ender non πŸ«ƒπŸ¦€ (@arm64_v8a) profile picture

twitter is a shit hole overrun by white supremacists and nazis

good britland
Joined March 2022
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Plants empire #pvz
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A response to recent reporting in Germany, in service of clarity and accountability: First, it’s important to be precise when it comes to critical infrastructure like Signal. Signal was not β€œhacked” β€” in that our encryption, infrastructure, and the integrity of the app’s code was not compromised. However, sophisticated attackers have engaged in a harmful phishing campaign, posing as β€œSignal Support” by changing their profile display name and using social engineering to trick people into handing over their credentials β€” information that allowed these attackers to take over some targeted Signal accounts. This is something that plagues any mainstream messaging app once it reaches the scale of Signal, but we know how high the stakes are given the trust people place in us. In the coming weeks, you’ll see us rolling out a number of changes to help hinder these kinds of attacks. Because we don’t collect user data, what we know about these attacks comes from the victims of phishing. And from what victims have told us, the attacks followed a broad pattern: after tricking people into revealing their Signal credentials, attackers then used those credentials to take over their account and also frequently changed the associated phone number. Because such a change results in de-registering your Signal accounts, attackers prepared people for this by telling them that being de-registered was intended behavior, and that all they would need to do is β€œre-register,” or, create a new account. When they moved to create a new Signal account β€” one that was now decoupled from their hijacked account β€” the victims thought they were logging back in to their primary account. As a result, many didn't notice the takeover. The compromised accounts were then weaponized to target the victims' contact lists by posing as the owners of the account. We understand the trust that people put in Signal, and how devastating this kind of social engineering can be. While it’s true that all messaging platforms are susceptible to scammers and phishing that betrays people’s trust and convinces them to β€œunlock the front door” where no backdoor exists, we are looking to do everything we can to help people avoid and detect such scams. For the time being, please stay vigilant against phishing and account takeover attempts. Remember that no one from Signal Support will ever send you a message request or ask for your registration verification code or Signal PIN. For an added layer of protection, you can enable Registration Lock in your Signal Settings (Account -> Registration Lock).
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my proposal for IPv8 (hope it's not too late): MAKE IT AI FIRST. it doesn't matter how long an IP address is and how reliable the DNS infrastructure is, if a program can just request in natural language "hey send this packet to that social network server". the LLM under the hood, having all the user context, can infer what social network this is about and how to route the packet efficiently. no DNS needed either
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Recently, France's national law enforcement began fearmongering about GrapheneOS and smearing it with inaccurate claims. France's corporate and state media heavily participated. Many articles and also radio/television coverage misrepresented GrapheneOS as being for criminals.
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Despite being done for profit, /e/ receives millions of euros in funding from the EU on an ongoing basis. /e/ and Murena use extraordinarily inaccurate marketing to not only promote their products/services but also to mislead people about GrapheneOS and scare them away from it.
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The level of European chauvinism and xenophobia you need to have in order to have a problem with using an OS from Canada is extraordinary. Meanwhile, your proposed EU alternative was literally partnered with Putin's government from 2015 through 2023. That's truly bizarre stuff.
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The portions of SailfishOS specific to it are largely closed source so it can't be forked as GrapheneOS can do with AOSP. Due to Jolla's close partnership with the Russian government from 2015 through 2023, they were able to make their Aurora OS fork of it which is still ongoing.
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Android Open Source Project is no less of a Linux distribution than SailfishOS. SailfishOS using glibc and systemd doesn't make it more of a Linux distribution. Unlike SailfishOS, AOSP is an open source project which can be forked by anyone instead of only the Russian government.
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Apple and Google regularly tell the media they haven't seen exploits of a specific vulnerability or exploits of devices with a security protection enabled. This is heavily misinterpreted as meaning exploits aren't happening. They don't ever find out about many successful attacks.
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There are at least a dozen people spending at least several hours attacking GrapheneOS across platforms on a daily basis. It's a very strange situation. How do these people have so much time and dedication to keep making posts across platforms attacking us? It's relentless.
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That's a very watered down idea of how it works. It doesn't make any sense to claim only those components matter or that only that component is closed source and capable of doing malicious things. It's nothing more than an echo chamber meme about security coprocessors, etc.
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Replying to @hello_volla
These are unsafe devices lacking basic privacy and security patches/protections while including multiple invasive services. Sending sensitive user data to OpenAI without consent and misleading users about which security patches are provided isn't ethical. discuss.grapheneos.org/d/241…
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Replying to @hello_volla
Android provides a standard hardware attestation system with support for alternate operating systems via allowing their verified boot key fingerprints. It's mainly used with Google's root of trust and remote key provisioning service but the API supports alternative roots of trust. Volla's Unified Attestation is fully built on Android's hardware attestation API. It solely exists to create a centralized authority and service determining what's allowed under their control. Unified Attestation will permit using products from the companies involved in it while forbidding using arbitrary alternatives. They clearly aren't going to enforce reasonable security standards since their products wouldn't meet those. The whole purpose of the system is to permit their products regardless of merit and convince banking/government apps to adopt it. There's nothing neutral or fair about a system controlled by companies approving their own products while disallowing other options. Companies forming an anti-competitive cartel providing a service which permitting their products and while disallowing others isn't legal regardless of how they market it. It's not legal when Google does it with the Play Integrity API and it's not legal when it's Volla, Murena and iodΓ© doing it. We won't be participating in a system which gives these companies veto power over app compatibility on GrapheneOS. These companies will not be given the power to make arbitrary demands of GrapheneOS. We've been talking back and forth with multiple regulators over the past several years about the Play Integrity API to have action taken against it. Unified Attestation is a massive disruption to our efforts and will get in the way of having regulators take action against this. We've also been considering filing a lawsuit against Google over the Play Integrity API. Unlike Google, the companies involved in Unified Attestation don't have massive resources to defend their anti-competitive system. Android's standard hardware API doesn't require delegating verification to a centralized service. One or more neutral organizations could exist certifying devices and operating systems without providing a centralized API. Those organizations could simply provide signed releases with the roots of trust, revoked keys and operating system key fingerprints. Apps could use multiple different certifying organizations. This is already something Android's hardware attestation API fully supports today. Volla, Murena and iodΓ© are each a for-profit company selling devices. Each of them has failed to keep up with important security patches and protections. Each has marketed their products as providing a level of security they don't provide. It's very clear why these 3 companies want to be in charge of choosing which devices and operating systems people are allowed to use. They want to make sure their products are permitted and want to have an advantage over others to boost their profits. Unified Attestation is an anti-competitive cartel turning a decentralized decision into a centralized one. Instead of neutral organizations being formed to certify devices without a massive conflict of interest, these companies will sign off on their products regardless of the level of insecurity. Multiple competing companies forming a cartel which locks out other options is not legal. We're fully willing to file one or more lawsuits over this. It should be discontinued now prior to harming us.
