Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso) header
Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso) profile picture

Shipping, Energy, Investor,Family, Skiing, Biking, Hiking, Triathlon, Gaming, LNG &Future fuels at Wärtsilä. Tweets and retweets are views of my own.

Vaasa, Suomi
Joined February 2015
Photo by Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso)Photo by Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso)Photo by Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso)Photo by Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso)Photo by Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso)Photo by Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso)Photo by Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso)Photo by Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso)Photo by Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso)Photo by Mathias Jansson (@mrjansso)
We at Wärtsilä are very exited to start this collaboration with Hycamite TCD Technologies. Could this be the quickest and easiest way to guarantee hydrogen availability onboard vessels? It might be! #LNG #Hydrogen lnkd.in/d6u94PQc
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Global oil decline rates are surging... They've doubled over the last two decades. The world needs to add ~6 million barrels per day just to maintain current production levels... That's ~50% of total US oil production. We were barely investing in oil before the war... Now it's gotten even worse. Lower CapEx now = lower future oil production = higher future oil prices. And because we're depleting our inventories now... There won't be a buffer to keep oil prices down. Brace for higher oil prices in the coming years.
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Mathias Jansson retweeted
Another milestone for ammonia as a marine fuel. Mineral Europa successfully recently bunkered approximately 500 MT of green ammonia at Port Hedland, marking Australia’s first green ammonia bunkering of an ammonia-powered dry bulk vessel.
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En oo nähnyt yhtään 🐎 pienempää moottoria täällä Wärtsilän 🏭 Nää on ihan valtavia. Vaikka tää 46TS, jolla oli se oma drinksukin 🍹 eilen. Get your motor running…🎶
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Kyllä liehuu Wärren lippu komeasti. Se on nää rannikkokaupungit 💨 STH, here I come.
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Wärtsilä has successfully completed the conversion of one engine on three #LNGcarriers operated by Chevron Transport Corporation from dual-fuel (DF) to spark gas (SG) operation. Read more: wartsila.com/media/news/03-1…
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Laitetaan vielä yks 🚢video ennen talousjohtajan lukukalvoja. Se on LNG. Onkohan WISAn vanerit sisällä? 🤓 #WärtsiläCMD2026
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Nyt on tiukkaa shottia tarjolla 🍹🍹 Otin ton 31DF ja heti alkoi päässä soimaan Get your motor running…🎶 #WärtsiläCMD2026 ja Born to be wild.
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Mathias Jansson retweeted
Tervetuloa Wärtsilän pääomamarkkinapäivään!
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Jos Pohjoismaat olisivat yrityksiä, niin mihin sijoittaisit?
🤖 Made with AI
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Nyt kun YLE näyttää uudestaan ja uudestaan Sofia Virran ja Ville Rydmanin eilistä yhteenottoa, ikäänkuin silminnäkijänä, tuli mieleen sellainenkin journalistinen idea, että ehtiskö kukaan toimituksessa tarkastaa mitä he oikein sanoivat ja puhuivatko totta?
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Kaikkea sitä.
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Mathias Jansson retweeted
Australia fuel prices hit record high (if you can find any)
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QATARENERGY CEO TELLS REUTERS: TWO OUT OF 14 OF OUR LNG TRAINS AND ONE OUT OF TWO OF OUR GAS-TO-LIQUIDS (GTL) FACILITY WERE DAMAGED IN THE ATTACKS WE WILL BE LOSING 12.8 MILLION TONS PER YEAR OF LNG FOR THREE TO FIVE YEARS, AROUND 17% OF QATAR’S EXPORT LNG WE MAY HAVE TO DECLARE FORCE MAJEURE ON LONG-TERM CONTRACTS FOR UP TO FIVE YEARS FOR LNG SUPPLIES TO ITALY, BELGIUM, KOREA AND CHINA
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Entering a more dangerous phase of the war as Iran begins to directly target energy infrastructure Hormuz stoppage is like a kinked garden hose—you can unkink it and flow will resume Hitting infra is like taking a shotgun & blowing off the faucet to which that hose is attached
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Jään sanattomaksi. Kerrankin.
