Long River Holding

It's been 6 months since my last portfolio update. So here it comes: To begin with, I've Changed My Approach, Not My Investment Philosophy. Since December 2025, I've deliberately avoided chasing the high-flying mega-cap technology trade. That doesn't mean I've been sitting in cash. I've been reallocating capital toward businesses with tangible assets, strong cash generation, durable competitive advantages, and occasionally, deeply mispriced cyclical opportunities. Here's what my portfolio looks like today: 1. Quality Compounders: $BRK.B $MELI $SPGI I'm increasingly interested in owning exceptional businesses rather than simply buying statistically cheap stocks. Berkshire, MercadoLibre, S&P Global, Copart, and Zoetis offer very different business models, but each has characteristics I find attractive. (Thanks to recent meltdown on some of these names) 2. Energy, Commodities & Infrastructure: $DVN $VST $MOS $EWZ $NE $MTZ $CPRT I continue to believe tangible assets, electricity demand, energy infrastructure, and agricultural inputs deserve a place in a diversified portfolio. This is partly an inflation hedge and partly a bet on long-term infrastructure investment. 3. Financials & Special Situations: $ALLY $NU $PFSI $RDN $RKT $HHH I'm still looking for opportunities where market pessimism creates attractive entry points. Consumer lending, mortgage servicing, insurance, and digital banking all offer different ways to participate in financial services. But I recognize the concentration in credit and interest-rate sensitivity. 4. Consumer & Retail: $LULU $SFM $CPNG $KHC $ZTS I'm interested in businesses with differentiated products, customer loyalty, recognizable brands, and attractive unit economics. Some are growth opportunities; others are recovery or valuation plays. (Thanks to recent meltdown on some of these names) 5. China & Asia: $PDD $JD $TME Still maintaining exposure to businesses generating substantial cash relative to their valuations. The geopolitical discount is real, and I don't underestimate it. But I also don't believe every Chinese business deserves to trade at permanently depressed multiples. I exited $SE and now am looking at better entry point. 6. Industrial & Cyclical Value: $GBX $TWI Asset-heavy businesses that are often overlooked when capital flows overwhelmingly toward growth and technology. The key is buying at normalized earnings valuations rather than peak-cycle earnings. (Thanks to recent meltdown, I was able to buy more) 7. Healthcare & Biotechnology: $ADMA $RYTM $INSM $BHC A combination of established pharmaceutical businesses, specialty healthcare, and higher-risk biotechnology opportunities. Position sizing and balance-sheet discipline matter considerably here. These are relatively small in terms of sizing..except $BHC 8. Other Cash-Generating Opportunities: $SIRI A restructuring and capital-allocation story that I continue to follow. One of my long-term holding. And, of course, $SGOV remains part of my portfolio (25-30% of my portfolio as of today). Cash is not a failure to invest. It's optionality. A few things have changed recently. I've added $MELI, $SPGI, $CPRT, $ZTS, $SFM, $GBX, $MTZ, $RKT, $NU, and $TWI. I've also exited several positions after realizing gains or identifying more attractive opportunities elsewhere. I previously had exposure to residential homebuilders and hospitality real estate. My original thesis was relatively straightforward: interest rates would gradually decline, mortgage affordability would improve, pent-up housing demand would return, and hotel operators would benefit from stronger travel spending, particularly with the 2026 FIFA World Cup approaching. I still believe parts of that thesis could play out. However, the risk/reward has changed. First, I underestimated how difficult the interest-rate environment could remain. I initially expected monetary easing to provide a tailwind for housing and real estate valuations. But inflation has remained persistent, geopolitical developments have added uncertainty, and the Federal Reserve has not followed a straightforward easing path. It held rates at 3.75%–4.00% on October 28, while the average 30-year mortgage rate was still 7.32% on October 22, compared with 6.19% a year earlier. Second, I am less enthusiastic about hospitality opportunities after the World Cup. Major sporting events can generate temporary increases in hotel room rates and revenue, but I don't want to mistake a one-time demand catalyst for sustainable earnings growth. Once the event passes, hotel operators still have to contend with labor expenses, maintenance, renovation requirements, financing costs, and normalized occupancy. Third, I started questioning the opportunity cost. Even if interest rates eventually decline and real estate recovers, are these businesses still offering a better prospective return than other opportunities available today? Outside of that, I've been selling covered calls along the way, generating additional premium income, although some shares have naturally been called away. I know this portfolio will probably underperform if speculative mega-cap technology continues to dominate the market. I'm comfortable with that trade-off. My objective isn't to own whatever is going up. It's to allocate capital where I believe the relationship between business quality, intrinsic value, and downside risk is most attractive. I don't need every position to work. I need the overall portfolio to compound intelligently while protecting capital. Now I'm curious: If you were evaluating this portfolio, what would you be most concerned about? Too many positions? Excessive cyclical exposure? Too much emerging-market risk? Or am I missing an obvious opportunity? I'm particularly interested in hearing which holdings you would eliminate and which ones you would make larger positions.

