🎙️ Σήμερα στο 10 ΠΑΝΤΟΥ #10pantou βάλαμε κάτω το μεγάλο ερώτημα: Είναι μόνο λόγια η τουρκική ένταση ή έρχεται και το… πεδίο; 👇 @Katerina_Papak1 @OpenNewsGr @ivalinakis @Γιώργος Καμπάς 🇹🇷 Ο τουρκικός Τύπος απαντά: Η Αθήνα «προκαλεί», η Άγκυρα προειδοποιεί και ο Μητσοτάκης "δοκιμάζει τα όριά» της. 🏝️ Καστελλόριζο: «πρόβλημα ασφαλείας» για την Τουρκία. Επομένως... θα μπορούσε να «καταληφθεί» σε μία ώρα — γιατί στην τουρκική τηλεόραση... όλα γίνονται εύκολα. 🗺️ Ρω και Στρογγύλη: Απόστρατοι αντιναύαρχοι βάζουν στο τραπέζι ακόμη και θέμα «αμφισβητούμενης κυριαρχίας» και χαρακτηρίζουν το Καστελλόριζο «Αχίλλειο πτέρνα» της Ελλάδας. 🔥 Το συμπέρασμα; Πόλεμος δεν λένε ότι θέλουν, αλλά δεν αποκλείεται και κάτι 'θερμό'. Η τουρκική αντιπολίτευση βέβαια δείχνει να αποζητά κάτι 'δραστικό' και άμεσα... 🇬🇷 Γιάννης Βαληνάκης στο #10pantou: "Η Άγκυρα δεν κάνει απλώς θόρυβο· καλλιεργεί κλίμα και μπορεί να περάσει σε υβριδικές πιέσεις και κινήσεις στο πεδίο". 🌊 12 ναυτικά μίλια: Ελληνικό κυριαρχικό δικαίωμα που πρέπει να παραμένει πάνω στο τραπέζι, ειδικά αν η Άγκυρα περάσει από τη «Γαλάζια Πατρίδα» στα… έργα. ⚓ Γιώργος Καμπάς στο #10pantou: Δεν αποκλείει πιθανές κινήσεις της Τουρκίας στο πεδίο. Από ψαράδες και ακτοφυλακή μέχρι δοκιμές των ελληνικών αντανακλαστικών. 🎯 Το ερώτημα δεν είναι αν θα δοκιμάσει, αλλά πού και μέχρι πού. youtube.com/watch?v=bvRjvIR1…

DE MATCH DIE NIEMAND ZAG ⚽ 😂 Trump in actie, Zelensky als laatste verdediger, gekke tackles en… het eindigt op Mars als Champion of the Universe! Pure AI-parodie waanzin voor de FIFA World Cup. Wie had dit ooit verwacht? ~ biing_c #FIFAWorldCup #Trump 🟥 #Zelensky #Merz #Macron #EU #UnitedKingdom #England

The official terms of the U.S. Memorandum of Understanding are out—and it’s worse than anticipated. The official signing ceremony isn’t until Friday, but the agreement was already signed digitally last night during a dinner at the Palace of Versailles. Anyone familiar with the palace’s history knows this makes the MOU the second great surrender signed at Versailles. Except this time, the U.S. is the one capitulating. Here’s why it’s worse than we thought. As the details slowly leaked, it became clear that this agreement is not a pause—the status quo held in place while negotiations ran their course. It was a rewind, actively restoring the Islamic Republic. The only question left was how fast it would run, and according to these clauses, faster than we would like. U.S. officials, including the vice president, previously assured reporters that the agreement provides a “dial,” with economic and sanctions relief increasing only as Iran demonstrates good behavior and compliance. The text is less specific. The clearest financial concession involves the issuance of oil waivers in Section 10, which on their own will return monthly revenue of $5 billion; meanwhile, Section 11 seems to imply that all of the regime’s assets will be made available immediately—best case, that remains credit the Islamic Republic can use only for humanitarian purchases; worst case, it is transferred to them directly. Either way, money is fungible, and besides, I’m not sure exactly what leverage the U.S. assumes it will retain once it has surrendered Iranian assets up front. As has been clear for the past couple of months, two of the conflict’s four goals—the funding of proxies and the ending of the ballistic missile program—have been abandoned. In fact, Trump defended the omission. “If other countries have them, it’s a little bit unfair for them not to have some,” Trump said in France, where he held a press conference on the sidelines of a Group of Seven summit. “If Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and they all have some, I would say that in relative proportion, I think it’s okay” for Iran to have ballistic missiles as well. I haven’t seen Saudi Arabia firing those missiles at the U.S. recently, but I digress. The JCPOA famously made the same omission—but at least it didn’t promise the removal of all primary and secondary sanctions on the ballistic missile program and on terror sponsorship. Section 7 provides for the removal of all sanctions pending a final deal—so even if Trump somehow clutches victory from the claws of defeat and secures a strong nuclear deal, Iran’s other malign activities can continue without sanction. Indeed, Lebanese and regional sources told Reuters that Iran has promised to increase Hezbollah’s funding “as soon as possible” once the United States unfreezes Iranian assets. Chalk up a point for the JCPOA. The third of the original four goals fares no better: the MOU codifies the abandonment of the protesters, enshrining noninterference in Iran’s “internal affairs”—those hoping for an uprising in the next 60 days are likely to be disappointed. That leaves only the nuclear front—the last remaining goal, and one whose outcome remains entirely unclear. Zero enrichment was