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Match analysis, specific topics, formations, video analysis, scouting... PFSA Level-2: Opposition Analysis, PFSA Level-2: Talent Identification

Joined August 2019
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OVERLOAD TO ISOLATE: 5-4-1 against 4-1-3-2
4
65
4,919
DEFENDING TRANSITION IDEA: 5-2-3 against 4-1-4-1
4
57
3,824
ATTACKING TRANSITION IDEA: 4-3-1-2 against 3-4-2-1
2
61
4,152
2 REST DEFENCE IDEAS: 5-3-2 against 4-2-2-2 Rest Defence is the defensive security a team establishes behind the attack while in possession, in preparation for a possible turnover. This structure does not simply mean leaving a few players behind; it is about controlling the opponent’s first pass, first run, and first counter-attacking space before the ball is lost. In a good rest defence structure, the centre-backs, full-backs, and midfielders position themselves by considering the opponent’s striker connection, wide runs, second balls, and possible central exits. This allows the team to maintain defensive preparation even while attacking. The main focus of Rest Defence is building the right balance behind the attack. A team may want to commit more players into the penalty area, but if it leaves uncontrolled spaces behind when possession is lost, the attacking plan becomes risky. For this reason, the coaching staff must answer key questions: “How many players do we keep behind the attack?”, “Where does the opponent’s most dangerous counter-attacking threat come from?”, and “Who makes the first action after the turnover?” Rest Defence is not about neglecting the attack in order to defend; it is about planning the transition moment that may appear after the attack.
1
8
47
3,506
PIN THE BACK LINE: 3-4-3 against 4-3-2-1 It means using our attacking players to occupy the opponent’s defensive line, preventing defenders from stepping forward, supporting central areas, or applying pressure to other players. This principle is used when we want to keep the opponent’s back line fixed and create space between the lines, around the box, or for second runs. The objective is not only for the forwards to score, but for their positioning to create better attacking conditions for the players arriving from deeper areas.
5
57
6,164
COMPRESSED DIRECTNESS -Because Arsenal preferred to attack directly, while Aston Villa defended without allowing Arsenal to get close to their penalty area, the game was played in a very narrow space. -Arsenal’s full-backs were often positioned close to the striker, while the wingers stayed close to the touchlines. In midfield, sometimes one player — and sometimes two — dropped between the centre-backs. -When the full-backs made runs towards central areas, they opened space for the wingers. When the wingers received the ball and the full-backs moved alongside them, they created space for the most advanced players to attack.
8
834
FREEDOM WITH COVER -Monaco give one of their midfielders the freedom to step out and win the ball. The central space left behind is then covered by one of the full-backs. The reason behind this adjustment is to prevent the dropping Marseille attacker from becoming involved in the build-up. -When Marseille try to carry the ball into the opposition half through the wide areas, the Monaco full-back on that side goes forward. The space created behind him is covered by one of the midfielders. -Although the full-back’s forward jumps can weaken the defensive security behind the ball, his ability to recover quickly and win the ball when Marseille play forward restores Monaco’s defensive strength.
8
1,102
LEAVING ONE BEHIND -Newcastle United never pressed the goalkeeper or the centre-back without the ball aggressively in the opposition half. This allowed them to keep one player behind the press and maintain security in transition. -When the ball was with the goalkeeper, the striker and the attacking midfielder matched up with Tottenham’s midfielders who dropped deeper to receive. Once the ball was played to one of the centre-backs, one of Newcastle’s front players pressed the centre-back, while the other moved onto the dropping Tottenham player. -When the ball was switched to the other centre-back, Newcastle applied the same plan with different players. -When the ball was played to a Tottenham full-back, the Newcastle full-back on that side did not go forward. This helped prevent from creating a transition opportunity behind him. In these moments, the striker also dropped deeper, so that if Newcastle won the ball, he could immediately become a free passing option.
1
2
20
1,582
FAST DIRECT ATTACKS BY BAYERN MUNICH AGAINST STUTTGART
1
696
PROGRESSION THROUGH ROTATIONS -Because Athletic Club did not apply intense pressure while defending Barcelona in the second zone, Barcelona were able to try different progression variations. -Barcelona pushed one full-back higher while dropping the other full-back deeper. A midfielder then moved into the space vacated by the dropping full-back, and Barcelona built the play through him. -The winger made a run from a central position in behind the defensive line, opening space for the full-back behind him. The Barcelona defender in possession then looked to find that full-back with a long pass. -In another variation, the winger and one of the midfielders waited for the pass on the same horizontal line in midfield. At the same time, the striker also moved into that area, creating 1v1 match-ups against the opposition defenders. From there, they used forward-and-backward movements to attack the space behind the defensive line.
1
14
2,391
ADAPTIVE PRESS SHAPE -Fenerbahçe prevented Lyon from controlling the game for large periods of the match. To do this, -They changed their formation in the opposition half from 4-2-3-1 into 4-3-1-2. -The midfield three was formed with the wingers, Greenwood and Aydın, moving inside. As a result, Lyon’s full-backs initially looked free, but whenever the goalkeeper played into them, Greenwood and Aydın could quickly jump out to press. -Guendouzi covered a large amount of ground vertically, while Kante covered distance horizontally. -Guendouzi’s quick recovery runs from higher positions allowed him to win the ball back for his team in unexpected moments.