$COF - One thing I noticed digging through $COF that I don't see discussed much: Nobody at Capital One seems particularly interested in buying the stock. Over the last 12 months, 12 insiders have sold roughly $90M of COF stock in open-market transactions. Insider purchases? $0. Richard Fairbank, the CEO, sold roughly $37M in late October/early November. Peter Raskind, a director, sold another ~$339K on Nov. 6. And this isn't just one executive. Retail banking, banking & premium products, the general counsel, credit/risk executives and others have all been selling. Do you think they know something?

Trump wants a 10% cap on credit-card interest rates. The Senate has been pushing the same idea. Both are stupid, equally stupid. Let's use Capital One's Q3 2026 disclosures and run the numbers. For every $100 of average credit-card receivables, the annualized results look roughly like this: Net interest income: +$14.06 Other income: +$3.69 Credit-loss provisions: -$3.62 Operating expenses: -$8.59 What's left? $5.54 in pre-tax income. Now let's stress-test the proposed 10% cap. Capital One's consolidated funding cost was approximately 3.18%. Using that as a funding-cost proxy: 10.00% interest income 3.18% funding cost = 6.82% net interest income Keep the other income, credit losses and operating expenses unchanged: 6.82% + 3.69% - 3.62% - 8.59% Result: -1.70% pre-tax margin. That's an illustrative scenario, not a precise forecast. But it shows how quickly the economics can break. And this is before considering how underwriting, credit limits and customer mix would change. These are unsecured loans. Banks still have to fund them, absorb defaults, pay employees, run underwriting models, prevent fraud, maintain technology, handle compliance and service millions of accounts. I have no problem with criticizing excessive interest rates or demanding more competition. But proposing a 10% cap without addressing any of these costs is a different story. Trump and the Senate seem to think they can simply pick an interest rate and the entire industry will adjust around it. That's not how lending works. And you cannot cap away credit risk. If the economics no longer justify the risk, banks will stop lending to certain borrowers. And those borrowers are likely to be the ones with the fewest alternatives. Maybe spend some time reading a bank's 10-K before trying to run its credit business. $COF $JPM $AXP

I've been looking at Mondelēz $MDLZ and I like the business more than I like the stock at today's price. Oreo, Cadbury, Milka and Ritz are excellent brands. The distribution network is difficult to replicate, and I don't think the business is going away anytime soon. (The BTS limited edition flavor 🤌） But a few things caught my attention. Revenue has grown, yet free cash flow has barely compounded. Its five-year FCF CAGR was just ~0.5%. Net debt is still around $20B. And despite the latest earnings looking much better on the surface, Q3 GAAP operating income benefited from roughly $543M in commodity derivative gains. I wouldn't confuse that with underlying operating improvement. There's another detail worth watching: North American revenue grew 1.5% over the first nine months, while segment operating income declined 15%. That's not what I want to see from a business with strong brands and pricing power. At $66, I'm paying roughly 23x TTM free cash flow. That's not particularly compelling given the leverage and the uncertainty around normalized margins. My preliminary intrinsic value is around $52/share, with a more attractive entry point below $44. I like the company. I just don't like the price. A great brand doesn't automatically make a great investment. So MDLZ stays on my watchlist.

They should try NINJA loans. I heard that benefited a ton of people back in the days.

$THRY Either John Paulson is WAY TOO WRONG over here, or this price actually looks like an interesting opportunity. Not a long term holding but can be a turn around play.

