Gustavo Rivero (@griverog) header
Gustavo Rivero (@griverog) profile picture

Economista / Independent private banker @AndbankES / Columnista @elespanolcom / Ex-CEO Bankia BP y Caja Madrid Bolsa / Exconsejero Inversis

Madrid, Comunidad de Madrid
Joined October 2017
Photo by Gustavo Rivero (@griverog)Photo by Gustavo Rivero (@griverog)Photo by Gustavo Rivero (@griverog)Photo by Gustavo Rivero (@griverog)Photo by Gustavo Rivero (@griverog)Photo by Gustavo Rivero (@griverog)Photo by Gustavo Rivero (@griverog)Photo by Gustavo Rivero (@griverog)Photo by Gustavo Rivero (@griverog)Photo by Gustavo Rivero (@griverog)
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
#GráficosParaElDebate | Los mercados financieros internacionales atraviesan una fase de expansión, dinamismo y sofisticación sin precedentes ✍️ Por @griverog 📲 Lee la opinión completa en dozz.es/f7c1l
1
1
1
385
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
The post Jensen $NVDA changes the AI landscape significantly. Jensen was a very aggressive dealmaker with confidence when it came to backstops, M&A, and financing deals, and making big moves in general. Not to mention managing the supply chain with $TSM's handshake deals and the memory players. We will probably see less support for financing the ecosystem from $NVDA and might see more supply chain moving to $NVDA's competitors, as there is a lot of uncertainty right now in the supply chain when it comes to $NVDA and the pace of this company in the future.
14
17
2
227
28,558
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
JUST IN: Google CEO declares today's AI will look as “primitive as a flip phone” in just 3 years.
287
874
187
12,882
538,006
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
The Fed Is Fighting the Wrong Inflation. Warsh needs to show leadership! Warsh wants to scrap forward guidance and dot plots while leaving Fed officials free to broadcast their policy preferences. That does not end forward guidance. It hands the microphone to hawks and disgruntled colleagues, allowing their pronouncements to shape expectations. Reckless comments from Fed officials need to stop! The result is neither coherent communication nor disciplined policymaking. A central bank should distinguish a fading supply shock from persistent demand pressure, not let its loudest voices dictate the response. October’s CPI rose 0.4 per cent, down from 0.6 per cent, the trend matters. Core was 0.3% unchanged from previous month. Governor Waller is floating a half-point December increase. A tenth above expectations, and out comes the sledgehammer. That’s reckless!! Yet services accounted for nearly 90 per cent of core inflation, with shelter contributing half of core services. Owners’ equivalent rent, an estimate, not a payment homeowners make, dominated shelter rent. Housing scarcity is not a wage-price spiral. Higher rates can aggravate it by raising construction costs and locking homeowners into existing mortgages. The supposed cure risks feeding the disease. Meanwhile, the energy shock is unwinding. West Texas crude has fallen more than 20 per cent from late October; wholesale gasoline is down 27 per cent since September. One-year inflation swaps are below 2 per cent. Six-month annualised core CPI is 2.7 per cent; Dallas trimmed-mean PCE is 2.4 per cent. Third-quarter productivity rose 3.6 per cent annualised, while unit labour costs fell 0.7 per cent. These figures demand judgment, not reflexive tightening. Raising rates into easing energy prices and falling labour costs would risk turning a temporary inflation shock into recession.
