Nick Hutton retweeted
Russian national Igor D’iu charged with illegally entering US in the summer to spy on Palantir employees on behalf of Russia, due to Palantir's assistance to Ukraine in war. D'iu stalked workers to their homes, followed them in cars, took photos of their laptop screens in cafes
There is a sort of tyranny of low ambition infecting these people. "No need to have a semi industry, just buy from elsewhere". "No need to have our own software firms, we'll get the benefit from buying in". "Forget foundational tech, just get good at using things made by others". The British elite have a strange relationship with technology, which by the way has saved their necks now several times in the last 300 years alone. This guy probably thinks having successful resellers (which we do) is a substitute to successful platforms, software, hardware.
Nope, No, just NOO!! If anyone from the UK Gov (hi my fellow tea drinkers) is watching this or happens to be reading the comments... this is ABSOLUTELY THE WRONG TAKE.
We need skin in the game. This isn't like spinning up some cloud infrastructure and claiming we are "ready for cloud", this takes years of planning, infrastructure expansion and knowledge/skills.
From just a infosec perspective we should be all over this. Claiming we have agreements with partners for access just won't cut it.
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A slightly more composed take. Hard power enables soft power. The AISI is by no means hard power, even within the confines of this specific narrow discussion and frame.
This gives me sweaty palms.
Yes, if you have something that the US is dependent on, and which you can use as leverage to ensure continued access in outlier scenarios, then fine. A government department that does safety assessments is not that. AISI is fantastic, and do great work, but it is not the same as controlling some part of the supply chain needed to make frontier models work.
The UK absolutely needs to either control some part of that supply chain, or have capacity to build, if not frontier models, models that can keep the economy, military etc ticking over in a scenario where access to American models is limited or cut off.
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As I was saying. teapaw.org/tomough/status/2123487…
> we don't need steel
> we don't need heavy industry
> we don't need a navy
> we don't need nuclear power
> we don't need north sea oil
> we don't need entrepreneurs
> we don't need babies
> we don't need housing
> we don't need infrastructure
> we don't need orbital launch
> we don't need overseas territories
> we don't need borders
> we don't need data centres
> we don't need frontier ai
> we'll still have a seat at the table though
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👀
We seeded 2m canaries into popular AI services and tracked where they were stolen and abused.
This identified:
- Three compromised providers
- Resellers stealing prompts via built-in logging
- Providers ignoring ZDR & privacy flags
dragos.com/blog/ai-supply-ch…
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Nick Hutton retweeted
Scaling Security: The 7 Pillars of Elite Cybersecurity teams is a management “operating system” for established CISOs, rising executives, CIOs, CEOs and Board members.
philvenables.com/post/scalin…
Nick Hutton retweeted
Way back in 2000, Marcus Ranum gave an unpopular talk in which he said “the Huns never knew how to build a Rome, they only knew how to sack one”.
He was warning against taking script-kiddys advice, but the same holds for listening to the AI vendors.
Orgs that cram their web sites full of 3rd party trackers got what they deserve. If your site is serving code, you take responsibility for it. Most of these guys failed to take even basic steps to protect their end customers.
This is a big one.
We found malicious JavaScript being served through Optimizely to some of the world's largest websites.
178 organisations affected, with everything from crypto theft and card skimming to iOS exploits.
Zoom, BBC, CNN, HSBC, Salesforce, GitLab, KLM, IKEA, Equifax, Ledger. The list goes on... Full list in the post.
blog.report-uri.com/worlds-l…
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You wouldn't dream of deploying unreviewed, unmonitored code to your production servers, yet we routinely allow third parties to do exactly that in our visitors' browsers.
The Optimizely incident was a near miss, and far too close for comfort. We need to do better.
scotthelme.co.uk/reflecting-…
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