Why is everyone still buying $BRK.B at nearly $580? I'm genuinely curious. I understand the appeal. In a market where investors are increasingly uncomfortable (or scared..you can say that too I guess) with expensive technology stocks, AI valuations and concentration risk, Berkshire looks like a natural place to park capital. You get insurance, railroads, utilities, manufacturing, consumer businesses, a substantial equity portfolio and a ton of cash and Treasury bills. And Greg Abel is showing a greater willingness to deploy capital. Berkshire repurchased approximately $9.6B of its own shares in Q3 and another $2B in October. I also think investors are increasingly comfortable with the management transition. Buffett may no longer be CEO, but Berkshire's underlying culture and capital allocation philosophy haven't suddenly disappeared. So I understand why people want to own it. But here's where I'm struggling. Berkshire's Q3 operating earnings declined 6% YoY to approximately $12.7B. GEICO's pretax underwriting earnings fell roughly 45%. Some of its consumer and retail businesses are experiencing weaker demand. McLane is under pressure, and I'm still trying to understand what normalized returns on the OxyChem acquisition will look like. Meanwhile, BNSF and BHE are performing reasonably well, and the balance sheet remains exceptional. It's a mixed operating picture, not some extraordinary acceleration in underlying earnings. What makes the valuation particularly interesting is that Berkshire is now trading around $580, compared with the roughly $400 level where I found the investment considerably more compelling. That's a 45% increase. Has the intrinsic value of Berkshire increased by 45% over that period? I'm not convinced. I understand that the market is assigning a premium to Berkshire's liquidity, resilience and ability to capitalize on a market dislocation. But that optionality isn't free. That huge cash pile is already part of the balance sheet. The insurance float is valuable, but it isn't free equity capital. And a collection of wonderful businesses doesn't automatically justify any purchase price. I actually WANT to own Berkshire during the next major market panic. And I am still owning it at this very moment. The irony is that the more investors buy Berkshire as a safe haven, the less attractive its entry price becomes. I'm not bearish on the business. I'm just having a harder time getting excited about the stock at this valuation. Am I missing something? Are investors primarily buying Berkshire for its intrinsic value, its defensive characteristics, or simply because they don't know where else to put their money? I'd genuinely like to hear the other side of this argument.

This is the dumbest fucking thing any administration can do.

$JRVR Q3 2026 was bad operationally..but not as bad as the headline makes it look. Numbers are ugly. Net loss $189M - $4.08 diluted loss per share Adjusted operating loss: $4.4M - $0.10 per share Gross Written Premiums, Net Written Premiums, Net Earned Premiums were all down 14-22% YoY. Combined ratio was 115.6% So I would not dismiss this quarter as simply the goodwill impairment makes the numbers look bad. Without all the impairment, the insurance operation actually lost money. But here's where the quarter gets interesting. Management says the 19.2M reserve charge is highly concentrated in an old product-liability portfolio that is now fully in runoff. The company performed its annual "first principles" reserve review and discovered additional losses primarily associated with this legacy portfolio. And management is saying something very specific: the more recent accident years beginning in 2023 are performing materially better. The current accident-year loss ratio was 65.1% in Q3 versus 63.5% a year ago. So I can also see that they are doing some clean up. I actually like management's response to the competitive environment. This is probably my favorite part of the quarter. JRVR isn't trying to defend premium volume. They're deliberately shrinking. Management explicitly says they're prioritizing profitability rather than volume. That's exactly what I want from a specialty insurer entering a softer market. The move toward smaller accounts is very interesting This might actually be the most underappreciated part of the story. Management said more than 80% of the in-force book is now policies with premiums ≤$35,000. They believe smaller accounts have higher retention, produce better results, and provide a better long-term result. I am not 100% sure if that'd work, but it's something I'd keep it on watch list. Right now, tangible common equity / share is still significantly higher than current price per share. Onto the next one.

$M $DASH Not gonna lie…I like the idea… DoorDash is really getting creative these days.