29
58
11
379
17,155
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
Criticáis a Jensen Huang porque le tenéis nvidia
71
1,000
63
10,399
149,046
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
Sra. Colau, según sus parámetros, #SoyPijo. Mi padre murió cuando yo tenía 18 años. No heredé nada. Mientras estudiaba Ingeniería Industrial, trabajaba todas las horas que podía para ganar dinero. Empecé de cero. He creado empresas, he vendido varias y me ha ido bien. Detrás hay incontables noches sin dormir, riesgos y sacrificios que usted desconoce. Me fui a California con mi familia para seguir emprendiendo. Mi mujer renunció a su plaza de médico, ganada por oposición. Después de 14 años, hemos vuelto. Y me encuentro con que una exalcaldesa de Barcelona considera aceptable hablar de “freír” a impuestos a personas como yo. Pagar impuestos es justo y necesario. Financiar los servicios públicos exige que contribuyamos según nuestra capacidad. Pero una cosa es exigir una contribución y otra convertir en enemigo a quien ha prosperado. Usted no sabe de dónde viene cada persona a la que llama “pija”. No sabe qué ha arriesgado, cuánto ha trabajado ni a qué ha renunciado. Su etiqueta borra todo eso para convertir el éxito económico en un motivo de desprecio. Un país necesita personas que quieran emprender, invertir, crear empleo y contribuir. Si el mensaje que reciben es que se las quiere “freír”, algunas acabarán haciendo todo eso en otro lugar. Y perderemos todos. No le pido que me exima de contribuir. Le exijo que deje de señalarme como enemigo por haber prosperado. La envidia es muy mala consejera. Y alimentar el resentimiento desde una tribuna pública es una irresponsabilidad. Usted ha sido alcaldesa y conoce el peso de sus palabras. Debatamos sobre impuestos, pero deje de utilizar el desprecio como argumento político.
Señora Cayetana Álvarez de Toledo: vamos a freir a impuestos a usted y a sus amigos pijos.
1,128
5,811
275
19,748
679,742
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
DeepMind CEO Demis Hassabis: "One person who really understands AI will outperform an entire startup team In 5 years, the people who build with AI will run whole companies with a tenth of the headcount"
302
916
258
7,634
2,234,489
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
La propuesta «Tax the Rich» de Ada Colau gravaría cada año con un 2% los patrimonios de más de un millón y con un 3% los de más de 50 millones. Pero medido sobre lo que rinde ese patrimonio, el tipo se dispara. Un activo que rinde un 4% pagaría el 80% de su rentabilidad entre IRPF del ahorro y el nuevo impuesto, y el 105% con el tipo del 3%. Por debajo de un 2,9% de rentabilidad, el 2% ya supera lo que genera el activo, y el patrimonio se reduce cada año aunque no se gaste.
26
24
2
119
16,906
Acumular viviendas no implica necesariamente escasez para vivir. Cuanto más viviendas tiene alguien, más probable es que las alquile a largo plazo (22% con 1 extra → 60% con 10 o más). Por tanto, quitar viviendas a multipropietarios no garantiza más oferta disponible.
¿ACUMULACIÓN = ESCASEZ DE VIVIENDA? No necesariamente. Me explico 👇 Alguna gente parece dar por hecho que una manera de hacer la vivienda-para-vivir-en-ella más abundante implica quitarle a quien tiene muchas las que tiene, o impedir que acumule más. Pero esto parte de un supuesto, ¿no? Quien acumula viviendas NO las tiene en alquiler. Así que, como ejercicio, me he hecho la pregunta empírica tal cual: ¿tener muchas viviendas hace más o menos probable que las pongas en alquiler de larga duración? Usando el Panel de Hogares del IEF podemos mirar todas las viviendas que los hogares tienen además de la suya, y (mediante declaraciones fiscales) ver para qué las usan: alquiler de larga duración, otro alquiler (temporada, turístico) o a disposición propia (segunda residencia, uso ocasional, vacía, etc). Esto es lo que me sale: → Quien tiene una vivienda además de la suya la alquila en larga duración el 22 % de las veces. → Con 5 a 9 viviendas, crece al 44 % de las veces. → Con 10 o más, el 60 %. Esto si te paras a pensarlo tiene todo el sentido: acumulas para... bueno, para alquilarlas y sacar rentabilidad, ¿no? Y si queréis hacemos un test más exigente: → Comparando viviendas del mismo municipio, tamaño y antigüedad, y dueños de la misma edad, la diferencia entre tener una y tener diez o más sigue siendo de unos 32 puntos. → Si vemos qué hace un mismo dueño con la misma vivienda cuando pasa a tener más, la probabilidad de que la alquile en larga duración va en dirección positiva aunque apenas cambie: unos 3 puntos más incluso con diez o más viviendas. Claro, es que para mí hay una contradicción entre dos argumentos que se sostienen desde el mismo lado, normalmente: que el multipropietario tiene viviendas para sacarle rentabilidad (sí) y que si se las cogemos pues habría más vivienda disponible para vivir en ella (no necesariamente). Si lo primero es cierto es más difícil que lo segundo lo sea. Otra cosa OJO es que el objetivo de la política pública sea *redistribuir la propiedad para redistribuir la riqueza*. Pero eso es DISTINTO al argumento del uso. Y, por último: sí, los porcentajes de uso distinto al alquiler de larga duración son grandes, incluso para los grandes tenedores... ...PERO lo que importa aquí es el uso. Desincentivar otros usos e incentivar el uso de alquiler de larga duración es la clave.
