Rajeev

The adversary will do what it can do; the Q is what are we doing?

Continuing with the untold stories from the Kashmir invasion of October 1947: A platoon locality lay at Bhattika, north of Muzaffarabad, along the IB. The approach to the platoon was via the track connecting Muzaffarabad with Tithwal, further north and northeast, and along the Kishanganga River. A foot track at Maira connected the post with the main track. The platoon, consisting of Dogra soldiers and a few Muslim ones, all from the 4 JAK Infantry, was commanded by Subedar Hukma Singh, a WW II veteran. Another platoon post, in depth, at Gohari was commanded by a Muslim JCO, Subedar Mir Waz, from 4 JAK Infantry itself. That platoon included Muslim soldiers from ‘D’ Company. No attack or fire assault happened against the post on 22 October. However, from his commanding position, Subedar Hukma Singh could see smoke pillaring up at Muzaffarabad and then at Domel. Long bursts could also be heard intermittently. The JCO tried to contact his company HQ, co-located with the battalion HQ at Domel, but to no avail. Sometime in the afternoon, he received an urgent call from Subedar Mir Waz, requesting reinforcements and assistance because, as the caller alleged, his platoon post was under attack from all sides. However, there was no sound of firing or any such noise, though the Gohari post was much closer to Bhattika than Muzaffarabad. Guided by his intuition, Subedar Hukma Singh politely declined, saying his post was also under attack and everyone was committed. During the night of 22/23 October, all Muslim soldiers of his platoon, except one, simply walked away. The platoon commander, now isolated and out of contact with his superior, kept his platoon's morale high throughout the day on 23 October and decided to move north to Tithwal. He made this decision because, from his vantage point, he could see the destruction in Muzaffarabad and Domel, which, in his view, meant the end of his battalion's command structure. However, at 1700h, about 500 invaders, including Muslims deserters from his own platoon, surrounded the post and asked for surrender. The platoon fired back in response. Soon, all hell broke loose, and the platoon came under heavy 3-inch mortar fire. The Dogras, however, held their nerves and repulsed the attack. It was dark by then, and the enemy pulled back into the dominating hills around, leaving seven dead behind. Many soldiers, too, had been wounded but were in a position to walk. By now, the ammunition had reached a critical level; at about 2300h, he ordered his platoon to evacuate the post. The platoon moved out silently and was soon out of the loose circle created by the invaders around the post. The platoon took a cross-country route to maintain surprise. However, somewhere near Bafal, the lone Muslim soldier, Sepoy Lal Din, slipped away and ran to the post at Gohari without anyone coming to know about his exit. He updated Mir Waz on the state of ammunition, the plight of the wounded, and the platoon's plan to head towards Tithwal. Just before first light on 24 October, the platoon was ambushed near Pahalakar. Many of the attackers were men from Mir Waz’s platoon. A bitter fight ensued, but soon, the platoon ran out of ammunition. Most of the men, including Subedar Hukma Singh, were caught alive and marched down to the riverbed. They were made to line up, stripped to their underwear, humiliated and then shot in the cold blood one by one. One sepoy, Sansar Singh, however, decided to take his chances and dived into the freezing and fast current of the Kishanganga River before he could be shot. He was washed away but managed to emerge on the opposite bank about a mile downstream. He then made it back to safety and lived to tell the tale of an unparalleled treachery and inhuman treatment meted out to the unfortunate platoon. (One clarification about yesterday's post about Kotli and Naik Sant Ram: this Kotli is different from Kotli town which is closer to Mirpur)