Shocking
Crime coded tbh
1/ An investigation into @Cupseyy, a trading "legend" who used his fame to extract $1.7M through side wallets in just a few months
One of crypto's largest KOLs has been secretly extracting millions from his audience
We’ll expose him soon
Unfortunately, he’s just a symptom of a much bigger problem
Social trading has brought out the worst in KOLs. It was designed to keep them honest by making every trade public. In reality, the opposite happened
In just a few weeks, we exposed a number of "top social traders" using the same tricks:
• Public wallets to attract copy traders
• Side wallets to dump
• Callouts to farm rewards
• Bundled tokens to hide supply
And there are plenty more doing the exact same thing
Why? Because our industry incentivizes it
1) Launchpads allow it
Most launchpads today are obsessed with one thing: volume. Millions in callout rewards, affiliate links, and top leaderboards. Almost nothing on detecting bundles, side wallets, or shady traders. Scams drive volume. Launchpads have no reason to stop it (other than actually caring about their users)
2) Social trading incentivizes it
Side wallets have become a business model. Before social trading, only big KOLs could do it. Now, anyone who lands on a leaderboard can monetize by dumping on their copy-traders. The temptation is real
3) CT normalizes bundle culture
“Everyone bundles. It's how it's done" - an excuse we hear every time we expose a KOL. Supply control isn't the problem. Hiding it is. If it's so bullish, why hide it? Spoiler: because you're planning to sell
***
Launchpads are paying millions to dishonest KOLs. It's time they start taking it seriously
Audit the top traders. Expose their side wallets. Ban repeat offenders
We have the tools. What's missing is the willingness to use them
No one's coming to save us
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ok safe to say binance is pwned
The biggest assets were approximately:
• 1.615B USDT
• 62.6M RLUSD
• 29,934 wBETH
• 11,372 XAUt
• 6.19M UNI
• 198.4M ENA
• 7.175T PEPE
• 27.8M USD1
• 2.26M LINK
• 127,853 AAVE
about $2.5B at the explorer’s prices.
1. The attacker deployed a delegate contract, 0x63e842b0...73e9c6fAe, from the relayer at 15:59 UTC.
2. About four hours later, the relayer submitted an EIP-7702 authorization transaction
That installed the malicious 7702 delegate code on Binance 14.
3. The relayer then made a call to Binance 14, executing the delegate code, and transferring Binance 14’s ETH and token balances.
4. The calldata is labeled sweep(address, address[]). The second argument is a list of recognizable token-contract addresses plus the zero-address (eth).
5. The same relayer later used the same delegate to move 780M USDC from Binance Hot Wallet 34 into the same pool
• The relayer 0x7C... was funded by three Tornado Cash 0.1 ETH withdrawals over the prior two days.
• The same pool also received 28,005.6 ETH from Binance 16 24 seconds after the main sweep.
• The pool then forwarded 195,460 ETH to a fresh, unlabeled EOA
• That EOA has only one transaction and currently holds the 195,460 ETH.
What's a bit unclear is why the relayer was needed in the first place. If they had the private keys to the Binance wallets, they could have just sent the assets out in an atomic bundle without needing a relayer at all.
So it seems likely that they didn't have the private keys and instead just had the 7702 auth signatures, which must have been phished somehow.
I think we can go ahead and assume DPRK.
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Trends come and go, bull and bear markets end, but there’s one constant onchain in every environment
$CRIME onchain retweeted
120k in rewards for "calling" 10k mcap coins...
OOOOOOOoooooooo it's crime.
Replying to @theunipcs
Here’s your answer uni
Because shilling low caps is being rewarded with millions
$CRIME onchain retweeted
Wazz's wallet label db / onchain intel tool now has a Crime Score ™️ for every single wallet
In short:
If your wallet or entity has been associated with bundling/rugging/serial deploying operations which have been investigated in our DB, then you will have a crime score
12/ I hope to continue receiving grants from foundations and donations from individuals, as it enables me to take on higher risk for unique cases that others may not consider viable.
For this case, I fronted $349.7K and lost 5% on each order, with no guarantee Jimmy wouldn't disappear with the funds, and an unknown amount of personal risk from dealing with the syndicate.
Since 2022, I have helped action $75M+ in freezes related to DPRK incidents.
My findings were immediately shared with trusted investigators within the private sector and law enforcement assigned to the case.
Due to sensitivity around the investigation, I was unable to publish sooner.
That is one of the frustrations I have with my work. I am not always able to share findings as quickly as I'd like, and I am currently sitting on significant findings from other cases.
If this case resonates with you and you're in a position to support it, feel free to reach out.









