39
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
#GráficosParaElDebate | El verdadero peligro no es que las máquinas piensen como los humanos, sino que los humanos empiecen a pensar como las máquinas” (Sydney J. Harris) ✍️ Por @griverog 📲 Lee la opinión completa en dozz.es/l9_fb
1
1
320
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
Tech is now the market’s cheapest trade relative to growth. Main Street Research CIO James Demmert joins @Cline_Woods to share his exact playbook for semiconductors, deploying cash into this dip, and positioning for a year-end S&P 8,100 melt-up. #investing #stockmarket
6
4
2
26
12,882
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
“Stocks always go down faster than they go up, but they always go up more than they go down.” —Me
44
77
5
995
30,288
Colau propone el impuesto “tax the rich” para gravar a patrimonios de más de un millón de euros:
271
29
69
359
184,530
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
One of the things the data analysts on our side obsessed over was "composition"—whether the electorate looked close enough to 2024 for Republicans to win. And despite polls that showed a Democrat blowout, the data kept on telling us the same story: in some states turnout was merely OK, in other states it was downright amazing, and in no state was it catastrophic. There was a genuine sense of optimism on our team: our people were showing up. So, I asked the smartest data guy I know, does that mean we're going to shock the world? "No," he told me. "We might do better than the polls suggest. But the data is telling us that a lot of Trump/Vance 2024 voters are pissed and planning to vote for the other guys. Our voters are turning out, but they may not vote for us." Well, that looks prophetic now. Our voters did show up. In Florida, for example, the electorate was 9 points more Republican than Democrat, just a couple points worse than 2024. Undoubtedly there were places we could have done better on turnout. But the main problem is not turnout. The main problem is that many people who voted for Trump/Vance in 2024 voted for Democrats in 2026. There will be a lot of infighting and arguing over what happened and why that is. One of the pollsters I really respect told me that our economic messaging wasn’t sharp enough down the stretch. I’m sure that’s true. But the real reason we lost is obvious to almost everyone. Another pollster—one of the smartest people I know in politics, told me yesterday we’d lose the generic ballot by 13 points. I felt negative going into Tuesday, but even I was shocked by this. In his polling, he saw that a lot of Trump 2024 voters were angry and planning to vote for Democrats. He asked those voters who had abandoned us what would cause them to come back on our team. The top four answers, accounting for nearly all of the responses were: 1) End the war 2) Focus on cost of living/inflation 3) Put America First 4) Change our relationship to Israel Our voters showed up. And the above four reasons are why many of them voted for Democrats. This is according to a pollster who nailed the results. While many spent Monday attacking Rachel Campos Duffy for calling for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, it turns out her political advice was sound. (She’s also a great person.) In the next few months, there's going to be a lot of gaslighting. Expect to hear any number of establishment politicians say the solution to our woes is amnesty. I'm open to the idea that we should change enforcement—by focusing more on businesses that hire illegal labor, for instance. But anyone pushing amnesty is lying to you. The reason we lost is the war. The president himself said so last night. If you'd like to argue it was worth it, that losing the Senate for the next 6 years was worth it, then do so. Argue it was a worthwhile cost to pay. Agree or disagree, that's at least honest. But everyone knows why we lost. And any honest conversation about where we go from here must start there. I remain hopeful about our country. To the people who are pissed off and want to say, “I told you so”: you’re right, you did tell us so. Take that energy into electing Republicans who share your worldview. To the people who are just pissed at the results, you should be. Let’s take that anger and get back to the work of saving our country.