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Jeff Currie from Goldman Sachs is probably the best person I know regarding commodities. His take on oil prices:
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Hegseth says the Navy is performing better than expected. He says the Navy had a comprehensive plan for the Strait of Hormuz. He says we have the best warships in the world. He says we have enough munitions. All of that can be true. And yet the Strait is still closed. The real problem isn’t capability. It’s capacity. The U.S. Navy has 74 destroyers. Roughly a third are in maintenance and another third are between deployments. That leaves about 24 ready ships for the entire planet. Those ships aren’t sitting idle waiting for Hormuz. They defend carrier strike groups, support amphibious forces, and cover global commitments. The Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group in the Caribbean ideally should have several destroyers. It reportedly has one. Another amphibious group in Okinawa likely has only one as well. Carrier groups consume even more. Traditionally you’d assign three destroyers and a cruiser to protect each carrier. But the cruisers are being scrapped, so destroyers now fill that role too. The Ford reportedly has 4 DDGs. The Lincoln has 3. The George Washington in Japan likely has at least 3. Now we’re down to roughly a dozen destroyers left for everything else the US Navy does worldwide. And that’s before anything goes wrong. The fleet structure makes things worse. We eliminated most of our smaller frigates & we’re scrapping the cruisers. So destroyers are forced to do everything from missions too small for them to missions too big. Then there’s physics. Warships can’t teleport. A destroyer’s top speed is under half the average highway speed. Moving them across oceans can take weeks. Each destroyer carries about 96 vertical-launch missiles. But they aren’t all air defense. Roughly 1/3rd are Tomahawks, a third anti-submarine, & 1/3 anti-air. That leaves about 32 air-defense missiles per ship. When those run out, the ship has to sail to port to reload. The Navy eliminated most at-sea missile reload capability, so the round trip.. transit, reload, & return.. can take weeks. During the Red Sea operation typically 3 weeks. In practical terms, a destroyer escorting convoys may spend most of a month cycling through reloads. So your “12 destroyers” quickly becomes something closer to three on station at any given time. 3 ships. Roughly 96 air-defense missiles total. If Iran can launch 97 per week, missiles or drones, they overwhelm the defense. Yes, destroyers also have backup systems like their guns & CIWS. But those are last-ditch defenses. CIWS literally means Close-In Weapon System. Close is the key word. To use it effectively, the destroyer has to stay very close to the merchant ships it’s defending. That shrinks the defensive umbrella and forces convoys to be smaller. Small convoys don’t move much oil. The Strait of Hormuz is about 100 nautical miles long. A destroyer could sprint through it in roughly three hours but convoys move at the speed of the slowest ship. Supertankers average about 12 knots. 100 nautical miles at 12 knots is about eight hours. Then the escorts have to turn around and bring empty tankers back out. Even in optimistic scenarios, say one destroyer protecting four supertankers carrying two million barrels each, you’re moving roughly eight million barrels per convoy cycle. And that assumes no mines, no drones, no delays, no damaged ships, no orders from cautious admirals. With two destroyers taking serious risk while one reloads CWIS & fuel at sea… & everything going perfectly, you might move most of the oil. But my napkin math has more assumptions than a block of dollar store Swiss cheese. Option 2 Pull the carriers, send the airwings to Dubai airport & free up 7 destroyers for convoy duty. But carriers without air or DDG would have to go far from shore around Africa to get home. American supercarriers sailing home empty cover wouldn’t exactly project strength. P.S. that’s why we 💯 need Battleships. Large guns = wider umbrella and lots more ammo/fuel storage.
