Jonathan Panikoff

Thanks to the @WSJ for publishing my latest: “What Victory Looks Like in Iran” wsj.com/opinion/what-victory… @AtlanticCouncil @ACMideast

Some early thoughts on what last night’s results mean for US policy toward the Middle East…. 1) If President Trump‘s going to strike Iran intensely again, it’s going to happen during this lame-duck period as he’ll want to finish the entirety of US action before the new Congress takes over. 2) On the other-hand the likelihood the region faces a long-term low intensity conflict without a full resolution — a potential new normal the Gulf has already accepted — probably increases. The U.S. leaves, the Gulf states make their own own accommodations, and Israel faces a challenge of having to decide how to manage the challenge of Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities potentially without nearly as much U.S. support. 3) Longer-term the result reinforces the already mounting bipartisan likelihood that most aid to Israel is likely to end in the way we know it, even as joint production is possible. But…. 4) An underestimated is that a consequence of that is it is also likely to seriously endanger aid to Jordan and Egypt as well. 5) The election results are probably good news for the Israeli opposition including Eisenkot but are not going to be determinative as to what happens next in Israel’s government formation. But they perhaps will be a final death knell to what has been a terrible Israeli foreign policy effort over the last decade, that its foreign policy can, and perhaps even should, be partisan. 6) Gulf states will have a tough balancing act. They’re likely to align with Democrats on not restarting the war but are at risk of being part of the corruption accusations with the administration that are about to come. 7) On the other-hand as farmers and ranchers and many in the U.S. have learned, the Gulf states and the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are critical to their lives, as well, with prices of energy and petroleum-derived products, fertilizers and helium, commodities across the board, dependent on the global market place. Reinforcing once again that like it or not, the Middle East is in the middle of the world and cannot be geographically wished away. 8) Policymakers across the aisle should be careful not to throw out the baby with the bath water. The war in Iran has been an unnecessary, unmitigated disaster that has diminished U.S. leverage and influence in the region and vastly overestimated, again, the likelihood that that hitting the Iranian regime hard would lead to its collapse. But the U.S. does have vital interests in the region and cooperation, partnership, and engagement there is critical for U.S. national security, including economic security — as the war has proven, they are one in the same. @AtlanticCouncil @ACMideast

Thanks to @CNBC and @KellyCNBC for having me on earlier today to chat about the latest dynamics in the Middle East, including the potential for the war to escalate again in the coming weeks. cnbc.com/video/2026/10/22/al…

There's a debate raging among Middle East experts on how to think about the future of the region, with one prominent view being that it's splitting into two blocs. Today, the @AtlanticCouncil published my alternative hypothesis in a new piece, entitled: "The new Middle East is modular: what the two bloc thesis of the region misses". I welcome hearing your thoughts, as well! atlanticcouncil.org/content-… @ACMideast

I’m so incredibly saddened to hear about @AzizAlghashian’s passing. He was a great analyst and wonderful friend. My deepest condolences to his family.

Thrilled to have the opportunity to join the @CNASdc Brussels Sprouts podcast hosted by my friend and former USG colleague @AKendallTaylor and @jteurope. And to get to engage on such an important topic alongside @RUSI_org's @MTSavill. You can find the episode here: cnas.org/publications/podcas… @AtlanticCouncil

October 7th marks the deadliest attack on the Jewish people since the Holocaust. On this day, everyone should be able to recognize the pain of the Israelis who lived through it and grieve alongside them, without bringing up the Israeli government or Prime Minister Netanyahu’s actions that followed. That’s true whether you strongly supported those actions, were horrified by them, or land somewhere in between. Otherwise, what you’re engaging in is a moral relativism that diminishes Israeli lives and the trauma a whole country is still living with. If you’re doing that, then your priority isn’t honoring everyone’s humanity or the sacredness of innocent lives on both sides of the painful divide between Israelis and Palestinians. The suffering of Palestinians in Gaza is real and deserves to be mourned too, but not as a rebuttal to Israeli grief. Today, Israelis deserve to be seen. Their pain deserves to be acknowledged on its own terms, without anyone rushing to “balance” it by pointing to the government’s strategic and moral choices, often with far more emphasis than the grief itself.