69,447
30,801
21,249
284,816
73,477,253
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
Si mañana le pides el hotel a un agente de IA, ¿se queda $BKNG fuera del negocio? $BKNG presenta resultados hoy tras el cierre, así que es buen momento para pensarlo. Pero para responder, antes hay que hacerse una pregunta más básica: ¿cuánto le cuesta hoy a $BKNG cada cliente? Imagina una familia que reserva un hotel en Lisboa por 1.000 $. $BKNG se queda alrededor de 145 $. Si esa familia entró directa en la app, se queda los 145 enteros. Si llegó por un anuncio de Google, $BKNG pagó unos 100 $ para conseguirla, y solo le quedan 45. Y esto es importantísimo, porque alrededor del 55 % de las noches de $BKNG llegan directas, sin pagar ese peaje. Es decir, la diferencia entre una reserva directa y una pagada es quedarse 145 o quedarse 45. Con eso en la cabeza, vamos a la pregunta del agente. ¿Puede el agente de IA saltarse a $BKNG e ir directo al hotel? El problema es que el agente no tiene la oferta. Las diez mayores cadenas hoteleras son poco más del 10 % de las noches de Booking.com, según su propio CEO. Todo lo demás son hoteles independientes y apartamentos que no tienen equipo técnico. Para ellos, $BKNG es su departamento comercial, su sistema de cobros y su atención al cliente: más de 100 formas de pago, más de 50 monedas y opiniones de huéspedes reales. Es decir, el agente necesita que alguien le agregue toda esa oferta. Y quienes lo hacen a escala son $BKNG y $EXPE. Así que una reserva del agente sin $BKNG, en la práctica, pasa por un competidor. Pero hay otro problema para el agente. Reservar navegando por webs son unos 20 pasos. Y aunque cada paso salga bien el 97 % de las veces, la reserva completa solo sale el 54 %. Y si luego hay una cancelación, el agente no tiene esa reserva en ningún sistema. Y lo más importante de todo: sin contrato no hay comisión. El propio modelo que ha anunciado @finkd de $META necesita acuerdos con quien vende. Es decir, el agente no puede dejar fuera a $BKNG, y $BKNG no puede quedarse fuera del canal. Ahora bien, esta película ya la hemos visto. En marzo de 2021, $GOOGL dejó que los hoteles aparecieran gratis con enlace directo. La misma amenaza de desintermediación. ¿Y qué pasó con $BKNG? En 2025 reservó 1.235 millones de noches, un 46 % más que antes de la pandemia. Entonces, ¿no hay riesgo? Sí lo hay, pero está en otro sitio. Lo más probable es que $BKNG se conecte al agente y lo trate como un canal de pago más, igual que hoy trata a $GOOGL. Supongamos que le cobra un 3 % (es una hipótesis, $META no ha dicho cuánto). Si ese cliente venía de $GOOGL, $BKNG pasa de pagar 100 $ a pagar 30. Pero si venía directo, pasa de pagar 0 a pagar 30. Es decir, lo que decide si el agente es bueno o malo para $BKNG es de dónde salen sus clientes. Pero hay algo todavía más interesante. Al principio, el agente puede incluso abaratarle a $BKNG las reservas que hoy paga a $GOOGL. Pero con el tiempo lo normal es que el peaje suba y empiece a comerse parte de las directas. $GOOGL también cobraba poquísimo por clic, hasta que se hizo imprescindible. Y esto es lo que hay que mirar esta noche. Hoy el tráfico desde asistentes de IA es menos del 1 % de las noches. Y las directas siguen en torno al 55 %, igual que hace un año, según dijo $BKNG el trimestre pasado. Eso sí, en el segundo trimestre de 2026 el marketing subió al 4,7 % de lo reservado, desde el 4,4 % de 2025, porque creció un 11 %, más rápido que las propias reservas. No digo que eso lo cause la IA, no lo sabemos. Pero es exactamente el tipo de cifra que hay que seguir de cerca. Así que, volviendo al principio: si mañana le pides el hotel a un agente de IA, ¿se queda $BKNG fuera del negocio? Mi respuesta es que no. La IA no va a matar a $BKNG. Le va a cobrar. La pregunta es cuánto, y quién se queda con el cliente. Por eso esta noche miraremos una métrica por encima de todas: el porcentaje de reservas directas (y, de paso, el marketing sobre lo reservado). Si ese porcentaje empieza a bajar, significará que los agentes se están quedando con clientes que antes llegaban gratis. ¿Y tú? ¿Crees que $BKNG acabará pagando a los agentes de IA más de lo que hoy paga a $GOOGL?
11
7
2
40
6,648
Elon Musk dice que el cuello de botella para el próximo año no son los chips, sino la energía, los equipos eléctricos, la refrigeración, las redes y las baterías.
And electrical equipment, cooling, networking and batteries
