
Blockchain Security Researcher. Past Experience: Security Specialist @sherlockdefi, Auditor @PashovAuditGrp
Joined November 2022
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t0x1c retweeted
There are around only 24 hours left to donate to the DAO security fund.
I would like to ask you to please donate to Cyfrin Updraft & Tooling. If you know someone who learned security with us, please consider donating!
We have been the #1 education platform for onboarding security researchers and developers to Web3 for 3 years straight, 100% for free.
qf.giveth.io/project/cyfrin-…
Some stats:
- Averages 8k students a week
- Hundreds of thousands of hours of watchtime in aggregate
- Millions of views on YouTube (500k on foundry 1 year ago, 600k 2 years ago, ~200k on intro to security, ~25k on assembly and formal verification, etc)
- Thousands of stars on security education on GitHub
Not to mention @SoloditOfficial, Aderyn, LocalSafe, WiseSigner, ERC-8213, @CodeHawks first flights & AI first flights (competitive audit live trainings) and more.
If you don't like our education, we have a tooling page too:
qf.giveth.io/project/cyfrins…
Thank you for your consideration!
t0x1c retweeted
The Move auditor ask surfaced some gems. Now gentelemen I need your help with ZK:
Who are the underrated ZK/cryptography auditors flying under the radar?
t0x1c retweeted
Zak was attacked by installing this extension:
"juanbIanco.solidity"
instead of:
"juanblanco.solidity"
See the difference? Let's put them into a code block:
Replying to @0xzak
13/ The Attackers' Full List (AVOID):
- contractshark.solidity-lang
- juanbIanco.solidity (capital I)
- Theme.darcula-dark
- "solsafe" npm package
- Any Solidity extension with 50K+ downloads but <100 reviews
t0x1c retweeted
⚡Electisec has shaped many security gigabrains… but we're not done!
We're soon kicking off our Smart Contract fellowship to find the next set of security superstars, and we invite you to be a part of this trial-by-fire program.
Think you’ve got what it takes? Details below!
t0x1c retweeted
This past week, we launched the Cyfrin Updraft AI-based full-stack coding course.
And I must warn you, only take this course if you want the burden of being able to become a one-person powerhouse.
Here is what you can do with this new knowledge, and what you'll learn 👇
t0x1c retweeted
A new Foundry feature allows you to test your contracts in a more interactive and efficient way
In some cases, you no longer need to store rpc links or private keys in users' .env files.
Instead, you can type different values directly into your terminal line
Let's take a look⬇️
t0x1c retweeted
Time is ticking... there are only 7 days remaining until the largest competition in history kicks off.
$1.25M USD. Are you ready researchers?
50 invite codes below for any late straddlers looking to participate. 🪐
t0x1c retweeted
Introducing Code4rena Pro League 🏆
⭐ All-star auditors
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🥇 The best security talent including @cmichelio, @samczsun, @hellocccz, @IAm0x52, @xuwinniexu, @zachobront, and more!
Read more: code4rena.com/blog/introduci…
t0x1c retweeted
Awards have been announced for the $140,000 USDC @taikoxyz audit! 🥁
Top 5:
🥇 monrel - $39,108.58
🥈 @int0x1catedCode - $19,343.85
🥉 Shield - $14,677.71
🏅 @zzebra83 – $9,799.48
🏅 @MrPotatoMagic - $7,230.36
t0x1c retweeted
such a cheap move by Cronos
and if you think about it, they are assumed to be a major player
i'm curious how their CEX marketing department will feel about if this post goes viral
e.g. "Cronos is downplaying issues and gets exploited after"
might be unpopular opinion, but there should be consequences for actions like this
after all, when a project gets exploited its the user funds, so i feel like the devs are like - whatever
this should change
In November, I submitted a critical bug to Cronos (@cronosapp) which they downplayed and have since been kicked off Immunefi. Here's some info about the bug and an example of how projects can simply not pay a fair amount.
Report: gist.github.com/fatherGoose1…
tl;dr:
- It's a simple staking contract where you stake your TONIC and receive xTonic at the current exchange rate.
- The vulnerability lies in a function called performConversionForERC20() which allows anyone to convert other tokens held by the contract into TONIC.
- This function is vulnerable to reentrancy because the caller sets an arbitrary swap path and can inject a malicious token in the middle to gain control of execution.
- The contract determines the estimated amount of TONIC that should be received by the swap, and any extra goes to the caller as a reward.
- But since there is reentrancy, the caller can also STAKE their TONIC prior to the above function completion.
- The caller's stake is honored AND they are transferred back their TONIC, essentially receiving free staked tokens.
Caveat:
There is a 10 day unstaking delay. So the exploiter would not be able to actually convert the staked tokens back into TONIC until the cooldown period had passed.
What Cronos said:
Thank you for reporting this issue.
The team has verified that the exploit described can indeed work. From our side, we have safeguards in place to mitigate these risks; such as a 10 days delay period for the xTonic minted. As such, there is a low possibility of the exploit realising; as the issue will be rectified before the exploiter can launder the gotten funds.
