly, the vibe-coded app has quite a few vulnerabilities surfaced within minutes, including vuln101-level bugs (e.g. `.includes()` instead of `.startsWith()`). I guess @AnthropicAI wasn't kidding when they said "90% of the code written at Anthropic is written by Claude." What I'm really curious about is where Anthropic draws the security boundary. Claude Code asks whether you trust the workspace at the very start, and you basically can't use the tool unless you consent. From that point on, all responsibility shifts to the user. Consent once, and running Claude on a directory becomes a 0-click RCE vector in multiple ways. So maybe these aren't considered security vulnerabilities as far as they're concerned…?
Claude code source code has been leaked via a map file in their npm registry! Code: pub-aea8527898604c1bbb12468b…
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Claude Code source code just dropped. > built with React + Ink (terminal UI) on Bun runtime, ~512k lines of TypeScript Major gated features that aren't public yet 👀
Claude code source code has been leaked via a map file in their npm registry! Code: pub-aea8527898604c1bbb12468b…
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SOMEONE DROPPED A FULLY JAILBROKEN, OPEN-SOURCE, PRE-BUILT IOS 26 VIRTUAL MACHINE Repo: github.com/34306/vphone-aio
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
The "someone" who released this is @Little_34306 (as seen on the linked GitHub: github.com/34306). The OP regularly fails to credit the work they post.
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🚨 Rapid7 Labs has uncovered stealth “sleeper cell” access embedded in telecommunications networks by a China-nexus threat actor. Telecom networks are the central nervous system of the digital world. This type of compromise impacts everyone. IoCs & more: r-7.co/3NQ7szA
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