32
Gustavo Rivero retweeted
Today was a clear wake-up call for the market. It’s apparent that most investors weren’t, and perhaps still aren’t, prepared for each of the big 5 (incl. SPCX) to potentially raise multiple hundreds of billions of equity/debt capital through 2030, and multiple trillions collectively. These investors also weren’t prepared for the capex growth to have no end in sight. Ironically, many of the executives of these companies have been out in public clearly communicating their intention to keep spending very aggressively, with no plans to stop anytime soon. And yet, for whatever reason, street estimates called for capex to slow dramatically into 2028 and basically plateau thereafter. The street modeled 50-60% capex growth across the big 5 in 2027 (which itself is low), and then MSD% growth annually. There is no good fundamental reason to model that unless you think companies spend less because the returns on the technology slow, or you think there are severe physical/power/financing constraints (though this would just result in slower growth, not the plateau that’s been modeled). But it seems just as likely that out-year estimates simply defaulted to a plateau. Companies only guide a year out, and few on the sell-side are willing to model years of cash burn at this scale, so in their models, burn peaks in 2027 before FCF flips back positive in 2028 and scales from there. That path doesn’t require nearly as much capital issuance. To be clear, this would be a much happier and easier world for equity investors, who could go back to reaping the rewards instead of writing the checks. But for those who took the companies at their word and modeled continued elevated capex growth through the balance of this decade, these levels of issuance were a mathematical inevitability. Yesterday’s filing from $META probably forced many to contemplate for the first time that each of these companies could actually burn and issue multiple hundreds of billions of dollars in the coming years. The credit markets have already shown signs of strain under the sheer magnitude of issuance, so more of this may need to be done through equity. That means there was also some front-running of eventual, unknown but likely material levels of dilution. Equity markets don’t like being diluted, and they generally don’t like companies spending money at all. Especially not when the dollars get this big and when, rightly or wrongly, many still doubt the viability or magnitude of the returns, or at the very least don’t care to wait around to find out. Add in the crowding and leverage, along with a continued rise in oil on Middle East flare-ups, and you get a meaningful stock correction. And so that’s what I believe the market priced in today: more burn, more issuance, more dilution, more leverage, more risk, more financing constraints (esp. for the most rate-exposed stuff, which got hit the worst today), along with some uptick in the chance this all falls apart. This is going to sound perverse, but I think a day like today is very healthy. The companies are ambitious and the markets are stingy. And they will have to work with one another to get what they want. The companies want unprecedented capital to invest in what they believe is a re-platforming of the entire global infrastructure for an AI future, and the markets demand sufficient evidence that they’ll earn above the required return on the capital they lay out and the risk they take on. Ultimately, this forces the companies to be more disciplined and to show ROI as early and visibly as possible. That doesn’t mean they spend less, just that they have to prove the spend is working. I don’t think Zuck’s comment about monetizing Muse so much more rapidly than previous platforms was a coincidence. He knows what he needs, and he knows what he needs to show to get it. So what now? Is AI a powerful enough driver to muscle its way through the fears being expressed by markets? I think so. The big 5 may grow capex from >$1.3 trillion in 2027 to >$2.5 trillion in 2030, a ~25% CAGR. That implies a lot of paper, but in general, the hyperscalers can afford to pay higher rates, and there still seems to be demand from credit investors for it. At yesterday’s Robin Hood conference, execs at Diameter and HPS expressed a view that 7-8.5% yields on bonds from these companies are interesting. And I’d argue that’s for good