However, we do appreciate your effort in identifying this issue and plan to update the contract to eliminate the risk entirely. In addition, we are happy to reward you with USD1,600 as a token of appreciation.
Actions:
Cronos fixed the vulnerability immediately, before even responding to the report.
My thoughts:
Obvious lowball. Cronos's max bounty was $250,000 and they offered $1,600. I understand the technicality with this attack, and would have agreed to a payout less than the max, but the payout would have to accurately represent the value of this report.
Mediation:
Immunefi mediated twice and confirmed that this report deserved the max bounty. Immunefi told Cronos that a simple unstaking delay is not an adequate means of protection.
Cronos claimed:
"We have implemented a robust monitoring framework, consisting of internal systems, protocols, and strategic third-party partnerships, which promptly respond to any anomalies within our smart contracts. This is the standard of any big organization, and we refrain from disclosing further specifics to maintain the integrity of our security protocols."
When Immunefi asked them to provide any information regarding their automated detection and mitigation processes, Cronos would not comply.
Result:
Cronos was kicked off Immunefi.
Final thoughts from Django:
'Tis the life of a bug hunter.
t0x1c retweeted
One of the most high-impact things you can do as a Solidity developer or auditor is study how the most significant DeFi protocols work in detail.
“In detail” means you can point to a random storage variable and explain how and where it is used. You don't merely give a hand-wavy overview of how the protocol works.
There are numerous “how to Solidity guides” online, but extremely few protocol walkthroughs, especially on lending protocols — despite how popular lending protocols are.
You can dive into the codebase and take notes until you understand what each variable and function does. This is effective, but time consuming.
Or, you can read the RareSkills books where you get the benefit of studying the entire protocol, but a lot more efficiently.
You get a clear list of what you need to know going into reading a certain section of code. You get enough explanation that you don’t spend hours trying to understand something that should have taken 30 seconds. But we don't explain obvious things, therefore avoiding boredom.
And, you get loads of videos, graphics, animations, and text. We believe text is the most information dense way to present information — no need to 2x speed the video. But sometimes graphics and animations are a better medium to present certain kinds of information.
With that, we are proud to announce the RareSkills Book of Compound V3.
Compound V3 is surprisingly simple, but it relies on prerequisites that aren’t taught anywhere online — until now.
At 14 chapters long, you will come away with an understanding as if a member of the team sat down and walked you through the codebase. But not by “reading” it to you, but insteady by explaining the motivation and context for each part, including the tokenomics.
It took hundreds of ours to produce this work, a team of dedicated animation interns (shoutout to @TaylorAymeric for leading the effort), and a close review and feedback by Faybian Byrd, Andrew Clarimonte, and @wcavinaw. We are very grateful for their contributions.
The sooner the intricacies of DeFi protocols become common knowledge, the sooner security will become the norm.
You certainly can become a DeFi auditor without the Compound V3 Book, but you will get there a lot faster with this resource.
We believe it should be an essential part of any auditor or developer roadmap, along with our Uniswap V2 Book.
You will not find this level of detail, comprehensiveness, and production quality on this topic elsewhere.
t0x1c retweeted
You asked and we listened!
The @cantinaxyz security review competition has been extended by 1 week! You can keep hacking until December 18 at 20:00 UTC 🙌
t0x1c retweeted
✅ You should leverage the `deployCode` function from Std Cheats (book.getfoundry.sh/reference…), which will deploy the contract by directly fetching its generated bytecode.
t0x1c retweeted
We're making @CantinaBouncer take a break for the next 12 hours. All reposts and mentions of @CantinaBouncer will be given an invite code.
No questions asked.
Come, security researcher. Enter the Cantina 🪐
t0x1c retweeted
At this point I've audited a couple *hundred* Smart Contracts.
Along the way, I've picked up a number of things that more often than not... lead to Critical bugs/vulnerabilities.
So I decided to compile them all and share them with you.
→ 17 Common attack vectors I always try out on a new codebase (+ 5 Bonus):
- Frontrunning/backrunning
- Using very small amounts as inputs (e.g. 1 wei)
- Passing zero as an input
- Using contracts that cannot accept ether
- Gas griefing with external calls
- Weird ERC20 tokens (fees, 777, return values, etc...)
- Price manipulation
- Blacklisted ERC20 addresses
- Potential overflow/underflow
- Block re-orgs
- Reentrancy (721, inter-function, inter-contract, inter-system (read-only))
- Sybil attacks on incentives/tokenomics
- Flash loans (even flash mints e.g. Dai)
- Accepting any data from an arbitrary address (Malicious bytes)
- Inflating internal accounting by sending tokens to the system
- Forced precision loss when precision really matters (min balance checks etc...)
- Addresses that might be empty at one point, yet house contract code at another
5 Bonuses:
- Reverting (external calls I can make revert, inputs I can use to cause a revert)
- Unexpected addresses (provide a `receiver` address pointing to another contract in the system)
- Selector clashing
- Signatures (replay, malleability, recover to 0 address etc...)
- Hash collision (encodePacked)




















