John Sydes

The Russle Brand conviction harps back to the 1970s feminist movement, "all men are rapists".

John Sydes @johnsydes Now Russle Brands lawyers can appeal after his sentencing on November 9th; asking for permission to appeal will be the first request, and this will be a tight time limit. The legal team will need specific grounds, such as an error in law or an error in the judge's direction to the Jury. In the absence of any hard facts of non-consensual rape, when it is agreed on both sides that consent for sex was given, I would presume a request to appeal has a good chance of being granted.

Russle Brands ' lawyers can appeal after his sentencing on November 9th; asking for permission to appeal will be the first request, and this will be a tight time limit. The legal team will need specific grounds, such as an error in law or an error in the judge's direction to the Jury. In the absence of any hard facts of non-consensual rape, when it is agreed on both sides that consent for sex was given, I would presume a request to appeal has a good chance of being granted.

Watch Angus Macintyre, armed forces spokesman, Future star a certainty. Imagine this guy on Question Time? facebook.com/share/p/1Cc3Zt4…

Im uncomfortable about the criminal conviction of Russle Brand, where is the evidence that he had anal sex without concent? Its just an aligation. As much as he behaved inappropriately and is a wrong un. To find him guilty without factual evidence is a miscarried of justice. The Jury obviously decided differently.

Nigel Farage has to concede that Zia Yusuf is the future of reform UK. He is young eager motivated articulate and focused.

Looking forward to another two year of Donald Trump and there is nothing the Democrats can do about it.

It's time to stand behind the Brexit referendum result. Labour under Burnham is incontestable in its desire to rejoin. The next election is imminent. The right and left who believe in the opportunities of complete divergence should unite. ''The perception of institutional “fettering” of Brexit is real and rooted in a deep elite–public cultural mismatch, not pure conspiracy. UK institutions (especially the senior civil service, judiciary, House of Lords, universities, and much of the media/quangos) are disproportionately Remain-leaning in outlook and demographics. This produces risk-aversion, preference for regulatory continuity or alignment, and friction with maximal divergence—even when governments formally deliver exit. It is not total sabotage, but it is a structural drag that Leave voters correctly notice.⁠Briefingsforbritain Civil service bias and culture Senior Whitehall is heavily skewed toward Remain. It is London-based, highly educated, cosmopolitan, and graduate-heavy—exactly the demographic that voted Remain by large margins. Former officials and ministers have described groupthink, fear of admitting a Leave vote (career risk), and open resistance. Lord Kerslake (ex-Head of the Home Civil Service) suggested officials might need to put “stewardship of the country” ahead of the government of the day to avoid no-deal. Suella Braverman spoke of a “Remain bias” and inability to conceive of life outside the EU. Anonymous accounts and reporting describe contempt for Leave voters as “racist,” “stupid,” or “uneducated.” Officials were reported in tears after the 2016 vote. Boris Johnson later blamed Remain-minded civil servants for the high post-Brexit migration (“Boriswave”).⁠Briefingsforbritain The civil service did implement formal Brexit (exit in 2020, TCA, border systems). It expanded significantly to do so. But when governments were divided (especially under May) or when ministers pushed divergence, the default institutional culture favoured caution, process, and continuity. Impartiality norms exist, yet the skew is undeniable and has damaged trust. Judiciary, Lords, and parliamentary friction The Supreme Court rulings on Article 50 (Gina Miller) and prorogation were legally arguable under existing constitutional practice but were widely seen by Leave supporters as judicial activism constraining the popular mandate and executive. The Daily Mail “enemies of the people” headline reflected that view. The House of Lords—unelected and heavily Remain-oriented—repeatedly amended or delayed Brexit legislation (Internal Market Bill, Withdrawal Bill, etc.), often citing rule of law or international commitments. It cannot permanently block but can slow and dilute. During the May minority-government period, a Remain-leaning Commons and divided Conservatives produced the “meaningful vote,” Benn Act, and other constraints. These were legitimate parliamentary processes in a system of parliamentary sovereignty, but they clashed with the referendum result and hardline Leave expectations.⁠Parliamentnews Practical and political limits Leaving the EU after 40+ years of integration is extraordinarily complex. The Retained/Assimilated EU Law dashboard tracked ~6,900 items; by mid-2026 roughly 2,700 had been revoked or reformed. Radical sunset clauses risked legal and economic chaos, so governments (even Conservative ones) chose selective change. Northern Ireland’s special arrangements (Protocol, then Windsor Framework) require ongoing alignment in goods to avoid a hard border—an inherent constraint. Capacity limits, lack of clear long-term strategy from successive governments, and economic trade-offs (friction at borders, regulatory equivalence for trade) also constrained divergence. Many “EU laws” stayed because departments and ministers preferred them or lacked bandwidth to replace them.⁠Gov.uk Conservative governments after 2019 delivered the formal exit but limited radical divergence on regulation, tax, energy, and migration. Labour governments (Starmer, then Andy Burnham as PM from July 2026) have pursued a “reset”—closer ties, youth mobility, selective alignment—with cabinet divisions on full rejoin. Institutions that leaned Remain are now more aligned with the direction of travel.⁠Al Jazeera Bottom line The “hell-bent on fettering” charge reflects a genuine elite preference for European integration, regulatory continuity, and international norms over the democratic mandate for divergence. Demographics, socialisation, and risk aversion in permanent institutions produce that outcome. Checks and balances (courts, Lords, civil service impartiality norms) are also normal democratic features and sometimes protected against rushed or legally problematic moves. The bigger failure was political: governments that won on Leave often lacked consistent will or capacity for the domestic reforms required to use the new sovereignty fully. Brexit exposed the gap between the electorate and the governing class more clearly than almost any other issue''.