$SE - Q3 results made me more bullish on the business—but not blindly bullish on the stock. Bought some during pre-market hours around ~$72 a share. Shopee is the standout: GMV +23% Core marketplace revenue +51% Adjusted EBITDA +45% That’s real operating leverage. Sea is monetizing transactions much faster than it’s growing them. Garena is quietly becoming a monster cash generator too: EBITDA +46% to $458M. The problem is Monee. Loans receivable reached $12.6B, up 60%. Credit-loss provisions jumped 82%. 90+ day NPLs rose from 1.1% to 1.3%. That doesn’t mean Monee is bad. It means the business is now large enough that underwriting matters enormously. ($MELI has similar issues) Sea also spent $4.4B on loans receivable through 9 months while buying back ~$1B of stock. So the question isn’t whether Sea can grow. It clearly can. The question is whether Shopee + Garena + Monee can turn that growth into high incremental returns on capital. That’s what I’m watching. But i sure do love the price point.

Every time it gets late and I’m still awake, I end up looking back at some of my past investment decisions and thinking about how stupid I can be sometimes. I’ve been thinking a lot about errors of omission vs. errors of commission. $POOL is one that bothers me. I followed it for a long time. Around $150, I thought the price was attractive enough. I had done the work. I understood the business. But I decided to wait for a better price. Same thing with $PEP around $125. I didn’t expect explosive growth. I was looking at it more as a high-quality, defensive business with a roughly 5% dividend yield and a reasonable price. I still didn’t pull the trigger. And $LULU is another one. I believed the numbers I had calculated. I thought the valuation was becoming interesting. But I didn’t size the position aggressively enough when I had the opportunity to add below 95 Now some of these stocks are bouncing back. And honestly, I’m not sure what bothers me more: Losing money on a bad investment, or being right about a good investment and not having the conviction to act. I do not want to be a victim of FOMO. That’d be stupid. But at what point does “I’ll wait for a better price” become an actual investment mistake? How do you think about errors of omission? And how do you distinguish disciplined patience from simply being too afraid to pull the trigger?

China has the ability to innovate and manufacture things cheaper and faster. And apparently they have the ability to manufacture a discount version of Jensen as well..

$SIRI - The questions I'd ask as a shareholder... Why replace a CEO just as the company's operating performance is beginning to improve? Witz's tenure has included work with YouTube, improved churn, and recent FCF progress. Does the next stage require a different kind of CEO? In April 2026 proxy statement, it was disclosed publicly that Witz's employment agreement ended December 31st 2026. So this looks more like a planned leadership transition at the end of a defined employment term. The board definitely has been putting in effort to build a new leadership team. Sud joined the board in March 2025. The 2026 proxy document highlighted that and another director, as well as the appointment of a new CFO and Chief Ad Revenue officer. Does the board believe the turnaround phase is largely complete and the the next challenge is digital transformation? Does the board believe that the existing business model needs a more aggressive / fundamental change? Interesting move in my opinion.

$STLA - I decided to give it another chance. My preliminary read of Stellantis is that the business is stabilizing operationally but has not yet demonstrated a durable turnaround. This is a high-risk turnaround/value position to me, not a high-quality bargain. The automobile industry remains structurally difficult. The major problems are low switching costs, high fixed costs, high capital intensity, cyclical demand, price competition, chinese competition, tariffs, EV transition uncertainty. A few things I like: 1. North American is recovering. Adjusted operating income is improved. 2. Revenue is growing again. 3. Liquidity remains substantial. 4. Cost restructuring is underway. 5. Product strategy and discipline are improving. A few things I'd watch: 1. Cash flow is still negative. 2. Profit margins remain weak. 3. Europe remains a problem. 4. Inventory increased. Quality and recall issues still persist. Three things I will pay attention to in the next 2-3 quarters: 1. Does industrial free cash flow turn positive? 2. Can their margin reach 3-5%? 3. Can they normalize inventory without sacrificing pricing?

$AMD - They need to be careful. China: 'What if we just match Lisa Su with a handsome Asian guy?' AMD's board better start stress-testing that scenario after what happened at $NVDA

$MOS The bull case is real: strong potash assets, constrained global supply, lower input costs, and potential Brazil savings. But the financials still matter. Debt-like obligations are there. Brazil remains deeply challenged. There are still significant capital requirements. I own MOS but I am not interested in adding more at current price point. Onto the next one.

$SIRI CEO transition is quite unexpected in my opinion. The new person will come from Tubi…Interesting..

$NVDA doesn’t look too promising.

Jensen Huang scandal makes Warren Buffett look even more impressive.. Decades of marriage. Minimal scandal. How can people not respect Warren..