Jay Berg (@jaybny) header
Jay Berg (@jaybny) profile picture

1st to tweet $BTCUSD. @SidepitExchange Bloomberg '98, Fortress '07, Bitcoin '10, Sidepit '23 ☀️ᚠ 🥪

SF
Joined December 2008
$BTCUSD 12.00 new high! j.mp/QNpGM8 $$ @zerohedge
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Fehu Friday ✈️ #bitcoin
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the biggest loss is not even reported. it's hidden in the price: slippage
This quoted post is unavailable.
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Thoughts on the eCash (ECX) hard fork: • Satoshi’s coins sold to fund devs • BIP300 is cool--but does eCash need scaling? • Airdrop to bitcoiners, with full transparency • Name overlap: eCash (XEC) already exists My prediction: heavy selling pressure. See for yourself: ecash.com/join/
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Can You Trust the Bitcoin Price w/ @jaybny 0:00 What does Bitcoin’s price mean? 3:56 November event 4:58 How traders create a price 7:31 Investors, traders, and “number go up” 13:50 Bad ticks, liquidity, and flash crashes 23:15 Bitcoin loans and trust in the price 28:09 Computers, Wall Street, and financial innovation 31:23 How @SidepitExchange approaches price discovery
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Thoughts on the Ledger supply chain attack: (1) Physical active tamper is important. Automated device security checks are insufficient if the device can be opened without triggering a tamper event. (2) Trustable manufacturing is important. Domestic manufacturing is preferred. I don't want a hardware wallet manufactured by Foxconn in Asia. (3) Transparent enclosures are not a panacea. Implants can be made smaller and can blend in. (4) DIY hardware is not a panacea. How soon until Amazon sellers are modifying Raspberry Pi's and other dev boards, hoping that someone uses it for Bitcoin or crypto storage? (5) Was surprised to learn today that no company makes an encrypted display driver chip. That would have prevented this kind of attack, where the data signals going to the display were intercepted. (6) There are many different ways to do a supply chain attack. We've seen simple ones like Amazon sellers including a seed card already filled out, and some percentage of uneducated users entering those exact seed words. This was the most complex and well-executed attack we've seen. (7) Multisig would have protected you here, but I am not sure if passphrase would have. Attackers may have been able to also see the readout on screen of a passphrase entered on-device. @MagicalTux can hopefully confirm when he dumps the firmware. This is brutal. @FoundationHQ will be further improving our active tamper detection to create a new mode for supply chain integrity – adding an additional supply chain key to our security check that will be cleared at tamper, ensuring that a customer is always warned that the device has been opened at some point.
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Jay Berg retweeted
they didn’t hack ledger. they didn’t exploit the code. they BOUGHT the company selling you the device. $86 million gone a company called CryptoBilis was an authorized ledger reseller in southeast asia. trusted. legit. sold ledgers for years a random chinese company quietly bought CryptoBilis from its malaysian owner made the original owner sign a confidentiality agreement. he couldn’t tell anyone the company was sold same brand name. same website. same “authorized reseller” badge. but different people behind it now the new owners started opening every ledger device before shipping soldered a tiny spy chip onto the board inside. repackaged it. sealed the box. shipped it the device looked normal. felt normal. worked normal but the spy chip was silently capturing your private keys the moment you set it up your seed phrase was sent to the attacker before you even finished writing it down hundreds of wallets across ethereum tron and bitcoin. all drained the guy who lost $5.3 million said “i did everything right. no leverage. no memecoins. i stored my funds on a hardware wallet like we’re all told to” he was right. he did everything right except his device had a parasite inside it that he couldn’t see ledger has now told CryptoBilis to stop all sales. told recent buyers NOT to set up their devices mark karpelès posted photos of the implant. normal board on top. spy chip below the most dangerous attack in crypto this year wasn’t a line of code it was a business acquisition
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Alpha Friday BT 💪😎💥 @BrainHarrington
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Make market orders great again
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Jay Berg retweeted
NEW GAME SHOW: I run around San Francisco and give cold hard cash to anyone who can Name A GPU!
