The dark side of advertising in the shadow economy
Wagyu just grew right before our eyes. Seven months after launch, the service claimed $700 million in volume, and its founder publicly showed off multi-million dollar swaps. The same visibility made the service popular in the shadow economy. ZachXBT named it as one of the channels used to move funds into Monero after the theft of $106 million from a European entity. After the Lighter attack the service took in about $3.5 million for conversion to XMR in just over an hour.
Popularity like that comes at a cost. A service handling large and sensitive flows is itself a target. First there were the extortionists. The WhiteArmor group demanded $5 million and, when refused, published three months of internal data – 38,628 orders and 10,139 IP addresses. Then came the hack On November 20, 5.2 million XMR1 were withdrawn from the deployer address, and some $13.5 million was stolen. In both cases, the users were the ones who took the hit. Some came looking for privacy, but got their data out in the open. Others were left with a token that dropped from $488 to $1 in half an hour.
Publicity brings customers, but it also brings those who know how to count other people's money and look for weak spots. The more popular a service is in the shadow economy, the less space it has for security mistakes.
AML Crypto is working with @officer_secret on a big investigation into Wagyu: how the service works, where its liquidity comes from, and how it has been used in money laundering schemes. It’s coming out soon.
Thanks, @etherscan. Great partners to work with. The Wagyu exploiter’s addresses got their labels within hours of the incident. Whoever runs into these funds next will see the warning first.
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People are starting to write to the Wagyu exploiter. Directly on the blockchain, in messages attached to transactions sent to his addresses.
There are ads interspersed with all the other messages. A swap service writes “Hey genius use this platform its very secure” link attached. Friendly tip on where to wash 7,348 stolen ETH, delivered straight to the wallet. One transaction fee per ad budget. Targeting: spot on. Leads:1.
The money still hasn't moved. We still watch.
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Wagyu has replied. Almost five hours after 5.2M XMR1 left his own wallet, the founder is “not completely sure what happened yet”.
Here is what’s known so far. The tokens went out in three transfers over half an hour, each one signed with the deployer key. The statement doesn’t mention the key. It doesn’t say whether XMR1 still swaps back to real Monero either. Swaps being fine is not much comfort if you are holding a one-dollar token.
He says he is open to talks. The other side is quiet: 7,348 ETH have been sitting on 0xF32D…Dc59 and 0x1464…20Bf since morning and haven’t moved.
We are watching these funds. If they move, we’ll post.
Graph: bholder.amlcrypto.io/shared/…
Hi.
Not completely sure what happened yet, will investigate.
Seems like MMs of XMR1 got hit primarily as they kept buying the endless amount of XMR1 being dumped on the market.
Swappers were OK, suffered no loss there.
Whoever did this, I'm open to negotiations of course.
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Wrapped Monero came unwrapped. On November 20, Wagyu’s XMR1 on Hyperliquid went from $479 to $1. Real XMR didn’t notice and stayed around $475. Lookonchain politely asked if this was a hack.
On-chain it all looked pretty routine. Address 0x1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bf got 5.2M XMR1 straight from the deployer wallet 0x2077…e06a (Wagyu owner). Three transfers: 100K, another 100K and, why not, 5M. Then the Hyperliquid order book, 13.22M USDC, and 7,467 ETH on the way out. The book ran out before the tokens did: 4.8M XMR1 are still sitting there unsold.
Graph: bholder.amlcrypto.io/shared/…
Nobody had to print anything. All 20M XMR1 were issued back in December 2025, in one go. That is more than the amount of Monero that exists, by the way. About 1.3M made it into circulation. The rest waited on one address with one key.
Wagyu’s founder did warn everyone: “I am the counterparty risk”. As for multisig, he said it only turns 1/1 custody into 2/3 custody. Today the market priced that difference at $478 per token.
Two versions. Someone stole the deployer key and sold the tokens. Or they were sold by whoever had the key from day one. On-chain you can’t tell them apart: same signature.
The same key issued ZEC1 and TRX1. They are still there, for now.
XMR2 (XMR - Beluga), which showed up on Hyperliquid on November 10, has nothing to do with this: different deployer, different service, no link to the incident that we could find.
The dark side of advertising in the shadow economy
Wagyu just grew right before our eyes. Seven months after launch, the service claimed $700 million in volume, and its founder publicly showed off multi-million dollar swaps. The same visibility made the service popular in the shadow economy. ZachXBT named it as one of the channels used to move funds into Monero after the theft of $106 million from a European entity. After the Lighter attack the service took in about $3.5 million for conversion to XMR in just over an hour.
Popularity like that comes at a cost. A service handling large and sensitive flows is itself a target. First there were the extortionists. The WhiteArmor group demanded $5 million and, when refused, published three months of internal data – 38,628 orders and 10,139 IP addresses. Then came the hack On November 20, 5.2 million XMR1 were withdrawn from the deployer address, and some $13.5 million was stolen. In both cases, the users were the ones who took the hit. Some came looking for privacy, but got their data out in the open. Others were left with a token that dropped from $488 to $1 in half an hour.
Publicity brings customers, but it also brings those who know how to count other people's money and look for weak spots. The more popular a service is in the shadow economy, the less space it has for security mistakes.
AML Crypto is working with @officer_secret on a big investigation into Wagyu: how the service works, where its liquidity comes from, and how it has been used in money laundering schemes. It’s coming out soon.
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Update: @etherscan have tagged the attacker's addresses. Thank you for the fast reply! We'll keep an eye on the cluster of attacker addresses and let you know if we see any new ones. Thanks for working with us to fight illicit activity!