51
193
90
2,451
1,049,227
LOW-MID-HIGH BLOCKS: 4-4-1-1 against 3-5-1-1
5
37
4,496
ROUTE TO THE BYLINE -Roma used two attacking methods that developed in different ways but aimed for the same final action. -In the first method, because Fiorentina’s shape allowed them to control the centre, Roma dropped their midfielders between the centre-backs. This helped them secure the wide areas and develop the attack through the wings. -In the second method, when Roma were able to progress towards the in front of the box, the attacking midfielders played through passes into the wing-backs who had found space out wide. This allowed the wing-backs to receive the ball close to the byline. -In the final phase of the attack, Roma committed several players into the box and usually delivered the cross towards the player arriving or staying free at the back.
1
4
1,797
TARGETING DISRUPTED SIDE -Whenever Newcastle struggled to play out from their own half, or recognised that Liverpool’s defensive structure had become disconnected, they looked to play long balls towards the right side. The main reason was, of course, to use Elanga’s speed on that wing. -This content shows four different moments. The first one is about Liverpool’s left-back allowing two Newcastle players to make forward runs, even though both of them were already positioned ahead of Liverpool’s defensive line. -The second situation, which Newcastle tried several times, was the long pass from the right centre-back towards the forwards, but directed into the right-side channel. The space appeared because Liverpool’s left-back had matched up with Elanga high up in Newcastle’s half, leaving the area behind him exposed. -The third moment shows Elanga moving inside and creating space for the right-back. The fourth moment again shows Elanga dropping deeper, with the right centre-back this time playing a grounded pass into him. From there, Elanga was able to face the defender 1v1, use the central space, and carry the ball into Liverpool’s half.
7
1,345
BUILD-UP BALANCE -When Bayern Munich build from the first zone, they bring both centre midfielders towards the same side while keeping the centre-backs in central positions. This allows them to support the wide-side build-up without weakening their central defensive security in case possession is lost. -In many situations, Kane drops towards the front of his own half and becomes one of the key players in the build-up. Another important idea is to free the full-backs and use the wingers as the main connection points for progression. -When Bayern have possession in the second zone, they look to play directly into the wingers. The aim is for the winger to carry the ball from the wide area into the central spaces. From there, he can either continue driving forward or play to a teammate who is under weaker marking.
4
27
2,057
EXTRA LAYER ADVANTAGE -Both Marseille and Strasbourg used 4-2-4 in the second zone. However, Marseille gained the advantage because they used their structure with four layers, while Strasbourg defended with only three layers. -Marseille created the extra layer through the movement of the right winger into the centre and one of the centre midfielders moving into the opposition half. This opened space for the two Marseille players positioned in the additional layer. -When Marseille entered the opponent’s penalty area, they continued to use this advantage. These two players and the striker formed a triangle inside the box. If the player in possession had delivered the cross, one of the three players could have attacked the ball and finished the action, but Marseille were unable to execute this final part.
1
12
1,092
CUT BACK: 4-1-2-1-2 against 4-5-1
2
32
2,914
ROLE PROFILE: Inner Channel Winger *In Possession — Attack The Inner Channel Winger does not behave like a traditional winger who constantly stays on the touchline in settled possession. His main threat comes from positioning himself in the inner channel between the opposition full-back and centre-back, forcing the defensive line into difficult decisions. He does not completely abandon the width, but his biggest impact appears when the threat can be created from the inside channel rather than from the touchline. If the opposition full-back follows him, the outside lane can open for the full-back. If the centre-back steps towards him, space may appear centrally or at the far post for another run. In this role, the objective is not only to play 1v1, but to disrupt the internal balance of the defensive line and prepare more dangerous entries into the penalty area. *In Possession — Defence When the team is under pressure in its own half or in the second zone , the Inner Channel Winger’s role is not only to stay wide and wait for a long ball. Instead of staying fixed to the touchline, he can move into the inner channel at certain moments and create short connections with the full-back, the number 8, or the number 10. This movement forces the opposition full-back to decide whether to follow him or hold his position. If the opposition full-back follows him, space can open on the outside. If he does not follow, the winger becomes a passing option inside, with the possibility to receive and turn. For this reason, under pressure, this role becomes a flexible connection point that allows the team to escape not only through the wide area, but also through the inner channel. *In another piece of content, I will explain what the inner channel winger does when the opponent in possession.
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945
CONTROLLING BOTH DIRECTIONS -Atletico Madrid vs Malaga -When Malaga tried to attack through the centre, one of Atletico’s centre midfielders stepped forward to apply pressure and continued pressing until the ball was forced backwards. -Once the ball reached the goalkeeper, Atletico’s back five spread across the pitch in a balanced structure, preparing for the long ball. The central players matched up man-to-man, while the two Atletico players in the first line did not press the goalkeeper directly; instead, they blocked the centre-backs. -When one Atletico player moved towards the goalkeeper, he pressed with a curved run to block the pass into the centre-back next to him. This forced the goalkeeper to play long. -When the ball goes to Atletico’s goalkeeper, their back-five structure gave them two wide players positioned on the outside. This allowed them to start the build-up from either side. Once the ball reached these wide players, Atletico could transition into attack without first having to play back through the centre.
1
11
879
2 SETTLED ATTACK IDEAS: 3-1-4-2 against 4-3-1-2
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829