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Replying to @hello_volla
> UnifiedAttestation is legal because the software is an independent, non-derivative work. It's not legal because it's an anti-competitive cartel from several companies collaborating to ban using anything other than the products of the companies participating in it. It's irrelevant that it's open source, which doesn't change that it's a centralized anti-competitive system. A court isn't going to care whether your centralized system has open source code. > > The proposed system is open source under the permissive Apache 2.0 license. The verification and certification process will be transparent and independent of the respective OEM. For-profit companies choosing what's permitted to be used and imposing rules on others who want to be permitted is inherently anti-competitive and against the law. We're already in the process of winning a lawsuit and we can accept spending a bunch of money on winning another too. That's not an idle threat and you should seriously consider whether you want a legal conflict with us in multiple jurisdictions over this. > The consortium is already much larger than the manufacturers mentioned, and Graphene OS is invited to participate and contribute for improvements. GrapheneOS will not participate in an anti-competitive system that's illegal under Canadian law and is clearly being made to permit the products of those participating regardless of their atrocious security. The system needs to be discontinued rather than GrapheneOS being invited to join it which isn't going to happen. GrapheneOS was not invited to participate until we publicly posted about this. We would have happily spoken our mind about this in private years ago to explain why it's completely unacceptable. You chose to involve multiple companies which have spent years trying to mislead people about GrapheneOS including with vile attacks on our team to promote their products. You only invited us because we strongly publicly opposed the system and it isn't going to change that we oppose it. We could have steered you away from making a completely unacceptable system years ago but now you're going to need to discontinue it after all of this work on it. Your companies selling phones and operating systems cannot be the ones deciding what's permitted. It's inherently anti-competitive and should never have been attempted. This should only be done by multiple independent third parties with a decentralized system not requiring any centralized service. Android hardware attestation is perfectly usable without you building a centralized service on top of it. You could be distributing a signed list of approved roots and approved verified boot key fingerprints for Android hardware attestation instead of fully seizing control with a centralized service. That would still be immensely problematic due to the companies making the products being in charge of what's allowed but at least it could work alongside others instead of seizing full control with a centralized service. > UnifiedAttestation's intention is to promote competition and it has the potential to attract app developers who currently use Google Play Integrity, thereby making alternatives even more appealing to consumers. It does the opposite of promoting competition. It takes an API which is actually open and permits trusting arbitrary roots of trust and operating systems to build a centralized system giving you control over what's allowed on top of it. > Regarding Volla OS: Security patches are released monthly, as well as vendor security patches as soon as they become available. Major firmware and kernel updates are also applied. The Volla Phone Quintus will soon receive a kernel 6.6 update. Android doesn't backport all of the patches to older releases. Keeping up with kernel updates would mean regularly shipping LTS revisions. You aren't actually keeping up with updates at all. The pace you ship partial security backports being monthly doesn't mean you're shipping all of the Android security patches monthly or keeping up with kernel updates on a monthly basis. You're working with companies which do far worse than you do and mislead users about what's provided including setting an inaccurate Android security patch even if that's something Volla hasn't done themselves. It was your choice to work with Murena and iodΓ© including giving them a say over what's permitted. discuss.grapheneos.org/d/241…
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Daniel Micay stepped down as lead developer of GrapheneOS due to the relentless libel and harassment you're participating in towards him. We made clear announcements explaining he was unable to continue being productive working on development due to it and someone else took over.
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Copperhead paid for press releases and heavily edited Wikipedia themselves to push their false narratives. Wikipedia is heavily astroturfed and not a reliable source of information. The narrative push about GrapheneOS there is inaccurate. You're making vile personal attacks.
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Replying to @arm64_v8a @0xocdsec
Yes, and there are tools for comparing APKs and also GrapheneOS community written tools for comparing the OS builds which can be used as the basis for future enforcement. It's a lot more complex for the OS because it has a ton of signatures due to all the APKs, APEXes and more.
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There's a signed tag for every signed binary release of the apps. It's verifiable that the binary releases correspond to the tags. We've provided everything needed to perform the verification. The whole point of verification is that other people do it not cloud CI infra we run...
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Each of our app releases has both a signed tag release and a signed binary release with a matching version. The binary release can be reproducibly built from the signed tag. It's still unclear why you believe us doing builds/signing via cloud server CI would be an improvement.
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