already abandoned by Trump last week, but the MOU goes further, defining the new U.S. minimum not as exporting its enriched uranium, but as on-site down-blending under IAEA supervision. In the case of uranium, what goes down can also go up. Without the material in friendlier, less fanatical hands, “good” is not an applicable adjective for the deal. Not only that, Clause 5 gift-wraps the regime’s trump card—the one it has played to such great effect against the U.S. Iran’s leverage over Gulf shipping was always its readiest threat, the valve it could squeeze whenever it needed the world’s attention. A serious agreement would have taken that card out of their hands. Instead, the MOU merely gestures at “negotiating the status” of the waterway with other states in the region—language that quietly abandons the prior baseline of freedom of the seas and hands the question to bilateral talks between Tehran and its neighbors. That is not a settlement; it is leaving the shopkeepers alone with the mob and telling them to work it out among themselves. The U.S. assiduously avoided the word “tolls,” so Iran rebranded them “service fees.” The honest term is protection money—and the only thing Iran is offering protection from is itself. Clause 6, the reconstruction fund, must come as an even more bitter pill for the Gulf allies—particularly those who took the U.S. at its word two weeks ago, when it pledged to make “Iranian assets [available] to its Gulf allies to support, repair and mitigate future damage that Iran may cause.” That promise has been inverted. Rather than Iran paying for the damage it inflicts, the MOU drafts a Marshall Plan while the Nazis are still in power—and leaves France and Britain to foot the bill for German reconstruction. The most immediate problem for Israel is the first clause: Lebanon, whose status is left unclear by the MOU. A Hezbollah source told Emirati media that Iran had informed Hezbollah that the MOU provides for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon over a phased, 60-day period. The same source added that any withdrawal now rests with Israel, which, along with Hezbollah, is not a party to the MOU. A Lebanese political source told the same outlet that Lebanon has received “no official guarantees” of an Israeli withdrawal and has not yet raised the matter with U.S. officials—an account that sits at odds with Iran’s claim that the MOU plainly obligates Israel to withdraw. Despite U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee’s assurance that “Israel doesn’t need Iran’s permission to defend itself,” the agreement has created a circumstance in which increased attacks on the country could pry the U.S. and Israel apart as Israel is compelled to respond. And note the sequencing, buried in the final clause: negotiations on the substantive terms of the final deal—the nuclear restrictions, the enrichment ceilings, everything still ostensibly up for grabs—will only begin after the ceasefire, the blockade’s removal, the maritime opening, the oil waivers, and the unfreezing of assets are already implemented. That ordering gives away the game. This is not the “Hormuz for Hormuz” swap the administration is selling—open the Strait, lift the blockade, call it even. The concessions that matter to Iran are all front-loaded, banked before Tehran has to concede anything of substance in return. By the time the real bargaining starts, the sanctions relief is flowing, the oil is moving, and the assets are unfrozen. The regime gets restored first and negotiates second. That is the rewind in a single clause—and it runs fast. The silver lining, thin as it is, is that the U.S. military is not withdrawing until the conclusion of a final deal. As Trump put it yesterday, “If I don’t like it, if they don’t behave, we’ll go right back to dropping bombs.” With sanctions relief and waivers already forthcoming, the threat of military action is fast becoming the only stick left in the American arsenal. Do I believe him? Less than I did two months ago, and less still than a week ago—but it remains, at the very least, an option on the table. Trump, for his part, seemed unbothered by the holes in the deal. At a press conference in France—shortly before he declared the agreement “signed” at Versailles—Fox News correspondent Peter Doocy read him back a famous line of his own: that Iran “never won a war, but never lost a negotiation.” Trump asked who had said it. Told it was him, he replied that he’d figured as much, then drew the distinction he wanted on the record: this time, Iran “lost militarily.” Yes, Mr. President, they always do, that’s the point. To read the rest of today's newsletter click here amitsegal.substack.com/p/its…

🤣 Albanian PM Edi Rama on when Albania will join the EU: “There are three things you can't predict: God, sex and the EU.” Probably the most accurate description of EU enlargement ever.