reason: aside from SPCX, these companies generate massive operating cash flow and have largely benign net debt/EBITDA levels. On the other hand, the more speculative companies that sit further out on the risk curve, pay higher spreads, and often don’t generate any cash at all will likely be forced to spend less. If you thought CRWV and NBIS would spend a combined ~$150-200 billion of capex in 2030 (vs. ~$60 billion in 2026), that might get cut in half because of financing constraints. But even a $100 billion reduction is only a 3-4% hit relative to the big 5’s 2030 capex, which, on net, is very manageable. That may be an issue for those companies, but it’s not enough to derail the ecosystem as a whole. Ultimately, you have to believe there are attractive returns in AI, which I strongly believe are inflecting and wrote about here: teapaw.org/evergreencap3/status/2…. So even while things remain turbulent, the path still appears bright.
Some thoughts on AI ROI, which I believe is misunderstood and severely understated. TL;DR: AI ROI is inflecting for end customers (most important) and infra providers. Pure model provider ROI is less clear, but models will keep improving regardless, driving the industry forward. Of all the debates on AI, the biggest and most persistent is around ROI. The problem is that the debate revolves around a single, inconsistently applied definition, when in reality there are three: 1) ROI for model providers, 2) ROI for model customers, and 3) ROI for infrastructure providers While cooperative, #1 and #2 are fundamentally at odds with one another. All else equal, the higher the margin a model provider captures on the tokens it sells, the lower the margin the customer of those tokens captures on the work being done. This is driving enterprises to rationalize spend where they can: if a job can be done as effectively with a cheaper model, the ROI on that job is proportionally higher than if it were done with a more expensive model. That’s not 'bad' for AI. It just represents margin shifting from the provider to the customer. Meanwhile, the ROI for infrastructure providers is a collective function of both. And while there are nuances around returns for individual infra providers depending on the concentration of and share between the model and customer cohorts, the reality is that infrastructure ROI overall benefits as long as demand for tokens keeps growing, regardless of the ongoing push-pull between model providers and customers. In the last couple of months, we seem to be heading in a certain direction: aggregate model customer ROI is accelerating as customers benefit from the utility of increasingly intelligent tokens (and apps) at falling prices. This is evidenced by nearly all of the token-volume metrics across the industry, which continue to show growth and/or acceleration. Both the qualitative and quantitative data points on positive customer ROI are growing in concert, most recently with AWS CFO John Felton remarking that he studied AWS’ own token usage and found that, in general, more is better. And for those who still don’t believe in return on token spend, I implore you to model out the number of tokens needed to complete a job of your choice and measure the value of that job relative to the underlying cost of the tokens, with or without the model provider margin. Sure, there can always be waste. But when utilized properly, the returns on tokens are extraordinary, which is exactly what's driving continued volume growth. We’ve subsequently seen this flow through to the cloud infrastructure providers, whose payback periods have compressed and whose returns have also increased, primarily as a function of rising rental prices for GPUs/accelerators. And as those returns have increased, so has demand for the underlying infrastructure, benefiting the AI supply chain at large. So far, so good. That leaves the model providers, where the biggest question really lies. The fact that inference gross margins can be so high is certainly positive in addition to being obvious: the prices at which tokens are sold are multiples higher than the miniscule cost of the underlying FLOPs needed to generate them. And again, the value of the work being done by the end customer is multiples higher than the token prices, so everybody wins. However, inference gross margins paint an incomplete picture, because token prices are primarily a function