🚨86,477 USDT stolen: 2 attempts to launder it via Railgun stopped
On Nov 9, a crypto service lost 86,477 USDT (TRC-20) due to unauthorised access to its infrastructure.
The attacker used a no-KYC exchanger to swap the funds from Tron to Ethereum, then tried to launder them via Railgun (twice). The second time, a part of the funds was swapped to USDC using NEAR Intents infrastructure, and transferred to a new address. Both attempts failed and the deposits were blocked, which meant the attacker had to return the funds to the original addresses.
This is where @RAILGUN_Project’s Private Proofs of Innocence (PPOI) system comes in. PPOI reacts quickly to the attacker's transactions, not letting stolen funds get any further inside Railgun - the only option left is to withdraw them back.
@aml_crypto is working on this case with @officer_secret. We continue to monitor the funds. The investigation is ongoing. We are working on the digital traces left by the attacker on the server and on the infrastructure behind the IP addresses used during the attack.
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🚨86,477 USDT stolen: 2 attempts to launder it via Railgun stopped
On Nov 9, a crypto service lost 86,477 USDT (TRC-20) due to unauthorised access to its infrastructure.
The attacker used a no-KYC exchanger to swap the funds from Tron to Ethereum, then tried to launder them via Railgun (twice). The second time, a part of the funds was swapped to USDC using NEAR Intents infrastructure, and transferred to a new address. Both attempts failed and the deposits were blocked, which meant the attacker had to return the funds to the original addresses.
This is where @RAILGUN_Project’s Private Proofs of Innocence (PPOI) system comes in. PPOI reacts quickly to the attacker's transactions, not letting stolen funds get any further inside Railgun - the only option left is to withdraw them back.
@aml_crypto is working on this case with @officer_secret. We continue to monitor the funds. The investigation is ongoing. We are working on the digital traces left by the attacker on the server and on the infrastructure behind the IP addresses used during the attack.
1/8 We've seen a Robin Hood in crypto thieves, someone who doesn't take it all?!
On September 6, 2026, 1,000,500 USDT was moved out of a TRON wallet with 1.5M USDT in it. The seed was known to a number of people. Looks like somebody took a lot, but left enough to keep the business going.
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7/8 The investigation continues. 7/ 538,479 DAI are located at 6 Ethereum addresses we attribute to the attacker as of November 6, 2026.
Exchanges and swap services: if you see them in your deposits, DM us.
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8/8 As of 6 November 2026, stolen assets are held on 6 Ethereum addresses we attribute to the attacker: 538,479 DAI 👇
0xfdc62d081bf6890b2a724c69f6b7f02e6ba28669 0xf11e0a4acab784ed1b0dc1d2de796b7c07633bb8 0x7972a7dd2f8c3719635db61a639c20d197d46364 0x39285e15834d03e5113a9fd14771abdc7c5ca6f9 0x655cd93a31b47964979b308837b3611dbfeebeb2 0x9e5fca21eb3a90ec7542b78125b721edb9f5bfbc
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TRX theft: the attacker transfers the funds
On Nov 5, 2026, the attacker started moving stolen funds from TFssrAF788Aa98VBYcMDzUp4SNWBXvLnch. In one day, 2.2M TRX was moved out of the address, about 3.2M TRX remains.
- 2.2M TRX traded for ~300 ETH on THORChain. Funds received on:
0xea0465bebd62a0925b583f3b5bd21ff67aebc44c 0x14a9a2615989809a97116e27bd97737c5b68b3a9
- From 0xea04, 26 ETH swapped to ZEC on THORChain.
- Another 124 ETH from address 0xea04 is moving to ZEC via Wagyu.
Forensic examination of the victim’s device confirmed that the theft was conducted with the help of malware. Work is still underway on the attacker’s digital identifiers.
Another TRON address (~$106K) was hijacked in the same way, still active Oct 12, 2026, 15:32:51 UTC
Do not paste commands from chat or websites into a terminal. Keep your antivirus running, update software regularly, verify calls on a different channel. We fight crime and investigate together with @officer_secret. OPSec tips in his profile.
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How it occurred. The screenshots show the victim’s chat with the attacker, with the images translated.
The attackers wrote from the hacked Telegram account of a long-time acquaintance. They spent a month establishing confidence before they sent a calendar invite to meet.
The link led me to a fake Teams page: “access not permitted” on the phone, a “SDK update” prompt for the terminal on the laptop. The victim was travelling and less vigilant. The command installed malware and in an hour the attacker had taken over the TRON address. Loss: ~ $1.7M.
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iOS updated? If you think your seed phrase may have leaked, move to a new wallet too.
Lost crypto? DM @aml_crypto or @officer_secret We'll see what the prospects are. We mark attacker addresses at least with proof of theft and wallet ownership. Sometimes that alone gets funds frozen.
Crypto is being massively stolen from users of various crypto wallets through… 18+ websites - victims have already lost $5,570,000 due to a vulnerability in iOS 18.
It’s all because of the DarkSword vulnerability: just open an infected website via Safari and malicious code is already running on your smartphone - passwords, messages, photos, and crypto wallet files (including private keys) are under attack.
Update iOS to the latest version as soon as possible. And never ever store photos of your seed phrase in the gallery or write it in Notes!
AML Crypto retweeted
Crypto is being massively stolen from users of various crypto wallets through… 18+ websites - victims have already lost $5,570,000 due to a vulnerability in iOS 18.
It’s all because of the DarkSword vulnerability: just open an infected website via Safari and malicious code is already running on your smartphone - passwords, messages, photos, and crypto wallet files (including private keys) are under attack.
Update iOS to the latest version as soon as possible. And never ever store photos of your seed phrase in the gallery or write it in Notes!


















