$CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain) header
$CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain) profile picture

onchain $CRIME supercycle || art by @renrutts and @yappr_ || memes based on crime fighting legend @zachxbt (do not tag zachxbt in your $crime posts)

Joined October 2023
Photo by $CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain)Photo by $CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain)Photo by $CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain)Photo by $CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain)Photo by $CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain)Photo by $CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain)Photo by $CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain)Photo by $CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain)Photo by $CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain)Photo by $CRIME onchain (@crime_onchain)
CRIME
*FBI'S NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER HACKED -CNN
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$CRIME onchain retweeted
🤝 Paid partnership
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Crime coded
This one is going on my Crime board 📸
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$CRIME onchain retweeted
Shocking Crime coded tbh
1/ An investigation into @Cupseyy, a trading "legend" who used his fame to extract $1.7M through side wallets in just a few months
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S Tier - USDC / USDT / CRIME A Tier - BTC / HYPE / LIT / ZEC B Tier - ZRO / XMR / ENA / PUMP / MORPHO F Tier - ETH / 2Z / BP Satan Tier - XPL / SOL
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$CRIME onchain retweeted
Another day Another hard rug Solana (home of crime onchain)
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There’s too much crime it’s exhausting
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One of crypto's largest KOLs has been secretly extracting millions from his audience We’ll expose him soon Unfortunately, he’s just a symptom of a much bigger problem Social trading has brought out the worst in KOLs. It was designed to keep them honest by making every trade public. In reality, the opposite happened In just a few weeks, we exposed a number of "top social traders" using the same tricks: • Public wallets to attract copy traders • Side wallets to dump • Callouts to farm rewards • Bundled tokens to hide supply And there are plenty more doing the exact same thing Why? Because our industry incentivizes it 1) Launchpads allow it Most launchpads today are obsessed with one thing: volume. Millions in callout rewards, affiliate links, and top leaderboards. Almost nothing on detecting bundles, side wallets, or shady traders. Scams drive volume. Launchpads have no reason to stop it (other than actually caring about their users) 2) Social trading incentivizes it Side wallets have become a business model. Before social trading, only big KOLs could do it. Now, anyone who lands on a leaderboard can monetize by dumping on their copy-traders. The temptation is real 3) CT normalizes bundle culture “Everyone bundles. It's how it's done" - an excuse we hear every time we expose a KOL. Supply control isn't the problem. Hiding it is. If it's so bullish, why hide it? Spoiler: because you're planning to sell *** Launchpads are paying millions to dishonest KOLs. It's time they start taking it seriously Audit the top traders. Expose their side wallets. Ban repeat offenders We have the tools. What's missing is the willingness to use them No one's coming to save us
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$CRIME onchain retweeted
i can't believe it's a $crime season again
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ok safe to say binance is pwned The biggest assets were approximately: • 1.615B USDT • 62.6M RLUSD • 29,934 wBETH • 11,372 XAUt • 6.19M UNI • 198.4M ENA • 7.175T PEPE • 27.8M USD1 • 2.26M LINK • 127,853 AAVE about $2.5B at the explorer’s prices. 1. The attacker deployed a delegate contract, 0x63e842b0...73e9c6fAe, from the relayer at 15:59 UTC. 2. About four hours later, the relayer submitted an EIP-7702 authorization transaction That installed the malicious 7702 delegate code on Binance 14. 3. The relayer then made a call to Binance 14, executing the delegate code, and transferring Binance 14’s ETH and token balances. 4. The calldata is labeled sweep(address, address[]). The second argument is a list of recognizable token-contract addresses plus the zero-address (eth). 5. The same relayer later used the same delegate to move 780M USDC from Binance Hot Wallet 34 into the same pool • The relayer 0x7C... was funded by three Tornado Cash 0.1 ETH withdrawals over the prior two days. • The same pool also received 28,005.6 ETH from Binance 16 24 seconds after the main sweep. • The pool then forwarded 195,460 ETH to a fresh, unlabeled EOA • That EOA has only one transaction and currently holds the 195,460 ETH. What's a bit unclear is why the relayer was needed in the first place. If they had the private keys to the Binance wallets, they could have just sent the assets out in an atomic bundle without needing a relayer at all. So it seems likely that they didn't have the private keys and instead just had the 7702 auth signatures, which must have been phished somehow. I think we can go ahead and assume DPRK.
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$CRIME onchain retweeted
NEW: @zachxbt SAYS YOU’RE LIKELY SAFER TOUCHING BONNIE BLUE THAN TOUCHING INDIAN CEX @CoinDCX
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Crime Wednesday for the entire Internet
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Thank you for your attention to this matter
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Trends come and go, bull and bear markets end, but there’s one constant onchain in every environment
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$CRIME onchain retweeted
120k in rewards for "calling" 10k mcap coins... OOOOOOOoooooooo it's crime.
Replying to @theunipcs
Here’s your answer uni Because shilling low caps is being rewarded with millions
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$CRIME onchain retweeted
Wazz's wallet label db / onchain intel tool now has a Crime Score ™️ for every single wallet In short: If your wallet or entity has been associated with bundling/rugging/serial deploying operations which have been investigated in our DB, then you will have a crime score
wallet label db / onchain intel tool looking good here
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$CRIME onchain retweeted
🤝 Paid partnership
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1/ How I infiltrated a Chinese organized crime syndicate that has laundered $1B+ across multiple exploits for Lazarus Group. Posing as a client, I gathered intel that helped action freezes for the Feb 2025 Bybit exploit and attribute illicit activity onchain.
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$CRIME onchain retweeted
12/ I hope to continue receiving grants from foundations and donations from individuals, as it enables me to take on higher risk for unique cases that others may not consider viable. For this case, I fronted $349.7K and lost 5% on each order, with no guarantee Jimmy wouldn't disappear with the funds, and an unknown amount of personal risk from dealing with the syndicate. Since 2022, I have helped action $75M+ in freezes related to DPRK incidents. My findings were immediately shared with trusted investigators within the private sector and law enforcement assigned to the case. Due to sensitivity around the investigation, I was unable to publish sooner. That is one of the frustrations I have with my work. I am not always able to share findings as quickly as I'd like, and I am currently sitting on significant findings from other cases. If this case resonates with you and you're in a position to support it, feel free to reach out.
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