For my first post, I’m sharing a letter @NVIDIA signed on why open models matter. AI will transform every industry, power every company, and be built by every country. Open models strengthen safety and cybersecurity, accelerate innovation and diffusion, and enable sovereignty. The world needs both frontier closed models and frontier open models. images.nvidia.com/pdf/Open-W…

Open is the way. Jensen is right.

Very happy to support this on behalf of Google. We have long benefited from open source, are big contributors to open source and in fact have consistently made open weights models with Gemma available from @GoogleDeepMind @demishassabis . Onwards!

Over the last two weeks, both the U.S. Government and Anthropic took significant actions that demonstrated their power to control access to AI by restricting what others can do with frontier models. This has been one of those moments that, once seen, will be hard to unsee, and it is significantly accelerating many businesses’ and nation states’ efforts to ensure reliable access to AI that no one else can terminate. Anthropic first released Claude Fable 5, a version of its Mythos model with additional guardrails, including some restrictions that seem well justified on safety grounds (such as limitations on applying it to hacking, bioweapons, and so forth). However, it also restricted developers’ ability to use it to build competing LLM technology. This move was concerning, given that the whole AI community, including Anthropic, has benefitted tremendously from open research — indeed, the AI revolution was kicked off by my former team (Google Brain) freely publishing the Transformers paper! Imagine if Microsoft’s terms of use barred anyone from using their tools to build competitive software, or if Google barred using it to search for information to work on competing search engines. Anthropic’s argument that it was unsafe for others to be able to make advances in AI also rang hollow. Initially, Anthropic silently degraded Fable 5’s performance for users detected to be working on LLM research through invisible interventions that weakened the model’s outputs without notifying the user. After significant backlash, it walked back this decision and decided to be transparent when it did this, but it still refuses to use its latest capabilities to help AI researchers. This move represents a raw demonstration of power by Anthropic. It has used “safety” arguments to hinder potential competitors. Platforms succeed when they are viewed as stable, reliable partners that one can build on. The sudden rule changes by Anthropic (including a mandatory 30 day data retention policy for Fable usage) have made developers wonder about the stability of building on any one proprietary LLM provider, not just Anthropic. The U.S. Government then shortly followed with an even greater demonstration of power. It used the Commerce Department’s authority to regulate technologies that may be national security threats to restrict exports of Mythos and Fable, requiring a license for use by any foreign national, whether inside or outside of the U.S., including employees of Anthropic. This led Anthropic to disable access to Fable to all users worldwide. Sam Altman pointed out, referring to Anthropic, “It is clearly incredible marketing to say, ‘We have built a bomb, we are about to drop it on your head. We will sell you a bomb shelter for $100 million.’” But when one engages in this type of fear-based marketing, it increases the odds that the U.S. Government will agree with you and slap export controls on the bomb you say you have built. To be clear, I don't think Anthropic has built anything like a bomb, and I don't think export controls on Fable are appropriate. However, following the U.S. Government making this move, many nations, including U.S. allies, saw how the U.S. can suddenly yank their access to AI models. In many capitals around the world, this has spurred discussions on AI sovereignty and how others can ensure uninterrupted access to this critical technology. For decades, many nations were comfortable having many parts of their supply chain rely on the U.S., China, and other major producers. Once a nation issues a threat, or takes action, to limit other nations’ access, other nations will rationally try to secure alternatives. For decades, semiconductor manufacturing in China made slow progress; once the U.S. moved to limit China’s access, China’s efforts kicked into high gear. Similarly, once China threatened U.S. access to rare earth minerals, U.S. efforts to secure alternatives accelerated. Now that it has become crystal clear that private U.S. companies and the U.S. government can limit, in short order, other nations’ access to frontier AI models, the incentive of others to invest more in alternatives like open source grows significantly. Of course, training frontier models is not easy, so it remains to be seen how successful they are, but we have crossed the rubicon. Satya Nadella wrote an essay about the importance of building a healthy ecosystem on top of frontier AI technology. I heartily agree with him, and hope this week’s events will ultimately prove to be constructive steps toward this. I hope we can build a more free, more open world, where research is freely shared, and laws and societal norms shape a level playing field that allows everyone to make progress. A silver lining of the events of these past two weeks is now that everyone better realizes key points of instability of the current system, we can all work to create a more stable foundation. [Original text: The Batch newsletter]