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If anyone is interested in the intersection of Crypto & Personal Finance, my good friend @BrainHarrington is running an event in California in a month or so all about this. I will be attending as well as speaking on the idea of taking more risk and aligning it to your personal investing archetype. It'll be November 3-5 in Murrieta, CA and I have a sizable discount code if anyone is genuinely curious to come to a more intimate small group retreat style event. DM me if so and I can chat more with you on it. Here is the event page: events.brianharrington.org/
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how about a second opinion here?
Today I call upon the blockchain industry to calmly begin planning for "bunker mode". My personal recommendation is to set in motion a controlled mass migration of assets to fresh addresses, i.e. addresses whose pubkeys remain hidden behind a hash. Holders, starting with large and sophisticated ones, should consider moving the bulk of their funds to addresses that have never signed a transaction. And when they do sign one, they should also move remaining funds to a new address (possibly generated from the same seed phrase). Don't rush. While I believe there is cause for action a rushed migration would do more harm than good. Don't panic either. Moving assets to protected addresses is a simple, preventative step which does not require new cryptography or new wallets. IMO it is now reasonable to brace for the possibility that ECDSA breaks before qday, in the worst case in months not years. By "break" I mean fast private key recovery (e.g. in one week) on available hardware (e.g. a large GPU cluster). Recent days have been humbling for human mathematical intuition. Long-held, unquestioned hypotheses have fallen. This includes the n log(n) bound for integer multiplication and the 3SUM conjecture. In hindsight, May's unexpected disproof of the Erdős unit distance conjecture was our warning shot. Yesterday's OpenAI drop made it clear that mathematical superintelligence is upon us. They say there are weeks where decades happen. We are about to live through weeks where centuries of mathematical progress happen. Could our magic 64-byte ECDSA signatures be too good to be true? Was it just security through obscurity all this time? Elliptic curves feel especially vulnerable to superintelligence. Curves carry rich structure, with room for fancy tricks like Schoof, Frobenius, pairings. (By contrast, hashes are designed to minimise algebraic structure.) Separately, as Ewin Tang can attest, an efficient quantum algorithm sometimes foreshadows an efficient classical one. We should be open to the possibility of a classical counterpart to Shor that breaks elliptic curves and RSA at once. Also noteworthy is the striking under-representation of cryptographic breakthroughs among the 722 mathematical results OpenAI published. I've witnessed first-hand the US government censoring academic quantum cryptanalysis results. Backroom interventionism is my base case. I urge large, sophisticated actors to lead by example. Project11's "risq list" (bitcoin-risq-list.projecteleven[.]com) is a great tracker of exposed BTC pubkeys. Binance, Bitbank, Robinhood, Bitfinex, and Tether have an opportunity to harden their cold storage. Next month I'll address institutions in London in a live Q&A (forum.ethereuminstitutional[.]org/london-2026). Again, please do not rush. Wallets holding under 50 BTC enjoy partial cover from "Satoshi's shield", i.e. his 20K exposed addresses that hold 50 BTC each. Load-bearing signers like oracles and L2 security councils should consider rotating ECDSA pubkeys with every signed message and/or multi-signing with a hash-based schemes like SPHINCS. Exiting bunker mode safely will require post-AI cryptography. My inclination is to go all-in on hash-based cryptography and avoid structured mathematical assumptions entirely, whether from curves, lattices, or isogenies. A single battle-tested hash (e.g. from the SHA or BLAKE families) yields plausible post-AI security. The Ethereum roadmap on strawmap[.]org fully embraces hash-based cryptography with end-to-end formal verification as a response to the quantum threat. Those timelines must now be revisited and accelerated in light of mathematical superintelligence. I'll be pushing for maximum defensive acceleration.
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i support the activation of bip-448 aka THIKCS. it is a technically acceptable alternative to #LNhance. i still think #LNhance is slightly superior overall, but either one is fine. in fact it's long past due that we had these capabilities.
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What Bitcoin Investors Miss About Trading w/ @jaybny CEO of @SidepitExchange 0:00 Trading, speculating or gambling? 4:57 November event 5:58 Bitcoin investors, traders and risk capital 13:49 Rock, paper, scissors and front-running 17:34 How electronic markets changed 21:42 Market orders, bad fills and slippage 25:38 What happened on October 10? 28:35 Sidepit’s mission and who it’s for
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Tell me if you’re a long/short bitcoin trader Would love to get your feedback on a new venue
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If you are afraid of market orders or the market doesn't fill you at fair market prices, the market is broken
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