Kansan | Nonresident Researcher @CarnegieEndow | PhD @ Cambridge | transatlantic trade, tech, and security | Tweets my own
Washington, DC
Joined August 2014
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Mosley: "If you were to talk to the Ukrainians, all the experience I've had there ... is you need stuff that works, and you need it because if you don't, your dead. And the questions around sovereignty are secondary."
I doubt those questions are still secondary post-Starlink.
Europe may want greater tech sovereignty, but Palantir’s Europe chief Louis Mosley told me and @Gmvolpi that some reliance on US technology is unavoidable — while dependence on China for critical hardware gets less attention.
linkedin.com/safety/go/?url=…
Erik Brown retweeted
On The #Eurofile: Max + Lexi discuss Ursula von der Leyen's State of the Union address. Plus, Emily Benson joins the show with an update on uneasy state of U.S.-EU tech relations. Full episode below.
@maxbergmann @lexlinafelter
youtube.com/watch?v=abSqPAVR…
Erik Brown retweeted
Might I suggest "non-resident fellow"
Dear @MarkJCarney we want to bring the relationship with Canada to the highest level possible.
I would like to work with you on opening the door for Canada to being the first associate member of the EU.
And create a common prosperity and economic security space.
Erik Brown retweeted
The Trump Admin’s foreign policy toward the rest of the West has been premised on the idea that they can bully Canada and the EU because they’ll eventually come around on China and there’s no real alternative to the U.S.
Announcements like this demonstrate how wrong that is. Instead, they’ve proven the U.S.’s unreliability. The rest of the West is now planning for a world where they are forced to hedge between threats from the U.S. and China.
With each passing day, we lose more of the leverage and goodwill we need to coordinate action in response to China’s strategy to deindustrialize the West. In the final accounting, it’s likely Trump’s foreign policy will end up highly counterproductive to his own stated goals.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Erik Brown retweeted
Thrilled to reboot my Security Economics podcast as a new Lawfare Daily product. This will be dropping every two weeks going forward, and is available on all major platforms. Thanks to @mikereedschmidt for joining!
On Lawfare Daily, @petereharrell spoke to @mikereedschmidt, former Director of the CHIPS Program Office, about how the CHIPS program came together, challenges in implementation, and lessons for U.S. industrial policy in other critical sectors.
This episode is part of the new Security Economics podcast series.
Erik Brown retweeted
I feel like the debate Sriram describes often overrates how readily compute would 'leak' to other countries if the U.S. backlash against datacenters continued.
There are (almost) no safe international candidates with lots of capacity and better political conditions; especially given the less-than-stellar reputation of the U.S. and its tech firms in many of these countries. With the gulf becoming less and less attractive, it's really hard to get something big built anywhere else.
That means boosters shouldn't be too flippant in saying "well if we don't build here, there are many states and countries who'd be thankful to take our datacenters" - there in fact are not, and there are real costs to AI progress in not building in the U.S.
Some of that is solvable. If the U.S. wants to hedge through international buildout - as Lutnick has recently advertised again -, it could make international buildouts dramatically more attractive by offering assurances in return. The developers can only do so much on their own. Hosting countries want frontier model access in return, but that's imperiled by USG decisions (such as export controls). Flanking international buildouts with credible assurances not to cut off partners would go a long way to build trust. That might make the international leakage less lossy.
But all this also means: if the U.S. doesn't drastically improve on international buildouts, the backlash would probably actually slow down AI progress. I broadly like both datacenters and safe AI systems, but I think it's not as easy as saying "well the progress is happening anyways, building here retains maximal control"; the backlash probably genuinely 'helps' pace the frontier in a few years time. I don't really know what to make of that, either.
talking to a few ai safety / alignment organizations and find broadly they are not sure what to make of the data center protests - also it’s not something that has shown up in any timelines or predictions.
I see a split between
A) “we probably need data centers in US than in China”
B) “less data centers is a proxy for a slow down in capabilities and that could be a good thing “
Erik Brown retweeted
A constellation of allied democracies hosting strategically important AI infrastructure is beneficial along several dimensions:
- The host country gets economic and scientific spillover benefits (investment, high skill jobs, access to frontier compute);
- The world benefits from less concentrated power risk (ie, risk that any single government, company, or jurisdiction becomes the AI leviathan);
- Allied democracies benefit from resilience (natural disaster, grid failure, cyberattack, military conflict less likely to impair the entire ecosystem);
- US gets more buy in and investment in our "tech stack" / AI ecosystem (more countries with a stake in the ecosystem --> stronger incentives to maintain compatible export controls, security standards, cloud rules, etc rather than drifting toward China's stack);
- Turns US AI leadership into a more positive sum proposition for allies (if US gets all investment/econ benefit, asking allies mainly to accept export controls is less politically viable long term);
- Creates a larger trusted market for frontier AI (more countries with compatible security, data-governance, and infrastructure standards --> bigger "common AI economic area" --> bigger overall market);
- Strategic optionality. (If moratoria, energy constraints, permitting delays -- to pick purely hypothetical examples 🙃-- stop frontier AI development in one democracy, it need not go outside the democratic alliance altogether);
- Makes coercion harder. (Adversary or individual allied government can less easily threaten the entire AI supply chain).
