Lulu Wang (@luluywang) profile picture

Assistant Professor of finance @KelloggSchool. interested in market power and finance.

Chicago, IL
Joined April 2012
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NEW: @luluywang (@KelloggSchool) writes DOJ's lawsuit against Visa's debit card monopoly may have limited impact. Even if successful, it'll only affect a fraction of merchant fees. More competition could potentially harm both consumers and merchants. promarket.org/2024/10/03/a-d…
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When credit cards offer cash back, where is that “free” money really coming from? And why are credit card companies so eager to dole it out? Professor Lulu Wang’s new study shows how and why costs get passed on to consumers. kell.gg/pzi6 #KelloggLeader
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V/MC settlement doesn't seem like it will change the structure of the market. The much-hyped modifications to product-level surcharging have been there since 2013. A temporary interchange reduction doesn't change the fact that networks compete for cons, not merch
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The ability to give discounts to particular issuers is interesting. This would mean that merchants could give Chase debit a discount relative to local credit unions b/c Chase debit interchange is lower (due to Durbin). Would be weird to penalize small banks though.
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Biggest barrier to merchant fee competition is that there isn't an ability to charge Visa different from Amex. This means that when Amex raises merchant fees, merchants have a harder time substituting away. Settlement doesn't change that -> no big impact.
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My short take on the Cap One / Discover merger is that it almost certainly increases competition at the network level (w/ Visa, MC, AmEx), but that's in fact bad! Network competition is historically associated with higher interchange, not lower as networks compete for issuers
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(3) Merger is insurance against Credit Card Competition Act (Durbin 2.0). Proposed law requires each CC to be on two networks. Capital One now owns a natural second network. (4) Merger lets COF expand work in e-com fraud. COF widely recognized for working w/ merchants
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Discover network + customers make it worthwhile for merchants to invest in COF's fraud tech developer.capitalone.com/doc… @mikulaja @AlexH_Johnson @maiab @heysamir_ @CharleyMa @patio11
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After the Visa v USA decision that let V/MC banks issue with Amex, interchange rose! Key prediction: consumers win, merchants lose. Network competition tends to higher merchant fees to fund rewards to acquire cons luluywang.github.io/PaperRep…
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(2)$DFS and $AXP have an end-run around Durbin. They're the only two big players with rewards checking on the market because Durbin Amendment's caps on interchange only apply to open-loop networks like $V/$MC. Key prediction: Capital One shifts debit to DFS, ­­⬆ mkt share
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The Capital One/Discover merger stands to (1) increase network competition in the U.S. while (2) also letting Capital One skirt important network regulations in the U.S., both present and future. (1) Even if $COF doesn't shift volume, merger lets $COF bargain with $V / $MC
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Striking that it looks like the fee structure for UPI in the future will be similar as debit cards globally. Turns out taxing merchants to fund consumers is just a great way to fund a payment network. See my JMP luluywang.github.io/PaperRep… economictimes.indiatimes.com…
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Fantastic summer school, learned a ton about the philosophy and practicalities of doing structural work in finance
It's happening! Luke Taylor, Stephen Terry, and I are doing the structural summer school IN PERSON. This time at Wharton. June 13-16. It's different from the other summer schools. It's a hands-on bootcamp on estimating the parameters of dynamic models. rodneywhitecenter.wharton.up…
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Thanks for the shoutout @shoshievass! I study competition b/t payment networks, like Visa/MC/Amex. I estimate a 2-sided model to study competition + regulations. I find entry ↑ merchant fees, ↑ rewards, ↓ welfare, also repealing Durbin ↑ welfare. luluywang.com/
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BIG PICTURE: model is a quantitative tool to study payment markets, highlight two-sided, equilibrium effects of competition + regulation. I try to live up to Ohio v Amex's call for a "two-sided analysis".
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