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Kuten täällä jo kerroin, olen vahvasti TACO-leirissä. Eli lähden olettamasta, että Trump haluaa taputella tämänkin konfliktin mahdollisimman nopeasti pois päiväjärjestyksestä. Tähän uskon yhä. Mutta nyt on pakko huomioida tosiasiat: miten ihmeessä tämä konflikti saadaan pikaiseen päätökseen? Ei jenkit voi tuosta noin vaan lähteä alueelta ja jättää liittolaisiaan yksin taistelemaan Irania vastaan. Ja kuka uskoo, että Hormuzinsalmi avataan (kaikille) jos jenkit perääntyy? Iranissa vallanvaihto on epätodennäköinen koska IRGC ei varmasti länsimielisen hallinnon puolelle asetu. Tuloksena olisi siten lähes varma sisällissota Iranin armeijan ja IRGC:n välillä. Eli käytännössä konflikti lähinnä muuttaisi muotoaan, eikä ole mitään takeita, että salmi saadaan avattua. Tai että hyökkäykset naapurimaita kohtaan lakkaisivat, nekin ovat lähinnä IRGC:n tekosia. Näkemykseni tällä hetkellä on se, että Trump on pahemman kerran sohaissut ampiaispesää ja todennäköisesti katuu jo päätöstään hyökätä. Pahimmillaan tämä voi osoittautua poliittiseksi itsemurhaksi, bensan hintojen noustessa pilviin. Demarit saavat selvää hyökkäyspintaa välivaaleihin ja vedonlyöjät ennustavatkin nyt jo vaalivoittoa oppositiolle. Tosiasia on kuitenkin se, että jenkit eivät todellakaan ole suurin kärsijä tässä konfliktissa. Yhdysvallat on lähestulkoon toisella puolella maapalloa Iranista katsottuna, mikä tarkoittaa käytännössä, että myös raaka-aineet tulevat sinne lähempää ja Hormuzin salmen liikenne palvelee lähinnä Eurooppaa ja Aasiaa. Puhumattakaan siitä, että Yhdysvallat on maailman suurin öljyntuottajamaa. Jos joku kuvittelee, että Yhdysvallat ovat lirissä, niin suosittelen vilkaisemaan taalan vaihtokurssia. Venäjä ja Putin taitavat kuitenkin olla suurimmat voittajat tässä konfliktissa, mikä mielestäni nostaa todennäköisyyttä, että Iranistakin kehittyy sijaissota, joka pitkittyy. Venäjä ei tässä hetkessä uskalla näkyvästi osallistua, mutta jos konflikti kääntyisi sisällissodaksi, niin veikkaan että tilanne olisi toinen. Venäjä todennäköisesti tukisi IRGC:tä hyvinkin vahvasti. Eli jos yksi twiitti voi lähettää markkinat nousuun, niin mitä siinä lukisi? Viime vuonna kauppasodan aikana ennustin, että yksi Trumpi twiitti voisi nostaa markkinoita 12% ja osuin siinä hämmentävän lähelle. Juuri nyt en tuollaista osaa nähdä ollenkaan. Hormuzinsalmea ei nyt yhdellä twiitillä avata. Jos minä olisin Trumpin saappaissa, niin pyrkisin tekemään rauhan Khamenein kanssa, lähestulkoon hinnalla millä hyvänsä. Mojtaba kuitenkin menetti pommituksessa isänsä, äitinsä (kiistetty), vaimonsa ja yhden pojistaan, joten rauha ei välttämättä ole ensimmäisenä mielessä. Pyytäisin myös anteeksi tyttökoulun pommittamista. Mutta on varmasti paljon syitä miksi en ole poliittinen johtaja, olen ainakin aivan liian pehmo sellaiseksi. #pekka
Replying to @vontuchman
Yks Trumpin tviitti ja shortit kärähtää... just saying
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Iran is not on a suicide mission. It is on autopilot. And nobody in Tehran can reach the controls. In 2003, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari watched the United States decapitate Saddam Hussein’s centralised command structure in three weeks. He spent the next four years at the IRGC Strategic Studies Centre designing a military architecture that could never be decapitated. In September 2007, he was appointed IRGC Commander and immediately restructured Iran’s entire military into 31 autonomous provincial commands, one per province, each with independent headquarters, command and control, missile and drone arsenals, fast-attack boat flotillas, integrated Basij militias, pre-delegated launch authority, stockpiled munitions, and sealed contingency orders. The doctrine was built for one scenario: the death of the Supreme Leader. That scenario arrived on 28 February 2026. The doctrine activated within hours. It has been running ever since. The question nobody has asked is whether anyone inside the Islamic Republic can turn it off. No. The reason is constitutional. Article 110 of Iran’s 1979 Constitution vests sole command authority over all armed forces exclusively in the Supreme Leader. He alone is commander-in-chief. He alone appoints and dismisses military leadership. No other institution, not the President, not the Parliament, not the Guardian Council, not the judiciary, possesses constitutional power to issue military orders or rescind the Supreme Leader’s directives. Ali Khamenei issued the pre-delegation orders. Ali Khamenei is dead. Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed successor on 8th March. He has not spoken. He has not appeared. He has issued no verifiable order. He was wounded in an airstrike and has never addressed his nation in his life. The sole constitutional authority that could override 31 autonomous commands exists in an office occupied by a man who may not be capable of exercising it. Ghalibaf can reject ceasefires. He cannot order the IRGC to stop. Pezeshkian can issue statements. He cannot countermand a provincial commander in Bushehr launching anti-ship missiles at a tanker. The Guardian Council can vet legislation. It cannot revoke firing authority issued by a dead commander-in-chief whose orders remain legally binding until a living one explicitly rescinds them. No living one has. The 31 commands are not disobeying. They are obeying. The last orders said: fight independently, with whatever you have, for as long as it takes, without waiting for instructions that may never come. Those orders were designed to survive the death of the man who issued them. That was the entire purpose of Jafari’s twenty-year project. For insurers: no counterparty can guarantee cessation across 31 independent actors. For diplomats: no signatory can bind commands they do not control. For military planners: no single headquarters whose destruction ends the campaign. For Gulf states: each faces localised harassment from the adjacent Iranian province’s fast-attack boats, drones, and coastal missiles without any central coordination to intercept or negotiate with. For markets: seven P&I clubs modelled the probability that all 31 commands would simultaneously honour any agreement and concluded near zero. That calculation has not changed because the constitutional mechanism that could compel compliance does not functionally exist. The doctrine was not designed to win. It was designed to make losing impossible. Jafari studied how centralised armies die. He built one that cannot. The machine runs without a pilot. The pilot is dead. And the constitution says only the pilot could have turned it off. Full analysis in the link. open.substack.com/pub/shanak…
BREAKING: Iran’s Parliament Speaker just killed the ceasefire. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, March 10: “We are certainly not seeking a ceasefire. We believe the aggressor must be struck in the mouth. We will break this cycle of war, negotiation, ceasefire, war.” This arrives the same day the Wall Street Journal reports Trump’s advisers privately urging an exit. Oil crashed from $119.50 to below $91. The market exhaled. Iran’s second most powerful elected official just told the world the exhale was premature. Here is what every actor is actually doing while the ceasefire dies. The IRGC launched Wave 33 this morning. One-ton warheads on Kheibar Shekan missiles targeting Tel Aviv and the Fifth Fleet. Codenamed “Labbayk ya Khamenei” for a Supreme Leader who has not spoken and may not be conscious. General Mousavi announced no warhead below one ton from this point forward. Thirty-one autonomous provincial commands continue firing without central orders. The doctrine does not need a ceasefire because it was built to function without one. Seven P&I clubs, Gard, Skuld, NorthStandard, Steamship Mutual, American Club, Swedish Club, London P&I, covering 90% of global tonnage, cancelled war-risk cover on 5 March under Solvency II. Zero have reinstated. Hormuz crossings collapsed from 138 daily vessels to approximately 2. Premiums surged from 0.05% to 1-3% of hull value. The DFC’s $20 billion backstop has produced zero confirmed large-scale VLCC transits. Force majeures have cascaded from QatarEnergy to Saudi Aramco to Kuwait Petroleum to Bapco to Aluminium Bahrain to Yeochun NCC Korea to Formosa Taiwan to PCS Singapore to SCC Rayong Thailand. The naphtha-to-polyethylene chain feeding Asian manufacturing is broken. Ghalibaf’s rejection ensures it stays broken. China is not intervening. It is collecting. MizarVision publishes AI-labelled satellite imagery of every US asset in theatre. Shadow fleet vessels deliver drone components at night. The PLA is learning American reaction times, electronic warfare effectiveness, and interceptor depletion economics in the most comprehensive live-fire intelligence collection it has ever observed. Beijing does not need the war to end. It needs the war to teach. Russia is harvesting. Urals at yearly highs. Power of Siberia delivering 38.8 billion cubic metres to China. Putin evaluating a preemptive halt of European energy to redirect at Hormuz-inflated prices. The war finances Ukraine without Moscow firing a shot. The Houthis have resumed selective Red Sea strikes. If Bab al-Mandab activates alongside Hormuz, both chokepoints bracketing the Arabian Peninsula close simultaneously. Ghalibaf’s rejection extends the timeline in which that can happen. Twelve days. One Supreme Leader dead. One invisible. Thirty-three waves. Seven clubs withdrawn. 138 daily transits reduced to 2. Five navies deployed. Zero commercial transits restored. Zero insurance reinstated. Zero ceasefires. Zero negotiations. The war has no political exit because Ghalibaf closed it. No commercial exit because the actuaries closed it five days earlier. No military exit because the doctrine was designed to outlast every strategy conceived by the adversaries it was built to fight. The market priced a quick war. The doctrine priced a long one. Ghalibaf just told you which. Full analysis in the link. open.substack.com/pub/shanak…
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