Erik Brown retweeted
Nuclear deterrence is never mentioned in the piece. But it's clear from the Poland para (we don't want skin in the game) that it is also gone. And Europeans would be well advised to assume just that.
Erik Brown retweeted
Trying to run NATO like a protection racket--with echoes of how the Soviets ran the Warsaw Pact--a terrible idea. If you wanted to weaken deterrence in Europe and give allies an incentive not to procure more U.S. weapons you'd be hard pressed to find better approach than this.
Erik Brown retweeted
Self-interest can get people to buy solar panels and EVs. But it can't take the green transition all the way--the state must shut down fossil assets and mandate carbon removal.
My piece for the @FT/@ftopinion on what the Hormuz shock can and can't do for clean energy.
Erik Brown retweeted
Don't under estimate the change that is likely coming in European policy -- largely because Germany's own assessment of its interests has shifted (under duress)
Thorsten has been an very important voice in the German, and now (almost) global debate
Sharing this piece by @thorstenbenner on the stakes of China-EU trade tensions and why Europe shouldn't submit to acceptance of the status quo.
foreignaffairs.com/china/com… via @ForeignAffairs
Erik Brown retweeted
The unsustainable status quo between the EU & China.
How the China shock is threatening European core industries & how the EU needs to prepare for a confrontation it did not seek but cannot avoid.
My piece for @ForeignAffairs
Erik Brown retweeted
After a lot of lobbying by @jordanschneider, I am launching a substack. It will focus on international economics and a bit of geopolitics and US politics. No regular publication schedule, but it will be free! (You get what you pay for!). Link below.
Erik Brown retweeted
The US should establish a supply chain risk monitoring mechanism like this from China’s new supply chain security rule:
“Article 9: The state shall establish and improve a monitoring and early warning system for security risks to industrial chains and supply chains in critical sectors. Relevant departments under the State Council shall organize assessments and monitoring of the stability of supply channels for raw materials, technologies, equipment, products, and other inputs in critical sectors, as well as their impact on economic and social stability and national security. They shall identify security risks to industrial chains and supply chains and promptly issue early warning information.
Enterprises, industry associations, chambers of commerce, and other entities that discover situations affecting the security of industrial chains and supply chains may report them to the relevant departments of people’s governments at or above the county level.”
Erik Brown retweeted
🎧 NEW on the Pivotal States podcast:
The war with Iran, Trump’s claims on Greenland, and possible U.S. troop withdrawals have all put U.S.-German relations under strain.
Has trust been irreparably broken?
@SophiaBesch joins @CChivvis to discuss⤵️
youtube.com/watch?v=BCNfKMTv…
Erik Brown retweeted
“The World After the Unraveling”
The text of my Melbourne speech to the @LowyInstitute is now online.
lowyinstitute.org/publicatio…
Erik Brown retweeted
NEW ODD LOTS:
A massively underdiscussed element of the modern economy
@tracyalloway and I talk to @samanth_s about the extraordinary complex of undersea cables that keep the internet alive open.spotify.com/episode/724…
Erik Brown retweeted
Why Germany's and Europe's efforts to decrease dependencies on 🇨🇳for critical raw materials have failed, what we need to do better & how we can learn from others.
New study out today supported by Otto Wolff Stiftung and in context of our work with AA & Gulbenkian Foundation.
Erik Brown retweeted
My new Penguin e-book, Inflection Point: Biden, Trump, and the Future World Order, is now available to buy (for $6). This is a part of @LowyInstitute's wonderful Penguin paper series. Many thanks to @mfullilove and @SamRoggeveen.
The overall argument of the book is that there are now two Americas—an internationalist America that will likely focus on strategic competition and deepening alliances and an America First movement that will be much more skeptical of allies, favorable to punitive tariffs and predatory.
Unlike strategies of containment in the Cold War, these are largely antithetical.
Each will compete with, but will never fully vanquish, the other—at least not for some time. If you look at all US presidential elections since 1944, Republicans are currently in their 42nd year and Dems have had 40. So it splits 50:50.
The challenge for the world is to hedge against this dramatic fluctuation.
Two of the chapters are on my time in the Biden administration. Two are on Trump’s second term. And one looks at where we go from here.
The two Biden chapters offer my reflections on our Ukraine and Indo-Pacific policies in particular. Some specifics that you all might find interesting:
My account of the risk of Russian nuclear use in October 2022.
How we actually thought about escalation and military assistance to Ukraine.
What we thought of the Global South’s peace efforts (some were legitimate and sincere, some were not).
How we thought about the diplomatic endgame in Ukraine.
My account of the balloon incident of 2023 and the trajectory of our China policy.
How AUKUS came to be—why it might not have happened if the president knew how France would react but why it was still the right thing to do.
The lessons Democrats are learning from Biden’s foreign policy and where it is likely to go from here. And what America First may look like after Trump.
I hope you all get a chance to read Inflection Point. I will be in Australia next week for a series of events to launch it.
amazon.com/Inflection-Point-…
Erik Brown retweeted
This is a thorough assessment of Trump’s destructive undermining of both European and American security - which will take years to rebuild
"The behaviors, public statements, and policies of Donald Trump’s administration have perverted America’s strategic posture toward Europe" carnegieendowment.org/resear…