**Instead of the Abraham Accords: The Muhammad Accords** One small detail in the lost details of the 2.0 Iran nuclear deal carries far deeper significance: the United Arab Emirates has joined the Saudi-Pakistani axis — which is now also Iranian. For the first time, a Shia-Sunni alliance is being formed that will overshadow the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia already signed a defense pact with Pakistan about a year ago. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state that, until the war with Iran, had virtually no influence on Israel. Thanks to the war, Pakistan has become the country enabling the Iranian regime to survive: Pakistani mediation, a land supply route (connected all the way to China) — all of these will form part of the new power base in the region. The one who stood in the breach almost until the very last moment was MBZ, the ruler of the UAE. At first, the Emirates expressed uncompromising willingness to fight. It wasn’t entirely overt (the principality’s insignia were removed from Emirati Air Force planes that bombed Iran), and statements from people close to the regime (the same insiders who only a few weeks earlier knew in advance about the OPEC exit) dropped clear hints: the UAE would take part in the attack on the islands in the Strait of Hormuz — islands that Iran seized from the Emirates in the 1970s. But the economic price and the damage from the war were apparently more than the UAE could absorb. The UAE economy relies heavily on being a business hub for Western companies that settled there, among other reasons because of low taxes. The Iranians understood this. It’s no coincidence that the UAE absorbed more missiles than Israel or Saudi Arabia: Iran aimed at the UAE’s soft underbelly — to drive the foreigners out. Not the millions of Asians working in construction and services, but the layer of Western businesspeople and professionals (bankers, lawyers, accountants, management) who support the economy. The strikes on power stations and oil facilities (which Trump refused to respond to and did not view as an Iranian violation of the ceasefire) were only a hint of what was to come: Iran’s ability to damage the water desalination infrastructure and the electricity supply needed for air conditioning — right before summer — threatened the UAE’s ability to hold out. Without electricity and water, the UAE collapses. This is what was on MBZ’s mind, and the results of his joining the Saudi-Pakistani axis will echo for years across the Middle East and beyond: Islamist power is rising, and life in the region — for the one Jewish state that relied on American support — is going to become much harder. The Abraham Accords, which began as an initiative of Netanyahu and Trump and appeared to be expanding and bringing regional peace, are shattering against the UAE’s return to the bosom of the radical Islamic states. Officially they won’t be canceled — but in practice a strategic shift is occurring in which Saudi and Qatari money, Pakistani nuclear capability, and Iran’s military power to project force across the Gulf states are becoming the dominant factor in the region. It will take Iran several years to rebuild its military capabilities — the money Trump is now releasing to them will allow the construction of a far more modern army than they had before. The old planes and ships that Trump is so proud of having sent to the bottom of the sea (how many times did he repeat that they have no navy — yet they still controlled Hormuz) will be replaced by brand-new Chinese and Russian equipment. At the western end of this Shia/Sunni alliance stand Egypt and Turkey, which will link up with the Pakistani-Iranian-Saudi axis. An axis that, over time, will make life in the State of Israel extremely difficult. The UAE was the first domino to fall — but the impact will reach far: to all Western countries. The rise of global Islamic power will not be limited to terrorist organizations like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah — but to an axis of radical states. Countries that the UAE once thought to separate itself from — but is now returning to partnership with them. This is the (unofficial, though not formal) end of the Abraham Accords and the rise of Islamist power to levels we have not known since Islam conquered parts of Europe. Trump’s hesitation and foot-dragging have created a dangerous monster.