Samatalis Haille, MA LPCC

0825 Liban woke up on time this morning but reported not feeling well. Earlier, he spent 35 minutes browsing, which he had not planned. He now aims to complete 52 minutes and will report back, intending to finish five 52-minute sessions today. He has also missed the previous required logging.

1046 Liban has completed only one session since starting work at 8 a.m., when more than two should have been finished. His work so far has been superficial, and it’s time to take action to improve productivity. He also missed two session to log, incurring fines.

Reading the “Kabul of the Horn” Claim: Liban’s Assessment of al-Qaeda Messaging and the Foreign-Force Drawdown in Somalia In November 2026, Liban noticed some Somali commentators, many from Somaliland, warning that al-Qaeda would take over Somalia once Ugandan and African Union forces left. He examined the claim by asking where it came from, what facts supported it and what scholarship says about it. Origin of the Claim The claim traced largely to a Substack summary of an article in Al-Bayan, an outlet the Substack describes as sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch. Dated November 7, 2026, the article called Mogadishu the “Kabul of the Horn of Africa” and presented the US exit from Baledogle airfield as a sign of collapse. Liban noted that this was a sympathetic article, not an official al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab statement. The Kabul comparison had also appeared earlier, after al-Shabaab’s 2025 offensive.[futureuae] Verified Facts Uganda has begun a phased withdrawal and plans to remove all its forces by the end of 2027 (AP). US troops left Baledogle but stayed in Somalia, and US airstrikes have continued since. This is a repositioning of forces, not a full exit like the US departure from Afghanistan in 2021.[taskandpurpose +1] Real Risks The African Union mission (AUSSOM) warned that Lower Shabelle, south of Mogadishu, could become vulnerable to attack (Voice of Nigeria). The mission’s mandate and UN-funded logistics expire on December 31, 2026, with no replacement funding agreed. Scholarship shows that foreign forces drove al-Shabaab from the cities but could not create a political settlement (Williams). It also links the group’s resilience to marginalization (Farah et al.) and to weak state security institutions (Ingiriis).[securitycouncilreport] Propaganda and the Kabul Analogy Jihadist groups use media deliberately to project momentum (Bockstette). Analysts had predicted that al-Shabaab-aligned outlets would exploit the Baledogle move. The Kabul analogy is weak. The Taliban won after a complete foreign withdrawal, and even then experts considered other outcomes possible (Giustozzi).[hamerintel] Amplification and Motive Liban observed that the alarmist commentary repeated al-Qaeda’s own prediction and spread it to a wider audience. Scholars describe publicity as the “oxygen” of terrorism (Keranen and Sanprie), and news coverage can advance militants’ goals without meaning to (Nacos). If people come to expect collapse, they may accommodate the insurgents and help bring it about. Liban also considered motive. Somaliland’s campaign for recognition partly rests on contrasting its stability with insecurity in the south (Hussein), so a story of collapse in Mogadishu suits that argument. He treated this as a possible motive, not proof, and did not attribute hostile intent to any group without evidence. Whatever the intent, the effect can be the same: building insurgent momentum and spreading fear. Conclusion Liban separated three things. The verified facts are a phased Ugandan withdrawal and a US repositioning within Somalia. The real concerns are funding and Lower Shabelle’s exposure to attack. The unsupported claim is that al-Qaeda will take over the country, which comes from the group’s own propaganda. No al-Shabaab territorial gains caused by the Ugandan withdrawal have been independently confirmed. Commentary that echoes the claim deserves the same scrutiny as the propaganda itself.[kulu-media]

0847 Liban woke up at 5 a.m., and now, four hours later, little work has been accomplished; he spent time in an unproductive discussion about Somalia that led nowhere.

Hiiraan and the Limits of a Two-Region State, New. Proposal: Liban's Analysis of a Reconfigured Hirshabelle On 7 November 2026, the Hawadle Ugaas, Yusuf Ugaas Hassan, called on Hawadle men and women serving in the Somali National Army to report to his residence in Beledweyne. He said the clan's dignity was under attack from clan fighters wearing the federal uniform, and he asked other soldiers to stay out of the confrontation. During a nine-hour discussion program, several analysts, Liban among them, read the call as a way of showing how serious the situation was and how urgently intervention was needed to prevent more bloodshed. The call followed a reported exchange of fire between two Hawadle figures, one opposed to the Hirshabelle administration and one serving as its vice president, and there were fears it could escalate.[51] A second reading tied the call to Abdullahi Mohamed Ali Sanbaloolshe, a former NISA director. In an interview with Geylan Media, Sanbaloolshe said he had met the leaders of Puntland and Somaliland, and also Jubaland, in the United Arab Emirates. He did not explain the purpose of the meetings, and his account has not been independently verified. He said he would use all available means, and he did not rule out cooperating with al-Shabaab. In his view, the problem would end if the Hawadle were given the Hirshabelle presidency.[1][3] ## An Electoral Problem Liban sees the dispute as mainly electoral. Had the federal government held free and fair elections, the question of who leads the state would matter much less. Responsibility is therefore shared: Mogadishu failed to hold credible elections, and Sanbaloolshe's readiness to use every available means makes matters worse. Research supports the structural side of this view. The Heritage Institute found that Hirshabelle's rushed, top-down formation, its unresolved clan grievances and repeated breaches of informal power-sharing deals produced parallel administrations and a security vacuum. Wider scholarship shows that member states drawn along clan lines strengthen clan identity at the expense of shared governance.[32][36] ## Why the Presidency Is Insufficient Liban concludes that the Hawadle would not be satisfied even with the presidency. The post has gone to Hawadle leaders twice, and neither president established effective governance in Hiiraan. Some Hawadle also hope for a state of their own, especially in eastern Hiiraan, because western Hiiraan is dominated by non-Hawadle clans. Sanbaloolshe says the aim is to rebuild Hirshabelle, not to split from it, but that hope already exists. ## A Proposed Reconfiguration Because Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan are hard to hold together, Liban proposes a separate Hiiraan state covering all or part of the region. Hirshabelle would then be centred on Middle Shabelle, with the Abgal-inhabited areas of Galgaduud and Mudug added to it. Communities in western Hiiraan that do not want to join the new Hiiraan state could join this larger Hirshabelle. Clans that want to stay together could do so, rather than being forced into one state. Galmudug may lose one or two districts under this plan, so Liban proposes compensating it with Matabaan district, which is mostly Habar Gidir (Ayr). Interpeace supports the demographic case: most Matabaan residents belong to the Habar Gidir, the dominant clan in Galmudug, and the district has been neglected by both states. The same study warns, however, that moving Matabaan would be politically difficult and would breach the federal constitution, so it would need a negotiated constitutional settlement.[23] Sources [1] Sanbaloolshe's Return and the Unravelling of Hirshabelle's ... ftlsomalia.com/sanbaloolshes… [2] Abdullahi Sanbalolshe Will Not Rule Out Al-Shabaab as He Plans a ... thesomalidigest.com/abdullah… [3] [PDF] Galmudug Reconciliation: - Interpeace interpeace.org/wp-content/up… [4] The Formation of Hirshabelle State Challenges and ... heritageinstitute.org/the-fo…

Ugaaska beesha Xawaadle warkiisa waa meesha halis aa ka jirto ee halagu baraarugo. Laakiin siyaasada inuu galo, ow dhaho DF waqtiga aa ka dhamamaday waa siyaaso, ee ma aha dhaqan, ama arin beeshiisa khusaysa, marka dhaqan waa ka gudbay.