of model quality, which is primarily a function of training spend. That spend, in aggregate, is causing model providers to burn lots of cash. And because competition remains so intense, it’s unlikely in my view that any model provider can retain its inference margins without continued aggressive training spend. So the two go hand in hand and should be assessed together. While Anthropic’s reported positive FCF in 3Q was a nice surprise, I don’t expect it to continue, especially as OpenAI remains committed to investing aggressively and burning cash for the foreseeable future. So that’s the predicament. The market is unsure what the long-term business and economic model of a 'lab' is, and rightly so. That raises the question: if the labs can’t make money, who’s going to fund the training, and how will the models keep getting better, which is the critical ingredient in continued AI adoption and end-customer ROI? I see a few outcomes to this question: Scenario 1: Concerns about model-provider economics prove overstated, and the market expands rapidly enough to accommodate multiple profitable frontier developers alongside a thriving open-source and open-weight ecosystem, supporting broad-based growth with attractive margins. This is probably the cleanest outcome which is why the market tends to like it so much. I still think this is the most likely path in the fullness of time, but it’s admittedly unclear. The mega-pilled RSI scenario also fits within this outcome, mainly in the sense that the investment pays off. Scenario 2: Because of heightened competitive intensity and elevated training costs, the aggregate model provider ecosystem simply operates at maturity with razor-thin margins and very tight/minimal free cash flow generation, like other extremely competitive and/or commoditized industries. This is at least where we seem to be today, and where we will likely remain for some time. Scenario 3: Financial pressure causes weaker participants to exit, merge, or scale back large training programs, eventually giving way to consolidation and reduced frontier training intensity, which allows the remaining players to expand margins. This seems both logical and likely to happen to some unknown degree, which would be positive for the value of the remaining players. Note that megacap tech hyperscalers, who collectively generate hundreds of billions in operating cash flow from their core businesses and are also training models, can continue to tap into that cash flow for ongoing training (ie GOOGL, META, and more recently NVDA). That will persist regardless of what happens with OpenAI or Anthropic. Scenario 4: Frontier labs eventually convert into true public benefit corporations (in more than just name), owned and funded by a broad coalition of companies and the USG, all with incentives aligned toward the ongoing training and development of new models, effectively making the labs public utilities rather than private corporations. I do believe there is tremendous value in the IP at both OpenAI and Anthropic, and consequently see this as a far more likely outcome than either of them “going bust” and ceasing operations. While this may seem scarier to markets and in the headlines, the actual end result could be quite positive and well distributed across the entire AI ecosystem (rather than concentrated in the two labs). And at the very least, I believe there is strong merit in a pool of government-funded dollars for model development, much like the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, which authorized $280 billion in federal funding and incentives. The US federal government spends >$7 trillion annually. Point being, there is both ample budget and precedent for the USG (and megacaps/others) to contribute to this national cause. All in, some combination of these four outcomes should play out. And while some paths are smoother than others and there will be inevitable volatility and hiccups along the way, they all ultimately lead to positive ROI on AI spend: better models drive better end-customer returns, which drive better returns on infrastructure. That flywheel is already in motion (as evidenced by rising token volumes, GPU rental prices, and infra returns), and it’s much more sustainable than the market fears. It will take time to get from here to there, but the endgame appears to be quite positive, almost any way you slice it.
42
73
7
816
131,166