Your margin is my opportunity: AI version… The biggest surprise of 2026 is that the capability gap between the best open-weight/source models and the best closed models has narrowed much faster than the pricing gap. The pricing gap remains enormous while the capability gap is quite narrow. What does this means in practice? For a company consuming 1 billion input tokens and 1 billion output tokens per month: GPT-5.5 Pro: ~$105,000 Claude Opus 4.8: ~$30,000 DeepSeek V4 Pro: ~$5,220 DeepSeek R1: ~$2,740 I asked ChatGPT what it thought about this and it answered as follows: “If I were building a company today, the economic frontier would look roughly like: DeepSeek V4 Pro / R1 for high-volume inference. Claude Opus for premium agent workflows where reliability matters. GPT-5.5 Pro only for workloads where its incremental capability demonstrably produces enough business value to justify a 20–40× token premium.” Most CEOs have no idea that, instead of this nuanced approach, their teams are running amok internally by picking the most expensive models in most cases and burning through massive budgets with zero governance, audit ability and control. As control planes like our Software Factory become more standard, you can expect the run rate revenue growth of the frontier labs to go down meaningfully and the revenues of the open models to skyrocket. Why? Because we can implement the nuanced approach above and be agnostic to model - instead focusing on customer intent, model task and cost management among other things.

Coding agents are accelerating different types of software work to different degrees. When we architect teams, understanding these distinctions helps us to have realistic expectations. Listing functions from most accelerated to least, my order is: frontend development, backend, infrastructure, and research. Frontend development — say, building a web page to serve descriptions of products for an ecommerce site — is dramatically sped up because coding agents are fluent in popular frontend languages like TypeScript and JavaScript and frameworks like React and Angular. Additionally, by examining what they have built by operating a web browser, coding agents are now very good at closing the loop and iterating on their own implementations. Granted, LLMs today are still weak at visual design, but given a design (or if a polished design isn’t important), the implementation is fast! Backend development — say, building APIs to respond to queries requesting product data — is harder. It takes more work by human developers to steer modern models to think through corner cases that might lead to subtle bugs or security flaws. Further, a backend bug can lead to non-intuitive downstream effects like a corrupted database that occasionally returns incorrect results, which can be harder to debug than a typical frontend bug. Finally, although database migrations can be easier with coding agents, they’re still hard and need to be handled carefully to prevent data loss. While backend development is much faster with coding agents, they accelerate it less, and skilled developers still design and implement far better backends than inexperienced ones who use coding agents. Infrastructure. Agents are even less effective in tasks like scaling an ecommerce site to 10K active uses while maintaining 99.99% reliability. LLMs' knowledge is still relatively limited with respect to infrastructure and the complex tradeoffs good engineers must make, so I rarely trust them for critical infra decisions. Building good infrastructure often requires a period of testing and experimentation, and coding agents can help with that, but ultimately that’s a significant bottleneck where fast AI coding does not help much. Lastly, finding infrastructure bugs — say, a subtle network misconfiguration — can be incredibly difficult and requires deep engineering expertise. Thus, I’ve found that coding agents accelerate critical infrastructure even less than backend development. Research. Coding agents accelerate research work even less. Research involves thinking through new ideas, formulating hypotheses, running experiments, interpreting them to potentially modify the hypotheses, and iterating until we reach conclusions. Coding agents can speed up the pace at which we can write research code. (I also use coding agents to help me orchestrate and keep track of experiments, which makes it easier for a single researcher to manage more experiments.) But there is a lot of work in research other than coding, and today’s agents help with research only marginally. Categorizing software work into frontend, backend, infra, and research is an extreme simplification, but having a simple mental model for how much different tasks have sped up has been useful for how I organize software teams. For example, I now ask front-end teams to implement products dramatically faster than a year ago, but my expectations for research teams have not shifted nearly as much. I am fascinated by how to organize software teams to use coding agents to achieve speed, and will keep sharing my findings in future posts. [Original text: deeplearning.ai/the-batch/is… ]

I burned 84 million tokens on February 28th. Researching companies, drafting memos, running agents. That’s running Kimi K2.5, a serverless model via API. At Claude or OpenAI rates — roughly $9 per million tokens blended — equivalent usage would cost $756 for a single day’s work. My peak days hit 80 million tokens. My average days run 20 million. Cloud inference at frontier-model pricing adds up fast.