I've spent the last week in the Gulf, first in the UAE (Abu Dhabi and Dubai) and then in Kuwait. As I head back to DC this evening, here's a bit of what I heard, learned, confirmed, and changed my view on: Heard: Lumping the Gulf states together is almost always a mistake that undermines analysis and policy, but it keeps happening. Many of us who work on the region will view this as obvious. But I was taken aback by how intensely, and how often, I heard frustration that policymakers (not just American ones), media, and academics, strategize about the region as a whole rather than as individual states with their own requirements and preferences. This point cuts against the notion of a more integrated Gulf. As I heard a few times, the Gulf countries aren't looking for the GCC to function like ASEAN, let alone the EU -- they're okay with a looser and sometimes non-cohesive intra-GCC relationship. Learned: While many in the West debate base, best, and worst case scenarios for the impasse that is the Iran war, I hadn't fully appreciated the extent to which Gulf states have already accepted the situation as their new normal. The West remains focused on Iranian leverage over the Strait. Gulf allies, unsurprisingly, are more focused on the fact that Iran has permanently shattered the taboo of attacking them directly (including civilian targets), and indirectly through Iraqi militias and the Houthis. That won't go away whenever/if the conflict is resolved in the coming months or years. It's already altering how states in the region think about investment, security, technology, commercial, and geopolitical roles. Confirmed: Frustration remains high that the U.S. didn't consult before President Trump took action, leaving the Gulf states to pay the consequences. But frustration with Europe is growing too. Individual European countries are heralded for their in-country military support during the war, and both the UAE and Kuwait are looking to Europe to diversify procurement of systems. But Europe's unwillingness to put the UK-French-led maritime force into the region — even to ensure its own energy and commodity flows — has raised concerns that, like the U.S., Europe's shifting political winds will limit how far partnerships can expand and grow between the regions. Changed my view: The language they use may be different, but both the UAE and Kuwait are looking past the idea of hedging and strategic autonomy. They see balancing between the U.S. and China as a construct the west relies on to make sense of a region that has moved beyond that binary. The prevailing sentiment is that it isn't the responsibility of regional states to balance between Beijing and DC, and they're not trying to. They'll choose, sector by sector, whatever best serves their national interests. Many of us have heard that line and seen it play out these last years. What's different is that they're now doing it outside what they view as a dated Western framework. @AtlanticCouncil @ACMideast

It was a privilege to have the opportunity to spend some time this evening with my friend @Abdulaziz_anjri, the founder and CEO of Reconnaissance Research here in Kuwait City. His extraordinary and gracious hospitality provided an opportunity to begin discussions on as a range of issues related to the region and beyond that I look greatly forward to continuing over the coming days.

Thanks to @dan_murphy and @CNBC for having me on this morning to talk about the latest on the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, war with Iran, and what comes next in the region. cnbc.com/video/2026/09/30/u-…

As oil price rise again and tensions with Iran (and the Houthis) increase, I was happy to join @KellyCNBC Evans this afternoon to talk about the current state of play. Here's a part of our conversation. @AtlanticCouncil @ACMideast cnbc.com/video/2026/09/11/gu…

Incredibly grateful to all my friends and colleagues in the AC network who contributed to this phenomenal retrospective on the state of terrorism 25 years after 9/11. @AtlanticCouncil atlanticcouncil.org/dispatch…

I appreciated the opportunity to spend a few days in Berlin this past week meeting with senior officials from across the German government on the Middle East -- and of course Ukraine. A few themes came through clearly: 1) Ukraine is still Berlin's foreign policy priority, but Germany is likely to ratchet up its intensity on the conflict and Russia. Expect Berlin to take an even harder line on Russia now that it's confirmed Moscow was behind last month's drone attacks on Leipzig airport. The focus on Ukraine has been easier to sustain lately given that the conflict with Iran has flared and faded without resulting into a full-blown war as it was in the spring. If a broader war in the Middle East reemerges, it may challenge Berlin's bandwidth to play a meaningful role across both conflicts. 2) Frustration with the US runs deep. The Trump administration's decision to act in Iran without consulting allies is viewed by Berlin with derision. As a result, German leaders have little patience for the idea that it should now help reopen the Strait of Hormuz or fall in line behind Washington's "Economic D-Day demands." Which is a bit ironic given that Germany has been more forward-leaning than the US on sanctioning Iran the last few years. 3) The Middle East matters to Germany, but it isn't the priority. Berlin sees real opportunity with the Gulf states, particularly on trade and defense-tech investment — which is symbiotic for all: GCC countries want to diversify their suppliers, and German manufacturers like Rheinmetall are eager to sell. But over the next year, German attention will tilt even more toward Ukraine and building out common European security, especially as Washington starts to look like a less reliable partner. 4) The likely AfD win in Saxony-Anhalt today has German leaders rattled. There's a real debate about what it means: the start of a broader shift, or a protest vote the mainstream parties can still come back from before it bleeds into future federal elections. But on one point there's wide agreement — comparing the AfD to Italy's Brothers of Italy, UK's Reform, or even France's National Rally is a mistake. The AfD is more radical and less willing to compromise, which is a genuinely frightening prospect to many in the country given how intensely the memory of WWII and the Holocaust still shapes how it sees its role in the world. @AtlanticCouncil @ACMideast